

PASSPORT



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In this issue of *Passport*

Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s
Environmental Diplomacy
India's Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War

...and more!

Passport

THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW



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
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A Roundtable on Michael Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*

Jason Colby, Dustin Walcher, Vanessa Walker, David Farber, Steven L.B. Jensen, and
Michael Franczak

Introduction to Franczak Roundtable

Jason Colby

In recent years, there has been no shortage of scholarly interest in the 1970s. Of the many superb studies that have appeared, I shall highlight but a few of my favorites: Jeremi Suri's *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* gives us a fresh account of Henry Kissinger, the decade's central diplomatic figure; Jefferson Cowie's *Stayin' Alive* explores how the decade's economic and political shifts impacted working peoples in the United States; Tim Borstelmann's *The 1970s* traces the parallel rise of personal liberties and neoliberal economics; and Sarah Snyder's *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War* reframes how we understand the international role of human rights in the late-twentieth century.¹ Yet as Michael Franczak shows us in *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, we still have much to learn—particularly from history that didn't happen.

Franczak takes as his point of departure the New International Economic Order (NIEO)—a proposal introduced in May 1974 at the United Nations by the Group of 77 developing nations to radically restructure global economic power. Although the plan was never implemented, the challenge it posed to the Bretton Woods system, particularly due to OPEC's rhetorical support, forced a response from the United States and its European allies, which dominated the world's diplomatic agenda for years to come. In exploring that response, Franczak casts new light on familiar issues of the 1970s, such as the oil and food crises, the contested definition of human rights, and the emergence of neoconservatism and neoliberalism as political and economic frameworks, respectively. Using this approach, Franczak convincingly decenters the Cold War in order to excavate the roots of post-Cold War international relations. But he also implicitly opens broader questions, such as How do we deal with unsuccessful initiatives in international relations? As historians, we routinely emphasize context and contingency, but we generally shy away from counterfactual speculation. This is hardly surprising, as our interpretations are expected to rest upon primary evidence, which is unavailable when events *didn't* happen. Yet our certainty as historical narrators often elides the uncertainty with which our subjects experience their times. Put simply, historical actors, unlike historians, don't know how things will turn out, and they often give

a tremendous amount of thought and attention to matters that scholars later ignore—to their detriment. In this book, Franczak reminds us of this pitfall. The NIEO may never have been adopted as a framework for transforming the global economy, but it profoundly influenced discussions and debates that still loom large in international relations. Indeed, he makes a strong case that we cannot understand the developments of the decade without it.

As such, it is hardly surprising that the four reviewers find much to admire in *Global Inequality*. They praise its original perspective on the international questions of the 1970s, and they particularly credit Franczak with highlighting the influence of the Global South's challenge on the priorities and policies of the United States and its allies. Yet they also identify questions they wish Franczak had addressed. David Farber asks "why did the G-77 nations fail to leverage their power, allowing the NIEO challenge to be beaten back so easily?" (8). Stephen L. B. Jensen wonders whether greater attention to the 1960s might have highlighted larger continuities. Dustin Walcher acknowledges that "the fact that the NIEO ultimately failed suggests that U.S. resistance may have been at least partially responsible," but he notes that Franczak is largely silent on the overall efficacy of U.S. policy" (6)—highlighting the need for more research into the diplomacy of the Global South itself. For her part, Vanessa Walker praises Franczak's contribution to our understanding of US relations with both European allies and the G-77 nations in the 1970s, but wonders why Franczak does not draw upon the rich vein of recent scholarship on the role of Congress in shaping US policy, observing that "the lack of engagement with this literature leaves this book's inquiries isolated from a larger conversation about human rights politics, the late Cold War, and the importance of development in U.S. strategic thinking." (6)

Franczak is both reflective and engaging in his response. After acknowledging some of the book's blindspots, he adds to its interpretive framework by connecting it to his current area of international environmental governance, putting *Global Inequality* into a richer perspective. He also includes a thoughtful intellectual autobiography, recalling his early inquiries about why historians had ignored the NIEO. One senior scholar informed him that the NIEO was "interesting as a postcolonial document, perhaps, but never taken seriously by the great powers, resolutely opposed by the US, and thus dead-on-arrival in 1974." But then came Franczak's research. "When I went digging in FRUS for the

Nixon/Ford and Carter years (and later in those presidential libraries),” he notes, “I found something quite different. The NIEO was *everywhere* in US foreign policymaking in that decade, not just in international economic and UN policy discussions in the State Department but also Agriculture, Treasury, and the White House.” Herein lay a lesson for young scholars, within and beyond SHAFR: don’t let the assumptions of established historians discourage you from asking original questions. True, those questions can result in dead ends. But they can also lead you to primary sources that upend accepted narratives and produce new insights on historical developments we thought we understood.

Note:

1. Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Jefferson Cowie, *Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class* (New York: The New Press, 2010); Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Equality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021); Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Review of Michael Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*

Dustin Walcher

Change was a long time coming. There were demands for it at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, the United States had led the resurrection of a liberal international order that enabled wealthy Western powers to reassert their control over the global economic order, even as their grip on colonial possessions slipped away. Great power control over new supranational economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank served to limit the degree of change in the distribution of power across national borders.

Less economically developed states across the Global South, both long-established and newly independent, bristled at those dynamics. The challenge came in developing a collective response capable of both effecting the redistribution of power within the international system and facilitating economic growth across the Global South.

The United Nations General Assembly provided a forum for such a project, in large part because each member state enjoyed equal voting rights within the body. The large bloc of states from the Global South—the G-77, established in 1964—could set the agenda and frame the terms of debate. Although General Assembly votes lacked the binding power of, for example, a Security Council resolution, for the traditional powers the use of the supranational body as a platform from which to call for substantial revisions to the world order was jarring.

The New International Economic Order (NIEO) was the product of those political forces. Perhaps because it ultimately failed, the NIEO has not received the attention it warrants from foreign relations scholars. Yet the issues at stake—food security, unstable commodity prices, the terms of trade, development assistance, energy access, and sovereign debt—were central to the international politics of the 1970s and early 1980s. The Global South’s demands compelled reactions from successive U.S. administrations—principally from Gerald Ford to Ronald Reagan. Those reactions are the subject of Michael Franczak’s well-written and well-conceived book analyzing the evolution of U.S. policy toward the NIEO and the country’s participation in the North-South dialogue.

Franczak asks two important questions. The first drives the bulk of the book’s narrative: “How did successive US

administrations respond to the South’s challenge, both inside and outside the various economic forums in which the NIEO was debated?” (2). The answer is complicated, and though Washington consistently resisted major concessions designed to address systemic inequality, albeit with varying levels of ferocity, the U.S. position evolved. Moreover, U.S. officials were often internally divided over the necessity or desirability of engaging with the NIEO.

Those internal divisions were especially prominent in the Ford administration. On the one hand, the economic team preached the gospel of market fundamentalism and effectively laid the groundwork for the later neoliberal turn. On the other hand, Henry Kissinger remained most interested in power politics, and, somewhat remarkably, appears as something of a moderate when engaging the NIEO. He was uninterested in making significant concessions, but, as Franczak points out, he understood “that the United States would gain nothing by countering the NIEO with a vision of the market that was unpopular even in developed countries” (55). He also saw opportunities to divide the G-77 by driving a wedge between OPEC states—which benefited from high oil prices—and their oil-importing allies, for whom high energy prices exacerbated economic challenges, including food insecurity.

The basic problem of food availability, which took center stage at the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome, offers an important early example of the Ford administration’s internal divisions. The free market champions, led in this case by Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz, opposed any food aid. Butz held that market incentives were sufficient to manage the global distribution of food.

Kissinger correctly understood that such a message had little chance of resonating in countries with significant numbers of impoverished and hungry people. Frustrated with the zealotry of the message of market orthodoxy, Kissinger declared, “I want to avoid the Protestant missionary approach. I don’t want to preach” (31). Instead, he wanted to maximize political advantage, in this case by driving a wedge between OPEC members and oil importers by highlighting the food issue. He was, in other words, willing to employ economic policy levers in the service of political objectives, whereas for Butz, spreading orthodox market structures constituted a critical foreign policy objective in itself. In that sense, Butz previewed the neoliberal turn.

The Ford administration also challenged the G-77 on its home turf: the United Nations. Neoconservative Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who had a short and rocky tenure as U.S. ambassador to the UN, was tapped for the assignment precisely because he was already a vocal critic of countries in the Global South, and Ford and Kissinger agreed that the Third World offensive at the UN was important and demanded a firm response. The fact that Moynihan was also a Kissinger critic was something that could be overlooked, provided that he proved effective at standing up to challenges to U.S. authority at the UN.

Moynihan more than lived up to his reputation, adopting an even more combative posture than Ford and Kissinger authorized—especially on the question of Zionism. That independent streak ensured that he would not last a year in the job. However, as interesting as the palace intrigue between Moynihan and Kissinger was, the more important point for our purposes is that the administration interpreted the G-77 as posing enough of a threat to U.S. interests that it sought out a combative UN ambassador to answer that challenge.

If Kissinger engaged to a greater degree than might have been expected with the NIEO’s concerns—albeit not out of any particular sympathy for them—Jimmy Carter ultimately adopted a more pragmatic stance—despite his compassion for the plight of poorer countries. To be sure, Carter’s background with the Trilateral Commission and

desire to manage an interdependent world were hallmarks of his administration. Additionally, Carter deployed allies with a record of concern about human rights, and the Global South more generally, most notably Father Theodore Hesburgh. However, while Carter was genuinely sympathetic, he insisted on retaining control over the levers supranational institutions used to distribute assistance. The maintenance of U.S. control was ultimately nonnegotiable.

In that critical respect, the United States remained in firm opposition to one of the NIEO's most basic objectives: to redistribute power within the international order. Moreover, despite its rhetoric, the Carter administration lacked a sense of urgency about its stated priority of eliminating global poverty. All in all, Franczak argues, the Carter approach "affirmed the South's status as beggars and recipients of charity rather than as genuine partners in a common project, as Vance and Carter once insisted" (172). The contrast with Kissinger is intriguing. "The irony," Franczak writes, "is that Kissinger may have been less sincere about his concern for the South's plight, yet he was much more willing to meet the South on its own terms in the dialogue. This mattered" (173).

The Reagan administration was neither sympathetic toward the plight of the South nor willing to meet the South on its own terms. As one Reagan Treasury official put it, "[u]ltimately the South wants our money. It's a scam" (182). Together with the Margaret Thatcher government, the Reagan administration hammered nails into the coffin of the North-South dialogue—a coffin that was firmly closed at the Cancún conference in 1981. The onset of the Mexican debt crisis a year later, and the contagion generated across Latin America, provided the opportunity for the Reagan administration to display its callousness toward poorer countries. To provide debt relief, the administration argued, would be to encourage moral hazard (189). Debtor countries should instead adopt austerity measures and throw themselves on the mercy of the market. Nixon and Ford's economic team would be proud.

Franczak's second question is this: "What was the North-South dialogue's legacy for U.S. foreign policy as it moved out of the crisis-ridden 1970s and toward a new era of neoliberalism, reform, intensive globalization, and eventually post-Cold War triumphalism?" (2). It leads him to somewhat opaque conclusions. "Between 1974 and 1982," he writes, "the North-South dialogue transformed U.S. foreign policy, but U.S. foreign policy did not transform the North-South dialogue [emphasis in original]" (187). The NIEO's failure ushered in the era of the Washington Consensus. "By the time the debt crisis hit, the consensus on markets, the state, and development in the United States, the IMF, and the World Bank had moved decisively in favor of the NIEO's greatest critics: the neoliberals and neoconservatives who began the 1970s on the fringes of the foreign policy establishment and came to dominate it in the 1980s and beyond" (190). At least until the 2008 global financial crisis, bipartisan U.S. administrations continued the neoliberal approach that triumphed under Reagan.

Though Franczak concentrates on U.S. foreign policy and consequently explores the dynamics of what is broadly understood as North-South diplomacy, the story he tells points toward other avenues for fruitful research, particularly in the area of South-South diplomacy. The story of countries across the Global South coming together around the NIEO's agenda and the negotiations that process entailed has yet to be thoroughly told. The divergent interests and material conditions within the G-77—a topic Franczak alludes to at critical points—is fascinating and significant in its own right.

The window Franczak opens on inequality, U.S. responses to the NIEO, and the North-South dialogue compels us to revise our macro-narrative of international affairs during the 1970s and 1980s. Cold War-centered

stories of détente, its breakdown, and ultimate Soviet decline remain critical to our overall understanding of the era, but they do not figure prominently in this narrative. Though this is not a book about ideas and policymaking in the Global South, it appropriately treats those dynamics as distinct and important in their own right.

Creating economic growth while rectifying inequality between states was a central strategic objective of the G-77. Though it ultimately failed, the NIEO constituted a frontal challenge to the U.S.-led international order. Consequently, the U.S. response to those dynamics itself comprises a profoundly important subject of analysis. Indeed, the fact that the NIEO ultimately failed suggests that U.S. resistance may have been at least partially responsible, though Franczak is largely silent on the overall efficacy of U.S. policy.

The NIEO comprised a frontal challenge to the underpinnings of the U.S.-led liberal international order. It sought nothing less than a fundamental realignment of resources and power within the international system. Those objectives were, in their own way, as challenging to the United States as anything the country faced in the second half of the twentieth century. Odds were long for success, and more work is needed to thoroughly analyze the dynamics of the NIEO itself. But Franczak clearly demonstrates the extraordinary significance of the issues involved for the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world. Understanding international relations in the 1970s and 1980s demands reckoning with the events, ideas, and issues raised in the North-South dialogue.

Basic Human Needs and American Grand Strategy in the 1970s

Vanessa Walker

In May 1974, a diverse coalition of nations from the Global South and the developing world presented the UN General Assembly with a proposal for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Their proposal sought to challenge Europe's and the United States' control of commodity prices, a symbol of the entrenched power and economic differentials in the existing world order. The NIEO was part of a larger, decade-long effort to rethink the systems that created global inequality, and it had far reaching implications for international relations and U.S. national security.

In *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, Michael Franczak argues that the response of U.S. administrations from Nixon to Reagan to initiatives like the NIEO transformed U.S. international power in the late Cold War. U.S. responses to the developing world's growing assertiveness, he writes, "became an inflection point for some of the greatest economic, political, and moral crises of the 1970s, including the end of golden age liberalism and the return of the market, the splintering of the Democratic Party and the building of the Reagan coalition, and the rise of human rights in US foreign policy in the wake of the Vietnam War" (3). In particular, Third World challenges to the established economic order highlighted a new interdependence within the international system that required new U.S. policy initiatives.

Franczak uses the renegotiation of North-South power dynamics to reconsider the 1970s as a pivotal moment in the evolution of U.S. grand strategy away from Cold War binaries toward more multilateral approaches to the international system. He writes that the "NIEO brought global inequality to the forefront of US national security,

with lasting and visible effects on US politics and power” (3). Focusing predominantly on U.S.-Latin American relations and on international forums like the United Nations and Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), he shows that these new challenges from the Global South not only reshaped U.S. relations with the developing world, but also transformed and consolidated U.S. relations with Europe. “Rather than destroying US-European relations, the Third World’s challenge may have saved them, uniting developed countries around a political and economic consensus intended to sustain the postwar order” (37). This, then, is not a simple story of ascendant new powers, but also of consolidating existing hegemonies and structures of power in the international system.

In the early years of the 1970s, this process of consolidation took the form of new policies to leverage food power and commodity prices to court the NIEO coalition while attempting to split them from the OPEC countries and maintain US and European dominance over economic structures. Franczak notes that “for US foreign policy, OPEC’s advocacy for the NIEO upgraded the world food situation from a nuisance to a crisis. It also upgraded the US dominance in global food production from a burden to a powerful tool, at a time when traditional levers of US power were either ineffective or, as in the case of military intervention, potentially catastrophic” (22). Secretary of State Henry Kissinger responded creatively to the NIEO with a willingness to try new government interventions in international markets, such as a global system of grain reserves. These initiatives, designed to keep the United States at the helm of international economic policies, met with a tepid response from the NIEO coalition, which wanted more far-reaching structural changes.

Yet the real challenge to Kissinger’s approach came from within the United States. “For Kissinger,” Franczak writes, “the state’s economic power was above all a political lever, essential for domestic stability and international bargaining” (60). A growing number of officials within the Ford administration, however, advocated for new neoliberal approaches to these international economic problems. Rejecting Kissinger’s proposed interventions in the global economic system, they instead advocated removing “politics from economics by transferring the enforcement of discipline from individual countries to the IMF” (60).

This challenge to Kissinger’s strategy was most clearly embodied by Earl Butz, secretary of agriculture under both Nixon and Ford. Butz openly promoted removing the U.S. government from the management of the world food economy, a position that brought him into direct conflict with Kissinger, whose proposals for commodity programs were designed to win over the NIEO coalition. Butz was joined by other members of Ford’s premarket, antistate or “market fundamentalist” economic team, including Treasury Secretary William Simon and Alan Greenspan, a member of the president’s Economic Policy Board (15–16). The struggles between the secretary of state and Ford’s economic team embodied shifting currents within the Republican Party itself, which was moving away from Keynesianism and toward the neoliberal championing of market forces that would dominate the coming decade.

Moreover, a growing number of U.S. leaders saw this new North-South struggle as symbolic of a large ideological confrontation “between US liberalism and its anti-liberal Third World detractors” (10–11). Here Franczak challenges scholars to think about debates over détente as more than neoconservative antipathy for the Soviet Union. The

neoconservative critique of détente also arose in the context of a perceived need to defend American liberalism from attacks by socialists abroad and the new internationalist agenda within the Democratic Party. Franczak points to Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s tenure as ambassador to the UN as the vanguard of this neoconservative rejection of détente, arguing that “Moynihan’s attacks on antiliberalism and anti-Americanism at the UN brought him wide esteem from other right-wing liberals alienated by the Democratic Party’s apparent embrace of egalitarianism, multiculturalism and nonintervention” (83).

Moynihan’s “combative neoconservatism” further catalyzed an ongoing realignment in American domestic politics and “threatened Kissinger’s attempts to articulate an approach to the Third World that was more in line with western Europe’s” (65). While Kissinger prevailed in the face of Moynihan’s attacks in the short term, the secretary of state’s policies never garnered the necessary support within the Ford administration to be transformative. The limits of Kissinger’s ability to implement his vision revealed the growing power of neoconservative forces in shaping U.S. strategic thinking and the vital role that programs like the NIEO played in shaping the neoconservative foreign policy agenda.

Franczak also highlights how questions of North-South inequality shaped the United States’ growing focus on human rights as a central aspect of its foreign policy, giving much-needed attention to the economic foundations of Carter’s human rights agenda. Scholarship on Carter’s human rights policies has focused overwhelmingly on political rights and bodily integrity. Franczak offers a welcome emphasis on the foundations of Carter’s policies in pressing issues of economic equity, multilateralism, and interdependence. “Though remembered today for its censure of Southern Cone dictators,” he writes, “the [Carter] administration intended its human rights policy to act as a positive incentive as well. State Department officials believed that including basic needs in the definition of human rights would encourage regional cooperation on development and moderate the North-South dialogue” (12). Economic rights and basic human needs, while not getting top billing in administration rhetoric, merited sustained attention “because of their relevance for North-South relations,” and the Carter administration, particularly Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, promoted the concept of basic human needs, as well as social and economic rights, as a core element of the administration’s policies (133).

Franczak focuses much of his analysis of Carter’s policies on Latin America, “where human rights, development, and the North-South dialogue intersected more directly than anywhere else in the world” (117). He attributes much of Carter’s foreign policy vision in the region to two organizations—the Trilateral Commission and the Overseas Development Council. “The Trilateral Commission’s idea of an interdependent world divided not between East and West but between North and South was the starting point for Carter’s post-Vietnam foreign policy,” he declares, “while the ODC’s promotion of a model of development based on meeting ‘basic human needs’ became a major part of his administration’s approach to human rights” (12). Together, these organizations married an emphasis on multilateralism and interdependence with a human rights agenda that promoted a wide range of human rights, including economic and social rights.

Yet like Kissinger, Carter found his policies stymied by a combination of foreign dissatisfaction with the limited accommodations proposed and domestic divides that hampered the administration’s efficacy. Indeed,

Franczak also highlights how questions of North-South inequality shaped the United States’ growing focus on human rights as a central aspect of its foreign policy, giving much-needed attention to the economic foundations of Carter’s human rights agenda.

the parallels that Franczak draws between Carter's and Kissinger's attempts to accommodate the NIEO coalition in light of new forces of interdependence are one of the more surprising elements of his book. While key partners like Venezuela and Mexico were willing to work with Carter and applauded both his human rights and economic initiatives, they were also disappointed with the lack of structural change and the limited control ceded to the Global South in the development and governance of these programs.

"Carter's call for increased economic and political cooperation with the Third World proved persuasive enough in 1976," Franczak argues, "but his seeming inability to deal effectively with multiple security crises . . . as well as a stagnant economy impervious to the tools of the old Keynesian playbook—exhausted public support for development before his administration could really get started" (143).

Reagan's election and his appropriation of human rights for Cold War security imperatives ended the Carter administration's incorporation of basic human needs as part of the U.S. human rights agenda. His election also marked the termination of efforts to share power, however limited, with the developing world in international financial institutions.

Franczak's work raises many important questions and challenges scholars to look at the Global South in order to understand shifts in U.S. grand strategy during the 1970s. Yet it has several puzzling omissions. The most important of these is a more thorough examination of the role that Congress and its politics played in these policies and programs. Franczak often stresses the importance of domestic resistance, including congressional resistance, in limiting the more ambitious responses by various administrations to the NIEO. He writes that "in the age of interdependence, US foreign economic policy was stuck between Congress, beholden to corporate and labor lobbies, and capital, beholden to profit" (135), and he frequently points to poor congressional relations as one of the primary reasons Carter was unable to realize a more extensive reorientation of North-South relations. Yet he almost never presents Congress's specific concerns and responses to particular initiatives. Congress played an outsized role in the development and execution of foreign policy in all three 1970s administrations, and a greater attentiveness to congressional politics and perspectives would have strengthened the analysis in *Global Inequality* in crucial ways.

The reach of Franczak's analysis is also limited by a lack of engagement with recent literature on human rights in the 1970s and with new scholarship on the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations. In contextualizing his work, Franczak draws primarily on literature from the early aughts. But in the past fifteen years, there has been enormous scholarly production on these topics, fueled by the new sources declassified from the Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies. The lack of engagement with this literature leaves this book's inquiries isolated from a larger conversation about human rights politics, the late Cold War, and the importance of development in U.S. strategic thinking.

Although Franczak's account leaves the exact nature of this transformation of U.S. politics and power a bit vague, he ultimately makes a compelling case for the need to bring the Global South into our conversations about U.S. grand strategy in the 1970s. Moreover, he raises important questions about the place of the political economy and international development in human rights scholarship from this period. This work makes clear that scholars should pay greater attention to the developing world and its concerns about structural inequality in understanding the 1970s as a watershed moment for America's global influence.

The United States and the New International Economic Order: The Dog That Didn't Bark

David Farber

According to conventional wisdom, Americans were reeling in the 1970s. The nation had lost the Vietnam War. Nixon had resigned to avoid sure impeachment. The OPEC oil embargo and subsequent oil shocks had forced Americans to face their dependence on foreign nations. Stagflation had ravaged paychecks and torn at the very fiber of the American dream. The Iran hostage crisis had shattered Americans' faith in their global power. This litany of despair led many Americans to fear that their nation had lost its way. *New York Times* editorial page editor John Oakes worried that "we as a people seem . . . to be foundering in uncertainty, to be unsure of ourselves in our relationships to each other and the world at large."¹

Such public lamentations were commonplace throughout the era. And in response to the turmoil of the decade, Americans turned on their leaders. In less than seven years, from August 1974 to January 1981, the United States went through four different presidents. A *Time* magazine cover story, "In Quest of Leadership," joked bitterly that if a space alien landed in the United States and demanded that he be taken to our leader, no one would know what to do.²

While not painting over the broad strokes of this dark national portrait, in recent years a number of historians have challenged this picture of the 1970s.³ Thomas Borstelmann, in *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality* (2010), argues that Americans were indeed reeling in the 1970s, but more significantly, the nation also underwent fundamental and long-lasting changes.

First, Borstelmann argues that in the 1970s, Americans broadly accepted "formal equality" for the first time in the nation's history. The brutal racial and gender hierarchies that had previously ruled the American people were no longer legal; rapid change, he insists, ensued. Second, he argues that in the 1970s, Americans—and, indeed, much of the world—increasingly embraced "free-market economics as the preferred means for resolving political and social problems."⁴ These twin engines of change produced a neoliberal era that sanctified individual choices, a merit-based society, and, at the same time, gross economic inequality.⁵

In a related vein, Daniel Sargent, in *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (2015), portrays the era not as a time of American despair and absent national leadership but instead, as his title indicates, as a nervy era of elite-led global strategic transformation. Above all, he argues, American leadership maneuvered "to cede the responsibility for managing the world economic order it has exercised since the 1940s—not to foreign nation-states but to integrating markets."⁶ Sargent insists that it was this rapidly accelerating "interdependence" (as most elites then referred to what we now call globalization), more than domestic crises, that drove historic change in the 1970s and created the strategic limits within which American policy elites operated.

This historiographic turn is both embraced and deepened in Michael Franczak's important new book, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s* (2022). Franczak, like many authors of the new U.S.-oriented histories of the 1970s, focuses readers' attention on the advent and meaning of interdependence or globalization. His work, however, is among the first to assess how interdependence in the 1970s affected U.S. relations not with the most economically developed nations with which it competed, most notably Japan and Germany, but instead

with the Global South nations upon which the United States depended for natural resources and profitable capital investment.

In taking on this broad subject, Franczak makes a pointed argument. He claims that “policy debates and decisions in the North-South dialogue were pivotal moments in the histories of three ideological trends—neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and human rights—that would form the core of the United States post-Cold War foreign policy”(3). All three of these U.S.-led trends, even U.S. human rights policy, Franczak concludes, contributed to “the reconstruction of an essentially Anglo-American market-based world system that had very little to do with the [economic redistribution goals of the] NIEO [New International Economic Order]—the political, economic, and intellectual defeat of which enabled the new system’s development and spread” (13). This U.S. government-led defeat of the NIEO, a policy regime championed by a host of Global South leaders, is at the heart of Franczak’s re-conceptualizing of the history of U.S. foreign policy and globalization in the pivotal decade of the 1970s.

Franczak argues that the defeat of the Global South’s economic redistributionist demands in the 1970s and the United States government’s embrace of neoliberalism was by no means a certainty. Nor, he insists, was the eventual defeat of the NIEO without consequences for U.S. foreign policy. He writes in his lucid introduction that “the NIEO convinced realists in the Ford administration and liberal internationalists in the Carter administration of the necessity of North-South cooperation on energy, food, and other commodities, but it also galvanized neoliberals who sought to return international economics to the free market” (3).

Franczak portrays the international 1970s as an era of almos—it was a time when the Global South almost formed an alliance; it was a time when the United States government, pressured by the South, almost conceded that the gross economic inequality in the Global South produced by a long history of merciless exploitation by imperialist and neo-imperialist powers had to be rectified by redistributionist measures; it was a time when global power was almost radically rebalanced. But as he explains, none of those efforts came to fruition. The dog didn’t bark. Instead, the United States and other key nations rejected the zero-sum statist redistributionist approaches championed by the advocates of NIEO and instead embraced market-based approaches to global development.

This account of “almost but not quite” begins on May 1, 1974, with the unveiling of the New International Economic Order at the United Nations General Assembly. The NIEO doctrine was championed at the UN by the G-77, the group of developing nations that had formed a decade earlier after the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and had demanded “a new and just world economic order.”

That decade-long demand had been given a new salience by the increased number of nations that had joined the G-77 and, critically, by the success of the oil embargo sprung on the world by Arab members of OPEC. The subsequent quadrupling of oil prices revealed the potential power natural resource producers had over the global economy and most especially over wealthy nations. Venezuelan president and OPEC leader Carlos Andres Perez laid out the implications of the embargo: “What we aim is to take advantage of this opportunity when raw materials,

and energy materials primarily, are worth just as much as capital and technology in order to reach agreements that will ensure fair and lasting balances” (2). Deng Xiaoping, speaking for Mao at the UN, threw China’s support behind the NIEO and the effort to leverage the Global South’s resources to gain a greater share of the world’s wealth: “What was done in the oil battle should and can be done in the case of other raw materials” (7). The game was afoot.

On the U.S. side, Franczak makes it clear that the irrepressible Henry Kissinger expected to be the frontman during the last years of the Nixon administration and throughout the Ford presidency. And Kissinger meant to play ball with the NIEO rebels, even as he slyly maneuvered to limit OPEC nations’ economic power and influence. In 1975, he explained his game plan to the dubious U.S. ambassador to the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan: “Our

basic strategy must be to hold the industrialized powers behind us and to split the Third World . . . Bloc formation in the Third World can be inhibited only if we focus attention on practical measures in which they have a tangible stake” (74). To do that, Kissinger was willing to offer—or, at least, to appear to offer—the non-OPEC nations of the Global South an array

of concessions, including support for their exports, IMF guarantees, and promises of direct capital investment in their nascent industries.

Franczak hedges on how serious Kissinger was in making such offers. To some extent Kissinger meant what he said, especially when it came to providing direct support, including food relief, to the Global South. But Franczak provides powerful evidence that Kissinger never meant to facilitate a new international economic order. Instead, “his goal was to hold on to the old one” dominated by the United States (77). Still, Kissinger was willing to play ball with the NIEO advocates.

Franczak’s portrait of Kissinger complements current historiographic trends.⁷ The Kissinger seen here is far from the monster portrayed in Greg Grandin’s old school polemic, *Kissinger’s Shadow* (2015), for example, or in many earlier biographies. Rather, he is shown as an able strategist, a flexible and pragmatic if not always economically sophisticated realist who is willing to yield a little to anyone when measures are needed to maintain American power. Franczak also underscores that during his years working under both Nixon and Ford, Kissinger had a great deal of leeway in managing U.S. relations with the Global South. His years in power, which ended only in January 1977, marked the high point in the NIEO advocates’ negotiations with the United States for global rebalancing.

In the post-Kissinger years, other trends, interests and events diminished the already limited influence of the NIEO advocates. Some resistance to the economic demands of the Global South was offered by Moynihan, whom Franczak credits with bringing a neoconservative approach to the fore during his short tenure as UN ambassador under Gerald Ford. Moynihan certainly rejected the somewhat fashionable U.S. sympathy for the governments of developing nations that was prevalent on the U.S. Left in the early and mid-1970s. He also rejected what he called the “authoritarian majority in the [UN] General Assembly,” and he saw little need to meet the various demands of the G-77, whether economic or geopolitical, halfway—or, really, in any way.

While Franczak does not emphasize the point, Moynihan’s public disdain for the proclamations and

Franczak portrays the international 1970s as an era of almos—it was a time when the Global South almost formed an alliance; it was a time when the United States government, pressured by the South, almost conceded that the gross economic inequality in the Global South produced by a long history of merciless exploitation by imperialist and neo-imperialist powers had to be rectified by redistributionist measures; it was a time when global power was almost radically rebalanced.

demands of the G-77, and the Global South more generally, was widely popular among the American electorate. While such popular sentiments meant little to Henry Kissinger or to many members of the national security elite, the politicians who ultimately commanded such operators *did* recognize the relevance of public opinion—a factor that Franczak, along with many of us who write about foreign relations and national security, too often downplay or even ignore.

Well before the advent of the Reagan administration, U.S. foreign policy had turned directly against the kind of demands laid out in the NIEO of 1974. The Carter administration did not even offer the kind of lip service that Henry Kissinger had. Franczak convincingly lays out the Carter administration's plans:

First, Carter downgraded the developing countries' emphasis on global structural inequalities in favor of addressing the immediate (and less political) problems of basic human needs. Second, Carter brought back the Trilateral Commission's optimistic plan for joint OECD-OPEC funding for development, which had largely failed when Kissinger tried it. Third, Carter promised to transcend the North-South dialogue by rejecting slogans and instead improving regional and bi-lateral relations, especially with the richer countries in Latin America (113).

Franczak explains that Carter, unlike Kissinger, was genuinely concerned about creating a more moral, human-rights based international system but that his vision differed fundamentally from the demands outlined by Global South supporters of the NIEO. Carter believed that state-guaranteed individual freedoms would lead to economic progress within nations, while, Franczak concludes, the G-77 nations emphasized the need “for the economic rights of states” (116). In this critical sense, the Carter administration's approach to international economic reform, while far more humane, was much closer to the approach that would be taken by the Reagan administration.

The Reagan administration, as is well known, categorically rejected the underlying premises of the NIEO. This rejection was bluntly laid out by Reagan ally Margaret Thatcher: “The intractable problems of Third World poverty, hunger, and debt would not be solved by misdirected international intervention, but rather by liberating enterprise, promoting trade—and defeating socialism in all its forms” (186). Less than a decade after the unveiling of the NIEO at the United Nations, neoliberalism ruled Anglo-American elite policymaking, as it would well into the twenty-first century.

Overall, Franczak clearly charts the narrative arc of American foreign policy elites' approach to the Global South-led NIEO challenge to the economic power of the “North.” He makes the case, as well, that for at least a few years, American policymakers took the NIEO challenge seriously and placed North-South issues on the front burner. He also, throughout the text, shows American policymakers' misgivings about and downright opposition to the statist international economic reforms laid out by the NIEO advocates during the 1970s.

Thus, while a figure like Earl Butz, secretary of agriculture under both Nixon and Ford, is rarely given a star turn by historians of the era, Franczak portrays him as a stalwart market-oriented champion of American global agricultural interests and an able opponent of Kissinger's accommodating stance toward the redistributive demands of the Global South. Franczak shows little sympathy for Butz or other anti-NIEO U.S. policymakers, but he has nonetheless contributed to an accounting of neoliberal—or simply pro-market—advocacy within U.S. policymaking elites—advocacy that took place well before the

inauguration of Ronald Reagan.

Less well explained in *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s* is what happened within the Global South. Why did the G-77 nations fail to leverage their power, allowing the NIEO challenge to be beaten back so easily? In 1974, following OPEC's demonstration of its power, members of the G-77 really *did* think they could force rich nations to redistribute economic wealth. As Pakistani UN official Sartaj Azizi recalls, “We all felt very good and we agreed that . . . the New International Economic Order could become a reality in a few years.”⁸ While Franczak ably explains the twists and turns of U.S. foreign policy elites' approaches to the NIEO, he does not write much about the NIEO advocates' countermoves or changing economic perspectives.

Franczak cannot really be faulted for the relative absence of the Global South perspective. He never claimed he was writing such a book, and researching an international history of North-South relations in the 1970s would be extremely difficult and time consuming. (It would probably require an international team of scholars, and even then, source material would likely be a huge problem).⁹ Still, readers of *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s* might be frustrated both by the relative lack of the NIEO side of the North-South conflict during the 1970s and early 1980s and by the author's decision not to explain more fully why, during that time, the G-77 nations did so little to ally with each other and counter the power of the world's wealthy nations.

Although more analysis of the Global South's perspective and tactical moves would have usefully enlarged the scope—and obviously the scale—of *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, Franczak has captured a critical moment in the balance of global power. Even as Americans in the 1970s often felt under siege both domestically and internationally, he has done well to remind us that American hegemony during that era was tested, but it was not by any means defeated.¹⁰

Notes:

1. For this quote and many like it, see David Farber, “The Torch Had Fallen,” in *America in the 70s*, ed. Beth Bailey and David Farber (Lawrence, KS, 2004), 10–11.
2. Farber, “The Torch Had Fallen,” 11.
3. Two very different sorts of books introduced a range of these complexities: Bailey and Farber, *America in the 70s*; and Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA, 2011).
4. Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality* (Princeton, NJ, 2012), 4.
5. This story of a bipartisan turn to neoliberal ideas and policies in the U.S. domestic sphere is convincingly carried forward in Lily Geismer's *Left Behind: the Democrats' Failed Attempt to Solve Inequality* (New York, 2022).
6. Daniel J. Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (Oxford, UK, 2015), 2.
7. See, for example, the contextualized Kissinger portrayed in Jeremi Suri, *Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).
8. Quoted in Paul Adler, *No Globalization without Representation* (Philadelphia, PA, 2021), 27.
9. I am looking forward to reading a related collaborative effort edited by R. Joseph Parrott and Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Tricontinental Revolution: Third World Radicalism and the Cold War* (Cambridge, UK, 2022).
10. My thanks to Beth Bailey, Richard Immerman, and Sheyda Jahanbani for their thoughtful comments on this piece.

Review of Michael Franczak, *Global Inequality and US Foreign Policy in the 1970s*

Steven L. B. Jensen

Which version of the United States will show up at United Nations meetings, conferences or international summits is a question that time and again has befuddled UN officials and diplomats from other states that have been involved in negotiations in multilateral forums. The recent dramatic political shifts—within a brief time frame—from the Obama to the Trump and Biden administrations were felt across the whole United Nations system and have been just one example of how far the pendulum can swing when it comes to U.S. multilateral diplomacy.

Consistency in diplomatic engagements can be a source of credibility and effectiveness. The United States has not always been characterized by being consistent, instead its inconsistencies could frequently be mitigated somewhat by the political, military and financial weight that the country carried within the multilateral system itself. There was political leverage to conduct everything from course correction to mere symbolic gestures—e.g., statements in support of the status quo—in real time in front of the eyes of the international community. There is without a doubt a larger history about the United States and the United Nations that can be written from these perspectives.

With *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s*, Michael Franczak has written a rich and wide-ranging book that goes to the heart of these patterns of U.S. engagement. It covers the period from 1974 to 1982, a relatively short time period that nevertheless contained enough international upheaval to enable a reshaping of U.S. foreign policy related to the domains of global economic order, development aid and humanitarian responses.

The thematic areas covered in the book, which include the global food crisis (1972–1975), the New International Economic Order (NIEO) process, debt, energy, science and technology, human rights, basic needs and more, illustrate the range of Franczak's analysis. Major international conferences and summits effectively serve as hooks to capture the evolution of strategies and policy positions within the different U.S. presidential administrations. These major gatherings include the 1974 World Food Conference, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) sessions (1972, 1976 and 1979), the Conferences on International Economic Cooperation (1975 and 1977) and the Cancún Summit (1981). This approach helps to highlight interactions with external actors that were in dialogue with and/or challenged U.S. views throughout the period in question.

The wide cast of characters diversifies the narrative as Franczak tracks the North-South and Trans-Atlantic dimensions of the story. The main actors on the U.S. side are Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Jimmy Carter, Theodore Hesburgh, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Ronald Reagan, as well as numerous officials and advisors in the various presidential administrations during the period covered. In supporting yet still critical roles we find a wide number of Global South actors, such as the Algerian foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika; the Jamaican prime minister, Michael Manley; and presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez from Venezuela and José Lopez-Portillo from Mexico, as well as European politicians ranging from European Community president Sicco Mansholt

from the Netherlands to Helmut Schmidt, Willy Brandt and Margaret Thatcher.

In one scene dating back to 1969, Kissinger is quoted as telling Chile's foreign minister that "Nothing important can come from the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no importance." Valdés' response was: "You know nothing of the South" (43–44). The coarseness of Kissinger's viewpoint aside, the exchange feels emblematic of U.S. policy positions covered throughout the book. They often missed the point raised and allowed major global issues to drift rather than address them. In the end, the United States reached a different political destination from the great variety of international public policy ideas or humanitarian crisis response proposals that were put forward during the 1970s by entrenching the neoliberal economic system that became apparent from the early 1980s. To a hammer everything becomes a nail.

Franczak tracks this trajectory and uses it to reach a very fair conclusion. "Contrary to prominent US foreign policy boosters and critics alike, I conclude that the greatest threat to the United States global leadership and prosperity is not Americans' populism or isolationism but the gross maldistribution of income facilitated by political elites over the past four decades" (13). Inequality thereby sits at the core of both the short-term and long-term aspects of this 1970s story.

Franczak has a keen eye when it comes to observing how little changed in the global domain, while pinpointing what actually did change in other arenas. The latter relate mainly to U.S. politics and society itself. "Although US foreign policy did not change the NIEO's character, the NIEO changed the character of US foreign policy. Policy debates and decisions in the North-South dialogue were pivotal moments in the histories of three ideological trends—neoliberalism, neoconservatism, and human rights—that would form the core of the United States' post-Cold War foreign policy" (3).

Franczak thereby gives significant historical weight to the NIEO, but it is one of the best features of the book that the NIEO story is not presented in isolation but in a much broader contemporary context. Interestingly, as Christian O. Christiansen has documented, the specific term "global inequality," featured in the book's title, appears to have been birthed in the context of the World Food Crisis of 1972–1975.¹ Franczak does not seem to be aware of this conceptual connection, but he convincingly elevates the importance of the food crisis in how we should understand the global history of the 1970s. I also found his dual analysis of the food and energy crises of the early to mid-1970s particularly illuminating. It enlarges our picture of the decade.

While Franczak broadens the contemporary context, his approach could have benefited from more historical depth—particularly from engaging more with the 1960s as a historical backdrop. The need for additional explanatory background here points me to a larger discussion about how the international history of the 1970s should be written. There is a tendency towards histories that are rather self-contained within that decade. However, it is worth having more of a debate about how engaging with U.S. multilateral diplomacy in the 1960s—through the political ecosystem of the United Nations—would provide us with a more systematic analysis of U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy engagements in the 1970s.

It is sometimes a little too easy for historians of U.S.

diplomacy to break up stories in different pieces based on presidential administration timelines. They should do more to recognize that a large part of the world observes and engages with the United States through a “continuity lens,” viewing the nation as a longtime state actor in the multilateral system. The global issues that Franczak examines have more longevity and continuity within this system than the typical U.S. chronologies and historiographical approaches indicate. Perspectives matter here.

Two examples can help illustrate this point. Many of the 1970s international political actors from the Global South and from Europe mentioned in the book were actually trying to respond to political questions or challenges raised earlier by the United States at the United Nations. In 1961, John F. Kennedy had, with much rhetorical fanfare, declared the 1960s the “Development Decade.” During the second half of the 1960s, the international community was already exhausted trying to deal with the implications of this proposal. As the 1968 UNCTAD Report *Towards a Global Strategy for Development* stated in its opening paragraph, “A development decade without a development policy. No wonder its results have been so meagre, for actually there was no policy at all—in the sense of a series of converging measures involving concerted action by the industrial centres and the peripheral countries to tackle the problem of development.”²

The laborious task of negotiating and defining global development strategy and policy, while addressing the multitude of emerging crises as identified by a variety of state actors, seemed to have had much less high-level attention in different presidential administrations. It was much easier to find ways of delegitimizing someone else’s points, including their risk analysis of pending multiple international crises, than to engage in frank political problem-solving. On this matter, Franczak certainly offers a critical assessment of U.S. foreign policy within the time frame he focuses on, but his coverage of substantive issues could benefit from a look further back in time.

A good example of the importance of looking further back in history is the New International Economic Order process. It does not belong solely to the 1970s; its history is longer and involves serious and deep-seated issues that had been troubling the international system for well over two decades. The NIEO was an imperfect response to these issues. We might look somewhat differently at some of the global actors – e.g. from the global south - and policy proposals involved in trying to reform the international economic order if earlier decades were more carefully examined. Greater attention to this deeper history would also enable us to say more about the fluctuations and inconsistencies in U.S. multilateral engagements and the political costs they incurred for the United States and for the international community.

My second example relates to the centrality of human rights in 1970s U.S. foreign policy and in U.S. engagements with Global South actors. It was a key group of states from the Global South that during the 1960s brokered the political, diplomatic and legal breakthrough for international human rights. It was their determined efforts that secured the international recognition for human rights that the United States relied on during the following decade.

These Global South actors saw the international human rights project as playing a vital part in mutually benefiting broader issues such as collective security, peacekeeping, reform of international trade and aid and multilateralism itself. The United States contributed remarkably little to this political breakthrough for human rights. Nevertheless, there was, as Franczak

shows, a striking degree of condescension from U.S. diplomatic actors on human rights across several of the U.S. presidential administrations in the 1970s as they asserted ownership of the project (and claimed, as it would turn out, that they had originated it).

The connection between the 1960s and 1970s here is that the failure of diplomatic and political imagination in one historical context can have a spill-over effect on a later period. Opportunities and progress were not consolidated and carried over. Part of the reason is that the United States during the 1960s was still not yet ready for an international human rights project with what it entailed. This would only come gradually. This is also an aspect of the global history of the 1970s that Franczak could have given more attention to.

Franczak’s analysis of the Carter administration’s promotion of the basic needs strategy for development shows the strength of the book’s approach, which entails moving across a range of policy initiatives and areas. He writes that “key developing countries remained unconvinced that Carter’s emphasis on basic needs was not a tactic to avoid a discussion of structural issues” (144). There is plenty of evidence that this skepticism had merit. When G77 proposals emerged on establishing a separate commission on debt, the U.S. response was that it was “Washington’s hope that ‘the North-South dialogue would address the real issues of development [i.e., basic needs] rather than engage in sterile rhetoric’” (155).

It may be that the debt commission proposal was not the best approach to negotiations, but to reduce the positions of a wide range of international leaders to mere “sterile rhetoric” and to confidently assert that the “real issues of development” could be reduced to “basic needs” shows a failure of diplomatic imagination and serious shortcomings on the part of the messenger here—i.e., the United States. It should be mentioned that there would be plenty to criticize the Global South or European counterparts for. However, that is not the focus of this story.

The main focus of *Global Inequality* is American foreign policy in the 1970s. And on this topic Michael Franczak has written a stimulating book, rich in detail, which convincingly places global inequality—and how it is produced and ignored—at the center of the story. Franczak shows that global inequality is an important part of the political legacies of the 1970s.

Notes:

1. Christian Olaf Christiansen, “The Making of Global Inequality: A Conceptual History, 1945–1980,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 16, no. 2 (Dec. 2021): 83–107.
2. TD/3/Rev.1: UNCTAD (1968). “Towards a Global Strategy for Development, Report by the Secretary-General of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to the Second Session of the Conference”, United Nations Publications, New York, p. 1.

Author’s Response

Michael Franczak

I would first like to thank David Farber, Dustin Walcher, Vanessa Walker, and Steven Jensen for their thoughtful engagement with my book, and Andrew Johns for organizing and making this roundtable possible. SHAFR has been my scholarly home for nearly a decade now, especially since two postdocs (2018–22) and a career change took me farther and farther away from history departments and historians. SHAFR friends and colleagues

were instrumental at every step of the process, from the first revisions of a still-warm dissertation to the last look at final proofs. Thus, it is a tremendous honor to have *Global Inequality* the subject of a roundtable by my SHAFR colleagues—the audience I had in mind while I wrote the book, and whose estimates of its contributions I value the most.

Two things led me to write *Global Inequality*. The first was serendipitous. I entered a PhD program in 2012, having written an undergraduate thesis on the U.S.-UK construction of the post-World War II global economic order (“multilateralism with an American face,” as I called it). The following year, researchers in the Treasury Department stumbled across gold: the previously unseen “Bretton Woods transcripts,” which gave us, for the first time, an accurate account of what was said, by whom, at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference establishing the IMF and World Bank.¹ Contrary to the old story—the one I had just reproduced—developing countries spoke loudly and often at Bretton Woods. Dollar hegemony, quotas and voting power, protections for the poorest countries: these were evergreen issues! And they were baked into the heart of the postwar economic order, at the top of which sat the United States. As David Walcher, speaking of the NIEO, opens his review: It was a long time coming.

The second thing that convinced me to write *Global Inequity* was reading and discussing the newest books in U.S. foreign relations and international history as a Ph.D. student. In 2013–14, when I was looking for a dissertation topic, there was a rash of new books that analyzed the 1970s as a distinct decade and a turning point for U.S. foreign policy. With the notable exception of Daniel Sargent’s *A Superpower Transformed*, the NIEO never merited more than a cursory mention in these works.² Why?

One answer (given to me by a senior scholar) was that there was not much more to say: the NIEO was interesting as a postcolonial document, perhaps, but was never taken seriously by the great powers, was resolutely opposed by the United States, and was thus dead on arrival in 1974. However, when I went digging in FRUS for the Nixon/Ford and Carter years (and later, in those presidential libraries), I found something quite different.³

The NIEO was *everywhere* in U.S. foreign policymaking in the 1970s, not just in international economic and UN policy discussions in the State Department, but also in the Agriculture Department, the Treasury Department, and the White House. It consumed the energies of Henry Kissinger in the last two-and-a-half years of his career, desperate as he was to restore legitimacy to the U.S.-led order, and it prompted the inclusion of social and economic concerns in Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy. It was at the World Bank; it was at the think tanks; and it became linked to issues as disparate as the Panama Canal and apartheid. The question I had to answer, then, was: What did it all mean for U.S. foreign policy?

As I completed the dissertation and then the book, working on the NIEO became a much less lonely endeavor. Over the last decade, the NIEO has gone from virtual obscurity to a regular subject of panels at SHAFR and the AHÁ.⁴ I frequently meet younger colleagues who are writing dissertations on different aspects of the NIEO, from country- and region-specific studies to related processes like the New International Information Order. As the reviewers point out, key questions about global South politics and alliances remain, and I discuss some of them below.

What’s more, scholars’ rediscovery of the NIEO has turned a new generation of activists and leaders on to its ideas and spirit. The left-leaning group Progressive International recently launched a global process to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the New International Economic Order, including plans to develop a twenty-first century

NIEO that the G77 can bring to the UN General Assembly in 2024.⁵

I am pleased that each reviewer found something different to like in *Global Inequality*. For David Farber, the “star turn” given to Earl Butz and other anti-NIEO policymakers shows that neoliberalism in U.S. foreign policy was on the way “well before the inauguration of Ronald Reagan.” While Farber describes *Global Inequality* as an “account of almost but not quite,” Vanessa Walker sees a story of “consolidating existing hegemonies and structures of power in the international system.” Walker also finds that *Global Inequality* brings “much needed attention to the economic foundations of Carter’s human rights agenda,” which was my intention. Stephen Jensen finds the “dual analysis of the food and energy crises . . . particularly illuminating” and thinks the basic needs chapters showed the book’s strength “in moving across a range of policy issues and areas.” Finally, Dustin Walcher compliments the use of global inequality as a framing device (or “window”) for understanding U.S. foreign policy and international affairs in that decade, which means the book delivers on its title.

Each reviewer also identifies one or more areas where he or she feels the book falls short. Most directly, Walker identifies “several puzzling omissions” in *Global Inequality*, namely, the role of Congress and “engagement with recent literature on human rights in the 1970s and new scholarship on the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations.” On Congress, which played such an important role in developing and advocating for the basic needs paradigm, I plead guilty. On human rights and the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, my response is more complicated. In articles for *Cold War History* (2018) and *Diplomatic History* (2019), I use key episodes from the Ford and Carter chapters to mark interventions in the literature on Carter and human rights, the oil crisis, neoliberalism and neoconservatism, and the new history of the 1970s.⁶ Moving these discussions from chapters to articles was a narrative choice (though, I realize now, perhaps not the wisest). I hope readers interested in those debates can see past this defect (and find my articles!).

Others identify omissions of content or perspective which could have strengthened the book. Jensen wishes that I had engaged more with the 1960s as a backdrop. I do, too. Referring to the lack of U.S. leadership in human rights during that decade, he writes perceptively that “the connection between the 1960s and 1970s here is that the failure of diplomatic and political imagination in one context can have a spill-over effect on a later period.” He also notes that the NIEO “does not belong solely to the 1970s”—although this is precisely why I started *Global Inequality* in July 1944, at the Bretton Woods conference. Indeed, in the introduction I sketch the 1950s and 60s origins of “North” and “South” as concepts within U.S. foreign policy, which I consider a novel contribution to the history of the NIEO, North or South.

Finally, Farber suggests that some readers “might be frustrated . . . by the relative lack of the NIEO side of the North-South conflict during the 1970s and early 1980s.” Walcher also wishes the book said more about the “diverging interests” within the G77—the OPECs and the “no-PECs”—that cracked the NIEO coalition apart. He writes that “the story of countries across the Global South coming together around the NIEO’s agenda and the negotiations that process entailed has yet to be thoroughly told.” While it is true that the South’s story has not yet been told, *Global Inequality* in fact distinguishes itself from other works on the NIEO by telling the (American) story *through* the negotiations.

Major North-South negotiations the book covers include the UN Conference on Trade and Development of 1972 (UNCTAD III), the UN Sixth Special Session and

World Food Conference (1974), the Seventh Special Session (1975), the CIEC (1975-77), UNCTAD IV (1976), UNCTAD V and the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development (1979), and the Cancun Summit (1981), as well as various UN General Assembly meetings, OPEC summits, and pre-UNCTAD G77 preparatory meetings wherein the G77 perspective and concerns are elaborated. Thus, in addition to Global South heads of state like Carlos Andres Perez, Global South technocrats like UNCTAD secretary-generals Manuel Perez-Guerrero (1969-74) and Gamani Corea (1974-84) take their place in the story alongside Kissinger and Brzezinski.

There is one more element of North-South politics that *Global Inequality* missed and that consumes me now: global environmental governance. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration struggled to convince “key developing countries” like India, Brazil, and especially China to join its climate change agenda. Those countries did not disagree with the global consensus on climate change (as spelled out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, founded in 1988), which was that the Earth was warming because of human activity and disaster would ensue unless measures were taken immediately to curtail emissions. But they did reject Washington’s insistence that they, too, pledge to prioritize a problem that rich countries created during some two hundred years of industrial growth and prosperity.

Clinton argued that stopping climate change could not happen without commitments from North and South, and he warned that by 2030 China would surpass the United States as the world’s largest source of emissions. Yet the United States was already responsible for a quarter of the world’s emissions, Chinese officials countered, consuming and polluting multiples more than even its European counterparts. The Clinton administration insisted that there was no inherent conflict between stopping climate change and stimulating economic growth but promised little in the way of new aid. The G77 and China were unpersuaded. Were rich countries not just kicking away the ladder to keep poor countries from climbing too close?

Clinton’s frustration would have been familiar to American presidents and policymakers in the 1970s, when global environmental governance emerged. At the 1972 World Environment Conference in Stockholm, 113 nations established the UN Environmental Program (UNEP), the first international organization of its kind. The Nixon administration was a strong supporter of the conference as well as a strong UNEP, promising \$100 million over five years for a new Environment Fund for “activities such as monitoring and cleanup of the oceans and atmosphere.”

The G77 was suspicious of the rich countries’ agenda, however, and almost did not attend the conference at all. They were persuaded by the efforts of its chairman, Maurice Strong, a charismatic Canadian and UNEP’s founding director. “If the developing countries sit out the conference, it would leave the hands in the issues of the industrialized countries,” Strong told Indian leader Indira Gandhi, who represented her country in Stockholm.

The price of the South’s cooperation was that trade and development issues dominated the conference agenda and gave the new organization a practical and normative mandate to include them. Indeed, it is the reason why UNEP is located in Nairobi, not Geneva: the Kenyan delegation lobbied hard, against the North’s advice, to locate UNEP in the South, with the hope that South nations could become equal partners in the production of environmental knowledge and governance of global public

goods. Russell Train, head of the U.S. delegation, reported back to Nixon: “We consistently opposed ‘politicizing’ of the Conference with war and similar issues, and had good success, given the makeup of the Conference. We also consistently opposed using the Conference as an excuse for new development ‘add-ons.’ However, it is evident that it is not possible to discuss environmental protection with the LDC’s [sic] completely outside the context of development objectives.”⁷

We know what happened next. That same year, crop failures and the depletion of American grain reserves by an ill-considered deal with the Soviet Union launched the Third World into its most severe food crisis ever. In October 1973, citing rising prices for food from developed countries, members of OPEC started an oil price revolution and quadrupled the price of the oil they sold to the West. In October 1974, one month before the World Food Conference, UNEP publicly threw itself behind the NIEO in the Cocoyoc Declaration, reaffirming the development-first nature of global environmental politics.⁸

By the end of the decade, a combination of Northern opposition (led by the United States) and Southern division (OPEC vs. the “No-PECs”) had left the NIEO on the ropes. The knockout punch came in 1979, when the U.S. Federal Reserve drastically raised interest rates (the “Volcker shocks”) to stop inflation. It worked, but at the cost of a massive debt crisis that began in 1982 in Latin America and spread into Africa and parts of Asia. The result was a “lost decade of development” for many countries.

The counter-NIEO movement had had its intended effect. Ronald Reagan adopted a generally hostile attitude toward the UN, which many Americans—including some Democrats—shared. At home, the Reagan administration utilized its own Environmental Protection Agency to remove financial and other regulatory restrictions to boost domestic energy supply and consumption. On the eve of the Latin American debt crisis, Barbara Ward, founder of the International Institute for Environment and Development, lamented that “some leaders in the West are starting to abandon the concept of our joint voyage on Spaceship Earth, and to dismiss any concern for the environment or development as ‘do-goodism.’”⁹

The push for sustainable development was still alive around the world—the Brundtland Commission’s landmark report was published in 1987—but it was dead, for now, in Washington. UNEP did score a major victory in the 1987 Montréal Protocol, which phased out the use of chlorofluorocarbons. “The Montreal protocol is a model of cooperation,” Reagan said after signing it. It was “a monumental achievement,” the “result of an extraordinary process of scientific study, negotiations among representatives of the business and environmental communities, and international diplomacy.”¹⁰

It was also a painless decision for rich countries. Less harmful substitutes had already been developed, and even chemical megapolluter DuPont dropped its use. Hence Reagan’s praise at a time when U.S. policy toward the WHO, UNESCO, and other UN agencies was openly hostile. The decision proved that American administrations were not averse to multilateral cooperation on the environment—as long as it didn’t cost much, in foreign aid or domestic surcharges. Such stipulations would define U.S. policy toward global climate change negotiations in the 1990s and beyond.

There is one more element of North-South politics that *Global Inequality* missed and that consumes me now: global environmental governance. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration struggled to convince “key developing countries” like India, Brazil, and especially China to join its climate change agenda.

Notes:

1. https://centerforfinancialstability.org/brettonwoods_docs.php.
2. Notable works on the 1970s which do not take up the NIEO include Charles Maier, Niall Ferguson et al, *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Daniel Rodgers, *Age of Fracture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Christian Caryl, *Strange Rebels* (New York: Basic Books, 2014); Barbara Zanchetta, *The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
3. I thank SHAFR for the role it played in this breakthrough. With a Samuel Flagg Bemis dissertation research grant, I spent five happy weeks in Atlanta picking the Carter Library clean. There, I benefited from being the first person interested in the NIEO and the issue of basic needs to access the newly updated State and NSC files on the Remote Access Capture machine. I can confirm that while the physical Carter files on the NIEO are limited, in the RAC machine I found a fully text-searchable treasure trove of new material, from which I was able to reconstruct key details of subjects like the Carter-Perez relationship and the impact of Overseas Development Council officials. (This material then led me to the papers of ODC chairman Rev. Theodore Hesburgh at Notre Dame, which—again by chance—I was the first to look at when they were made public after his death, via a grant from Notre Dame’s Hesburgh Library.)
4. For U.S. policy toward the NIEO across administrations, see Michael Franczak, *Global Inequality and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s* (Ithaca, NY, 2022). For the NIEO and Europe, see Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957–1986* (Oxford, UK, 2012). For the NIEO and OPEC, see Christopher R. W. Dietrich, *Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic Culture of Decolonization* (Cambridge, UK, 2017); and Garavini, *The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, UK, 2019). For the NIEO’s larger role in Global South politics and thought, see Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (Princeton, NJ, 2019), especially chapter 5; and Christy Thornton, *Revolution in Development: Mexico and the Governance of the Global Economy* (Oakland, CA, 2021). For prominent European neoliberals’ (or “ordoliberalists”) opposition to the NIEO, see Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Rise of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, MA, 2018), especially chapter 7 and the conclusion. For the NIEO and global human rights movements, see Samuel Moyn, *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World* (Cambridge, MA, 2018), especially chapter 5.
5. See <https://act.progressive.international/nieo-collection/#collection-00> for the introductory essay and table of contents. The December 2022 launch in New York was attended by several G77 diplomats, including Munir Akram of Pakistan, the country that was the outgoing G77 chair. Later that month, the UNGA adopted resolution A/77/445 DR, “Toward a New International Economic Order,” with a vote of 123–50–1. In January 2023, Progressive International will host a congress in Havana (Cuba is the incoming G77 chair) to discuss the resolution, proposals, and a way forward.
6. Franczak, “Human Rights and Basic Needs: Jimmy Carter’s North-South Dialogue, 1977–81,” *Cold War History* 18 (4), 2018: 447–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2018.1468437>; and “Losing the Battle, Winning the War: Neoconservatives versus the New International Economic Order, 1971–82,” *Diplomatic History* 43 (5), Nov. 2019: 867–89, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhz043>.
7. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d324>.
8. “The Cocoyoc Declaration,” *International Organization* 29, no. 3 (1975): 893–901, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706353>.
9. Maria Ivanova, *The Untold Story of the World’s Leading Environmental Institution: UNEP at Fifty* (Cambridge, MA, 2021), 157.
10. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-signing-montreal-protocol-ozone-depleting-substances>.

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A Roundtable on Jayita Sarkar, *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War*

Andrew J. Rotter, William Thomas Allison, Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, Tanvi Madan,
and Jeffrey Crean

Editor's note: Due to extraordinary circumstances, the roundtable that follows will not include a response to the reviews by the author of *Ploughshares and Swords*, Jayita Sarkar. AJ

Introduction: Roundtable on Jayita Sarkar, *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War*

Andrew J. Rotter

Stories of nuclear arms development are inherently compelling. They feature states and scientists conjuring with the most elemental forces in the universe, inviting terrible danger and opening the door to the ultimate threat. Nuclear weapons carry a horror unmatched by any other kind, with the possible exception of chemical and biological weapons; by their nature they supercharge diplomacy, forcing policymakers to examine every step they take, every word they utter, with the highest levels of caution. Even the possibility that Vladimir Putin would use nuclear weapons in Ukraine gives NATO leaders pause. They must weigh how far they might go to help Kyiv.

The presence of nuclear weapons in China and South Asia has for decades shadowed conflict in that region, too. The Chinese tested their first atomic bomb in 1964. India followed ten years later, and Pakistan officially joined the nuclear club in 1998, after another Indian test. Given the tensions in the neighborhood since the early Cold War—ongoing and frequently flaring conflict between India and Pakistan, hostility between China and India—the introduction of nuclear weapons in this part of Asia has been a matter of enormous concern across the globe. And it has drawn the attention of historians and political scientists. Jayita Sarkar's is the most recent book-length treatment of India's nuclear program, but, as Jeffrey Crean points out, it follows five others written since 1999. Given the limitations of access to records in India, at least until recently, this is an impressive amount of scholarship.

There is broad consensus among the reviewers for *Passport* that Sarkar's book is the most authoritative yet. William Thomas Allison calls it "exceptional" and "remarkable," praising its deep research and innovation. Crean writes that it is likely "to become the canonical text on this topic, presumably for decades to come"; Nicholas Evan Sarantakes thinks it "will likely remain the main authority on the topic for a future best measured in . . . decades." If Tanvi Madan is least effusive, she nevertheless finds the book a significant contribution to the literature on India's nuclear program. The book, the reviewers say variously, is clearly written (their own incisive summaries of its thesis

give evidence of this), deeply and broadly researched, fresh in its arguments, and persuasive in its claims.

There are "quibbles," of course. While acknowledging that it was not a nuclear accident, Allison would have liked the author to address the Bhopal chemical leak disaster in 1984. He would also have liked more analysis of India's "Sputnik moment," which involved China's launch of a satellite into orbit in 1970. Crean is critical of what he considers Sarkar's overuse of Fredrik Logevall's term "intermestic"—meaning the intersection of the international and the domestic—and wishes that she had devoted more time to examining Indian domestic politics. Like Allison, Madan wants more exploration of key issues; in her case, as in Crean's, that means more on the nuclear debate in India and more on the role of the wealthy Tata family in sponsoring nuclear research. Finally, Sarantakes asks, "How important was the Indian nuclear program in the Cold War?" That is a fair question, given Sarkar's subtitle, which has to do with valence or relative importance. The Americans fretted about India's nuclear ambitions, as they fretted about the spread of nuclear weapons generally. Yet how much time did they devote to these concerns relative to their worries about events in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia?

Sarkar argues that India pursued its nuclear program as a quest for security, as two of the reviewers (Crean and Madan) note, and thus takes issue with Itty Abraham's claim that a desire for status was its main motivation.¹ The reviewers seem content to take Sarkar's side. I confess, however, that I carry a torch for Abraham's thesis, in part because I don't see security and status as an either/or matter, and in part because India was unlikely to gain security with a bomb, given the near-certainty that an Indian nuclear test would inspire a Pakistani response, as Indian policymakers knew. That Sarkar doesn't bother to fight such historiographical battles in her book strikes me as one of its strengths. I suspect the reviewers agree.

It is of interest (to me, anyway) that three of the four reviewers begin with what I would call broadly cultural references to what would otherwise seem to be a problem of cold geopolitics. Allison starts with the Bollywood (Tollywood, actually, since the film was made in South India and is in Telugu) film *RRR*, a blood-soaked song-and-dance fest that, as he perceptively says, celebrates violent resistance to British colonialism. Crean offers a Tom Lehrer song and Nevil Shute's 1957 novel *On the Beach*. Sarantakes opens with a novel, too: Sir John Hackett's *The Third World War: A Future History*.

Historians tend to use cultural references like these, sometimes as a way to ease readers into their supposedly more serious work, sometimes to show that they have lives

beyond the documents, sometimes to provide color to their accounts. And sometimes, these references suggest something about the way they think about the subject or nation they are about to explore. Now, as during the Cold War, India was in the American mind as much a series of impressions, feelings, stereotypes, and clichés as it was a nation state that deserved to be taken seriously. Indians suspected this was so. What might a nuclear program do to jolt the Americans, and others like them, out of their fairytale (and nightmare) construction of Indian inconsequence?

I share the reviewers' admiration for Sarkar's study. It is model scholarship, a bravura first book. No pressure, Jay, but I look forward to more.

Note:

1. Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State* (New York, 1998).

Review of Jayita Sarkar, *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War*

William Thomas Allison

India recently marked seventy-five years as an independent nation and forty-eight years since "Smiling Buddha," its first underground "peaceful nuclear explosion." India's national trajectory has moved far from the anti-violent, secular nation Mahatma Gandhi envisioned. Today Gandhi himself is scorned by the most recent wave of determined Hindu nationalists, who instead look to India's more militant past for inspiration. Their preferred pantheon of Indian heroes had little patience for gaining independence through peaceful means, turning instead to violent force to break from the British Empire. These warrior-heroes include the controversial Subhas Chandra Bose, who commanded the Indian National Army during World War II, and Vallabhbhai Patel, who, as India's first home minister, ruthlessly forced fence-sitting provinces to join the newly independent Indian state.

The current Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, epitomizes this militarized narrative of India's independence with his efforts to sustain India's leadership in the nonaligned developed world by encouraging Hindu nationalism and agitating anti-Muslim suspicion.¹ Even Bollywood has embraced the anti-Gandhi, pro-force version of independence. The recent blockbuster *Raadhika Ranjani Rudhirani* (*Rise, Roar, Revolt* in English, but roughly *Rage, War, Blood* in Telugu), popularly known as *RRR*, which is the product of screenwriter Vijayendra Prasad and director Koduri Srisaila Sri Rajamouli, "pays tribute to the 'real warriors' of India's freedom struggle" in a three-hour-long "visual-effects spectacle" that leaves Gandhi out of the story entirely.²

Against this backdrop of Modi's muscular Hinduism, Jayita Sarkar's *Ploughshares and Swords* could not be more timely. Sarkar, a senior lecturer in economic and social history at the University of Glasgow, maintains that Modi's assertion that Cold War India was feeble and anti-militarist is wrong. While Gandhi passively resisted British imperial rule, more militant leaders employed violence against their British overlords. A preference for the militarized over the peaceable remained after independence.

Sarkar also contends that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru embraced the possibilities of atomic energy, promoted by Indian physicists, to pursue a duality of objectives—development and security. "The myth of a peaceful India," claims Sarkar, "does not hold against the reality of violence of partition and the wars that crafted India's borders with Pakistan and China" (10). She argues that India's nuclear ambitions stemmed from a strategically

planned nuclear program that simultaneously pursued peaceful and militarized atomic power to maintain "freedom of action" in the bipolar Cold War world and to secure its borders at home.

To cut through the complexities of India's atomic era, Sarkar skillfully guides the reader through many twists and turns involving the influence of various personalities, India's regional security concerns, and relations with Cold War powers. She persuasively demonstrates how India's nuclear program and anti-nonproliferation stance supported the nation's nonalignment policy and concludes that these and other national security considerations were vital to India's "pragmatic response to an asymmetrical world order" (12). According to the author, "the internal-external, domestic-international, and inside-outside were closely intertwined with important implications for what geopolitical challenges meant" to India as a nation-state. Achieving nuclear fission, India's scientists and political leaders concurred, would help achieve the "geopolitical goals of the territorial state as well as the technopolitical goals of the developmental state." To maintain "freedom of action" and serve the "national goals of development and security," India therefore embarked on a "dual-use" nuclear program that simultaneously served "military and civilian ends" (2–5).

Sarkar sets forth three primary supporting arguments throughout the book. First, she stresses that the duality of India's nuclear program was, from the outset, intentional. Scientists and political leaders structured the Atomic Energy Commission of India and the Indian Department of Energy to pursue both peaceful and military uses for atomic energy. They also took advantage of commercial partnerships, technological expertise exchanges, and nuclear relationships with other countries (France plays a key role here). Second, she contends that this "Janus-faced" nuclear program both developed and existed within the complex mass of India's regional security concerns and India's rather audacious nonalignment strategy during the global Cold War. For India, "securing borderlands" was just as important as protecting its border with China and Pakistan, as the numerous internal and external conflicts involving India attest (14). Third, she argues that, like the major powers in the Space Race, India used its space program to pursue both peaceful and military development and objectives. The critical difference is that India did so to gain knowledge and cooperation from other space-states while working on its own home-grown rocket program to retain "freedom of action" (123–24).

To tell this story, Sarkar covers a lot of ground, but she does so in an efficient 204 pages of text. Organized in three chronological parts, her book devotes each chapter to an examination of technological developments against an often unstable domestic political situation and volatile regional and international security conditions. Chapters 1 and 2 use the broader context of post-war decolonization to explore India's nascent atomic program, its institutional development, and how the program fit Nehru's expansionist plans for the new Indian state and his vision for India's post-independence accelerated economic development. Interesting here is India's discovery of a willing atomic partner in France, which also sought nonalignment, albeit ineptly, to maintain its own "freedom of action" in Europe.

Chapters 3 through 5 cover 1953 through 1970 and explore the evolution of India's nuclear program as it moved toward conducting an underground nuclear test. Sarkar showcases the brilliant game of nonalignment diplomacy India played to avoid signing the 1963 Partial Test Ban treaty and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, much to the disappointment of the United States. India's refusal reflected its strategic interests but was not without some risk, as India joined an odd company of other non-signatory nations—U.S. allies Israel, Pakistan, and

South Africa, along with perennial pariah North Korea. Sarkar's discussion of India's reaction to China's hydrogen bomb test and the clashes between India and China along the Sikkim-Tibet border is insightful.

The final two chapters connect Indira Gandhi's domestic political trials to India's so-called "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974. American support of Pakistan and the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan challenged India's nonalignment policy and put increased pressure on its dual nuclear program. Sarkar's contextualization of India's nuclear program within the larger picture of its Cold War relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and China is a strength here.

Several noteworthy points stand out in Sarkar's deeply researched history. Extraordinarily ambitious physicists such as Homi Bhabha and Vikram Sarabhai were indispensable in setting up India's scientific establishment and influencing government policy. Unlike their contemporaries in the United States—Edward Teller, Robert Oppenheimer, and James Conant, for example—Bhabha, Sarabhai, and other nationalist-minded Indian scientists convinced government authorities to pursue nuclear development without getting entangled in the international regulatory process. In her discussion of India's "atomic earths," especially its deposits of rare monazite, Sarkar maps out the complex web of industrialists, corporations, government agencies that had an interest in these mineral deposits and demystifies the international transactions in which the deposits were used as bargaining chips to preserve this and other coveted resources for India's own use—to preserve India's "freedom of action."

Similarly, Sarkar's account of India's deft political moves to get nuclear technical support from other atomic states and to successfully resist signing international atomic agreements is sound scholarship. The bold and brazen game of *realpolitik* that India played would have made Machiavelli blush. But Sarkar's most substantial contribution may be her analysis of how the Indira Gandhi government managed the difficult task of balancing the pursuit of India's nuclear program against domestic political turmoil and tensions with bordering states such as Pakistan and China. Sarkar convincingly illustrates how advancing India's nuclear development was vital in both security arenas.

Among Sarkar's more provocative points is an underlying criticism of the United States and its strategic narcissism concerning international controls on atomic energy and nonproliferation. The United States consistently failed to fully consider India's geostrategic position and nonalignment objectives. Instead, U.S. officials frequently viewed India's maneuvering only in terms of whether it served American interests and goals. From its experience maintaining nonalignment and "freedom of action," India recognized this rigid approach and often used American predictability to its advantage, enabling India to maintain "freedom of action."

Ploughshares and Swords does have some shortcomings. Sarkar's use of discipline-specific jargon seems, at times, unnecessary. Terms like "modernities," "sociotechnical imaginaries," and "intermestic" may leave non-specialists scratching their heads and wondering how these and other less-than-clear terms add to Sarkar's otherwise compelling and engaging analysis. The author's overuse of acronyms forces the reader to repeatedly return to what becomes a well-worn page of abbreviations (xv). And there are minor inaccuracies. Figure 6.1's caption describes a group of armed Mukti Bahini irregulars and "an Indian Army tank," but

the purported "tank" is a bulldozer (148).

These are quibbles. More significant is the missed opportunity in Sarkar's discussion of India's reaction to China's April 1970 launch of a satellite into orbit. Sarkar offers a well-documented account of how this event ignited "acute political criticism" of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government. Still, the author leaves the reader wanting more about India's own Sputnik moment, including perhaps a discussion of the applicability of the Sputnik analogy.

Also missing is a consideration of the 1984 Union Carbide industrial disaster at Bhopal, which exposed countless people to methyl isocyanate gas, injuring tens of thousands and ultimately killing as many as 16,000. The Union Carbide tragedy is a curious omission, since Sarkar extensively discusses efforts to avoid treaties and commercial agreements that would have committed India to safeguards for its reactor programs (161), and she briefly covers the controversy over radiation fallout from the Pokhran test (203). The Union Carbide disaster was not a nuclear accident but a catastrophic industrial disaster that might be looked at in relation to India's resistance to

international regulation. Consider that the Three Mile Island reactor meltdown had occurred only a few years before Bhopal, and Chernobyl happened less than two years after. Moreover, Union Carbide was an American company, and the United States had consistently pushed India to accept international atomic regulatory agreements (in addition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). Sarkar's view on whether a connection exists here would have

been most interesting.

These minor issues do not detract from the fact that Sarkar has produced an exceptional volume that challenges India's peaceful-state narrative and places Indian nuclear development and geostrategic objectives in domestic and international contexts. Sarkar should be commended for weaving this complex, multi-layered story into a concise, cohesive history. *Ploughshares and Swords* reveals the far-reaching influence of India's scientific community and the political tension surrounding India's nuclear program. Yet Sarkar's more significant contribution may be the sub-theme that runs throughout the book: India's nuclear ambitions remained unaltered despite the country's rather unsettling swings from democracy on the one side toward authoritarianism on the other.

India's atomic ploughshares and swords achieved a shape-shifting quality that facilitated India's nonalignment and aided its security goals. More to the point, so nationally crucial did India's nuclear development program become that opposition to it equated to being anti-India. As Sarkar puts it, "Opposing nuclear energy" was tantamount to "resisting economic modernity." More significantly, Sarkar contends that India's resistance to oversight and other regulatory agreements went hand-in-hand with the "coproduction of India's nuclear program and Indian society as an opaque, inegalitarian, and hierarchical order" that reinforced "an antidemocratic culture" (203). The scientists, the Indian Department of Atomic Energy, and the Indian government became one with the nation and its modernized development.

Specialists and non-specialists alike will benefit from Sarkar's work and should be impressed by its deep archival research and engaging framework. This is a remarkable book. Hopefully, Sarkar has plans to carry the story from the 1990s to the present, as there is much more to tell.

Notes:

1. Annabelle Timsit, "India Celebrates 75 years since

independence amid hope and tension," *Washington Post*, August 15, 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/15/india-independence-day-75/>. See also Debasish Roy Chowdhury, "Modi's India Is Where Global Democracy Dies," *New York Times*, August 24, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/24/opinion/india-modi-democracy.html?searchResultPosition=2>.
 2. S. S. Rajamouli, Raudram Ranam Rudhiram, March 25, 2022, DVV Entertainment, Hyderabad, Telangana, film; Gerry Shih, "As India marks its first 75 years, Gandhi is downplayed, even derided," *Washington Post*, August 12, 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/12/india-independence-mahatma-gandhi/>.

Review of *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Cold War*

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes

In 1978 General Sir John Hackett, a retired British Army officer, published the novel *The Third World War: A Future History*. This book was the first of a series of works of speculative fiction about World War III being fought between the United States and the Soviet Union within the context of the Cold War.¹ Hackett wrote the book as a warning that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was becoming dangerously weak in conventional military forces, which would encourage the Soviet Union to initiate a war that the West could not win even if it turned to nuclear weapons. In fact, no one would win a nuclear war.²

To read *The Third World War* several decades later is to be astonished at Hackett's analysis. He and his team—he co-wrote the book with several other retired British officers and civil servants, but he is the only one listed on the cover—got many things right: the breakup of Yugoslavia, an end to apartheid in South Africa, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and even electoral patterns in both the United Kingdom


and the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One thing they got wrong, though, was the prediction they made about the future of the Republic of India.³

Hackett and his team believed India would collapse. That they thought this possible suggests that India was weak at the time and faced domestic threats to its viability. That idea is one of many that Jayita Sarkar addresses in her first book, *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Cold War* (2022). An associate professor at the University of Glasgow, Sarkar was born and raised in India, then did her graduate work in France and Switzerland.

India is big and important. If a map of India were superimposed on one of the United States, India would reach from San Francisco in the west to Milwaukee in the east, and would stretch from Calgary, Canada in the north to the tip of the Baja California peninsula in the south. India also has a massive population of 1.3 billion. Long story made short, events in India are significant in and of themselves, just as events in the United States are.

Sarkar writes that "*Ploughshares and Swords* is not about India alone" (15). While that is true, India is the main actor in this drama. The book begins with a history of internationalized science and technology in India. The first part, in two chapters, covers early efforts to develop nuclear power in India. A great deal changed when President Dwight Eisenhower gave his "Atoms for Peace" speech, which led to greater support for India from France. China's development of a nuclear weapon put the Indian effort into high gear.

The second part of the book (chapters 3 through 5) examines the expansion of the nuclear and space programs in India. The final section (chapters 6 and 7) looks at the international reaction to the nuclear program and at dangers to Indian sovereignty. Sarkar refers to those threats as "intermestic," since they involved both internal and external actors. The threats were many and the biggest, most



dangerous ones came in the form of secession movements, suggesting that Hackett and his team had a point.

Over the course of the book, Sarkar makes three main arguments. First, she contends that India pursued a dual-use nuclear program that served both civilian and military ends. Second, she notes that geopolitics shaped Indian nuclear development in a profound manner, as keeping the borderlands peaceful by offering them nuclear technology and development was just as important to the Indian government as protecting the borders. Third, India developed a dual-use space program that was—physically, at least—separate from the nuclear program that so confounded U.S. analysts. Those analysts were using the U.S. experience as a template to measure when India would have the ability to put a weapon on target, and India organized its scientific development differently than the United States.

Domestic politics drove the decision to build a dual-use nuclear system. The author argues that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was operating from a position of strength as she decided to proceed with a nuclear explosion. Sarkar covers many different issues, but the connections she makes between issues such as nuclear testing, the annexation of the Kingdom of Sikkim, and the third India-Pakistan war are imperfect. The importance of India to world affairs is an open question. With that point made, many nations were interested in developments in India.

One of the strengths of this study is Sarkar's ability to present the facts in a dispassionate way that offers the reader an opportunity to see different perspectives on the issues. After obtaining its independence from the United Kingdom, India pursued a foreign policy of non-alignment. That certainly was understandable. After struggling to achieve independence, Indian political leaders did not want to undercut that achievement by aligning themselves with a political order that might very well subordinate them to the political and economic interests of Europe and the United States and make India independent in name only. Considering how the Soviets administered and ruled their territory and allies, however, Indians come across here as politically tone deaf. British rule in India might have been exploitative, but morally the British were in the right in the Cold War.

We see a similar disconnect on the question of nuclear non-proliferation. The United States wanted to limit the expansion of nuclear weapons, since they had the potential to do extensive and long-term biological and ecological damage to the planet. Indians, on the other hand, argued that non-proliferation was an infringement on their sovereignty. It was, but that seems more like a rationalization than an actual reason. India wanted the bomb to develop its international standing, and from the perspective in New Delhi, the United States was a "have" trying to keep the "have nots" from developing their own national resources.

The problem Indians faced is that world opinion was with the United States. When Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau decided to end nuclear assistance to India, Foreign Minister Jagat Singh Mehta captured the essence of the dispute in a cable he sent to Indian embassies: "We do not accept the Canadian view that there is no difference between a PNE [peaceful nuclear explosion] and a bomb" (192).

For a historian of U.S. diplomatic history, this book shows the limits of U.S. power. Even if the Americans opposed the Indian nuclear program, it still had huge support in India. When Gandhi's government announced a successful explosion, Indians of every political persuasion celebrated. India had a nuclear weapon that it could use to

protect itself, but since India had used a dual track system, those who wanted to believe that India now had laid the foundation for a peaceful nuclear system could do so. Sarkar argues that in many ways this twin nuclear program allowed scientists and administrators to evade democratic accountability and enabled politicians to force consensus on the India public.

There were, however, international and domestic problems. The test site was close to Pakistan, which was worried about radioactive fallout. The health problems of villagers who lived near the test site suggest the Pakistani concerns were well-founded.

The research foundation of this book is nothing less than stunning. Sarkar has visited the archives in eight nations on three different continents, requiring a reading knowledge of at least three different languages. All told, she visited twenty-five different repositories. Her research in the United States alone is impressive. She visited institutions on both coasts and in both the north and south, with several stops in between. The document collections she examined show a real diversity, ranging from national archives to the personal papers of politicians, with the records of international organizations and the files of private corporations thrown in for good measure.

Given her emphasis on domestic politics, it is not surprising that Sarkar also consulted the digitized collections of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Times of India*. It will be hard for future scholars writing on India's nuclear program to challenge this book, unless future declassification efforts produce documents that have significantly different information. The most likely new sources would appear to be archives in Pakistan or the former Soviet Union, and none of those institutions seem likely to welcome new scholars anytime soon. As a result, Sarkar's book will likely remain the main authority on the topic for a future best measured in scores rather decades.

Sarkar's writing is also good. She faces a diverse audience of scholars in South Asia, the North America, and Europe, and she has written in a manner that will be accessible to all.

The real question is the importance of the topic. India is important; 300 years of British imperial history make that clear. British control of the sub-continent was a major element in the factors that made the United Kingdom a world power. The ability to develop a nuclear weapon is an important sign that it is a world power in its own right. As a contribution to Indian history, this book is significant. But did it really stifle dissent? Gandhi's suspension of civil rights between 1975 and 1977 suggests that it had not and that a great deal more effort was needed.

How important was the Indian nuclear program in the Cold War? While the East-West confrontation did go global bringing in Africa, Asia, and South America, those incidents were secondary to events in the main theater—Europe. Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were peripheral. So was India. Although there were three shooting wars between India and Pakistan, South Asia was a strategic cul-de-sac. What happened there was not going to affect the East-West confrontation in any meaningful way. The Cold War was going to be won or lost in Europe.

Scholars can agree or disagree with these points as they like. What is indisputable is that Sarkar has written the type of book that everyone should aspire to write: thought-provoking, well written, and well researched.

Notes:

1. Hackett's novel has been the subject of investigation in two academic articles: Jeffrey H. Michaels, "Revisiting General Sir

One of the strengths of this study is Sarkar's ability to present the facts in a dispassionate way that offers the reader an opportunity to see different perspectives on the issues.

John Hackett's *The Third World War*," *British Journal for Military History* 3, no. 1 (November 2016): 88–104; Adam R. Seipp, "'Visionary Battle Scenes': Reading Sir John Hackett's *The Third World War, 1977–1985*," *The Journal of Military History* 83 (October 2019), 1235–57.

2. Leonard Downie, Jr. "The Best-Selling General Who Won World War III," *Washington Post*, June 18, 1979; Jeff Lyon, "Doomsday Author is an Optimist to the Core," *Chicago Tribune*, April 8, 1980.

3. Sir John Hackett, *The Third World War: A Future History* (New York, 1978).

Review of Jayita Sarkar's *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War*

Tanvi Madan

Over the years, the Indian nuclear program has garnered the attention of both scholars and policymakers. New Delhi's motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons, in particular, have been the subject of discussion and even debate. In *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War*, Jayita Sarkar delves into the origins, nature, and evolution of India's nuclear program. In this insightful historical account, she sheds new light on the Indian government's choices, embedding them within the geopolitical context they were facing and the foreign and security policies they were developing. Furthermore, Sarkar expands our understanding of the individuals and institutions beyond officialdom who contributed to India's nuclear and space programs. And she does so while gamely wading into the debate about India's nuclear path.

In *Ploughshares and Swords*, Sarkar takes the reader on a chronological journey from the 1940s, just before Indian independence, to the early 1980s and the aftermath of India's 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion." Her historical treatment contributes significantly to the literature on a subject that has received greater attention from political scientists than historians in the past. Accessing documents from eight countries, including India and France, she examines Indian choices about the country's nuclear program in the midst of decolonization and nation-building, the dawning of the nuclear age, and unfurling superpower competition.

The author's main argument is that India's nuclear program did not evolve from a civilian to a military one, but was dual-track from the start. Sarkar writes of a "deliberate duality," with a program designed to speak to both the development and defense needs—the "ploughshares" and "swords" of the title—of a newly independent India. The sword might have remained sheathed for several years, but Sarkar argues that Indian policymakers sought to keep that option open from the beginning. This decision reflected a broader Indian desire to protect the country's security as well as its strategic autonomy, i.e., its freedom of action, to the extent possible. Sarkar also shows how these objectives shaped India's view of non-proliferation initiatives, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. By requiring India to forswear the "sword" option, such agreements would have constrained India's autonomy. They were therefore unacceptable to officials who were intent on India maintaining an independent capacity to defend itself.

In outlining this motivation, Sarkar comes down firmly against some scholars' contention that a quest for status rather than security drove India's nuclear program. Security from whom? The author argues that it was the threat from China—more than the Pakistan challenge that some have focused on—that loomed larger in Indian decision-making in this context.

Sarkar's dual-track and security arguments also help push back against the narrative that it was only during the period around the 1998 nuclear tests that Indian decisionmakers went from being idealists to realists and

weak to strong. Instead, she emphasizes the continuities in India's nuclear program, asserting that the origin story of those tests lies in decisions made—or not made—decades earlier.

Those choices, Sarkar shows, included partnering with other countries. Indian officials and scientists maintained a diversified portfolio of technology partners, including the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain. This reflected Indian policymakers' broader strategy of diversification. Scholarship produced since Indian official archives have become more accessible has made evident that maintaining multiple partnerships was not a result of Indian idealism or indecisiveness. Instead, it was a deliberate, pragmatic choice to diversify India's dependence, as New Delhi sought security, development, and autonomy.

Sarkar contributes to the understanding of New Delhi's foreign policy diversification. She highlights how it gave Indian scientists access to multiple partners and how the scientists' technical needs, in turn, added to Indian policymakers' reasons for maintaining those partnerships. Sarkar also shows the benefits of that diversification—with India using one partner's offer as leverage with another, for instance, or having other technology sources to turn to when a partner proved to be unreliable. Missing from the book, however, is a deeper look into the downsides of that diversification.

Nonetheless, in exploring India's various technology partnerships, *Ploughshares and Swords* does add to our knowledge of India's relationships with major countries. Sarkar illustrates, for instance, how access to American talent, training and technology was crucial in the early stages of India's nuclear and space programs. The story of these informal and formal collaborations complicates the traditional narrative of an India-U.S. relationship that only moved from estrangement to engagement around 2000—a correction also evident in other recent books such as Rudra Chaudhuri's *Forged in Crisis*, David Engerman's *The Price of Aid*, and this reviewer's *Fateful Triangle*.

Ploughshares and Swords previews some of the reasons for that eventual estrangement. It explores the way U.S. non-proliferation priorities led to restrictions on India-U.S. nuclear and technology cooperation that left a long-lasting impression of American unreliability in New Delhi. The book also shows that India-U.S. friction sometimes stemmed from American policies that were not India-specific but nonetheless adversely affected Indian interests. Furthermore, Sarkar examines how American hesitation to work with India at critical points opened the door to a more willing Soviet Union and led to the India-Soviet nuclear and space cooperation that has helped Moscow retain its relevance to New Delhi to this day. This book should thus be of interest to practitioners and scholars of contemporary India-U.S. and India-Russia relations as well.

It is in looking at the India-France relationship, however, that Sarkar's book makes a more novel contribution. This is an understudied partnership that deserves more scholarly attention. The author does her part by offering us a glimpse of cooperation between two countries—one an American ally, one non-aligned—that sought to maintain as much strategic autonomy as possible while recognizing the need for partners. In doing so, she also sheds light on what made France—and still makes France—an attractive partner for India, including its flexibility and the fewer strings attached to its cooperation. An additional benefit of this exploration of India-France nuclear cooperation is that it helps disaggregate the "West," whose countries often get clubbed together in studies of Indian foreign policy. The book furthermore treats European countries as independent actors and not just American satellites—indeed, Sarkar shows how British and French institutions and companies competed with their American counterparts

for agreements with India.

While *Ploughshares and Swords* is largely focused on India's decisions, it does consider how the debates in and priorities of other countries, particularly the United States, shaped New Delhi's options: how, for instance, U.S. and Soviet interest in non-proliferation affected their view of India's nuclear program, or how a change in government in Paris and in U.S.-France relations could affect India-France nuclear cooperation. And Sarkar shows that these constraints forced India's scientists to be adaptive and innovative and to try to develop capabilities as independently as possible. They also contributed, she argues, to a simultaneous rather than the more common sequential pursuit of nuclear delivery vehicles and the bomb.

New Delhi's recognition of the way external partners' interests and internal debates could constrain its choices has been a crucial reason for India's perpetual pursuit of self-reliance. But this book also helps nuance that "self-reliance." The country's nuclear program was indeed part of its pursuit of freedom of action where its energy needs and particularly its security were concerned. But Sarkar shows that the program was only made possible through openness to partnership with others, and it benefited from both informal networks and formal links with foreign counterparts.

India's past policymakers recognized the necessary trade-off—that the quest for independence required some level of dependence. They tried to mitigate the consequences of that dependence via diversification. They also used the U.S.-Soviet competition, even as they criticized it, to garner attention and technical assistance while creating space for themselves. And *Ploughshares and Swords* shows that as India became a battlefield in the Cold War, the instruments Washington and Moscow deployed weren't just the food, economic or military aid that other scholars have written about, but also assistance for India's nuclear and space programs.

An intriguing part of Sarkar's book is her argument that India, too, saw its nuclear expertise as an instrument of diplomacy and a way for scientists to establish a global reputation as innovators. She offers a glimpse of the road considered but not taken in terms of aiding other developing countries' nuclear programs (including those of Iran and Libya). This is another reminder of how choices made in the past shaped India's subsequent options. Had India been more active in sharing its nuclear expertise then, an India-U.S. civil nuclear deal might not have been possible later (since India's non-proliferation track record was cited as a key argument in favor of that agreement in the mid-2000s).

Another feature of *Ploughshares and Swords* is its focus on the role played by key scientists or technocrats, including Homi Bhabha and Vikram Sarabhai, who had access to power, capital, and international networks. Sarkar highlights their preferences, agency and entrepreneurship, as well as their interactions with each other and with key Indian policymakers. She suggests that at various points it was their choices that were determinative, with government playing a more enabling rather than driving role—a theme that could have been explored further. In considering the scientists' role, Sarkar also argues that through them and the institutions they helped establish, India's nuclear and space programs—and their civilian and military dimensions—became intrinsically linked.

Also intriguing is the brief glimpse *Ploughshares and Swords* offers of the crucial role of the private sector, particularly the Tata conglomerate. This look at business-government relations is particularly interesting, given the Indian government's desire today to involve private corporations again in the development of India's defense industrial base. Here again, although its length makes for an easy read, *Ploughshares and Swords* leaves the reader wanting more.

This reader at least would have liked the author to delve further into some of the subjects she mentions, even if doing so had added to the page count. For instance, the book could have dived deeper into decision-making within India and some of the debates that took place—in public, between the scientists, between officials, and between officials and scientists (e.g., those responsible for the budget vs. those responsible for the bomb, or those who wanted to share nuclear expertise with other countries vs. those who did not). It could have also offered more insights into the business-government links, or the leaders of India's nuclear and space programs that came after Bhabha and Sarabhai. Or it could have added more on the debate about Sarabhai's view of pursuing nuclear weapons.

A more in-depth look would have also helped bolster some of the arguments Sarkar makes. We would like to know more, for instance, about her contention that India's peaceful nuclear explosion and its takeover of the Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim were linked. Also needing further elaboration is her argument that the ambiguity of India's nuclear program made it less accountable and anti-dissent. She briefly mentions this theme in the introduction and in the epilogue, but it is otherwise largely missing from the rest of the book.

An expanded volume could also have included roadmaps at the start of each chapter, which would have particularly benefited readers unfamiliar with Indian foreign policy or nuclear history. Otherwise, the book is very readable, in part because it is not burdened with the technical jargon that can sometimes make this subject inaccessible to a broader audience. Overall, *Ploughshares and Swords* makes key contributions to the literature on the Cold War, nuclear policy history, and Indian foreign policy. And it not only expands our understanding of the history of the Indian nuclear program, but it also identifies themes and sparks questions for scholars to explore further in the future.

Review of Jayita Sarkar's *Ploughshares and Swords*

Jeffrey Crean

Luxembourg is next to go,
And who knows, maybe Monaco?
We'll try to stay serene and calm
When Alabama gets the bomb!

(Tom Lehrer, "Who's Next?" [1965])

Nevil Shute's 1957 bestselling novel *On the Beach* depicts the lives of a group of Melbourne residents in 1963. They are awaiting their deaths from radiation clouds heading southward after a nuclear war destroyed all human life in the Northern Hemisphere the previous year. That war was not started by either the United States or the Soviet Union. Rather, it began with a nuclear attack by Albania against Italy, followed by a nuclear attack by Egypt against the United States and Great Britain. The Cold War had not destroyed humanity, at least not directly. Rather, nuclear proliferation had. As nuclear bombs became more numerous and less expensive, practically any country could acquire them. As a result, local rivalries between minor powers were transformed into potentially apocalyptic events.

In the real world, fears of nuclear weapons spreading beyond the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council led in the 1960s to the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which went into effect in 1970. The four nations that have notably refused to become parties to the NPT are India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. All four nations now have acquired nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. While these weapons have

not proliferated to the extent that many during the early Cold War feared was inevitable, the fact that two archrivals who have fought three wars each possess over one hundred nuclear warheads has long been a cause for concern. Not for nothing did President Bill Clinton declare in 1999 that the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, where Indian and Pakistani soldiers have faced off since 1947, was the most dangerous place on the planet.

Jayita Sarkar's *Ploughshares and Swords* tells the story of India's development of its first nuclear weapon in an illuminating, thorough, and pathbreaking manner. Certain to be the go-to book on this topic going forward, Sarkar's sturdily researched and eminently readable monograph focuses on the Indian scientists and politicians who pushed for a nuclear India even before it achieved independence. Cogently connecting the dots over time and across continents, the author presents both an international diplomatic history of India's state-level relationships and a transnational scientific history of the interactions between Indian scientists and their overseas colleagues. Employing archives from eight nations, she shows how India utilized dual-use technologies to turn the peaceful "ploughshares" it imported into nuclear "swords."

Sarkar's book is the sixth on this topic in the past quarter century, and it will supersede them all to become the canonical text on this topic, presumably for decades to come. George Perkovich's *India's Nuclear Bomb* (1999) was the previous definitive text, but the passing of two decades has enabled Sarkar to consult a greater variety of archival sources. Itty Abraham's *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb* (1998) argues that India's nuclear program was more about postcolonial independence than national security, a claim Sarkar effectively refutes. Robert Anderson's *Nucleus and Nation* (2010) provides detailed profiles of India's major nuclear scientists—information Sarkar contextualizes by merging it with diplomatic and military history.

Jahnvi Phalkey's *Atomic State* (2013) complements Anderson's book by focusing on interpersonal rivalries among Indian scientists, which Sarkar also touches on, while M.V. Ramana's *The Power of Promise* (2012) describes the failure of India's civilian nuclear power program, a topic Sarkar also covers. *Ploughshares and Swords'* greatest contribution to the literature lies in the way it merges scientific, diplomatic, and military history while incorporating domestic political factors. Sarkar also breaks new ground by elucidating the connections between India's space and nuclear programs. Though shorter in length than most of its counterparts, her book somehow manages to cover more ground than any of them.

The introduction lays out Sarkar's three primary subjects: the dual-use nature of India's nuclear program, its geopolitical import as a response to territorial threats from neighboring powers, and the value of India's space program to its development of nuclear weapons. The author uses the term "intermestic" four times in the introduction, which is three times too many. This term, coined by Fredrik Logevall, describes the interplay between international affairs and domestic politics. It may be a highly useful concept, highlighted by a wonderful historian, but it is a clumsy neologism which confuses rather than reveals. Sarkar also employs the concept of "technopolitics" to refer to the use of technology to achieve political goals, making this term as obvious as intermestic is nebulous. Both concepts are central to the book, but thankfully, after the introduction the author declines to burden her readers with much more of such jargon.

The body of *Ploughshares and Swords* is divided into

three chronological sections. The first covers the formative years of India's nuclear development, from World War II through independence and into the 1950s. During these years India's small coterie of trained physicists coalesced around their patron, Tata Industries, near its headquarters in Bombay, the city currently known as Mumbai. This metropolis, which is located nine hundred miles south of the political capital of New Delhi, insulated the scientists from significant political oversight, while the support of Tata made the nuclear program a mixed public-private endeavor. It was also during these years that Indian scientists developed their pattern of seeking out foreign technologies wherever they could find them. Trained in Britain, they reached out to the United States, where political leaders were wary of India using such technology for nuclear weaponry, but they also turned to France, where leaders asked far fewer questions.

Indian scientists also looked to Canada and Germany for technological assistance. India's monazite mines in its far south contained immense amounts of radioactive thorium, which can be used to produce weapons-grade uranium, albeit with difficulty. India temporarily used this resource to extort the Dwight Eisenhower administration into buying large quantities of monazite at a high price to ensure that India did not sell any to Communist Bloc nations. These actions showed how resourceful India's scientists and politicians could be.

The second section of the book focuses on how India's nuclear development factored into its unsuccessful 1962 war with China and its successful 1965 war with Pakistan. It is in these middle chapters that Sarkar reveals her gifts as a historian to the fullest, seamlessly weaving together diplomatic intrigues, military engagements, scientific advancements, and superpower rivalries.

The 1960s were a watershed for India's strategic culture and security establishment. In the 1950s, as the leader of what would become the Non-Aligned Movement, India sought friendly relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union even as it was establishing a friendly rapport with China's leaders. This last development was epitomized by the slogan "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai," meaning "The Indians and the Chinese are Brothers." But Sino-Indian comity did not survive China's crushing of the Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the Dalai Lama's flight to northern India, where he and his coterie found safe harbor. China began to fear Indian meddling in Tibetan territory, and the increasing antagonism between the two nations led to border clashes along India's northwestern and northeastern frontiers. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru began to reinforce these frontier posts, threatening territory claimed by China.

The People's Liberation Army responded in October 1962 by seizing the northern part of the Ladakh region in India's far northwest, a territory the Chinese call Aksai Chin and still occupy. That November, three PLA divisions decisively routed a comparably sized Indian force along India's northeastern frontier in what is now Arunachal Pradesh and threatened to penetrate deep into Indian territory. Having established undisputed dominance along this frontier, the Chinese promptly retreated into southeastern Tibet, but not before a panicked and humiliated Nehru asked John F. Kennedy to send over three hundred fighter jets to defend India, along with the U.S. pilots to fly them.

Two years later, in October 1964, China compounded India's insecurity by successfully detonating an atomic bomb. While the 1962 war spurred India to significantly expand and modernize its conventional forces, the

Chinese nuclear test accelerated its attempts to develop nuclear weapons. The Indian Army partially redeemed its reputation by besting Pakistan's army on the Punjabi plains in 1965. But in 1967, the Chinese successfully tested a hydrogen bomb, and in 1970 they sent their first satellite into orbit. India might have been dominant on the subcontinent, but China reigned supreme in Asia.

The book's third section covers India's successful nuclear test in 1974 and takes the story into the mid-1980s. The author ably details the impact of Sino-American rapprochement, which severely soured Indo-American relations, particularly during the Third Indo-Pakistani War in Bangladesh in 1971, when Richard Nixon strongly supported Pakistan so as not to jeopardize rapprochement with Pakistan's ally, China. Sarkar provides a skillful overview of Indira Gandhi's tilt toward authoritarian rule during the "Emergency" period from June 1975 until March 1977. She also shows that shift's connection to the nuclear program, calling nuclear weapons "a consensus-enforcing device" in Indian domestic politics.¹

In addition to developing nuclear weapons, Indian scientists also built intercontinental ballistic missiles to deliver warheads to their targets. In this endeavor, they were aided by India's space program. This supposedly peaceful program received foreign assistance that could be—and was—applied to the nuclear program, a notable example of India turning ploughshares into swords. The technology of rocketry and missileery was basically the same. To quote the scientist Satish Dhawan, who led India's Department of Space in the 1970s, "What's the damn difference? Only the software! You make a few minor changes, and the damn thing goes differently."²

India also masked the military nature of its first underground nuclear test by claiming it was a "peaceful" attempt to extract natural gas. It should be noted that in the mid-1970s, the United States detonated three nuclear weapons deep underground to see if they could be used for this purpose, so India's claim did not seem quite as absurd at the time as it would seem now. India then refrained from any additional tests until 1998, when Pakistan detonated its first nuclear weapon.

Today, India has approximately 150 nuclear warheads, a stockpile that is on a par with Pakistan's but slightly less than half of what it is assumed China possesses. Militarily, the program has been a success. Furthermore, during the later stages of the George W. Bush administration, the United States resumed cooperation with India's nuclear industry, effectively sweeping previous concerns about proliferation aside. Indo-American military cooperation continued to strengthen under the Obama and Trump administrations, and U.S. friendliness to India is as bipartisan today as antipathy is towards China. In terms of modernization, however, India's nuclear program has been a failure. Currently, nuclear power produces only slightly more than 3 percent of the nation's electricity.

My one quibble with Sarkar's exemplary monograph is that for a book that makes frequent use of the term "intermestic," there is not a lot of discussion of domestic politics. Sarkar references the existence of an anti-nuclear movement in India but fails to note if these activists were clustered in certain political parties or what form their activism took. Were there demonstrations against nuclear weapons similar to those organized by the nuclear freeze movement in the United States or Western Europe? Were there members of India's parliament who spoke out against nuclear weapons and nuclear power? This otherwise commendable work does not provide answers to these pertinent questions.

All that is clear is that both of India's governing parties fervently supported the development of nuclear weapons. Left-of-center Congress Party governments developed the first nuclear weapons, and right-of-center

Bharatiya Janata governments eagerly expanded the nuclear arsenal. If anything, it would appear that these two rival parties competed to see which one's leaders could be more supportive of the nuclear program. I also wonder if the insulation of India's nuclear weapons program from political oversight is more the norm than the exception in democracies. That was certainly the case in the United States.³ I would like to know if there were any nuclear weapons programs that did not enhance the power of the executive while marginalizing the legislature. Swords and ploughshares may go together, but bombs and democratic accountability apparently do not.

Notes:

1. Jayita Sarkar, *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 2022), 175.
2. Sarkar, *Ploughshares and Swords*, 155.
3. See Garry Wills, *Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State* (New York, 2010).

Seven Questions on...

Environmental Diplomacy

Kurk Dorsey, Gretchen Heefner, Toshihiro Higuchi, and Stephen Macekura

Editor's note: *"Seven Questions On..." is a new regular feature in Passport that will ask scholars in a particular field to respond to seven questions about their field's historiography, key publications, influences, etc. It is designed to introduce the broader SHAFR community to a variety of perspectives for a given field, as well as serving as a primer for graduate students and non-specialists. AJ*

1. What drew you to this field and inspired you to focus on your specific area of international/diplomatic environmental history?

Kurk Dorsey: Since I was a teenager, I have been fascinated by wildlife, especially birds. I started at Cornell as a biology major, thinking I would be a field biologist, until I took Walter LaFeber's foreign policy courses and saw the light. At one point, I read half a sentence in Tom Paterson's textbook about a migratory bird treaty from 1916 and thought that there had to be an interesting story there. There wasn't, but I wrote a book about it anyway! I didn't know what environmental history was until I got to Northwestern and met Art McEvoy, and that fortuitous meeting led me to look for ways to combine diplomatic and environmental history. At Yale, I was very lucky that both Gaddis Smith and Bill Cronon were willing to support my efforts to write a dissertation that dealt with some early 20th century environmental diplomacy between the US and Canada.

Gretchen Heefner: My engagement with environmental history lacks a particularly robust academic pedigree. I was not trained in environmental history nor was I even particularly aware of it as a distinct field until I realized - quite accidentally - that I might be one. In fact, for much of graduate school (and well beyond), I felt like something of a misfit generalist in a world that prizes specialization. If someone asked me: "what is your conference?", I was not sure what to answer. My research dabbled in stories of the U.S. West, social and military histories, U.S. in the world, and - I discovered later - environmental history. While I ultimately found an intellectual home with SHAFR, I have continued to circle at the edges of environmental history because it is the link that stitches together the stories I want to tell.

As a graduate student I was drawn to books by historians of the U.S. west and the environment because they managed to be academically rigorous and good stories. (Not coincidentally these two fields have long been linked). Really, then, I started poking into the field of environmental history because I was looking for models of good storytelling, which always seemed to start with scene-setting. It was not until later that I began to appreciate and notice the methodological and theoretical potential in environmental history.

Since I study the construction of military facilities around the world, the environment was a rather obvious tableau. You cannot write about how a man digs a hole in a glacier without starting to think about the mechanics of the glacier; the way snow changes into ice; or that if it is cold enough it is impossible to operate a metal drill without proper gloves, but proper gloves make operation impossible. The environment changes what the engineer can do with the tools they know and the blueprints they carry.

Toshihiro Higuchi: I was drawn to the study of U.S. foreign relations via my first M.A. thesis on Japan's nuclear disarmament policy that I wrote while in Japan. Being that virtually every aspect of my thesis was deeply tied to the United States, I needed to learn more about the American side of the story before proceeding with a Ph.D. dissertation. That is why I moved to the United States for the History M.A. program at the State University of New York at Albany where I wrote my second M.A. thesis on the Eisenhower administration's nuclear test-ban policy.

I became interested in the environmental dimensions of U.S. foreign relations by accident. I wasn't aware that there was such a thing as environmental history until halfway through my Ph.D. work. Indeed, I had entered Georgetown University wanting to write a dissertation on the social and cultural history of mutually-assured destruction. Then, toward the end of my coursework, I happened to learn about a major conference on the environmental histories of the Cold War that Georgetown historian John McNeill and his colleagues were organizing at the German Historical Institute. The conference theme inspired me to revisit the test ban as one of the first global environmental initiatives during the Cold War.

Stephen Macekura: My introduction to environmental history came from Edmund Russell. I was a Ph.D. student at the University of Virginia. I had arrived at UVA planning to work with Melvyn Leffler. I was focused on U.S. international development and foreign economic policy during the early Cold War. But I took a seminar with Ed on global environmental history that inspired me to study environmental history more closely. Ed helped me to understand how the environmental historian's perspective permits one to ask questions about the connections between policy decisions and their material and ecological consequences; about the ecological basis upon which national power rests; about how environmental ideas constrain or enable different ways of imagining the world and one's place within it. Global environmental history also incorporated analysis of historical change on longer temporal and spatial scales than international/diplomatic historians typically ventured. I found it fascinating.

While I was taking Ed's class, I decided that I wanted to investigate how environmentalism had (or had not) reshaped U.S. foreign policy and the extent to which foreign policy elites had ever incorporated ecological ideas into their policymaking. Those questions led a seminar paper that I researched and wrote about the President Nixon administration's policy towards the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. That paper, in turn, became the basis of my dissertation and later, my first book, *Of Limits and Growth*.

2. Which scholars do you see as having laid the groundwork for the study of environmental history in U.S. foreign relations?

KD: In terms of recent historians, both Tom Paterson and Mark Lytle published calls to incorporate environmental history into diplomatic history in the 1990s, but I think it is fair to say that some of our distant forebears were well aware of the way that the environment shaped US relations with the rest of the world. Writing about fisheries diplomacy goes back decades, and after all it was Samuel Flagg Bemis who summarized the species at the core of the 1911 fur seal dispute with Great Britain: "Amphibious is the fur seal, ubiquitous and carnivorous, uniparous, gregarious, and withal polygamous." Of course, it would have been very hard to combine environmental history if scholars like Roderick Nash, Samuel Hays, and Don Worster hadn't done important work to establish environmental history as a field in the 1970s.

GH: I will not be alone in my answer to this: Kurk Dorsey. There have been others, to be sure, but since his 2005 Bernath lecture, "Dealing with the Dinosaur (and its swamp)," Dorsey has continued to implore historians of the U.S. in the world to engage with the environment. (It is worth noting here that the other way around does not seem to be a problem, environmental history has long been interested in international and transnational ties). Dorsey has done just about everything imaginable to jump start this conversation: He has trained students, chaired panels, written justifications, been highly visible across both academic associations, and been a fierce advocate for students and academics interested in linking the two. He even gave the outstanding suggestion to graduate students in his 2005 address (one I now use with my own students): to think about how topics we think we know might be told with an environmental inclination. I am still waiting for an environmental history of containment.

Others that have also been important to how I have come to think about these connections. Given my own work in the Cold War and late 20th century, the work of Kate Brown and Jacob Darwin Hamblin have been instrumental in how I think about the relationships between defense practices and environments. Brown's work, in particular, operates on a number of different scales to show how certain processes (such as plutonium production) can affect individual health, local environments (through contamination and rearrangement of land and place), and global systems.

TH: I believe I am not alone when I say that we are all indebted to Kurk Dorsey for his path-breaking scholarship and tireless advocacy for bringing diplomatic and environmental history together. His wide-ranging work on wildlife hunting and protection (*The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy*, 1998; *Whales and Nations*, 2013) has not only introduced the environment as a major topic of research in the history of U.S. foreign relations but also advanced the international and transnational turns in historiography by illuminating the trans-border movement of migratory animals and the humans who followed them.

Another trailblazer is Richard P. Tucker, who has played an influential role in greening some of the well-studied themes in the field. His acclaimed book on the U.S.-driven ecological degradation of the tropical world (*Insatiable Appetite*, 2000) has added a new, environmental dimension to the study of the American empire. His co-edited volume with Edmund Russell (*Natural Enemy, Natural Ally*, 2004) has opened a new field of study on the relationship between war and the environment.

SM: I started my research in international/diplomatic history at a propitious time, as there many other scholars doing excellent research linking these fields. Mark Lytle and Kurk Dorsey were pioneers, and they had both published essays in *Diplomatic History* calling for diplomatic historians to incorporate environmental history into their study. Richard Tucker had written about the ecological consequences of the United States' quest for natural resources overseas. Jacob Hamblin was writing about U.S. environmental diplomacy and Cold War attempts to weaponize the non-human world. David Zierler, Lisa Brady, Evelyn Krache Morris, and others were investigating the environmental history of recent U.S. warfighting and toxic chemical use abroad. Tom Robertson and Linda Nash and many more were studying the ecological dimensions of U.S. international development policy. All these scholars greatly influenced my thinking at the time.

3. Discuss how the field has evolved to include different approaches to analyzing international/diplomatic environmental history.

KD: Of all fields that should evolve, ours is probably second only to history of science! Perhaps because it is so young, it really has not evolved, except maybe from some of us taking on relatively low-hanging fruit, like treaties specifically about wildlife, to much more complex negotiations among many nations about very technical subjects. One of the biggest changes that I have seen is a shift in who is writing about the environment in diplomatic history. When I started in the field in the 1990s, it seemed like most of my peers were historians of science, like Jake Hamblin and Kristine Harper, or environmental historians who were interested in transnational issues. Just from perusing recent issues of *Diplomatic History* and *Environmental History* it seems that more people who would label themselves as diplomatic historians are paying attention to the environment, with the environmental historians' interest staying roughly steady. Of course, those labels are hardly permanent-easily scraped off and replaced.

GH: Let me start by reminding readers that the field of environmental/U.S. in the world history remains wide open. In terms of how the field has evolved, I will note a few key topics that highlight some of the most exciting work and promising areas for exploration. Interested readers check out my recent concepts article for *Diplomatic History*, "An Accidental Environmental Historian," for complete and additional citation.

First, I would point to histories of development, particularly during the early Cold War when U.S. personnel fanned out around the world to remake spaces and places. Thomas Robertson's work on this is a great place to start, see especially his 2016 *Cold War History* article. He reminds us that things such as dams, roads, wells, and resource extraction all have what he calls "cascading environmental consequences." Second, while histories of war have long engaged with the environment, a new generation of scholarship is looking beyond how terrain and climate might affect battles, to how environments shape strategies and plans. Lisa Brady

has an overview in, “War from the Ground Up: Integrating Military and Environmental Histories” (2019). Third, the study of commodities and resources has emerged with the field of US in the world in exciting ways. Start with Megan Black’s fantastic book, *The Global Interior*. Julia Irwin in her 2021 Bernath lecture (printed in *Diplomatic History* in June of that year) highlights the fourth area where environmental methods seem to have an obvious fit with diplomatic histories: studies of catastrophe and responses to them.

TH: One of the most notable trends in recent scholarship is to explore the mutual constitution of the American empire and the global environment. Megan Black’s *The Global Interior* (2018) revealed the hidden role of the Department of the Interior in expanding and exploiting America’s mineral frontiers around the world. A number of scholars have also shed light on extreme environments, including the polar regions, desert, seabed, and outer space, as real-world laboratories for forging and asserting (extra)terrestrial American power. One such place, the Bering Strait region, became a front line of resource grab competition between capitalism and communism, as Bathscheba Demuth demonstrated in *Floating Coast* (2020).

The planetary reach of the American empire, civil society, and international institutions after 1945, in turn, radically reshaped the ideas of the global environment. In *Arming Mother Nature* (2013), Jacob Darwin Hamblin explained how a wide range of environmental warfare research sponsored by the U.S. military and its NATO allies gave rise to “catastrophic environmentalism.” Stephen Macekura’s book, *Of Limits and Growth* (2015), showed how the racialized fears of environmental degradation in the postcolonial world spurred U.S.-based and international environmental NGOs to push the discourse of sustainability into the development agenda. Perrin Selcer’s *The Postwar Origins of the Global Environment* (2018) revealed the role of the United Nations in forging a community of experts committed to rendering the global environment legible as a knowable and controllable object for technocratic governance.

These and other critical inquiries into the environmental context of American globalism have done much to diversify the historical actors, analytical perspectives, and archival sources of U.S. foreign relations. As scientists, engineers, NGOs, and international institutions have moved to the foreground of analysis, the knowledge of the environment itself has become an object of historical inquiry. The ecological perspective on the frontiers and borderlands has also underscored the importance of the material culture and lived experience of the people living on the edge of the American empire, including indigenous communities and migrant workers.

SM: The field has evolved in exciting ways. Following Kurk Dorsey’s pathbreaking analysis of conservation diplomacy during the early twentieth century, the historiography of environmental diplomacy has grown extensively during the past two decades. So too has the history of major international agreements and environmental issues (such as Rachel Rothschild’s study of acid rain and Toshihiro Higuchi’s investigation of the international dimensions of nuclear fallout and the origins of the Partial Test Ban Treaty), and there is some very promising work on climate change diplomacy in the pipeline. There has also been some insightful studies of the materiality of U.S. foreign policy. Gretchen Heefner’s recent work on extreme landscapes and the construction of military spaces is a great example of this, as is Simone Müller’s important research on the United States and the global trade in hazardous wastes.

4. What are some of the challenges faced by scholars working in the field?

KD: The biggest challenge is that just as someone needs Russian language skills to specialize in relations between the United States and Russia/Soviet Union, one needs some sort of scientific background to dig into an environmental issue. I had some knowledge of ecology from my undergraduate biology degree, which was very helpful for my books on wildlife and diplomacy. It doesn’t have to be a formal degree, but one probably needs a bit more than a close reading of some of the Wikipedia pages that my undergrads favor. But other than that, the challenges seem minimal: only occasionally are we dealing with highly classified materials, I don’t think we have any problems being taken seriously anymore based in part by how often environmental topics show up in *Diplomatic History*, for instance, and there are so many great topics that there is plenty of room for people to make a mark.

GH: Like efforts to integrate diverse fields and methods into our scholarship, time is perhaps the biggest obstacle. Who has time to learn new tools? Another difficulty—perhaps particularly relevant to environmental historians—is the tension between traveling to environments and attending to the costs of travel, both financially and environmentally. This relates to the final conundrum I see, which is the challenge of presentism. Given our global environmental crisis, scholars who engage with environmental issues and questions may find it difficult to avoid/stay clear of contemporary debates. This should not be the case; certainly not all history needs to relate to the here and now. But I think in the field of environmental history the line between activism and scholarship may be increasingly challenging to navigate.

TH: Many of the challenges faced by scholars working in the intersection between diplomatic and environmental history concern archival material. At times, information simply does not exist. Those who created records often ignored the non-human domain altogether or documented it in a selective and inconsistent manner. Even if such information exists, we may fail to recognize it as such. Diaries and journals often include revealing observations on the environment in which a certain event occurred, but historians tend to skip them and, in doing so, remove the event from its environmental context. Moreover, written documents may not suffice. In his 2019 presidential address at the American Historical Association annual meeting, John McNeill spoke of “peak document,” underlining the growing importance of scientific and archeological data in studying the deeper past.

The last point leads to another set of challenges. Historians often rely on the best available scientific information to reconstruct the environmental past. Science, however, is a dynamic human enterprise that produces conflicting evidence and interpretations in the process. Science also inevitably involves making assumptions and judgments, not all of which are testable and subject to rigorous peer review. Worse still, as Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway demonstrated in *Merchants of Doubt* (2010), some groups and individuals deliberately cast doubt on a scientific consensus on harmful products and activities to confuse the public, stir a debate, and stall timely action. For environmental historians, then, science is a sort of double-edged sword; it offers a powerful tool to study the past but also has a danger of misrepresentation and even unwittingly aiding the spread of disinformation.

SM: Environmental historians face the same major challenges all historians do: the absence of tenure track jobs, a paucity of research funding, declining support among administrators for the liberal arts in general, etc. In terms of their intellectual labor, there are a few additional challenges. Learning to ask questions like an environmental historian and understanding what it means to take the non-human world seriously in historical study are both time-consuming. It's helpful to have some grounding in the history of ecology and contemporary earth sciences to understand how human activities relate to natural systems, but that, too, takes up both time and resources.

In addition, researching environmental history often requires one to look beyond the typical archives of the diplomatic and international historian - governments and international organizations—and towards those who generate ecological ideas and promote changes in policy—private scientists and other intellectuals, social movement activists, non-governmental organizations. Those materials can be unorganized and incomplete. I've looked at archival materials for small NGOs than were just disorganized boxes of draft reports stashed away in a former official's basement. That can be frustrating, and it can also require creative ways of tracking down primary source material.

5. What are some of the significant questions in the field that you feel need to be addressed in greater detail or, alternatively, which questions need to be reconsidered by contemporary scholars?

KD: This will be a cop out, but the field is so new that I cannot think of anything that needs to be reconsidered. I suppose that we could revisit some of the fisheries disputes that earlier historians wrote about and bring in the methods of environmental history, that is, take more seriously the ways in which nature has been an actor. This idea, that nature is an historical actor, has been the biggest contribution of environmental history as a whole, and it may also be one of the hardest for other historians to integrate into their work. Of course, military historians have long recognized the role of things like weather, climate, forage crops, and tides in shaping the actual tides of war. Likewise, I don't think we have core questions that need to be settled, like we have debates about the origins of the Cold War or the reasons for dropping atomic weapons on Japan. Instead, people in our subfield seem more interested in filling in gaps rather than revising each other's arguments.

GH: We need more about how ideas about environments shape policy decisions and outcomes, as well as how global environments constrained (or provided opportunities) to U.S. operations and activities. Not every story benefits from an environmental reading, but it is worth thinking about where the environment might fit in every topic you consider. I would also like to see more histories of climate change policies and investigations that engage seriously with both policy and the environments at the heart of those policies.

TH: First and foremost, the history of the American empire needs to be brought into a fruitful dialogue with the history of Earth. Until recently, scholars had viewed the two histories as opposite ends of the timescale. Fernand Braudel once declared the natural world to be the immobile and almost timeless structure, likening political events to "surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs." As Dipesh Chakrabarty has recently noted, however, the geological and human timescales have become increasingly synchronized in the Anthropocene, a term proposed to describe the most recent period in Earth's history where human activities

have become a major driver of environmental changes on a planetary scale. A critical inquiry into many and various connections between the American empire and the Anthropocene is timely and urgent, as the whole world now confronts the large-scale and accelerating environmental consequences of Pax Americana.

The blurred boundary between human activities and natural processes in the Anthropocene, in turn, demands a more-than-human approach to the history of U.S. foreign relations. Rejecting the ontological distinction between "humans" and "nature," the more-than-human perspective illustrates their thorough entanglement across multiple scales. For instance, as John McNeill, Emily O'Gorman, and others have shown, humans, mosquitoes, and parasites in the European tropical colonies changed their behavior in response to one another and also shaped the (class-based, racialized, and gendered) ideas of health and illness with far-reaching implications for human and non-human cohabitants alike. Such relational views of the world suggest that, instead of trying to discover the role of nature in U.S. foreign relations as a discrete object, scholars should reconsider the familiar categories of humans and their collectives in relation to the things that both surround and constitute them.

SM: We need more studies of the short and long-term environmental consequences of U.S. foreign policy. I'm thinking here in terms of the inputs necessary to spark and sustain post-1945 U.S. economic growth and military expansion worldwide as well as the results of specific U.S. foreign policy actions, from changing trade policy to war-making, on the non-human world. The United States' empire is also an ecological one. It has used and continues to require vast networks of resources from around the globe, which in turn required the construction of massive infrastructure—of organizations, policies, physical objects—to move things all around the world. The United States has also generated deleterious ecological transformations because of its foreign policies. It has polluted land, air, and sea; it has destroyed lives and homes; it has burned staggering amounts of fossil fuels. It has changed the natural world, and in turn a changed natural world created new constraints and opportunities for further transformation (if not despoliation). Studying the nature, extent, and legacies of the ecological consequences of the United States and its place in the wider world—in both tightly focused local case studies and broad aggregate view—warrants greater study.

6. For someone wanting to start out in international/diplomatic environmental history, what 5-8 books do you consider to be of seminal importance—either the "best" or the most influential titles?

KD: In addition to the authors I mentioned above, start with anything by John McNeill, but especially *Mosquito Empires*

Richard Benedick, *Ozone Diplomacy*

Edwin Martini, *Agent Orange*

Rachel Rothschild, *Poisonous Skies*

Helen Rozwadowski, *The Sea Knows No Boundaries*

Richard Tucker, *Insatiable Appetites*

Lissa Wadewitz, *The Nature of Boundaries*

GH: Ah, this is a tough question! My own interest is

going to significantly shape how I answer this, not only my scholarship but also the texts that influenced me. Bill Cronon's work should not be missed, his essays (many available on his website) are a great way into the field and into the sort of writing that environmental history can encourage. Linda Nash's scholarship has long inspired connections between environmental history, science and technology, and U.S. power. Richard Tucker's work in U.S. exploitation of tropics is a must read (*Insatiable Appetite: The U.S. and the Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World*). Dorsey's work (see answer to question 2) is central to shaping how scholars of U.S. foreign policy have thought about the intersection of these fields. For an introduction to the Cold War and environmental history I would look to the edited volume, *Environmental Histories of The Cold War*, edited by J.R. McNeill and Corinna Unger. The essays and authors featured point to a number of topics and approaches to environment/diplomatic history. I will mention again Kate Brown's *Plutopia*, which I think everyone should read. Interested readers should start with a few roundtables and special issues that should generate ideas and reflection. In 2008, *Diplomatic History* ran a forum on "new directions in environmental and diplomatic history," with an introduction by Dorsey and Lytle. The *Journal of American History's* 2013 roundtable on environmental history more broadly is an excellent introduction to key themes and debates with the field.

TH: Kate Brown, *Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972).

Bathscheba Demuth, *Floating Coast: An Environmental History of the Bering Strait* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2019).

John R. McNeill, *Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth Century World* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000).

Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, *Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010).

Edmund Russell, *War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to "Silent Spring"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

SM: Dorsey, Kurkpatrick. *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998.

McNeill, J.R. *Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.

Biggs, David. *Quagmire: Nation-Building and Nature in the Mekong Delta*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012.

Robertson, Thomas. *The Malthusian Moment: Global Population Growth and the Birth of American Environmentalism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012.

Brown, Kate. *Plutopia: Nuclear Families in Atomic Cities and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters*. New York:

Oxford University Press, 2013.

Hamblin, Jacob Darwin. *Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Rothschild, Rachel. *Poisonous Skies: Acid Rain and the Globalization of Pollution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019.

Demuth, Bathsbeba. *Floating Coast: An Environmental History of the Bering Strait*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2020.

7. For someone wanting to teach a course on international/diplomatic environmental history or add environmental history to an existing course on U.S. foreign relations, what core readings and/or media would you suggest?

KD: This is really a challenge, because it is hard to add an environmental angle to the study of the Cold War, for instance, if the students don't have the basics of the Cold War in the first place. My diplomatic and environmental history courses are separate entities with little overlap, although the one place where I am seeing more overlap as I teach is my current research focus, U.S. grain sales to the USSR in the 1970s. The good news is that there are a number of edited collections that could lend an article to flesh out a more traditional topic:

Bsumek, Kinkela, and Lawrence, eds., *Nation-States and the Global Environment*


McNeill and Unger, eds., *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*

Diplomatic History had two special issues of note: Volume 32, no. 4 Sept 2008, had a forum "New Directions in Diplomatic and Environmental History;" and Volume 44, no 3, June 2020, had an "Oceans Forum."

GH: I would start by helping students see the environmental histories that are already at the core of U.S. relations with the world. This could be through commodity chain or food histories, for example. But rather than use these examples to illuminate only stories of political economy and resource extraction, students can also think about the environments where things were produced and consumed, or how they traveled. Disease and public health policies are also good places to introduce environmental history into existing courses.

If you want to add additional readings to an existing syllabus that help reframe traditional events, you might consider a chapter from Mark Fiege's *Republic of Nature* (2013), that retells well-known episodes in U.S. history through an environmental lens. His chapters on the railroad (westward expansion), Civil War, the Atomic Sublime, or oil in the 1970s could all be of interest.

As for an assignment, I have asked students to recreate particular moments in the history we are learning about from an environmental angle. For example, what was the setting and environment like in at the Yalta Conference? Reagan's meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik? What it would have been like to be on a boat in the Pacific during a nuclear test? They have to try to figure out how to find detailed environmental data (i.e. weather, terrain, climate, what types of flora and fauna one might expect), etc. And then they need to put it together. How had the environment in questions changed? Did the event we are looking at change it more? Did people involved talk about the environment? If not, why? It helps us think through



2023 SHAFR ANNUAL MEETING

RENAISSANCE ARLINGTON
CAPITAL VIEW

Arlington, VA
June 15 - 17, 2023

KEYNOTE: THOMAS S. BLANTON
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: MARY ANN HEISS
KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

FRIDAY NIGHT SOCIAL EVENT:
POTOMAC DINNER CRUISE

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ACCOMMODATIONS, AND PURCHASE EVENT TICKETS!

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Night on the POTOMAC



2023 SHAFR Annual Meeting Friday Night
Social Event: Potomac Dinner Cruise

A THREE HOUR CRUISE OF THE MONUMENTS AT NIGHT

Date: Friday, June 16th, 2023

Time: 7pm-10pm

**Boarding Begins at 6pm*

Tickets:

- \$100 per person
- \$50 Discount for Students/Contingent Faculty/k-12 Teachers
- \$10 Bus Ticket

DETAILS

Ticket Includes Dinner and Drinks

Companion Tickets are Available
for Purchase

Visit the Conference Website to
Purchase Events Tickets
<https://shafr.org/shafr2023>

how we might take environments more seriously as part of history, not merely as the settings on which events unfold.

TH: David Biggs, *Quagmire: Nation-Building and Nature in the Mekong Delta* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012).

Megan Black, *The Global Interior: Mineral Frontiers and American Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

Kurkpatrick Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998).

Jacob Darwin Hamblin, *Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

John R. McNeill, *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Richard P. Tucker, *Insatiable Appetite: The United States and the Ecological Degradation of the Tropical World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

SM: As background for an undergraduate course on recent international environmental history, there are no better starting points than John McNeill's *Something New Under the Sun* (New York, 2000) and the more recent synthetic volume he co-wrote with and Peter Engelke called *The Great Acceleration* (Cambridge, MA, 2016). Both are encyclopedic in their details, expansive in their topical coverage, and filled with rich anecdotes—perfect material for lectures, in other words.

There are many terrific documentary collections available online related to climate diplomacy that can be the basis of fun primary source-based activities. The National Security Archive has excellent briefing books on specific episodes in climate diplomacy and climate policymaking. This collection on U.S. efforts to lobby for national security exemptions to the Kyoto Protocol, for example, provides a rich documentary collection on how the U.S. constructs foreign policy: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/environmental-diplomacy/2022-01-20/national-security-and-climate-change-behind-us>. And when I run UN climate simulations, I have great success in assigning students different countries to represent in the activity by having them research and analyze a country's past Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/indcs>.

BATTER UP FOR ...

THE RETURN OF THE SHAFR
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WASHINGTON NATIONALS BASEBALL GAME

SATURDAY, JUNE 17TH, 2023
NATIONALS PARK | 4:05PM

WASHINGTON NATIONALS VS MIAMI MARLINS

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SHAFR SPOTLIGHTS

My origin story: I went to college in Washington, D.C., thinking I'd become a globetrotting career diplomat who served in embassies, negotiated in palaces, and attended cocktail parties. So, I majored in international relations and political science... until 1989, when many of the learned theories about Soviet behavior and repression in Eastern Europe – those I had dutifully absorbed for the midterm – had dramatically transformed into history by the final exam. I pivoted to history as well. After teaching high school for three years, I returned to earn my Ph.D. at the University of Texas at Austin and joined SHAFR.

I focus on the roles American citizens and private organizations play in shaping American foreign relations and their relationships with policymakers. My first book, *Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940-1960*, looks at dissident screenwriters and expatriate playwrights; it earned honorable mention for the Bernath Prize. My second manuscript, *Shadow Diplomats: American Humanitarianism in the Era of the World Wars*, examines a network of religious organizations providing war relief and refugee resettlement. Since 2005, I've taught at Christopher Newport University in Virginia, where I serve as department chair and lead students on study abroad programs. Along the way, I've shared the adventure with Kristen, our kids Noah and Lauren, and dogs Ben and Chester.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

A cliché perhaps, but *Casablanca* is the perfect movie because I find some new layer each time I view it or teach with it. Every supporting character, line of dialogue, close-up, and prop is there for a reason. I also enjoy most of the HBO prestige dramas and the imaginative films of Wes Anderson, Quentin Tarantino, and the Coen brothers. A re-watch of *The West Wing* (with the accompanying podcast *West Wing Weekly*) offered a salve for the years 2017-2021.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I have great admiration for anyone serving on the program committee organizing a conference. Let's start with that. But I was a nervous young grad student presenting one of my first papers at a professional meeting in Albuquerque. (This was *not* a SHAFR conference!) When I headed to my assigned room, I discovered that the organizers had over-booked the available space and I had to deliver my paper with my fellow panelists in a hotel guestroom. We set ourselves up as best we could next to the television, pushed aside the ice bucket, and watched the audience settle onto the king-sized bed and floor like some John Lennon/Yoko Ono bed-in. Aside from the cringe factor, at least I can say that our panel attracted a standing-room-only crowd.

You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?

I prefer nonfiction, cities, and air conditioning. If I'm on a desert island, I fear I'm doomed.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

In spite of my answer to the previous question, I'd like to have dinner with novelist Graham Greene, author of *The Third Man*, *The Quiet American*, and *Our Man in Havana* because his life blended the romance and intrigue of the world with a wry wit. I think the same can be said of Edward R. Murrow and Julia Child, who also mixed in the world of diplomats, travel, food, and media. But if I could add a fourth, I'd like to meet a key figure in my current research: Laura Margolis, a no-nonsense social worker who out-worked State Department consuls and out-manuevered dictators to re-settle refugees in Cuba, Shanghai, postwar Europe, and in Israel. To do so as a woman at that time and in those settings is all the more impressive.

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

Just last week someone in Maine won \$1.35 billion. Why should the humanities always get the short end of the stick even in a fantasy? C'mon, *Passport*, time to keep up with the cost of dreaming.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I highly recommend visiting a new exhibit at the Smithsonian titled "Entertainment Nation," where you can walk on a portion of the actual stage from Woodstock. The music curator, John Troutman, is a good friend from grad school who played in a small bluegrass band in Austin called Quickdrawl. I'd like to take a time machine back to those evenings in the "Live Music Capital of the World," listening to Quickdrawl, eating great barbecue, drinking Shiner Bock, and laughing with friends who have since scattered to all corners of the country. Other acts through the decades: Louis Armstrong, Beatles, Blondie, Tom Petty, Green Day, AJR.

What are five things on your bucket list?

- I suppose *travel* is the obligatory answer for most SHAFR members. In that case, my top destination in different regions: Japan, Morocco, Croatia, Cuba, and New Zealand. (No desire to see Antarctica. City guy... remember?)
- attend a White House state dinner
- finish this damned book manuscript
- convince my wife we need one more dog in order to be livin' the dream
- take my Powerball winnings to invent a time machine in case I get stranded on a desert island

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I once thought about becoming a political cartoonist. Today, as a committed doodler, I hone my "craft" during long committee meetings.



Andrew J. Falk

I'm Lucy Salyer, Professor of History at the University of New Hampshire. I study the history of migration and citizenship policies. My most recent publications include *Under the Starry Flag: How a Band of Irish Americans Joined the Fenian Revolt and Sparked a Crisis over Citizenship* (2018) and "Reconstructing the Immigrant: The Naturalization Act of 1870 in Global Perspective" (*Journal of the Civil War Era*, Sept. 2021). My love of history comes from my parents who never failed to stop at a historical marker or museum – and there were many. As a Navy brat, we moved around a lot and my father made up shameless stories about whatever dirt road we passed ("the famous Pony Express trail!") or rundown shack we encountered ("the hideout for Billy the Kid!"). Unfortunately, my own family has developed an aversion to historical markers and does their best to distract me when we pass them on road trips. I have two grown (!) children who live too far away – Nate in VA, and Naomi in CA and a husband, Lee, who has put up with my obsession for history (so far) for 33 year.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

Singing in the Rain, All About Eve, Captain Kangaroo (showing my age), *Seinfeld, The Americans, Babe*

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

There are so many...Probably being at a small conference where I was supposed to provide a report on a group discussion, and I pronounced a very eminent historian's name incorrectly. They were present and they were not amused. In my defense, I had just had my second child and was in a brain fog. Now, I always make sure I know how to pronounce people's names!

You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?

Not *Lord of the Flies*...

Harriet the Spy – because it got me through elementary school, so I assume it would help tide me over until help came. It's like mac & cheese, comfort food of a novel. And perhaps *Charlotte's Web*. Actually, I would probably take a lot of kids' books, including *Boxcar Children* because they were very resourceful and knew how to keep the milk cool by putting it in the stream.

Life of Pi by Yann Martel – because it's been on my "to read" list for years and would seem appropriate, given the circumstances. Perhaps it will have some good tips on how to survive.

Anna Karenina, Tolstoy – if not now, when?

Things Fall Apart – Chinua Achebe. Also on my "to read" list for years and the title seems apropos.

I need something funny. *Maybe My Year of Rest and Relaxation* by Otessa Moshfegh. Haven't read it but going by the title and a promise that it's funny....sort of.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Famous people make me nervous, so I'd rather be a fly on the wall observing – maybe listening to the dinner party between Booker T. Washington and Theodore Roosevelt in 1901. I'd rather have dinner with some of the people I've researched who were not as well known – perhaps Wong Kim Ark whose legal challenge upheld birthright citizenship, or John Warren, one of the leaders of the Irish nationalist Fenian movement. He had a good tenor voice so we would have good music and singing afterwards. Actually, I'd like to meet his wife Johanna Warren who died from injuries in a fire as I've always been curious about the circumstances of her death, as well as her life as an Irish immigrant and as the wife of a transnational political activist.

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

Faint. And change my phone # and address, moving to a deserted island.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Not my strong point. Aretha Franklin, Yusuf Islam, Diana Ross and the Supremes; Pink Martini, Asleep at the Wheel, Queen -- anything that's good for dancing!

What are five things on your bucket list?

Go to Japan; learn how to draw/paint; take a long road trip around the US; try to write fiction; be on a desert island

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Baking pies? For a job, maybe a librarian? I have tremendous respect for librarians. Or I might have liked to work in public history – taking care of all those historical markers! Or be a kindergarten teacher. I like 5 year olds the best.



Lucy Salyer

I grew up in southern California. I have taught history for nearly a quarter-century at Penn State Shenango, a small campus in Sharon, PA (on account of its location, I call it “Penn State Ohio”). I’ve loved history ever since I was a kid, although well into grad school international relations was my primary subject. While my early scholarship was on the Cuban Missile Crisis, I’ve recently published two books on women and foreign relations: *Breaking Protocol: America’s First Female Ambassadors, 1933-1964* and *Clare Boothe Luce: American Renaissance Woman*. During my Ph.D. program I met my wife, who is also a historian (in the same sub-field!), and we spent several years moving from job to job, triangulating until we both landed tenure-track jobs and could live together, which we’ve done for many years now in Pittsburgh, PA. Despite our long commutes in opposite directions, we’re extremely fortunate and love living in The ‘Burgh.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

I’m a huge fan of *Dr. Strangelove* (best Cold War movie by a mile, in my view). I love *The Godfather* Parts I & II like everyone else but otherwise am weary of our fascination with the Mob. I’m generally a fan of good WWII movies, especially HBO’s *Band of Brothers* and *The Pacific*, (but also the Dutch classic *Soldier of Orange*). Finally, for some reason I’m especially fond of bleak corporate malfeasance dramas like *Margin Call* and *Michael Clayton*.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I have not suffered inordinately in this regard. But I would cite three minor incidents. First, while lecturing about Hamilton’s *First Report on the Public Credit*, I wrote it on the board but omitted the “L” in “Public”—the students noticed. Second, I once downplayed the importance of a search committee member’s subfield during a job interview—probably one reason why a friend calls me “Mr. January”—lots of first interviews, few campus visits. And third, it was nerve-wracking to address an audience of 700-800 people at Chautauqua about Truman and Hiroshima—I had never been in front of a crowd nearly so large. It went well, although after what I thought was an extremely moderate, post-revisionist account, one outraged older gentleman confronted me. “It’s all a bunch of BALONEY!” he screamed. I thought he was going to slug me, but happily he stormed off instead.



Philip Nash

You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?

Honestly, I am not a big consumer of fiction, but if pressed I would take a couple of classics, *The Grapes of Wrath* and *The Great Gatsby*, the latter in particular striking me as perfect in every way. They both capture so much about the American and human condition with beautiful writing. Although often grim (see my film preferences, above), I’d be happy taking just about any of George Orwell’s fiction with me. A far quirkier choice would be Hans Fallada’s *Every Man Dies Alone* (or *Alone in Berlin*), a fantastic novel based on the true story of a couple who resisted the Nazis during WWII, and despite its tragic ending, I find it most inspirational.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Jeeze, that’s a tough one. Well, one obvious choice would be Clare Boothe Luce, mainly because I just wrote a book about her, find her fascinating, and would have a million questions for her (although I’m sure I could only ask her one, because I would not be able to get another word in after that). Second, a cliché: John F. Kennedy. Luce and Kennedy could debate the Cold War, and she could call him out for hitting on her when he was a young Navy Lieutenant and had arrived for a date with her daughter. Third, just to mix things up, Kaiser Wilhelm II. I’d ask him, 1) Dude, what were you thinking? and 2) What do you think of these two?

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

That’s easy: Give 95% of it to my favorite charities and blow the rest on travel.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Pretty confident my music festival would be among the oddest. It would begin with Scott Joplin (not that he was the best ragtime pianist, but he was King of the Ragtime Composers). He would be followed by Herbert von Karajan conducting the Berlin Philharmonic in a Beethoven symphony, ideally *No. 7*. The finale would be provided by The Clash doing a set from *London Calling*.

What are five things on your bucket list?

Because I have no desire to do anything crazy, like jump out of a perfectly good airplane, my bucket list consists entirely of travel: 1) see all the huge swaths of the USA I haven’t visited yet, including most of the big National Parks, and do a lot of it by rail; 2) visit Berlin again, which I haven’t seen since 1984 and I suspect has changed just a bit; 3) take a full Rhine cruise, Basel to the North Sea; 4) I spent a few days in Ho Chi Minh City, but I’d like to see all of Vietnam; and 5) visit several of the best tropical sites for snorkeling.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I’d likely have been a Foreign Service Officer, which I was planning to do. But teaching has been an absolute blast, and I’d while it sounds like diplomats lead amazing lives, I’ve been delighted to study them rather than serving as one.

I am an Associate Professor of History at Emory and Henry College. Prior to joining the E&H faculty in 2013, I had excellent professors and mentors that gave my general interest in history some focus and direction. This was true at the University of North Carolina Wilmington, where I started to research U.S. foreign relations, and at Temple University, where I did my doctoral work. I am the author of *Losing Hearts and Minds: American-Iranian Relations and International Education during the Cold War* (Cornell, 2017) and editor of *American-Iranian Dialogues: From Constitution to White Revolution, c. 1890s-1960s* (Bloomsbury, New Approaches to International History, 2021). My current book, *Mission Manifest: American Evangelicals and Iran in the Twentieth Century*, will soon be published with Cornell's United States in the World series. When not being a historian, I spend time with my wife, Samantha, and daughter, Hazel, enjoying life in southwest Virginia and on the Atlantic coast.

What are your favorite movies / television shows of all time?

As a child of the eighties and nineties, I am always happy to take in an episode of Seinfeld or the Wonder Years. The light-hearted movies of that era are nice, stuff like the Princess Bride. Otherwise, I am not a huge screen person. Let's catch a Phillies game, or go to a concert.

What was your most nerve-racking professional moment?

It will sound cliché, but definitely the job interview experience – all of it, but especially the so-called cattle call at the AHA. That was full-body anxiety.

You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?

I would probably grab a few historical novels that I enjoy teaching in class. Simin Daneshvar's *Savushun*, set in Iran during the Second World War, would be a good choice. I would also take a book of poetry, probably something absurd or abstract, to keep life on a desert island interesting.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Perhaps an ancient philosopher or alleged prophet, just to see how their claims sound to modern ears. As a diplomatic historian, I would have to put a Lincoln or Roosevelt on the list to better understand power. Someone related to my current research is the late Richard Irvine, and it would be interesting to talk to him about running international schools in Tehran during the three decades prior to 1979.

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

I don't think that I've ever purchased a lottery ticket. If I won the lottery, I would definitely have some fun and travel. But I would use a large sum of it to support education long after I'm gone. I'd likely give money to organizations and institutions that have supported me over the years.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I would love to see all of the original "fusion" artists at their peak in the 1970s. The jazz bands, whose members cut their chops in the Miles Davis groups of the previous decade, would top the bill: Mahavishnu Orchestra, Return to Forever, Weather Report, all in their classic lineups. It would feature innovative artists from around the world ranging from Jiro Inagaki to Mulatu Astatke, improvisational American rock and roll bands like the Grateful Dead and the Allman Brothers, and crossover acts such as Jeff Beck.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I am not a professionally-trained musician, but I play music, and if I wasn't a historian, I would have done something else. Maybe it would have been music.



Matthew Shannon

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SHAFR Award-Winners Announced at the 2023 American Historical Association annual meeting

The **Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture Prize** was established through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their late son, to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by scholars at the beginning of their historical careers.

This year's Bernath Lecture committee--*Naoko Shibusawa (chair), Adriane Lentz-Smith, and Paul Thomas Chamberlin*--have selected Professor **Megan Black** of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to receive the 2023 Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture Prize. Professor Black (Ph.D. George Washington University, 2015) has written a field-defining work of scholarship that not only bridges several fields but also resonates with scholars and students alike. *The Global Interior: Mineral Frontiers and American Power* (Harvard University Press, 2018) won four major book awards including the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize for best first book as well as best book prizes from the American Society for Environmental Historians, the Western History Association, and the British Association for American Studies. By focusing on the Department of Interior's activities in the post-World War II period, Black demonstrates how U.S. settler colonialism has informed and shaped its free trade imperialism. In doing so, she has helped redefine how we should study U.S. empire. Attentive to the material as well as to the ideological, *The Global Interior* is a remarkable work of scholarship that will remain on Ph.D. field reading lists for many years to come.



The **William Appleman Williams Emerging Scholar Research Grants**

were established by SHAFR's Council to promote scholarly research by members within six years of the Ph.D. and working on their first research monograph. This year's committee was chaired by *Karen Miller* (pictured below with grant recipients) and included *Jay Sarkar* and *Dustin Walcher* and is delighted to make three awards this year:



Vivien Chang received her Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in 2022. She is currently the Henry Chauncey Jr. '57 Postdoctoral Fellow of International Security Studies at Yale University. In her project, "Creating the Third World: Anticolonial Diplomacy and the Search for a New International Economic Order, 1960-1975," Chang traces a shift in the economic commitments shared by anti-colonial and then postcolonial African elites in the era of decolonization. This group fostered transnational alliances with American Black Power activists. Initially, they embraced economic emancipation for African-descended people, a program based on liberation from colonial inequalities, regional cooperation, and cross-Atlantic activist solidarities. At the same time, American diplomats and private companies pushed aggressively against these economic visions. These sensibilities threatened U.S. elites' interest in integrating African countries into an American-led global order. By the end of this era, however, Chang demonstrates that African and Black American actors had largely reconciled themselves to global capitalism and their countries' roles within it. Ultimately, she concludes, "the most lasting result of debates" about development was "the creation of a 'Third World' embodied by Africa whose societies committed to adapting, for better or worse, to the logic of neoliberal globalization."

Molly Avery received her Ph.D. in International History at the London School of Economics in 2022. She is now a Lecturer in the School of History at Queen Mary, University of London. Avery's project, "The Latin American Anticommunist International: Chile, Argentina, and Central America, 1977-1984," considers the relationships between Southern Cone and Central American anticommunists from the late 1970s into the 1980s. At the time, military oligarchies led by strongman, right-wing dictators ruled Chile and Argentina. These states intervened in the civil wars that were tearing apart Guatemala and El Salvador. They lent military, material, and political support to murderous anti-communist and anti-indigenous counterinsurgent leaders. Chilean and Argentine interest in these conflicts stemmed from their leaders' commitment to undermining all Latin American communism, since they saw successful left-wing struggles anywhere in the region as threats to their own legitimacy. Turning away from more conventional diplomatic histories that examine Southern Cone dictatorships and Central American civil wars vis-à-vis their connections to the United States, Avery's work illustrates the critical importance of bringing these conflicts together under a single lens that takes the violent and even genocidal institutionalization of autocratic anti-communist internationalism within Latin America seriously.



Laila Ballout received her Ph.D. from Northwestern University in 2017 and is currently an Assistant Professor of History at Wichita State University. Her project, “Saving Lebanon: Religion, Ethnicity, and Human Rights in the Reagan Era,” considers a range of U.S. Americans’ responses to the Lebanese Civil War from the end of the 1970s up through 1990 when the conflict ended. Indeed, “war in Lebanon attracted the interest of a diverse community of Americans because the stakes of the conflict intersected with major developments in U.S. politics.” In her study, Ballout uses the U.S. relationship with Lebanon as a site for understanding important shifts in U.S. foreign policy at the end of the Cold War. She traces two distinctive changes—the expanding role of religion, especially Christianity and Islam, in U.S. decision-making about international relations and the emergence and expansion of Islamophobic hostility toward Muslims and Arabs within the United States. She is particularly interested in the growing power of evangelical Christian Zionism outside of the borders of Israel and the changing contours of Arab-American identity, political engagement, and movements to defend Arab- and Muslim-American rights.



The Myrna Bernath Committee—chaired by *Lucy Salyer* and including *Kimber Quinney* and *Carol Chin*—is delighted to announce that **Sarah Meiners**, Ph.D. candidate in the History Department of Cornell University, is the recipient of the 2023 **Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship**. Meiners’ ambitious and provocative dissertation project, “Asylum Archipelago: Migration in the Borders of Empire in the Pacific and Caribbean,” examines the enforcement of U.S. migration and refugee policy at the peripheries of the U.S. empire. Reframing the United States as an “empire of migrants,” rather than a “nation of immigrants,” Meiners analyzes the role of U.S. territories and overseas military bases in responding to migration crises to illustrate how foreign and refugee policies became intertwined. The Committee was extremely impressed by the rigor and sophistication of the project and extends its warm congratulations to Sarah.

The **Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship** honors the long-time editor of *Diplomatic History* and is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. *Katherine Marino* chaired this year’s selection committee, which also included *Lorenz Lüthi*, and *Victor McFarland*.

The committee awarded the 2023 Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship to **Alina Bykova**, a doctoral candidate at Stanford University. Her project, “Extraction Islands: Environment, Politics, and Security on Svalbard, 1850 to the Present,” engages both diplomatic and environmental history. The award will allow her to conduct research in the Norwegian Polar Institute archive. The committee was very impressed with the scope and ambition of the project.



SHAFR’s Graduate Student Fellowship and Grant Committee makes the majority of our grants and fellowships each year. This year’s committee was chaired by *Kate Burlingham* and included *Hiroshi Kitamura*, *Catherine Forslund*, *Christopher Dietrich* (pictured below making the awards), and *Elisabeth Leake*. It is happy to announce the winners of a number of dissertation grants and fellowships to deserving graduate students:



The **Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant** was established by the family of the late Stuart L. Bernath to support dissertation research by graduate students in SHAFR. This year’s recipient is **Evan Bonney**, a Ph.D. candidate in the History Department at Sciences Po, Paris. His dissertation, “Forests and Power in the United States Empire, 1891 to 1914,” holds that U.S. relations with the German Empire played a powerful role in the management and surveillance of extensive areas of western North America and Puerto Rico. It promises to be an exemplary trans-imperial history. Building on the correspondence of German ambassadors, German and American foresters, and the director of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bonney will use the fellowship for research at the U.S. National Archives in the record groups of the State Department, Interior Department, Forest Service, General Land Office, and Bureau of Indian Affairs.

SHAFR established the **Gelfand-Rappaport-LaFeber Fellowship** to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president; Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*; and Walter LaFeber, founding member and former SHAFR president. This year’s winner is **Brian McNamara**, a Ph.D. candidate in the History Department at Temple University. His dissertation, “American Africans: Conservative Black Internationalism in the Late Cold War,” examines how conservative African Americans, who identified first and foremost as Americans, developed a distinct ideology through their ties in Africa. The fellowship will support research in the papers of Hosea Williams and Leon Sullivan at the Carter Presidential Library and in the Maurice Dawkins papers at the African American Research Library and Cultural Center in Fort Lauderdale.





The **W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship** was created by SHAFR to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. This year's winner is **Andrew Klein**, a Ph.D. candidate at UCLA. His project, "Militant Capital: Race, Empire, and the Global History of Oakland, California, 1865-1980," explores how global struggles over land, labor, and conquest transformed the social and ecological landscape of the Oakland-East Bay landscape. In particular, he traces Oakland's tradition of racial internationalism to multi-generational struggles over the governance of coastal land that were part of a transit hub for long-distance trade, military logistics, and racialized migration. He will use SHAFR funds to visit archives in Washington, DC, and Hawai'i.

SHAFR created the **Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants** to help underwrite some of the research expenses related to doctoral dissertations. The committee awarded ten grants this year:

Graydon Dennison is completing his Ph.D. in History at Temple University. His dissertation contributes to histories of U.S. imperialism through an examination of the different modes of control and influence exerted by U.S. state and non-state activists in the isthmus of Panama. Moving away from a focus on the building of the Panama Canal, he instead explores the U.S. presence in interwar Panama as a manifestation of settler colonialism.



Kaitlin Findlay is a Ph.D. candidate at Cornell University. Her project looks at the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) humanitarian oversight of population transfer and detention of persons of Japanese descent in the United States and Canada during the 1940s. By considering the ICRC in North America, rather than Europe, her project recontextualizes the histories of North American internment within the transnational politics and practices of early twentieth-century liberal internationalism. She will use SHAFR funds to conduct research at that ICRC archives in Geneva, Switzerland.

Syrus Jin is a doctoral student working with Mark Philip Bradley at the University of Chicago. His dissertation project, "Militarized Modernity, Military Advisors, and the Global US Security Architecture," situates the rise of the U.S. security architecture in Asia in what he calls processes of "military modernization" that aimed to remake local societies in East and Southeast Asia, primarily Korea plus Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines. Syrus investigates U.S. assistance and advisory missions abroad that deployed U.S. personnel, expertise, and materiel to Asia. In addition, the United States guided foreign military officers into U.S. educational institutes and military schools as exchange students where they actively exported ideas of military capacity and effectiveness abroad in an effort to develop those nations. The everyday experience of U.S. advisors, their Asian counterparts, and military students who studied in the United States provides a critical analytical lens that subverts the policy-level synopsis of what military-building entailed.



Damanpreet Pelia is a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University in the Department of American Studies. Damanpreet's project examines the American Presbyterian missionary presence in Punjab, from 1834 until the turn of the twentieth century. Uniquely, the study utilizes several archives in the UK to understand these relations. The study raises important questions about the relationship between religion, state power, and the global reach of the United States. Damanpreet will use SHAFR funds to conduct research at the British Library, the School of Oriental and African Studies, Cambridge University, and the University of Birmingham.

A. J. Perez is a Ph.D. candidate at Penn State University. His dissertation explores the limits of U.S. Manifest Destiny by recounting the intertwined histories of Yucatán and Texas in the first half of the 19th century. His study, in particular, draws attention to the failed annexation of the Yucatán, illuminating the geopolitical power of the U.S. in the Gulf of Mexico. He will use the SHAFR funds to explore the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City.



Sam Rogers is completing his Ph.D. in History at the University of Kansas. His dissertation explores how and why human trafficking became key to U.S. policy in the aftermath of the Cold War. Drawing on state and international organization archives, as well as oral histories, he looks at a diverse set of activists to trace how human trafficking emerged as both a domestic and transnational policy issue in the 1990s.



Boyd Ruamcharoen is a Ph.D. candidate, working with Christopher Capozzola in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's interdisciplinary doctoral program in History, Anthropology, and Science, Technology and Society. Boyd's dissertation, "Tropical Preservation: Media Technologies and American Power in the Tropics," uses the history of media technology preservation—namely for radio electronics and photographic film—in tropical climates since World War II to explore the United States' projection of power into the wider post-war world. He tracks the circulation of media materials and of the technoscientific knowledge about their preservation (from heat, humidity, and fungus) in tropical climates in the United States and Global South. The U.S. military and a diverse set of historical actors employed such media in the tropical, decolonizing world and tapped into the science of environmental deterioration as they projected American economic and cultural power overseas. The grant will help with final research at the U.S. National Archives, the corporate archives of Kodak and the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), the Smithsonian Institute, UNESCO, and other international archives.

Richard Sakamoto-Pugh is a Ph.D. student in History at Vanderbilt University. Working under the direction of Paul Kramer, his dissertation studies the formation and development of an inter-American police alliance involving the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Relying on multilingual archival materials from three countries, Sakamoto-Pugh investigates the rise of a transnational police regime between the 1930s and onset of the Cold War. This study will enrich our understanding of hemispheric relations during the middle decades of the 20th century and will specifically highlight the significance of surveillance and security in shaping the political and cultural dynamic from the Good Neighbor era and beyond.



Rohan Shah is a doctoral candidate at Columbia University. Rohan's dissertation looks at the unfolding of Nixon's New Economic Policy from 1971 to 1987 to highlight the deep tensions between free-market ideas and U.S. nationalism, between labor and capital, and between producers and consumers that determined the "pre-history" of what came to be described as globalization in the 1990s. Rohan's study follows economic bureaucrats and traces internal clashes over how to navigate the changing place of the United States in the world economy. He will use SHAFR funds to investigate the AFL-CIO Archives at the University of Maryland as well as the Henry M. Jackson Papers at the University of Washington.

Kaitlin A. Simpson is a Ph.D. student in History at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Working under the direction of Tore C. Olsson, Simpson examines the transnational formation of the cut flower industry in the Western Hemisphere. The dissertation specifically focuses on the interplay between the United States and Columbia, from which over 70 percent of cut flowers sold in the U.S. are produced. Through use of archival sources from the two countries, Simpson will demonstrate the political and economic forces that shaped the birth and growth of the cut flower enterprise since the mid 1960s and, in doing so, will reveal the roles of gender and consumerism in strengthening the hemispheric relationship.



SHAFR Council meeting via Zoom

Wednesday, January 4, 2023, 10 a.m.-2 p.m. (U.S. Eastern time)

Meeting Minutes

Present: Ann Heiss (presiding), Shaun Armstead, Laura Belmonte, Megan Black, Emily Conroy-Krutz, Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Gretchen Heefner, Daniel Immerwahr, Mitch Lerner, Sarah Miller-Davenport, Andrew Preston, Vanessa Walker, Molly Wood, Kelsey Zavelo

Attending: Amy Sayward (ex officio), Faith Bagley, Brian Etheridge, Kelly McFarland, Anne Foster, Petra Goedde, Elizabeth Ferguson

Introductory Matters

Ann Heiss started the meeting with introductions. Amy Sayward reviewed the motions passed since the last meeting in June: approval of minutes from the June and September 2022 Council meetings; approval of Brandon Byrd for *Diplomatic History* editorial board; and tie-breaker for Nominating Committee election. Sayward also highlighted retiring Council and committee members listed in the document packet; Council passed a resolution of thanks through consensus.

Financial Matters

Sayward reviewed the fiscal-year-end financial reports, including the Profit and Loss statement, a detailed Profit and Loss statement, and the Endowment Spending Report. She also reviewed the financial report, highlighting revenue and expenditures for the organization in each of the headings. Mitch Lerner and others expressed concern about the stock-market losses to the endowment. Lerner stated that he was dissatisfied with the fund manager's report to the Ways & Means Committee in November and requested Council permission to talk to the endowment liaison and the investment manager to discuss on-going concerns and report back to Council. There was appreciative consensus supporting this request.

Laura Belmonte, chair of the Ways & Means Committee, reviewed the recommendations of the committee to Council and echoed the concern about endowment losses stated earlier in the meeting. In regard to amendments to the contract that Oxford University Press has requested, the Ways & Means Committee opposed such amendments ahead of renewal/renegotiation of the contract at the end of 2024. The committee also thought that—to a large degree—the desired outcome of the second contingent faculty manuscript workshop proposed by former SHAFR President Andrew Rotter could be achieved without cost by shifting it to a Zoom workshop rather than reimbursing conference travel and attendance costs. This venue also holds the potential to make the mentorship more broadly available to precarious faculty. The Ways & Means Committee recommended a pay increase for SHAFR's Conference Coordinator and IT Director. Andrew Preston moved, Daniel Immerwahr seconded, and Council voted 13-0-1 in favor of an increase.

Electronic Communications

Brian Etheridge and Kelly McFarland, the Electronic Communication Co-editors, joined the meeting to give an update on the website. They had reached out to several web designers and settled on one, but the big question is how to best integrate the MemberClicks and shafr.org websites. Etheridge shared some examples of sites that use MemberClicks and some that just connect to MemberClicks. MemberClicks has limited templates, but SHAFR can use a web designer to customize one of the templates for the SHAFR website. Etheridge and McFarland recommended building the website within MemberClicks to make it functionally easier for members and to limit expenditures. Council questions led to clarification that some areas of the website can be public and others reserved (via password) to members. There was also a request to update some of the photographs (perhaps at the 2023 SHAFR Conference) that illustrate the current website. Etheridge and McFarland then left the meeting. Belmonte moved and Immerwahr seconded a motion that SHAFR unify its website under MemberClicks at the \$750 design expense specified; Council approved the motion unanimously 14-0.

Sayward mentioned IT Director George Fujii's report, which documented our website traffic, as well as former SHAFR President Mary Dudziak's report about Twitter. Sayward mentioned that SHAFR has downloaded and archived its tweets in case the platform implodes and highlighted Dudziak's recommendation to wait and see what happens since there is not currently a comparable platform.

Conference Matters

Sayward offered a short summary of Conference Coordinator Kaete O'Connell's report to Council, highlighting the cruise of the Potomac for the 2023 conference. She anticipated a great event but pointed out that tickets might be a bit higher than the norm in order to be more revenue neutral. For 2024, she highlighted affordable campus housing at the University of Toronto and anticipated a hotel contract in the near future. And she reminded Council that proposals to host the 2026 SHAFR conference were due in February and would be reviewed by Council in June.

Sayward also provided updates on the external ombudsperson who contracts with SHAFR to manage code-of-conduct

transgressions. Sherry Marts had handled SHAFR's original training and guided policy development at a very affordable rate, but she retired. Last year, SHAFR used the services of her successor, which were much more expensive. As a result, with support from SHAFR's President and Vice President, Sayward had negotiated with her colleague, Ashley Valanzola, to provide these services for a third of the previous cost. She also clarified that SHAFR's options remain open in the case that an external investigation is required: SHAFR could negotiate with Valanzola to conduct the investigation or employ a different investigator. Sayward also clarified that during the American Historical Association (AHA) meeting, SHAFR is covered by the AHA code of conduct and procedures.

Heiss then initiated discussion about the future of SHAFR events at the AHA, including the luncheon and the reception. Declining attendance and the difficulty of planning off-site events has characterized recent AHA conferences and resulted in high costs for SHAFR. Heiss proposed that beginning in 2024 the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture be delivered at SHAFR's conference rather than the AHA, which was what had happened for the past two years (during the virtual conference in 2021 and at the in-person SHAFR conference in 2022). Heiss argued that this would provide a larger audience for the Bernath Lecture and would limit expenses, by both eliminating the luncheon at the AHA and the need to pay a second luncheon speaker for the conference. There was general consensus in support of this. There was some concern about whether there would be a node for SHAFR historians at the AHA to socialize together, and Sayward suggested the possibility of SHAFR-arranged small-group dinners by SHAFR members attending the conference or the possibility of setting a general meet-up off-site. Sayward also mentioned that the Bernath family's concern when making the endowment was that it would reach a large audience, and Heiss shared that this desire had led SHAFR to move the lecture from the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH) meeting sometime earlier.

Publication Matters

Diplomatic History (DH) editors Anne Foster and Petra Goedde joined the meeting to discuss their report. Things are going well, with production issues having been seemingly ironed out. Submissions are down for the first time in several years, which they expected was largely the result of the COVID pandemic's impact on research access. Resubmissions from authors are also taking a little longer than before.

Sayward mentioned a previous issue raised by the editors of securing additional editorial support for international submissions and asked if it might be helpful to have Zoom workshops or other resources/help for those authors. She also mentioned the possibility of a more general workshop, open to all SHAFR members, on transforming your conference paper into an article. The editors thought this might be helpful, especially in building authors' confidence for submission. There was discussion about the role of the editorial board and of access to relevant, scholarly, secondary literature, which is becoming a broader issue in the profession in general. There was further discussion of how the Archival Sharing Committee and/or the Internationalization Task Force might be a further resource in helping Council think through these issues.

Elizabeth Ferguson joined to present Oxford University Press (OUP) Publisher's Report. She highlighted a slide showing "Visits with Content Engagement over Time," which showed a dip from 2021 in the number of downloads for articles. The reasons for this included a 2021 glitch that made all OUP articles free for an eight-week period and a special issue that year, so the lower numbers this past year are not concerning. She also highlighted the "Impact Factor Trend," which showed that 2021 was the second highest, indicating a higher rate of citing *DH* articles published in the last five years. The slide "Institutional Subscriptions by Subscription Type" showed a decline in conventional academic subscriptions due to library cuts, which has resulted in OUP trying to move those conventional subscriptions to collections, which are more financially prudent for libraries. The number of articles published open access was only three in 2022, which was down from 2021. Ferguson highlighted a new portal that helps authors choose their licensing and shows whether there are funds available for open access publishing. Finally, she showed the slide "Online Publication Speeds," which shows most production is under the thirty-day target, which is an improvement after earlier production issues.

Ferguson also addressed the impact of growing inflationary costs, which included a 15% increase in the cost of printing and distribution. This has meant that SHAFR's current per member pricing does not cover the cost of producing the journal, which will likely result in increased prices in the future. She also highlighted a new feature that allows OUP to anonymously collect aggregate demographic information on authors. Sayward raised a question about members not receiving their issues—or replacement issues—in a timely manner. Ferguson asked that she be included in all email requests for those issues so that she will be more aware of the problem from the beginning and better able to gauge the scale of the issue and to troubleshoot whether the issue is internal to OUP or more related to the U.S. Postal Service. Sayward thanked Ferguson for this suggestion on how to improve the situation. Ferguson, Goedde, and Foster then left the meeting.

Sayward then explained that *SHAFR Guide* editor Alan McPherson had asked for a reaffirmation of SHAFR's financial support for new section editors, which had already been written into the budget that Council had previously reviewed. Belmonte moved, Lerner seconded, and Council unanimously passed this resolution of reaffirmation.

Council Matters

Heiss discussed the possibility of a changed policy on proxy votes, which have previously not been allowed by the rationale that not being part of the Council discussion means that that member cannot generally register an informed vote. The consensus was that a change in policy was not needed.

Sayward then asked Council its opinion on whether the June Council meeting should be at the conference or virtual. Council members commented that in-person Council meetings at the conference have required members to travel early and to miss the starting session of the conference; they have also sometimes had to rush to complete the agenda in the allotted time period. Additionally, the virtual conference meetings have been efficient, accessible, and cost-effective,

although others did state that virtual meetings can become tiresome. Vanessa Walker suggested the possibility of a short breakfast meeting to meet one another and perhaps to discuss more philosophical or controversial issues (compared to the standard Council meeting agenda). There was general consensus on the desirability of both a virtual Council business meeting as well as a less formal breakfast meeting at the conference.

Development Efforts

Sayward discussed the limited development efforts for 2022, which consisted of the year-end appeal that was mailed to all U.S.-based members and emailed to all SHAFR members. To date, it had netted just over \$5000, which is about half of the overall budget goal for this fiscal year (November 1, 2022–October 31, 2023). Heiss mentioned the need for a new chair of the Development Committee and asked for suggestions about qualified and interested members. Sayward also clarified that SHAFR's specific 501(c)(3) status was that of a "non-operating foundation"—which did not mean that it did not operate but that it did not disburse a high level of its income each year to the public (but rather to members, especially graduate students). As a result, up to 30% of donations to SHAFR are tax-deductible, while up to 50% of donations to "operations foundations"—like the United Way—are deductible.

Committee Matters

Sayward presented the request from Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship Committee chair Katherine Marino that the eligibility be formally expanded to include not only graduate students but also early-career faculty who would benefit. This suggested change came in the context of having received a small number of applicants this year and in previous years, despite having previously expanded the award to support research in foreign-language archives as well as foreign-language training. There was Council consensus to support this change.

Sayward then raised the question of the gender qualification for Myrna Bernath awards. Having reviewed the correspondence about the awards between Council and the Bernath family, it was clear that the family's goal was to assist "graduate students and needy scholars" in general. It was SHAFR Council in 1991, when this award was created, that specified the focus on women, who were significantly under-represented in the organization at the time. Council therefore made the eligibility requirements very specific in order to increase SHAFR's gender diversity, but the family wanted the eligibility requirements to have flexibility so that the prizes could reflect the needs of the times.

The question before the Council was whether it wanted to expand the eligibility requirements in order to explicitly welcome trans and non-binary people to apply for these awards. There was some question about what the difference would be between the Stuart and Myrna Bernath fellowships and the Stuart/Ferrell and Myrna book awards if the eligibility requirements were expanded. But consensus developed around the shared goal with the past eligibility requirements of expanding SHAFR's gender diversity while modernizing those requirements by expanding the language around eligibility for these awards. Council empowered Sayward to consult with the Committee on Access, Representation, and Equity (CARE) as well as SHAFR members who might have expertise in this area to develop appropriate, inclusive language that would then be formally reviewed and voted upon by Council.

Molly Wood reviewed the Teaching Committee Report, which she had written, and Shaun Armstead and Kelsey Zavelo provided an update on the work of the Graduate Student Committee. They focused on the outgrowth of their survey of the impact of COVID on graduate students (including an upcoming session at the Organization of American Historians), ideas about fostering connection, and ways of making the mentorship program more robust. Sayward also highlighted the National Coalition on History's report on the recent omnibus budget bill's positive impact on historical organizations, especially the National Archives and Records Administration.

There being no new business, the meeting adjourned at 1:40 p.m. (U.S. Eastern).





Professional Notes:

Addison Jensen (Ph.D. candidate, U.C., Santa Barbara & assistant editor of *Passport*) has accepted the position of Assistant Professor of History at Montana State University starting in Fall 2023.



Errata

In the January 2023 issue of *Passport*, Hayley Williams's name was misspelled as Haley in the author credit of "The Last Word" column. *Passport* apologizes for the error.



SHAFR CODE OF CONDUCT

SHAFR is committed to fostering an environment free from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Our organization's collective professional and intellectual pursuits can only be realized when we treat one another with dignity and respect. To this end, SHAFR prohibits discrimination or harassment on the basis of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orientation, race or ethnicity, color, age, religion, disability, national origin, or immigration status. SHAFR also prohibits all forms of unwanted physical contact, including assault. The protections and prohibitions in this policy extend to any guests and members participating in SHAFR-sponsored events. All members and participants, including employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, and guests, are expected to engage in professional and respectful behavior and to preserve common standards of professionalism.

The following policy pertains to all SHAFR activities, including events associated with SHAFR conferences and any SHAFR-related business occurring throughout the year. It encompasses interactions in person, by telephone, and by electronic communication, as well as behavior that occurs outside of official conference venues during SHAFR conferences.

Sexual Harassment. SHAFR has absolutely no tolerance for sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is behavior (speech or actions) in formal or informal settings that demeans, humiliates, or threatens an individual on the basis of their sex, gender, gender expression, or sexual orientation. Sexual harassment can also take nonsexual forms and includes discriminatory remarks or actions based on an individual's sex, gender, gender expression, or sexual orientation. Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal comment or physical conduct of a sexual nature, including situations in which the request or conduct involves any implied or expressed promise of professional reward for complying; or the request or conduct involves any implied or expressed threat of reprisal or denial of opportunity for refusing to comply; or the request or conduct results in what reasonably may be perceived as a hostile or intimidating environment. Sexual harassment does not refer to occasional compliments of a socially acceptable nature or consensual personal and social relationships without discriminatory effect. It refers to behavior that reasonably situated persons would regard as not welcome and as personally intimidating, hostile, or offensive. According to U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, the victim of harassment can be anyone affected by the offensive conduct, not just the individual at whom the conduct is directed.

Sexual Misconduct. SHAFR has absolutely no tolerance for other forms of sexual misconduct. Sexual misconduct is a broad term encompassing any unwelcome behavior of a sexual nature that is committed without consent or by force, intimidation, coercion, or manipulation. Sexual misconduct can be committed by a person of any gender, and it can occur between people of the same or different genders. Sexual misconduct may vary in its severity and consists of a range of behavior or attempted behavior. It can occur between strangers or acquaintances, including people involved in an intimate or sexual relationship. It includes but is not limited to: sexual assault (a continuum of conduct from forcible intercourse to nonphysical forms of pressure that compel individuals to engage in sexual activity against their will); sexual exploitation (taking nonconsensual, unjust, or abusive sexual advantage of another person); and sexual intimidation (threatening another person that you will commit a sex act against them or engaging in indecent exposure).

Consent. For the purposes of this policy, consent is a freely and affirmatively communicated willingness to participate in particular sexual activity or behavior, expressed either by words or clear, unambiguous actions. Consent can be withdrawn at any time, and, by definition, a person is incapable of consent if the person is unable to understand the facts, nature, extent, or implications of the situation and/or if the person is incapacitated, which includes incapacitation by extreme intoxication, drug use, mental disability, or being unconscious. Critically, the person initiating a particular sexual activity or behavior bears the responsibility of receiving consent. In examining the existence of consent under this policy, SHAFR

will seek to determine, in view of the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable person would conclude that the recipient of the initiated sexual activity or behavior was (a) capable of consenting and (b) affirmatively communicated consent to the sexual activity or behavior at issue by words or clear, unambiguous actions.

Harassment. SHAFR has absolutely no tolerance for harassment. Harassment is behavior (speech or actions) in formal or informal settings that demeans, humiliates, or threatens an individual on the basis of their race or ethnicity, color, age, religion, disability, national origin, or immigration status. Harassment can include discriminatory remarks or actions based on an individual's race or ethnicity, color, age, religion, disability, national origin, or immigration status. Harassment refers to behavior that reasonably situated persons would regard as not welcome and as personally intimidating, hostile, or offensive. According to U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, the victim of harassment can be anyone affected by the offensive conduct, not just the individual at whom the conduct is directed.

Retaliation against a complainant of sexual harassment or other forms of sexual misconduct a person who reports harassment, sexual misconduct, or other behavior that violates these policies is also a violation of these policies.

Members and other conference attendees should be aware that their home institution's policies (such as Title IX) may require them to report allegations of sexual harassment or other forms of sexual misconduct involving people affiliated with their institution. SHAFR reserves the right to respond truthfully to authorized inquiries received from a member's employer concerning allegations, proceedings, and outcomes under this policy.

This policy will be clearly and prominently displayed on the SHAFR website. All participants in the annual meeting and anyone obtaining or renewing a SHAFR membership will be required during the registration process formally to acknowledge the policy and their responsibility to abide by it.

Complaints

SHAFR will designate a complaints team that will be available to receive complaints from, describe reporting procedures to, provide advice on resources to, and discuss issues with participants in any SHAFR-sanctioned activity who have experienced or witnessed violations of this policy. The team's contact information will be made available on the SHAFR website and in annual meeting registration materials. Neither the team nor any other SHAFR official can provide legal advice to those who make reports under this policy.

Members, staff, or guests who in good faith believe that they have been aggrieved by or witnessed conduct prohibited by this policy should contact the SHAFR complaints team. SHAFR will review each report and endeavor to respond proportionally and fairly. Responses may range from informal resolutions agreed to by the parties to investigations conducted by trained external investigators. SHAFR reserves the right to take interim steps during an event, such as removing the policy violator from the conference or a narrowly tailored "no contact" directive between the parties.

Annual Report

The Executive Director will prepare an annual report of complaints or other evidence of policy violations (with no names used). The report will be circulated to the full Council at the January meeting and made available to the membership on request. The report may also identify how many reports were received, the forms of discrimination and misconduct alleged, how long the matter took to be resolved, and the outcome.

Some text in this policy is adapted from documents produced by the American Historical Association, the Shakespeare Association of America, the Society of Biblical Literature, and the University of Iowa.



Recent Books of Interest

Adelman, Jeremy and Gyan Prakash, eds. *Inventing the Third World: In Search of Freedom for the Postwar Global South.* (Bloomsbury, 2022).

Allen, David. *Every Citizen a Statesman: The Dream of a Democratic Foreign Policy in the American Century.* (Harvard, 2023).

Barnes, Lindsey F. and Toni M. Kiser. *The American Animals of World War II.* (LSU, 2022).

Bergman, Una. *Politics of Uncertainty: The United States, the Baltic Question, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union.* (Oxford, 2023).

Béti, Eugene DeFriest. *Unsung Patriots: African Americans in America's World Wars.* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023).

Bowen, Bleddyn E. *Original Sin: Power, Technology and War in Outer Space.* (Oxford, 2023).

Chinoy, Mike. *Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People's Republic.* (Columbia, 2023).

Coleman, Sarah R. *The Walls Within: The Politics of Immigration in Modern America.* (Princeton, 2023).

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Dear Dr. Andrew Johns and Mary Ann Heiss, President of SHAFR,

In its January 2023 issue, *Passport* published an article by Dr. Joseph Stieb of the U.S. Naval War College reviewing an essay by Roger Peace and Jeremy Kuzmarov on Afghanistan, Iraq and the War on Terror. In this article Dr. Stieb harshly criticized Peace and Kuzmarov's essay, claiming that the authors "read recent history selectively" and "fail to account for how historical actors interpreted situations and formed policies." In Stieb's assessment, the authors bias stems from their assumption that "U.S. foreign policy is imperialistic and aggressive," drawing explicitly on the "revisionist school of diplomatic history." This "ideological lens colors all of their analysis, limiting its usefulness for scholarship and teaching."

It is clear from these statements that Dr. Stieb has a bone to pick with the "revisionist school of diplomatic history" that colors his own judgment and that he is in denial about the nature of U.S. foreign policy, which by any objective standard has been aggressive and imperialistic. As of this writing, the United States, for example, has upwards of 800 military bases all around the world—a figure greater than the Roman or British empires at their apex—and has military troops stationed in at least 170 countries worldwide. Over the last two decades, the U.S. has bombed Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Somalia, either contributed to overthrow or tried to overthrow governments in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ukraine, North Korea, Belarus, Honduras, Haiti and others, and supported dictatorships in Saudi Arabia, Rwanda, Uganda among other countries.

Stieb believes that the U.S. has acted as an "umpire" and not an empire, citing the writing of neoconservative author Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, whose assessment is not widely shared in countries around the world that have suffered from U.S. military and covert CIA interventions. Stieb also repeats the self-congratulatory trope of U.S. cold warriors that U.S. security guarantees helped save Europe from Soviet encroachment during the Cold War—when even policy-makers of the era understood that the Soviet Union never remotely threatened any military aggression in Western Europe and that the real "threat" came from indigenous communist and leftist political parties that the CIA worked determinately to subvert and destroy.¹

Continuing with his adherence to the tenets of American exceptionalism, Stieb in his article offers a tortured defense of the Bush's administration's War on Terror, claiming that the George W. Bush administration wanted to "strike at the roots of terrorism." The latter is simply not the case because terrorist groups almost always result from underlying grievances and an aversion to foreign colonial occupation, according to leading studies on the topic.² If Bush were genuinely interested in striking at the roots of terrorism in the Middle East, he would have pulled U.S. military bases from Saudi Arabia, which is what spawned the emergence of Al Qaeda in the first place, and renounced U.S. military support to Israel because of its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. He would not have ramped up U.S. military operations, and invaded numerous sovereign countries.

To Stieb, overthrowing the regime in Afghanistan that harbored Al Qaeda was a reasonable decision—though our essay presented strong evidence that the Taliban had a fractious relationship with Al Qaeda and were willing to turn over Bin Laden to trial—assuming that he was the culprit in the 9/11 attacks—in an offer that the Bush administration rejected. Stieb claims that "pushing the Taliban into negotiations when they were weak required the initial use of force." Yet it was the U.S. government's own accountability agency, SIGAR, that wrote in its August 2021 report, *What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction*: "in Afghanistan, the U.S. government refused opportunities to reconcile with the defeated Taliban [in late 2001] and declined to implement an inclusive, post-conflict peace process, so the Taliban soon rebuilt itself as a powerful insurgency."³ Stieb also misses the point that the Taliban were not international terrorists and thus the "war on terror" waged against them was a misnomer.

Stieb makes another dubious assertion in claiming that the war in Afghanistan was legal because "states have a right to self-defense, including against host states that fail to control the violence of a sub-state actor." To have carried out the war in Afghanistan lawfully, the Bush administration, however, would have had to have proven that the Taliban sent Al Qaeda to commit the 9/11 atrocity which they never did, or attempted to, and would have had to have obtained authorization from the UN Security Council.⁴ The majority of alleged 9/11 hijackers it should also be noted did not come from Afghanistan—they came from Saudi Arabia, with the alleged ringleader having lived in Germany, which nobody proposed bombing.⁵

After his attempt to defend U.S. policy in Afghanistan—a war that resulted in vast human suffering whose end result was the return of the Taliban to power—Stieb tries to refute Peace and Kuzmarov's argument that the war in Iraq used the pretext of the War on Terror to advance U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. In doing so, Stieb claims that the Bush administration and supporters of the war in Iraq believed the war was about terrorism because they "feared a potential nexus of rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and international terrorist groups which was too dangerous to tolerate after 9/11."

What Bush administration officials believed, however, is less important than how they acted. The fact of the matter is that they lied to the public about the existence of WMDs that were never found and pursued a regime change strategy as part of a long-standing vendetta against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. He was threatening to become a regional strongman and to assert local control over the region's oil in a way that threatened the interests of U.S. oil companies, which had pronounced influence in the Bush White House.

Stieb continues by claiming that regime change advocates felt they had to act because they were worried that Bin Laden and other adversaries viewed them to be a paper tiger. Does Stieb really believe that this fear of looking weak justifies a preemptive war that was blatantly illegal? The Nazis also feared that Germany looked weak following the Versailles conference and wanted to show the world how tough they were—and who would defend that policy?

Lest one thinks the comparison is offbase, one should remember that over one million Iraqis died because of the U.S. invasion and the entire Middle East was destabilized and plunged into years of warfare and violence consequently. The most popular man in Iraq afterwards was the man who threw his shoe at Bush who is widely regarded in the region as a war criminal.

After his discussion of Iraq, Stieb seems to offer a defense of the Bush and Obama administration's drone policy by suggesting that the terrorist threat was real. So does Stieb believe that Yemeni cleric Anwar Al-Awlaqi's sixteen year-old son, Abdul-Rahman, was a real terrorist threat? And the hundreds of other civilians that were killed, or is this just all collateral damage to him, to quote the military's euphemism?

Stieb generally scoffs at Peace and Kuzmarov's approach in framing the essay, claiming that it is written for "progressives who are predisposed to accept its claims," and that it is not original enough to interest scholars and too long for undergraduates or the "elusive general reader."

However, the length is very appropriate for students and the essay is quite original as a work that synthesizes a huge amount of scholarship and writing into a coherent narrative about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents detailed information in an accessible way that can help educate and better inform readers from all different backgrounds about the conflicts.

The essay includes a great deal of background information on Afghan and Iraqi politics and discussion of the human costs of the wars which are neglected in a lot of conventional scholarship. It addresses the pitfalls of American style techno war and experiences of U.S. and Iraqi and Afghan soldiers.

Generally, it is a great disappointment that *Passport* along with *Diplomatic History*, the flagship journal of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAHR), has only seen fit to publish one very negative article about the United States Foreign Policy History & Resource Guide website and to otherwise ignore it.⁶

This website developed by Roger Peace, with assistance from Jeremy Kuzmarov and a team of scholars, represents a major scholarly accomplishment. It provides succinct overviews of every major war in U.S. history that synthesize a huge amount of scholarship and writing, presenting highly readable overviews of these wars that are accessible for students of all levels.

And rather than being conceived for a narrow readership, these essays provide an excellent and honorable methodology in assessing each war based on the just war theories of St. Augustine and updated by modern scholars like Michael Walzer. Each essay provides detailed historical background and addresses the viewpoints of policymakers on the different sides and experiences of soldiers and civilians caught in the crossfire. The essays also identify alternative policies that government officials might have pursued—which can show students that alternative policies to war do exist. Finally, the essays address the often neglected history of antiwar movements in the U.S. and spotlight courageous individuals that tried to stop unjust wars from taking place—often at great personal cost—or protested their abuses while they were going on.

SHAHR was set up with the goal of improving the education of students in foreign policy issues and establishing debate and dialogue and ideas for alternative foreign policies that are more humane than the ones we have lived through. The United States Foreign Policy History & Resource Guide website is an invaluable resource for students and its conveners and authors should be treated with the respect they deserve—rather than being ignored or subjected to neo-McCarthyite attack, specious arguments and ridicule by a junior scholar who might actually learn something if he decides to read through the essays on the website with an open mind.

Sincerely,

Jeremy Kuzmarov
Managing Editor, *CovertAction* Magazine and past SHAHR member

Notes:

1. Stieb might read Daniele Ganser's study, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2004); and William Blum's *Killing Hope: U.S. and CIA Military Interventions Since World War II* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1998) though he probably would attack these authors too because they don't adhere to his ideological view and vision of American exceptionalism and seek to genuinely expose the truth.
2. See for example, Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2006); Mike Davis, *Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb* (London: Verso, 2008).
3. <https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/what-we-need-to-learn/index.html>
4. See Marjorie Cohn, "Bombing of Afghanistan is Illegal and Must Be Stopped," November 6, 2001, <https://marjoriecohn.com/bombing-of-afghanistan-is-illegal-and-must-be-stopped/>.
5. See Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005).
6. The website can be accessed at <https://peacehistory-usfp.org>.

In Memoriam: George C. Herring

George C. Herring, historian of the Vietnam War and US foreign relations, died on November 30, 2022, in Lexington, Kentucky. He was 86.

He served as Alumni Professor of History at the University of Kentucky, where he taught from 1969 until his retirement in 2005. Before coming to Kentucky, he taught at Ohio University beginning in 1965, the year that President Lyndon Johnson sent the first US combat forces to Vietnam.

Born in southwestern Virginia in 1936, he admitted to being a “poster boy” for the “Silent Generation,” being “apolitical, devoid of ambition and sense of purpose, floating with an uncertain tide.” After graduating from Roanoke College in 1957, he pondered careers in law and journalism but found his way into history after a two-year stint in the U.S. Navy.

While in graduate school at the University of Virginia, he gravitated toward military/diplomatic history despite the department having no specialist. He wrote his dissertation on Lend-Lease, largely sparked by a fellowship where he organized the papers of Edward Stettinius, the former director of the program. He later admitted that the final product “lacked a strong thesis and placement in the literature.” Herring finished his PhD in 1965.

Herring published the first of his eight books in 1972, *Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War*. It received good reviews and contributed significantly to the emerging post-revisionist literature on the origins of the Cold War.

He noted his next project “was a product of the events themselves” which centered around the divisive Vietnam War. His long-standing interest in Southeast Asia led him to teach a course on the war in 1973 that ensured the “more I learned, the more I wanted to know.” He subsequently published *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (1979).

Since its publication, *America’s Longest War* (now in its 6th edition, 2019), has remained a standard for understanding U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Herring shaped the field alongside others including Marilyn Young and Lloyd Gardner. Harvard historian Fred Logevall stressed “it’s a fair guess that it has taught more Americans about the war than any other book.” Herring ultimately added more to the scholarly debate on the war in Vietnam with an edited version of the negotiating volumes of the Pentagon papers and his book, *LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War* (1994).

Herring’s last major work was the magisterial *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*. In a thousand pages, he challenged many preconceptions of the long durée of U.S. foreign policy by showing extensive engagement with the world since the American revolution. It was a finalist for the National Book Critics Circle Award and received very strong reviews including one that noted his “Herculean power of synthesis” that “recaptures a

quarter-millennium of American foreign policy with fluidity and felicity.” It will unlikely be surpassed by any other similar work for many years, educating scholars and the public about the U.S. role in the world since its founding. The book also received the 2008 Robert Ferrell Award given by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) for the best book in the field.

Herring served as editor of SHAFR’s journal, *Diplomatic History*, as well as SHAFR’s president. He won fellowships from the National Endowment of the Humanities, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Guggenheim Foundation. He was also granted membership in the Society of American History, an honorary organization created to recognize literary distinction in the writing of history.

Herring was also a gifted teacher. The University of Kentucky recognized him with its Alumni Association Great Teaching Award and the Sturgill Award for Excellence in Graduate Education. In 2014, he was named to the University of Kentucky’s College of Arts and Sciences Hall of Fame.

But it is perhaps as a mentor that Herring will be most remembered and missed. His patience, kindness, and good humor served generations of graduate students. In Herring, they found a skilled editor and master of the narrative for future books on the press and religious groups and the Vietnam War and command and leadership in the early 20th Century. They also gained a good friend and countless stories underscoring his significance. One student recalled receiving wonderful advice from Herring as he worked on his dissertation: “Just remember, I’ve been doing this for twenty-five more years than you.” Such instruction was invaluable, especially when presented in daily interactions, and continued well beyond graduation for many who relied on him until his last moments.

It went beyond the classroom and halls of the 17th floor of Patterson Office Tower. He and his wonderful wife Dottie hosted holiday feasts and dinner parties for graduate students and faculty, creating a warm and hospitable atmosphere. He even proved a very good first baseman on the department’s softball team, one day showing on-lookers how to effortlessly catch a screaming line. He strutted off the field as if he had done it a thousand times. These memories and many more remind his students and colleagues of why he mattered so much to all of them and so many in the profession. He certainly will be missed.

Robert K. Brigham, Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations, Vassar College

Kyle Longley, Henry Salvatori Professor of American Values and Traditions, Chapman University

Editor's note: *George Herring's influence on not only the field of U.S. foreign relations but also on generations of historians of U.S. foreign relations is nearly incalculable...but the tributes that follow are representative of his legacy. AJ*

If you are lucky, you will find a second mentor early in your career. Not someone to replace your Ph.D. adviser, who for most of us—at least the fortunate ones—remains indispensable: for professional advice, calm encouragement, critical feedback on our writing and teaching, and so much more. A second mentor, someone not from your Ph.D. granting institution or your new workplace, can provide an invaluable fresh perspective on your work and career. As a freshly minted Ph.D., about to enter the often-bewildering world of academe with its lack of clear roadmaps, I found such a mentor in George Herring. He generously and selflessly assumed that role for me—whether he himself recognized he was doing so or not—and I am eternally in his debt.

I soon learned what a couple of generations of his grad students came to know: that George was, simply put, a uniquely caring, thoughtful, and generous human being. Although already a senior scholar of considerable renown and accomplishment, George was instinctively modest and refreshingly down-to-earth. Unfailingly gracious and helpful to a fault, he possessed a marvelous sense of humor, sharp wit, balanced temperament, and a keen appreciation for the ironic and the ridiculous. He became not just my second mentor, but a role model, a colleague, and a friend.

When I submitted my revised dissertation to Cornell University Press, I received two diametrically opposed assessments. One reviewer enthusiastically urged publication; the other offered a more negative appraisal, suggesting that what I had produced might make for a decent journal article, but not much more. The press, to my great good fortune, asked George if he would offer a third, independent appraisal, serving in part as a referee of those conflicting reports. Accepting the assignment, he came down decisively in support of publication while also offering some astute advice about how to strengthen the manuscript. Not for the last time, I followed his wise counsel.

We then began communicating, mostly by letter in that pre-email era. As editor of *Diplomatic History*, he began calling on me to review essay submissions—the first time a journal editor had asked me to do so. He thus introduced me to the other side of the publication process: how one goes about critically reading and offering a balanced and fair-minded assessment of an unpublished work of scholarship. Shortly thereafter, as chair of the SHAFR program committee, he flattered me by asking me to join that committee. The assignment gave me a unique opportunity to see what kind of work people in our field were doing. George encouraged me to make suggestions for sessions we could try to organize as a committee and to offer recommendations regarding who might be called upon to serve as chairs or commentators to fill out some proposed sessions. It is difficult to exaggerate how much I learned from working so closely with such an adept organizer. George then proposed that I replace him as chair for the following year's committee. My work leading up to the 1987 annual meeting at the College of William & Mary proved to be the hardest and most rewarding professional responsibility I had yet taken on beyond the realms of teaching and research. I have him to thank for that wonderful opportunity.

Our shared intellectual interest in the history of U.S.-Southeast Asian relations and the Vietnam War brought George and I together at numerous conferences over the years, along with the annual get-together at SHAFR, a meeting he (and I) hated to miss. It was always a delight to see him. I came to treasure our informal chats over coffee, a meal, a beer, or his beloved bourbon. And even as our relationship evolved from one of mentorship to one of deep friendship, George never ceased to be someone I could, and often did, turn to for critical comments on my writing, insights about the state of our field, and so much more.

Others will write about George's scholarship, about his role as Ph.D. adviser, and about his vital contributions to SHAFR, each of great moment. But from my personal experience, one of his enduring and perhaps least recognized roles was that of second mentor—to me and, I can only assume, many others.

Robert J. McMahon, Ohio State University (Emeritus)



The first word that comes to my mind when I think of George Herring is “gentleman.” In an age when at least some American men lament suffering through (yet another) crisis of masculinity, George was, to me, the epitome of a good man—always kind, ever caring, eternally selfless. He nurtured his students, if not the entire field of scholars working on the American war in Vietnam. He shared his insights and research freely, without ever a thought of recompense. He promoted the works of others always before his own and rarely spoke of the peerless impact he had on generations of historians wrestling with one of the most important events of the Cold War era. He was, in short, an inspiring role model. And he still is.

I had the good fortune to participate in a *Passport* roundtable on Vietnam in the summer of 2022. One question posed to us read, “Which scholars do you see as having laid the groundwork for the study of the history of the Vietnam War?” My first sentence answering was pretty direct. “My strong sense is that nearly all scholars of the American war in Vietnam would name George C. Herring as one of the principal architects of our field.” George emailed me not long after the issue came out to thank me for my “kind comments.” “They mean a lot to me,” he shared. It said everything you needed to know about him and what a true gentleman George was to all us in the field.

Gregory A. Daddis, San Diego State University



Unlike so many of my colleagues, I didn't know George Herring well—certainly not as well as I would have liked. But he was unfailingly gracious, kind, and generous on the many occasions when we crossed paths and shared ideas. I recall his hospitality during a particularly memorable conference that he hosted in Lexington in 2007, probably the most rewarding academic gathering of the three decades during which I've attended such events. And I remember a lively lunch in Washington in 2012 or so, an opportunity to compare notes with the author of the unrivaled *America's Longest War* shortly after publication of my own narrative of the Vietnam War. George struck me as the best sort of scholar—a humble man of towering achievements who showed genuine dedication to the advancement of younger generations.

I'm struck as well by the enormous debt that I owe to George for pioneering the study of the Vietnam War and laying down so many of the interpretive signposts that still drive scholarly inquiry. Although I occasionally cull my bookshelves to make room for new additions, I have proudly kept each edition of *America's Longest War*, books that both drove and reflected the evolution of the field in the 1970s. I've long called George the “dean” of Vietnam War studies, and it remains a privilege to work in an arena where such a fair-minded, meticulous, and eloquent historian looms so large. He brought the same traits, of course, to the broader study of American foreign relations, producing a stream of books and articles that entitle him to a place on the Mount Rushmore of diplomatic history. He is truly a model and inspiration.

Mark Atwood Lawrence, University of Texas, Austin & Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library



Like so many of us, I was fortunate to enjoy George and Dottie's legendary hospitality as they welcomed to their home in Lexington the participants in a working conference at the University of Kentucky. Hang Nguyen helped Marilyn Young and I to organize for our edited OUP volume on new histories of the Vietnam War. That George played a part in the creation of the volume was a wonderful turn for me. As a young doctoral student, I grew up on his *America's Longest War* and deeply admired how George was able to make a powerful argument about the failures of containment in Vietnam in ways that engaged even those who saw the war quite differently. He always did so, whether in prose or in person, with civility, grace and respect. George's approach to his scholarship, his colleagues, and his students offers an enduring model for all of us as we make our way forward in these perilous political times.

Mark Philip Bradley, University of Chicago



I do not remember when I first met George Herring. It was in the early 1980s, and he quickly became my friend, colleague, and role model as a historian and as a teacher. I remember clearly, however, when I met him through the pages of *America's Longest War*. I read the book in the spring of 1980 shortly after its initial publication. I had taught a university course on the American War in Vietnam for the first time in the spring of 1975—yes, literally as the war was ending with the fall of Saigon. Finding core reading for students was a challenge. Scholarship and academic texts in English on Vietnam and especially on American involvement there were extremely limited. I assigned all or parts of books by George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, Frances Fitzgerald, John T. McAlister, Joseph Buttinger, and Bernard Fall. And then, along came George. His book, *America's Longest War*, quickly became the go-to text for me and scores of others teaching courses on the war. In a reasoned, nonideological, and persuasive argument, it made the basics of the controversial war, especially decision making in Washington, accessible to students. It was also a mainstay for scholars. There are multiple references to it in virtually every monograph on the American war published since it first appeared. Considering that about the only original sources available to George in the late 1970s were in the Pentagon Papers, the durability of his initial arguments through subsequent, updated editions attests to his skill as a researcher and historian. He was well-aware of his lack of access to confidential U.S. sources and closed Vietnamese archives. Be that as it may, *America's Longest War* was and remains in many ways, THE book on how the costly American military intervention in Vietnam came about and lasted so terribly long. Historians, students, and policy makers are deeply in George Herring's debt for advancing our understanding of one of America's worst public policy mistakes.

David L. Anderson, California State University, Monterey Bay



I was deeply saddened by George's passing. I didn't know him well, personally, but his scholarship and example had long been guiding stars. His *America's Longest War*, through its many editions, remains the foundational text for my survey course on the United States and Vietnam, and George was the first person I approached when putting together a conference at UVA on “The Politics of Troop Withdrawal.” His presence was crucial in helping convince others to participate, and it was through that experience that I came to know his generosity and grace. Perhaps we bonded over shared connections to both Ohio University and the University of Virginia, but it was really just because George was George. Seeing him at SHAFR was always a treat—just having a couple of minutes with him would be a highlight of the conference.

Years later, George had asked for help in locating conversations from Lyndon Johnson's White House tapes for a paper he was delivering (at Ohio, no less) on LBJ's decisions for war. I was more than happy—honored, really—to provide support. George then agreed to transform the lecture into a digital short for a Miller Center series with UVA Press, and his e-pub—

The War Bells Have Rung—stands as a master class on how to integrate the tapes into a scholarly essay. Indeed, it revealed yet again why George was a master of the craft and the dean of American historians on the Vietnam War. He was both a giant in our field and an unfailingly gracious man, and will be greatly missed.

Marc Selverstone, University of Virginia



George Herring was an exceptional historian and mentor and an even better friend. Ironically, my first interaction with George was in March 1980 when I wrote to compliment his “In Memoriam” essay for Edward E. Younger in the *American Historical Review*. Professor Younger had directed both of our dissertations at the University of Virginia, albeit a decade apart. Dr. Younger was a wonderful adviser, but he had largely moved from U.S. foreign relations to Virginia history by the time I began doctoral work in September 1969. Because of his change of emphasis and untimely death in mid-1979, I had assumed my duties at UNLV with no acquaintances in the foreign relations subfield. Moreover, I was not attending professional meetings and lacked self-confidence in the scholarly realm.

After our exchange of correspondence, George graciously came to UNLV (for a meager honorarium) in October 1980 to deliver the keynote address for a three-session program that one of my former students and I had organized for Vietnam Veterans in our community. During that visit (the first of four that George would make to UNLV), George and I spent an afternoon becoming acquainted and discussing a broad range of professional matters.

In retrospect, that afternoon was truly a pivotal moment for me—personally and professionally. Over the ensuing several years, George provided sage advice and critical professional reinforcement. For example, when a press solicited potential readers for my first book manuscript, I turned to George with a list of possibilities. His response: “Do you know any of these historians?” That I had not thought of this was testimony to how badly I needed guidance. Shortly after that book was published, he invited me to contribute to a collection of essays he was co-editing—the first time I had been invited to submit a manuscript to a collection or journal. When George later invited me to serve on the editorial board of *Diplomatic History*, I felt like I was truly gaining traction and credibility as a scholar. Hence began a forty-plus-year friendship. Later, when I moved from researching the nineteenth century to examining the American South and the Vietnam War, George generously and, of course, most perceptively read all my work. Finally, I must emphasize that the value of this friendship extended far beyond the professional. It has also included the great joy my wife Sandy and I have had spending time with George and his lovely wife Dottie.

Joseph A. (Andy) Fry, University of Nevada, Las Vegas



Over the years and many, many meetings with George Herring I learned two lessons most of all. First, George was an open-hearted man who was always gracious even with those he disagreed with about historical interpretation. And second, perseverance is rewarded. The last time we spent much time together was at Lubbock, Texas, for a conference in 2019 at Texas Tech University on the Vietnam War. George and I were called upon to discuss how we started courses on the war. At one point during the session, George leaned over to me and with a big smile he said, “You know, I had to convince Bob Divine to publish *America’s Longest War* in the series he edited. He didn’t want to do it at first.” And that marked a turning point in George’s long career, and how we have all benefitted from that career.

Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University



In Memoriam: John Prados

In April 1982, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates sent a memo to his boss, Director William Casey, with copies to the agency's deputy director and half a dozen heads of key analytical offices. The subject was "John Prados Book *The Soviet Estimate*." Gates reminded everyone that he had previously referred the book to several of them. Calling it a "reasonably fair minded account—and at times an insightful one," Gates urged his colleagues to study it "for whatever lessons we might take from it in terms of improving our record with respect to predicting Soviet force capabilities."

Attached to the DDI's memo was a letter, eight pages in length, from veteran Soviet strategic forces watcher Howard Stoertz, whom Gates had asked to assess the book. Stoertz had the same reaction: "it should be recommended reading for all analysts and estimators working the field of Soviet military affairs; and it would be of interest to those involved with Soviet affairs and estimating in general."

Stoertz had his criticisms. He pointed out some flaws in information and argument and balked at the author's "troubling tendency to mix excellent insights with dark suspicions about the motives and actions of intelligence officials involved in the estimative process." Overall, though, John had pegged the 25-year history of CIA estimating "about right," including identifying "substantial overestimates and underestimates on critical issues." Stoertz admitted it was "a humbling experience to read at one sitting."

Even if Gates had just been trying to light a fire under the agency's Soviet analysts by comparing their output to that of an outsider with no access to classified material, it was an unusual compliment for a budding scholar who had just turned 31 and didn't yet have his doctorate.

I don't know if John ever saw these presumably grudging tributes, but since they were declassified in 2007 and are now posted in the CIA's electronic Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, it's likely that he did. If so, it's easy to imagine him reacting, a quarter century or more after the fact, with a mix of pride at having turned a few heads at the top levels of the CIA, and frustration (though surely not surprise) at how little had changed inside that community.

John Prados died on November 29, 2022, after four decades of investigating, assessing, and enlightening the public about the world of intelligence and other, often hidden dimensions of U.S. foreign policy, as well as the impact and implications of United States power. He was a true character, an iconoclast, especially within the domains he chose to study, who left a record of accomplishment that is hard to convey in a single appreciation.

Fortunately, he was well known to many readers of this newsletter, which makes the task far easier. Many of his fellow SHAFR members have already registered their admiration. Lloyd Gardner saw him as "a master historian." Jim Hershberg called him "stupendously prolific" and Bob McMahon praised his "astounding level of scholarly productivity."

John was born in Queens, New York, on January 9, 1951—sharing his birthdate with Richard Nixon, as John's *New York Times* obit pointed out. His family moved to Puerto Rico where his father had been from originally, but he came back to New York after high school to enroll at Columbia

University. Whether or not he went there *because* it was one of the epicenters of student upheaval over Vietnam, CIA abuses, and Watergate, it undoubtedly helped shape his intellectual thinking and moral sensibilities in those tumultuous times. As Bob McMahon wrote in his tribute for H-Diplo:

He was, and remained always, a 60s-era idealist, a person whose strong sense of morality and deep-seated commitment to human rights and responsible government underlay much of his scholarship. No one in our field has ever insisted with more conviction than John that policy makers must be held to the highest standards and that they must be called out when they fall short.

I got to know John starting in the late 1990s when he joined my organization, the National Security Archive, as a senior fellow. I had first met him in the mid-1980s when I was new to the Archive myself and he was part of a rarified (to me) circle of scholars, journalists, and information advocates whose shared frustration at perpetually being stifled by the federal government in their attempts to pry open the documentary record (primarily through FOIA) helped lead to the idea for the Archive, spearheaded by former *Washington Post* reporter Scott Armstrong, as a public repository of declassified documentation.

The Archive opened its doors just a few years after the *Soviet Estimate* became semi-required reading at CIA. By the time he formally signed on with us he had several more publications, each notable in its own right. By the time he died, he had written 27 books, some translated into other languages, plus many dozens of articles and book chapters.

The sweep of his scholarship was truly impressive, including deeply researched treatments of key moments in World War II, the Vietnam War, and later the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Mostly he concentrated on the intelligence aspects of U.S. policy, but the military and diplomatic dimensions were always prominently featured. Some of his books are high-altitude analyses, for instance his surveys of CIA and Pentagon operations (*President's Secret Wars* and *Safe for Democracy*) and the history of the National Security Council (*Keepers of the Keys*), which are still classic references. Others are big picture accounts designed to give context to events that suffer from being misleadingly viewed in isolation (e.g., *America Confronts Terrorism*).

Still other works are microscopically detailed studies of events and issues whose significance John believed was underappreciated by scholars. *Islands of Destiny* argued that while most people assumed that the leadup to the Battle of Midway was a turning point in the Pacific War, it was ultimately not as decisive as the chipping away of Japanese control of the Solomon Islands. *A Streetcar Named Pleiku* delved into a National Liberation Front attack in South Vietnam's Central Plateau in early 1965 – believed by Washington to have been planned in Hanoi to coincide with a visit by national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, but in reality an almost random strike ordered by local commanders – which prompted the initiation of the U.S. bombing campaign of the North. The catchy title played off a remark by Bundy suggesting that flashpoints like Pleiku are always coming down the line and will take you (or U.S.

policy) wherever you want (it) to go.

Vietnam was also the subject of one of John's most acclaimed books, *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975*, a formidable piece of research and analysis that many of his fellow Vietnam specialists agree has been one of the most important volumes yet produced on the conflict. It put many of John's skills on display – the deep exploration of archives, detailed argumentation, and vivid style. It also was an archetype of his drive – if not mission – to dispel erroneous accounts or interpretations that cloud our understanding of events of global importance. In this case, he was clinically precise in building the still unassailable argument that, in part because of realities such as the limited number of ports and landing fields in South Vietnam capable of handling the supplies needed to feed the U.S. war effort, “the factors necessary to achieve victory simply were not present.”

John was a master at detecting patterns and following threads from earlier periods to modern times in ways that threw new explanatory light on complex topics like battlefield strategies and tactics, the intelligence process, and the dynamics of presidential decision-making. Just in the intelligence sphere, *The Ghosts of Langley*, *William Colby and the CIA*, and *Family Jewels* are prime examples.

For his accomplishments, he won many accolades. His awards include the Henry Adams prize from the Society for History in the Federal Government (*Unwinnable War*), the annual book prize of the New York Military Affairs Symposium (*Combined Fleet Decoded*), the book prize of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (Soviet Estimate), and two selections by the U.S. Naval Institute as a Notable Naval Book of the Year. His publishers submitted four of his books for the Pulitzer Prize.

His colleagues in the field were equally fulsome. In the pages of this newsletter, Richard Immerman counted him “among the very few US historians” responsible for laying the ground for the study of intelligence history. Kathryn Olmsted and Hugh Wilford agreed, Wilford calling him “extraordinarily prolific.” In addition to the previously cited tributes on H-Diplo, scholars and a fair share of government information professionals—despite his thousands of access requests over the years – have sent warm messages and recollections to John's family and to the Archive.

John aspired to do more than just write credible history. He had what amounted to a calling to impart meaningful lessons to his readers about the epic events (and, frequently, catastrophes) that were his subjects. Describing his purpose in publishing *The Ghosts of Langley*, he wrote that thanks to a compliant President Obama, the CIA was able to commit “excesses [that] have only been exceeded by its efforts to evade responsibility for what it did. This was the really important story.”

He also had a passion for creating teachable moments and providing students in particular with the raw materials to study and learn from history. *The US Special Forces: What Everyone Needs to Know* and *How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History* stand out. The latter was as much a how-to guide for future scholars as it was an effort to tackle a complicated and contentious historical debate – something else John loved to do and excelled at.

Virtually every project he took on at the National Security Archive had a strong educational component to it as well. He produced seven major document collections as part of the Digital National Security Archive series—large-scale publications averaging 2,500 records apiece that represent major resources for students and scholars. Two more sets featuring mostly previously unpublished records on the management of CIA clandestine operations are in the queue. His many “e-books”—annotated primary source compilations on our website that professors love to assign—covered events from the Diem coup of November

1963, to the official release of the “full” Pentagon Papers in 2011, to the JFK-approved plot to oust Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana in 1964, to the Bush-43 propaganda campaign surrounding the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (also the subject of his widely applauded volume *Hoodwinked*). John even turned his essay for H-Diplo's excellent “Scholar's Craft” series into a mini-seminar on methodology.

A side of John that many people were not aware of was that he was a hard-core “wargamer.” He didn't just play them, he designed them—and he was phenomenal at it. Well before he raised eyebrows at Langley with his historiography, he was inventing and publishing wargames that have made him a shining star in the gaming community to this day. Among dozens of titles reflecting the expected Prados breadth are a Roman-era battle game set in the forests of Germany called “The Victory of Arminius;” “Look Away, the Fall of Atlanta, 1864;” “Khe Sanh, 1968;” “Crisis Sinai: The Yom Kippur War, 1973;” and “Panzerkrieg.” He won more than half a dozen awards, including for his most celebrated design, “Third Reich,” published when he was just 23 years old. It remains one of the best-selling wargames of all time. Remarkable.

As with his bibliography, John's gaming achievements brought admiration from his peers. (For one appreciation, by fellow historian and wargame enthusiast Leopoldo Nuti, see the H-Diplo tribute.) Emblematic of the sentiment among pure gamers, the publisher Against the Odds sent out a notice in January 2023 announcing John's passing but also declaring January to be “JOHN-uary” in his honor, noting that he had published more games with ATO than any other company. “We are proud of that,” the message added. How many of us can boast that kind of distinction?

The missing dimension so far in this column is John's personal side, which offers some insights into his approach to his profession. His family was of course extremely important in his life. His partner of 25 years, Ellen Pinzur, shared a passion with him for the experiences of Vietnam war veterans. He had two daughters, Dani and Tasha, from an earlier marriage to Jill Gay.

Everyone who knew John likely has a vivid mental image of some classic moment involving John. Before anything else, visually, there was ... the ponytail—tightly bound with two rubber bands—paired with the bushy mustache. As noted, a child of the 60s. He preferred jeans and maybe a leather vest though he had no problem putting on a tie and jacket when required. But he always stood out thanks to that signature haircut. So prominent was it that Robert McNamara, a frequent object of John's critical attention, and with whom he participated in an extraordinary conference in Hanoi in 1997, took to calling him simply “That Ponytail Guy.”

Most of the personal recollections sent to the Archive since last November focus on his lighter side: his fondness of conversation—from baseball to almost anything else—preferably with a beer in hand, but even more so his enjoyment for what could be described as shop talk—virtually any political or historical topic, current events, research methods, the state of FOIA, you name it. If you wanted to argue, he was perfectly fine with that, too. Fred Logevall said (half-jokingly) that he sometimes found him intimidating, especially as a questioner at a panel discussion, but that there was always a warmth to him that came out easily. While he was passionate about his principles, supremely confident in his point of view, proud of his achievements, and ready to defend them—sometimes to the point of stubbornness—one could also regularly witness his genuine modesty, his willingness to hear out an alternative theory (but in the end it better be sound), even his desire to know about any mistakes that might have crept into his writings. He was unfailingly generous with his time and expertise, whether with a senior colleague or an intern, and as an Archive standard bearer he was tireless.

Other colleagues remember John's commendable intolerance of "unpleasantries" like gratuitous displays of superiority, political obtuseness, or willful ignorance. His impatience extended to any hint of condescension or disrespect, especially from anyone in a position of influence or power.

In that connection, I recently received a vignette that beautifully epitomizes this facet of John. It came in an email from longtime mutual friends and colleagues Jim Blight and Janet Lang, who invented the concept of "critical oral history," an innovative methodology that has produced stupendous evidentiary results (and which the Archive and others have adopted often) in reexamining world-changing episodes such as the Cuban missile crisis, the American war in Vietnam, Carter-Brezhnev and the collapse of détente, and the thorny U.S.-Iran relationship.

It was at the aforesaid 1997 conference in Hanoi that McNamara and Prados made their awkward acquaintance. Jim and Janet got to know McNamara intimately over the course of several retrospective projects. During his years in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the former whiz kid was known as the "Electronic Brain," but to those of us who were part of the Vietnam project he was always "Maximum Bob." Here are J & J's recollection of that memorable encounter.

Bob wasn't just bad with names, he had some sort of cognitive tic that made non-standard, non-Anglo names difficult for him to remember. He tried a couple of times to use JP's name, but it came out something like, "Pray-dose." So in addition to JP's status, in McNamara-ese as "Ponytail Guy," JP became "the eccentric." The problem was that Bob for some reason couldn't say "eccentric." It always came out "ass-entric." At some point, we alerted JP to his elevated status as "ass-entric." We remember once in particular in Hanoi when Bob was feeling in an expansive mood, he invited JP to come into a side conversation we were having with him. To break the ice, Bob the diplomat said something along the lines of, "you're the ass-entric guy on our team, you know." JP raised an eyebrow, looked toward us for clarification and, receiving none, replied, "you're pretty ass-entric yourself." Well, after all, one of us said, it takes one to know one, doesn't it? Three of us knew why that exchange was funny; one did not. It was a beautiful thing.

Great stuff.

What stands out for me about John is that despite his unabashedly lefty political outlook and the adamance of his convictions—opprobrium for militarism, for the avoidable tragedies of Vietnam and Iraq, for the excesses of the powerful—he had the genuine respect of all sides. He won awards from U.S. military organizations and government historians, glowing reviews from establishment conservatives and liberals alike—not to mention a measure of deference at the CIA.

Even the likes of Bob McNamara, once he got past the ponytail, appreciated the value John added to the proceedings. John managed that feat through his distinctive skills as a historian, unquestioned seriousness of purpose, commitment to the truth and to following the evidence, his ability to set aside personal politics, and his utter fearlessness in standing up for principle.

John has left a profound impact on the field and a high personal and professional standard to follow.

Malcolm Byrne

In Memoriam: Bob Schulzinger

Bob didn't like the heat. And that contributed to his remarkable career and, incidentally, my own modest achievements. In the early-1970s Bob took a position at the University of Arizona. As a native of Cincinnati, educated at Columbia and Yale, he was unprepared for what the Sonoran Desert had in store for him. After sweating it out for one year on the faculty, he decamped for the cooler clime of Colorado, briefly to the University of Denver and ultimately to the University of Colorado at Boulder. He remained there for the rest of his career, a distinguished member of the Department of History, an honored teacher, and longtime director of the university's Center for International Affairs.



And me? Because Bob headed for the Rockies, Arizona had an unanticipated open position in diplomatic history. I got the job. Although a born New Yorker by way of Ann Arbor, I learned to savor the heat, appreciate the desert's charms, and remained in Tucson for the next 50 years. Oh yes, back to Bob. In the summer of 1974, he attended a workshop in Ann Arbor. Once he'd heard I had been hired by Arizona, he reached out and introduced himself to me just days before I moved to Tucson. Boy, did he tell me a lot about what was in store for me! It was, I like to think, the beginning of a beautiful friendship.

Over the next half century, Bob remained one of my closest personal and professional friends, a collaborator on several writing projects, a traveling companion to exotic research and conference venues (imagine, if you will, Bob tramping

along the Great Wall of China in exuberant spirits), and an example of how superb research, writing, and teaching coalesced in one individual. I had it from an unimpeachable source – my son – who took several classes from Bob at CU, that students in his diplomatic history and Vietnam war classes were riveted by his wit, wisdom, and insights into the arcane workings of the American government, the policy making bureaucracy, and the military. He knew precisely how to balance playfulness and seriousness in his presentations. I observed Bob's classroom magic myself, when he was a visiting faculty member one semester in Arizona in the 1990s (during the winter term!) and one semester in 2004 while I was a visiting

professor in Boulder. His final major monographs, on the origins, conduct, and legacies of the Vietnam War were a superb blend of domestic and international history.

Bob was exceedingly generous with students and colleagues and always open to reading and critiquing the work of other historians. Our collaboration on a pair of U.S. history survey textbooks revealed how much he knew about the field and how he understood both what to say and not to say in order to persuasively communicate ideas. In his personal life, Bob was a loving husband, a devoted father, a proud grandparent, and always a great companion. He embodied the fullness of the Yiddish term *Mensch*—someone whose whole person embodied goodness and integrity.

Michael Schaller



When I met Bob in January 1987, I did not realize that we were starting a continuing conversation that only stopped in the days before his untimely passing. I was a graduate student at Yale studying with Gaddis Smith, and Bob was a Visiting Professor, teaching Diplomatic History, while Gaddis (his former advisor), was on sabbatical. We had professional topics, Yale graduate school and Columbia undergraduate reminiscences in common. One of Bob's best stories, and every story Bob told was hilarious because of his skill as a raconteur, concerned the swimming test which every Columbia undergraduate had to pass in the years he attended. Bob passed easily, but his roommate never received his Columbia degree because he failed the swimming test.

That swimming test was just one of the many challenges Bob mastered with an ease and grace that is hard to convey. He had Arthrogryposis (AMC), a congenital issue which affects multiple joints prior to birth, causing them to be permanently bent or, alternatively, locked straight into place. In 1945, when Bob was born, children with such birth issues were not mainstreamed but relegated to special schools, as Bob himself was for several years. Indeed, some parents were advised not to bring children with AMC or similar congenital conditions home from the hospital, but to institutionalize them immediately. Because AMC was such a rare condition, doctors during the 1950s tried novel treatments on Bob, some of which were painful, all of which were uncomfortable. In my work as Executive Director of the Center for Adoption Policy, I speak with parents who adopt children with special needs, including AMC. Today, children with this condition have specialized surgery much earlier and have excellent outcomes, in part due to the techniques that were developed during Bob's childhood, and first used on him.

But with total determination, and the support of parents who believed that Bob deserved the same opportunities that his sisters had, Bob surmounted each and every obstacle. His was a childhood when physically challenged children, burdened with the tyranny of low expectations, grew up with little or no provision made in public or private venues for those who could not easily walk up or down stairs, or move at the pace New Yorkers or New Havenites did. Bob and I both made trips to China in 1996; he for professional reasons, me to adopt my first daughter. When we returned, Bob pointed out that there were no physically challenged people visible in China and noted that such had been the case in the United States when he was a boy. The extensive progress represented by the Americans for Disabilities Act and later legislation is only one of the reasons, I think, for Bob's eternal optimism, which never failed him.

Bob graduated at the top of his class in high school, and was his school's representative to Boys State, where he won the teen delegates' popular vote to become Ohio's representative to Boys Nation. The fifty state winners traveled to Washington; a visit to the White House was the grand finale. One of Bob's fellow Boys Nation attendees that year was Bill Clinton, who got his first glimpse of his later home, and, according to Bob, was politicking even then.

As SHAFR members know, Bob was a brilliant historian, a spell binding lecturer and a wonderful writer. His books remain standard reading in campuses across the country. My daughter Sarah and I visited Bob several years ago and had some great conversations about history and other subjects. But because he was just "Bob," it was only after he died that she realized that Bob was the Robert Schulzinger whose books remain required reading at Penn.

Bob was always generous with his time, to his students, colleagues, and friends. He was never too busy to read a manuscript, brainstorm an idea or comment on an outline. Working on an edited volume with him was a pleasure because of his encyclopedic knowledge and acute sensibility, leavened by his unfailing sense of humor.

Bob will be so greatly missed, first and foremost by his wife Marie, and his daughter Elizabeth, to whom he was devoted. But also, by all of us who were fortunate to call ourselves friends of Bob. May his memory be a blessing.

Diane B. Kunz



I didn't know Bob quite as long as Diane and Michael did, but our time did extend back thirty-three years. Little did I know that when I met him in June 1989 at my first SHAFR conference, at the College of William and Mary, Bob would change my life and give me a career opportunity of my lifetime. To me, Bob was all energy, super-smart, with a sense of humor that could make you nearly hysterical, irascible in his unique Schulzingerian way, and deep down, a man with a big heart who could be tough, impatient, and lovable all at the same time. I missed him when a stroke forced him into retirement over a decade ago, and I miss him even more now that he is gone.

I was finishing my dissertation when I accompanied my advisor, Steve Pelz, to Williamsburg for the SHAFR conference. Sitting at a table next to this older professor (they all seemed old to me back then), this guy welcomed me, asked I where I was from, what I researched on, what I thought of everything from the food to the weather, had amusing things to say—in short, the first but not last, typical Bob Schulzinger treatment. What I mean by that is Bob was a truly curious person who loved meeting people; he'd sound them out and either they liked him (most of them did) or they were stunned into shyness! But you were never going to sit there quietly around Bob, who'd make sure to hear from you before he held forth. And man, could he give his views of things, sometimes dismissing yours, oftentimes listening quickly and absorbing. He was no shrinking violet in terms of expressing himself—he was truly entertaining to be around—and that's what I loved about him.

Bob tracked me down a few months later, asking if I'd want to replace him in Boulder in Spring 1990 because he was taking a semester at the University of Arizona. We moved, even into his house; he rented it to us for \$200/month—when I asked him if that was a good deal, he replied, "buddy, you need to stop asking questions and accept the offer." I can just hear him nearly scolding me!). When the Schulzingers returned from Tucson in May, I sat their baby daughter in a big packing box to quiet her down, cleaned the house, and left Boulder for good—at least I thought. But Bob worked with the department to offer me an instructorship that lasted not only into the next Fall (and CU's national football championship) but for two more years, which then merged into a tenure-line position that I hold today. All the while, I had the simply great fortune to have Bob as a mentor and friend.

Bob went on, in the mid-1990s, to chair the Program in International Affairs, a post he held for twelve years at a time when the major expanded from 400 students to well beyond 1000 into the next century. At the same time he guided this complex program, he kept up his vigorous research agenda, resulting in numerous publications. And he taught a full load of courses at every level, most memorable being the huge diplomatic history and US since 1968 lectures. In these, he fielded questions from students. Did I mention irascible?

Bob welcomed—truly asked for—questions from students, but woe to the ones that he deemed not up to snuff. There are no stupid questions, we say, but of course, that's wrong. Yes, there are, and Bob might tell a student that her comment was "silly" or another one that he was off base. But never in a demeaning way, rather, only to make a point about thinking before speaking. Even these victims of his sharp wit ended up appreciating him, and many simply adored his lecture style. They even came to office hours, seeking advice.

Bob was, to me, just such a one-of-a-kind person. Sure, he had the disability. But I didn't notice it in class or at conferences when he was speaking. I didn't notice it when you read his detailed monographs and sweeping survey texts. I did notice it at the rec center when he swam laps—yes, he regularly dropped into the pool to exercise! What I also noticed is that Bob gave every ounce of energy, intelligence, wit, dedication, and care to running the International Affairs program, advising students, and contributing to the University on myriad committees. He was so impressive that he was named one of the first College of Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professors, an award that followed on the heels of many others, including

the presidency of SHAFR, a position he was so honored to hold and an organization he deeply loved.

I will always be indebted to him for providing me with a job and having confidence in me. I was so lucky to see him twice before he passed away, when he was resting at home. In his last word to me, he told me, though with a groggy voice: "Tom, I had a great life." He did, and in the process, made other lives great as well.



Tom Zeiler

The recent death of Bob Schulzinger is extremely sad for his many SHAFR friends, who all remember his encyclopedic knowledge of history, work ethic, and determination to overcome obstacles. Bob was my Ph.D. advisor back in the 1990s, and as his research assistant it was my great privilege to spend a lot of time with him outside of the halls of academia. We attended several sporting events, including Rockies baseball games and Colorado Buffalo basketball games. Those outings gave me additional insight into Bob's intellectual curiosity and treated me to his rapier sharp wit.

He provided me wonderful support as an advisor throughout the process of completing my dissertation and later during my search for a job. Although he had worked hard to help me get an interview to work in the State Department's office of the historian, he graciously applauded my decision to instead take a teaching job at a community college.

Some of his advice as my teacher for two seminars that has stayed with me all these years includes his emphasis on the importance of a good title and his insistence that we strive for concise writing. Overly verbose papers were described by Bob as "Beaver History," because they included "one dam thing after another." One of my goals as a teacher has been to pass on these points of emphasis to my students.

Thanks, Bob, for being a great teacher and advisor!



Andy DeRoche

The Last Word: It's Been Twenty Years— Time for Historians to Turn to Iraq

Marjorie Galelli

A lot of us still tend to think of the 1980s when we're thinking of something from twenty years ago, and many radio stations boast about playing the greatest hits of "the 80s, 90s and today" as if time somehow stopped at the turn of the millennium. But it is time to adjust and realize that the era of Michael Jackson, John Hughes movies, and shoulder pads was in fact forty years ago and that history did not end in the 1990s, despite claims to that effect at the time.

Twenty years ago, in March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq claiming that the attack was part of the global war on terror. Its goals were removing Saddam Hussein from power, securing the country's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and "liberating" the Iraqi people. As we now know, WMDs were nowhere to be found, and rather than a quick strike immediately followed by a transfer of authority back to an Iraqi government as anticipated by the White House, the conflict became a civil war that embroiled the U.S. military in a complex insurgency and lasted nearly a decade.

While many of us lived through these years and consider them current events, the Iraq War might as well be ancient history to the average college freshman today. Not only was this generation born after the September 11 terrorist attacks, but most of them were not alive when Colin Powell addressed the United Nations and claimed that Iraq was harboring WMDs, or even when the first American tanks crossed the border from Kuwait into Iraq. The same students were still in elementary school when U.S. troops left in 2011. These events are now very much a part of history and, as such, deserve our attention.

Looking at the historiography, it is hard to find works in the field published by historians beyond a handful of edited volumes, a few analyses (often written by people who participated in the events), and official histories published by the military. Why are historians so reluctant to tackle the subject? In the past, historians have often published analyses of wars, their origins, and their conduct soon after they ended. Marc Bloch wrote *Strange Defeat* while the Second World War was still ongoing. Hugh Trevor-Roper's *Last Days of Hitler* came out in 1947, and George Herring published *America's Longest War* in 1979, a mere six years after U.S. troops left Vietnam. Of course, these were not definitive analyses, but they proved foundational and helped start conversations that ultimately led to the robust historiographies that exist today.

It is true that any historian seeking to analyze the events of the turn of the century will face significant difficulties when it comes to sources, in large part because so many official documents will remain classified for decades to come. In addition, this was one of the first wars of the digital age. Units recorded after-action reports directly onto computers. PowerPoint slides were updated for daily briefs, and prior versions were rarely—if ever—archived. Entire

hard drives were erased when units rotated through areas of operation before archival procedures for digital material were developed. And instead of writing letters and diaries, soldiers, airmen, sailors, and Marines wrote blog posts and emails, most of which disappeared from the internet long ago. As a consequence, even though Operation Iraqi Freedom generated large amounts of material—probably as much if not more than any prior conflict—historians might end up with fewer sources to analyze, even once the records are processed and opened to the public.

Still, these difficulties are not grounds to leave the study of that time period to political scientists and journalists indefinitely. On the contrary, it is imperative that historians start looking at the war in Iraq (and the global war on terror more broadly) through our own methodological lenses and begin writing its history, even if it means devising more creative ways to access sources, since traditional archival collections do not yet exist. Oral histories, for instance, are particularly critical to achieving a more holistic understanding of the Iraq War, especially if one wishes to understand the views of enlisted service members. However, the longer we wait, the fewer people we will be able to interview. What is more, history is always in high demand from the public, and if we don't offer our own analyses, someone else will inevitably shape the narrative.

It can be daunting to step into a field in which the historiography is so scarce, but it is important to remember that neither the first nor the second or even the tenth study of any given event is its definitive history. Nor do we expect it to be. After all, refining, challenging, and expanding previous analyses is the whole point of history as a discipline. But for that to be possible, someone has to start the conversation, and it is past time for historians to start talking about Iraq.

The implications for this work go well beyond academia. The Iraq War has shaped the careers and lives of an entire generation of service members and led to sweeping changes in military doctrine—the guiding principles used by the military to conduct operations and achieve its objectives—that will affect the institution for years to come. When U.S. troops failed to discover Saddam's supposed stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, thereby putting in question the entire rationale for the invasion, the bond of trust between the American people and its government was fundamentally, and possibly irremediably, damaged. The United States' near-unilateral decision to go to war despite a lack of support from the United Nations also drove a wedge between the nation and many of its allies, thereby altering international relations on a global scale.

These are but a few of the critical issues raised by the war in Iraq, issues whose ramifications we need to analyze if we hope to understand the present. Journalists often label their work "the first draft of history." It is time for historians to revise and resubmit a second draft.

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