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IN THIS ISSUE

Assessing Burns & Novick's *The Vietnam War*
Service Learning in Nepal
A Roundtable on Jason Parker's *Hearts, Minds, Voices*

AND MORE...

Passport

THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW



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Passport

THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW
Volume 48, Number 3, January 2018

In This Issue

- 5 Contributors
- 7 Presidential Message
Peter L. Hahn
- 10 A Roundtable on Jacon C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*
Nicholas J. Cull, Jeffrey James Byrne, Carol Summers,
Andrew J. Rotter, Elizabeth Schmidt, Jason C. Parker
- 20 The By-Laws Amendment on Advocacy Resolution
Paul A. Kramer
- 21 Assessing Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's *The Vietnam War*
Jessica M. Chapman and Amanda C. Demmer
- 28 In Everest's Shadow: Reflections on Service Learning in Nepal
Rachel Mihalovich Osgood
- 33 Making the Case: Using Case Studies in the Classroom
Kelly M. McFarland and Vanessa Lide
- 36 Reflections on the SHAFR 2017 Summer Institute
- 39 Is there "Systemic Inequality" in the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
- 43 Some Articles, A Book, and a Speech
Wyatt Wells
- 47 SHAFR and Community Colleges
Hal M. Friedman
- 49 A Report on the SHAFR-Miller Center Workshop of Public Engagement
Stefanie Georgakis Abbott
- 53 A Review of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Iran, 1951-1954*
Gregory Brew
- 56 Book Reviews

Brian McNamara on Andrew Johnstone and Andrew Priest, eds. *U.S. Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2017)

Stephanie Freeman on Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., *Trust, but Verify: The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969-1991* (Washington, D.C. and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2016)

56 Book Reviews (cont'd)

John McNay on Michael F. Hopkins, *Dean Acheson and the Obligations of Power* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017)

Thomas H. Cox on John R. Haddad, *America's First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2013)

61 The Diplomatic Pouch

64 Dispatches

66 In Memoriam: Marilyn Young: Scholar-Activist/Activist-Scholar
Robert Buzzanco

71 The Last Word: Facing North Korea with Both Eyes Open
Kirk W. Larsen

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Passport 48/3 (January 2018)

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Presidential Message

Peter L. Hahn

Resigning as executive director of SHAFR in 2015 when I accepted a deanship at Ohio State was a bittersweet moment for me. While thrilled to embark on a new chapter in my career in Columbus, I regretted having to step back from the professional society I had grown to admire deeply. While delighted that Council appointed Amy Sayward as my successor, I felt a void in my work life for weeks after Amy drove away from the Ohio State campus at the wheel of a rental truck loaded with the documentary record of my 13 years of service.

SHAFR had been central to my professional life for even longer than that. *Diplomatic History* had provided an invaluable continuing education in the historiography of the field that propelled my intellectual development well beyond graduate school. SHAFR's annual conferences had created opportunities to solicit peer review, to discuss deeply new interpretive ideas, and to connect with a network of world-class scholars. Occupying the privileged position of executive director kept me continuously wired into a network of colleagues who shared my passion for the history of American foreign relations, cared deeply about our society, and helped each other thrive.

My affinity for SHAFR undimmed, I was truly honored to be elected vice president and president. While attending my 27th Council meeting last January, I experienced the new sensation of casting my first-ever vote as a member of Council, as well as considerable relief that the intense logistics of planning and execution were in Amy's very capable hands rather than mine. The SHAFR conference in June had a homecoming feel and confirmed the society's elite standing among professional societies in the humanities. I was reminded anew of SHAFR's remarkable *esprit* when recruiting the 2018 program committee. All fourteen of those invited to serve as members accepted, one writing "I should know better than to add any other burdens but I just can't help myself so, for SHAFR, yes, I would be honored to be a member of the program committee."

SHAFR's vitality stands in stark contrast to the environments in which we operate, where turbulence and disruptions test fundamentally our potential to remain a successful and influential professional society. Within our academic world, new economics and technologies call into question the sustainability of our traditional article-and-book-publication methods for disseminating our research. In a world embracing internet platforms, open source publishing, and economy-driven library consortia, how do we preserve—on affordable terms—such essential principles as original discovery, peer review, and publication? Can SHAFR lead the way in identifying alternative, yet still rigorous, methods to hone and disseminate new knowledge and interpretations? Should we help the broader historical profession refine the accountability metrics for the awarding of degrees and



tenure on terms consistent with new technologies and economic realities?

Challenges also abound in the institutional environment. The past decade has witnessed a frightful decline in undergraduate enrollments in most history departments across the United States, as students (and, especially, their parents and elected representatives) favor so-called "practical" majors that are believed to lead directly to jobs. Numerous data contradict the premise that liberal arts majors lack lifelong earning potential—affirming the need to base policy discussions on accurate information rather than conjecture. The decline in undergraduate enrollments has eroded graduate education as well, given that traditional models for funding graduate programs have rested on undergraduate teaching by graduate

associates, and given that anemic undergraduate demand has reduced the number of tenure-eligible positions available for new Ph.D.s.

How might SHAFR resist the emergent national consensus that higher education should be vocationally-focused? Should we support the modification of history majors and graduate programs to incorporate career planning goals alongside such traditional objectives as critical thinking and cogent writing? Does the study of American foreign relations history in particular equip students for specific professional endeavors? Can we assist in a broader effort across the humanities and social sciences to define an educational purpose that reaches beyond vocation and grasps such invaluable objectives as citizenship, diversity, cultural awareness, conflict resolution, and global understanding, and to advocate for that purpose in public discourse?

Perhaps the most serious challenges facing us as scholars and educators is the unprecedented political-cultural turmoil that has swept the United States and roiled much of the rest of the world. American politics and society have polarized into liberal and conservative bastions that veer toward the extremes, seethe with righteous indignation, and isolate themselves in echo chambers reinforced by social media, talk radio, cable television, and stealth websites imported from Moscow. Destabilizing fault lines appear along such axes as urban-rural, secular-religious, racial/ethnic and sexual identity, and level of education, aggravated by a chief executive unprecedented in his vulgarity and polarizing proclivities. Angry debates about free speech have divided numerous campus communities and pitted campuses against state legislatures or other external entities.

What is the proper role for a non-profit professional society like ours in this ugly new world? Shall we stand aloof from the political and cultural wars, aiming to preserve a balanced objectivity with which we can analyze and arbitrate? Or do we need to stand in defense of certain principles that are crucial to our educational mission—like decrying the obfuscation of the truth by the branding of criticism or inconvenient evidence as alternative fact or

crooked journalism? Can we proactively create venues where right and left can engage in healthy discourse—contentious and yet also respectful and prescriptive—on the vital issues of our times? Can SHAFR role model best practices for preserving the sanctuary of the classroom as a place where ideas can be expressed freely and also civilly, where empathy can be honed, where complexity can be embraced, where the issues that provoke nasty street fights can be addressed sensitively and effectively, where students are educated about and become practiced in the hallmarks of responsible citizenship?

These are heavy questions but ones that are demanded by the times. As president, I will encourage the officers and members of SHAFR to use our intellects and our organizational strengths to analyze the challenges, formulate prescriptions, and strengthen SHAFR for the new era.

HAPPY BIRTHDAY. SHAFR!

Help celebrate SHAFR's 50th year by contributing to the 50 for 50 fund.

We are aiming for 100% participation among all members of SHAFR.

Though the slogan "50 for 50" suggests a \$50 gift, smaller amounts will be appreciated. Multiples of \$50 are especially welcome. SHAFR has for a half-century offered a vibrant and supportive intellectual home for all of us. Let's take the occasion of this anniversary to give something back.

Whatever amount you give will help us to reach our goal of 100% participation. And any suggestions you have for making this 50 for 50 campaign a success and for future fund raising efforts by SHAFR will help our continuing campaign. Simply drop Frank Costigliola a note at frank.costigliola@uconn.edu.

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A Roundtable on Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*

*Nicholas J. Cull, Jeffrey James Byrne, Carol Summers, Andrew J. Rotter, Elizabeth Schmidt,
and Jason C. Parker*

Introduction to the Roundtable on Jason Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*

Nicholas J. Cull

If a someone were to draw a Venn diagram of the most exciting subfields of foreign policy history in recent years—transnational perspectives, work integrating the Third World into the Cold War story, and the study of the role of communication in foreign affairs—Jason Parker’s splendid new book, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*, would sit at the heart of the intersection. It is in the nature of such a book that its audience is seldom situated as perfectly, but it is a mark of Parker’s accomplishment that the diverse contributors to this roundtable—accomplished scholars from transnational history (Andrew Rotter), the Cold War Third World (Jeffrey James Byrne and Elizabeth Schmidt), and African history (Carol Summers)—all take so much from and are able to engage so deeply with Parker’s work.¹

My own line of approach is via the historical study of public diplomacy, which was the point of departure for Parker’s work.² His initial objective was to bring the study of Cold War public diplomacy beyond its early fixation with the East-West relationship and its second-wave focus on the West-West dynamic (which is to say, the projection of the Cold War United States in Europe) and to provide a comprehensive treatment of communication work in the Global South. It was in the process of this investigation that he came to believe that U.S. Cold War public diplomacy was actually one of the drivers of the formation of a Third World identity in the first place: pushing the newly decolonized Global South to imagine itself as a community with shared experiences and potential for cooperation. The watershed for this convergence was the Bandung Conference of April 1955.

Jeffrey James Byrne opens his remarks with a fascinating vignette from his own research: the story of Algeria’s plan to host the follow-up to Bandung in 1965. He goes on to raise some penetrating questions that range from the role of personality politics to the effectiveness of public diplomacy. His evocation of the wider currents of scholarship is helpful.

Andrew Rotter praises both Parker’s style and his achievement in decentering his narrative, even though, as Parker acknowledges, the scope of that narrative is restricted by its reliance on U.S. sources. Rotter (like Byrne)

is struck by one anecdote from 1959, related in the text, in which a young African recounts the range of news sources available to him over short wave radio and boasts about his regular engagement with them. This anecdote suggests that multiple stories were in play. This landscape is not just the familiar Washington-Moscow zero-sum duel for hearts and minds but a complex market place for ideas and identities in which the audience could pick, choose and adapt much of what they heard.

For Elizabeth Schmidt the glass is half empty. She raises concerns over the absence of evidence from the archives of the Global South and questions the historiographical foundations of Parker’s treatment of some of the crises which he covers in detail, most especially the Congo Crisis. She is also concerned by some of the nomenclature used by Parker, which she feels comes from his lack of familiarity with the regional discourse. She does, however, concede that Parker has accomplished a critical task by identifying and initiating an important conversation, and she calls for further scholarship to “launch” the discussion.

Carol Summers is taken with Parker’s revelation of the limited impact of U.S. public diplomacy and wishes for more detail on why it failed. Her account of the emerging regional scholarship again underscores a more complex reality on the ground than Parker’s protagonists might have assumed or indeed than Parker’s analysis indicates.

Parker’s gracious response to the roundtable is helpful in that it locates his argument in multiple historiographies. He concedes the geographical limits of his sources from the outset, but he makes a good case for the value of the perspective that his work contributes. It is interesting to see him contesting the notion of “audiences” for public diplomacy, arguing that the publics in the Global South during the Cold War were not passive consumers. Wise public diplomats not only recognize that their work provokes speech from the publics that they engage, they actively seek out such reactions and learn to listen to them. There is much in Parker’s book to suggest that the Cold War United States seldom showed this kind of wisdom.

By way of conclusion I would like to return to Parker’s starting point: the historiography of global public engagement. Considering the discussion from my personal vantage point—I am perched in the middle of the public diplomacy history Venn bubble—I feel obliged to make a couple of comments regarding the treatment of public diplomacy within the discussion as a whole. First, it is important to point out that Parker is writing not only about the State Department but about the United States Information Agency, which was an independent component

of the foreign policy apparatus in Washington DC from 1953 to 1999 and had its own approaches. Summers speaks of the State Department and “its” USIS; for most of the period that is inaccurate.

Second, Byrne is prompted by his reading of Parker and his knowledge of the developing world’s own responses to ask whether public diplomacy actually “works.” That question is a blunt instrument; it would be better to ask in what circumstances public diplomacy works and why people at the time were sufficiently convinced that it did to mobilize significant resources for it. Parker did not address this question, as it has been the preoccupation of so many other writers on the subject. Indeed, the reason the rest of the world took up the use of the term public diplomacy at the end of the Cold War was because it seemed obvious that the U.S. approach to communication in foreign policy had paid dividends.

Finally, there is a tendency on the part of some to see public diplomacy as specifically an American and a Cold War tool. This is most obvious in the remark by Rotter that without the Cold War, “there would have been no need for public diplomacy campaigns designed to win hearts and minds in the Third World.” While it is true that the American way of public diplomacy is to emphasize crisis, doubtless some other crisis would have pushed Congress into the kinds of investment necessary to engage foreign audiences. Crisis-driven public diplomacy was part of U.S. foreign policy during the Great War and World War Two, and can even be seen during the Civil War.

Other countries also developed or maintained international public engagement mechanisms for their own reasons and made significant contributions to the worldwide playbook of options whereby a democracy can influence foreign publics. The French wrote the book on engagement through culture; the British led the field in broadcasting; citizen exchange work was important for Japan and reached its most developed level in postwar Germany, most especially in regard to Franco-German rapprochement. Spain and Israel pioneered nation-branding.

The Cold War happened to be the issue driving much of this change, but not all. The coincidence of technological developments to reach mass audiences and the emergence of new audiences as a result of democratization and decolonization ensured that communication would be increasingly central to international relations whatever the core issue of the day. It was America’s folly to assume the primacy of the Cold War in diplomacy’s public turn: hence its initial decision to deemphasize public diplomacy programs in the 1990s and the eventual move to merge the USIA into the Department of State. Had the White House and Capitol Hill really understood the necessity of public diplomacy in the ordinary functioning of late twentieth-century foreign policy, the United States as a whole might have fared better overseas in the early years of the twenty-first.

Notes:

1. For other writing by the roundtable participants see Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (Oxford, UK, 2016); Andrew J. Rotter, *Hiroshima: The World’s Bomb* (Oxford, UK, 2008); Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge, UK, 2013); L. Carol Summers, *Colonial Lessons: Africans’ Education in Southern Rhodesia, 1918–1935* (London, 2002). Also relevant is Summers, “Slander, Buzz and Spin: Telegrams, Politics and Global Communications in the Uganda Protectorate, 1945–9,” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 16: 3 (Winter

2015), at <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/602381>.

2. My works in this area include Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge, UK, 2008); and Cull, *The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989–2001* (Basingstoke, UK, 2012),

Review of Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*

Jeffrey James Byrne

In the summer of 1965, the government of the poor, war-ravaged, and recently independent country of Algeria was preparing to host the follow-up to the fabled Summit of Asian-African Heads of State that had taken place in Bandung, Indonesia, ten years before. With French, Chinese, and Egyptian assistance, the Algerians had constructed a grand new luxury resort and conference complex in order to accommodate an anticipated thousand-strong throng of potentates and delegates. The exalted attendees would enjoy the comforts of a high-rise hotel, villas fitted with gourmet kitchens, and a self-contained on-site “village” of restaurants, shops, and post offices.

The conference facilities were designed to host a large-scale international event, using the highest standards of the time: the massive central hall and multiple ancillary meeting rooms boasted the latest in translation, audiovisual, and communications technology. Indeed, the Algerian leadership hoped that as many as eight hundred representatives of the world’s press would attend “Bandung 2,” instantaneously transmitting the proceedings around the globe and thereby making their country, at least briefly, the very epicentre of international affairs.¹

Of course, because of the rather indecorous coup that occurred in Algiers that June and, more generally, ongoing fighting between divergent factions in Asian and African politics, Bandung 2 never took place. But the dichotomy between ambition and capability that it represented is typical of the fascinating period in history that Jason Parker explores with great success in *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*. Moving from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, Parker examines the simultaneous phenomena of the early Cold War, the emergence of the Third World, and the advent of public diplomacy. In doing so, he aids our understanding of the deep, interconnected transformations of international affairs in that era. This is a post-Connelly, post-Cullather, and post-Westad book in the best sense. It shows how the microphone shaped Cold War decolonization as much as, say, missiles or mujahideen. While it has some limitations— notably, as Parker recognizes, it is decentered in perspective but U.S.-centric in methodology—this study insightfully shows how public diplomacy was the facilitator of the utopianism of the era, whether postcolonial, communist, or capitalist. It also contextualizes and situates American world-making aspirations in a refreshing manner.

Indeed, taking up the latter point first, Parker’s approach almost seems to have anticipated these Trumpian times. Even as scholars debate whether the American century is now reaching its conclusion, *Hearts, Minds, Voices* suggests that notion was always hubristic. Anti-colonial activists in Egypt, China, and India may well have drawn encouragement from Woodrow Wilson’s pronouncements in 1918, but Parker shows how, four decades later, the

very substantial resources of American public relations and propaganda failed to win over their postcolonial successors. For in the realm of public diplomacy, he argues convincingly, the Cold War was emphatically multilateral. African audiences, one U.S. official reported, enjoyed a great multitude of radio sources. As a result, Washington's campaign for the hearts and minds of the Third World was largely unsuccessful. By the mid-1960s, the prevailing image of the United States in the Global South was that of an imperialist, exploitative, and destructive superpower. Yet crucially, embracing that image did not preclude admiring American lifestyles or domestic politics.

One basic question I would like to put to the author is whether, in his view, public diplomacy actually works. After all, he describes how the most potentially powerful practitioner of the craft resoundingly failed in this instance. Actions, it seems, counted for much more than words in America's relations with the Third World, and no amount of spin could make American actions in Guatemala, Cuba, or Vietnam look good from the perspective of many in the Global South. Yet Third World actors' own public diplomacy did not necessarily achieve greater long-term success—projects such as Arab nationalism, pan-Africanism, Afro-Asianism, and Non-Alignment seemed to run out of momentum by the 1980s, or even sooner. Although Parker certainly does speak to this bigger picture, especially in his conclusion, I would be interested in hearing more on who, in his view, are the winners in this story.

An interesting facet of this era (and perhaps of our own?) that I would have liked to have read more on is the phenomenon of personality politics. From the American perspective, the effect of personality politics is most clearly revealed in the dichotomy between, on the one hand, the genuinely enthusiastic admiration that Third World publics and elites alike had for John Kennedy, and on the other hand, the very negative views those same constituencies frequently held of the country and policies that he oversaw. "Too good a man to be the president of the United States," is how Algeria's first president remembered him. Parker acknowledges this phenomenon, but to my mind it is a puzzle not yet fully explained.

Likewise, the great counterweight to Kennedy's popularity—a counterweight that by itself surely accounted for much of the failure of American public diplomacy in this era—was the charismatic power of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Guevara. Was there something about the communications technology of the time that accentuated the emphasis on individual leaders? I can't help but be struck by the similarity of political developments in the United States and the Third World: the comparatively youthful Kennedy's election was due in no small part to his telegenic presence, and in much the same way, many postcolonial elites sought to make their callowness an asset in cultures that had typically placed great emphasis on male seniority.

If this was the era of personalized politics in the decolonizing world, it was also the era of "the masses" to whom people like Gamal Abdel Nasser projected their voices and on whose approbation they built their legitimacy. Parker makes a good case that American information campaigns in the Third World became more sophisticated and perceptive under Eisenhower and especially under Kennedy. A significant change in strategy, begun under Eisenhower, was to focus more on targeting elite audiences in recognition of the fact that the overwhelmingly single-party, propagandistic postcolonial regimes intentionally made it difficult for the likes of the USIA to reach their "masses." One facet of the "formation of the Third World" that Parker does not emphasize, but which is a useful addition to his story, is the way in which these American information campaigns contributed to the widening gulf between postcolonial elites and the general population.

In particular, cultural campaigns (the creation of CIA-backed publishing houses in the Middle East, for example, and the sponsoring of Arab authors) would in time play a significant role in the production of elite intellectual and cultural milieux that could be alienating to much of the wider population in many countries.

Ultimately, Parker argues, the American bid for the hearts and minds of Third World constituencies failed, yet it still defined the contest and its parameters in ways that determined much of what the Third World actually was. This argument is sophisticated and nuanced; it recognizes the power of the United States to shape its own reality to an appreciable extent, but far from completely. A large majority of political actors in the Global South simply never bought into the notion that the contest against communism was the defining issue of the age. A great many never even allowed that it was terribly important. The author should be praised for this judicious measure of American power, since analyses focused on discursive, normative, intellectual, or cultural dynamics of the Cold War can often overlook the limits of the American century. In this respect, *Hearts, Minds, Voices* makes a largely successful attempt to answer the thorny question of just what was part of the Cold War and what was not. This book will not be the end of the debate—Parker himself recognizes that there are other dimensions yet to be fully studied—but it is an important step toward a more balanced and comprehensive history of the normative and discursive battles of the era.

Note:

1. I have taken the liberty of referring to this anecdote from my own work on decolonizing Algeria in order to illustrate why I find *Hearts, Minds, Voices* so engaging and productive. See Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (Oxford, UK, 2016), 2–3.

Review of Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*

Carol Summers

Jason Parker's study begins by acknowledging popular American views of the Cold War as a "bipolar confrontation" between the United States and the Soviet Union. It ends by asserting that the people of the "postimperial non-European world" became "not just listeners but speakers" in a global politics divided into new halves: the superpowers and the Third World. In between, it draws on careful work with American sources, especially those of the State Department and its information agency, the U.S. Information Service (USIS), as it examines official efforts to shape global public opinion.

The archival photographs from the USIS printed on the dust jacket (the attributions are on plates within the book) point to the work's focus. They show Egypt's President Nasser in mid-speech; Ghana's justice minister with a microphone labeled "Voice of America"; and, in a picture that foregrounds the technology of communication, from typewriter to radio dish, over jeep and greenery, a tall American with his arm around a small Cambodian colleague. These images emphasize the agency of non-American actors, even as they show American staging.

Parker takes the existence of the world seriously, and he sees an American acknowledgment that global leaders, interpreters, and media practitioners mattered. Official American policy, in his view, sought to pull the speakers and media of the world into association and even alliance with the United States rather than the Soviets by literally providing the microphones and other technologies that broadcasted the voices of leaders and reporters to wider

audiences. In his analysis, American public diplomacy sought to build solidarities both between the United States and the Global South and within that newly emerging sector.

Yet this book is also a study of American officials' profound lack of expertise and their difficulties in learning enough about the world to affect it in a particular way. The central problem, Parker observes, is that most political actors in the post-World War II era were focused on anticolonialism and nationalism rather than on the Americans' Cold War. Furthermore, guided by Soviet propaganda, they perceived the Soviets as potential allies in struggles against the colonial powers, while the United States was formally allied with Britain and other colonizers. For many people trying to build a better world, the United States was irrelevant, racist, or both.

The core of the book offers overlapping case studies of subjects such as Latin America's Alliance for Progress, the Asian context of the Korean war, the Egypt of the Suez crisis, and the emergence of new nationalist authorities in Africa. In these cases, Parker sees American officials intervening in overseas media to shape conversations and coverage among global consumers, even as they bumbled toward their own insights regarding the non-American world. American practitioners, for example, only gradually recognized that crude American ideas about race undermined efforts to woo African nationalists into valuing American ideals over Soviet aid; and they never seem to have noticed how experiences with racism from South Africa northward allowed observers to knowledgeably assess the various nuances of imperial, settler, and U.S. racism and color consciousness.

Through the 1950s, as American practitioners of public diplomacy learned, their aspirations became more limited. They sought to undermine Soviet narratives and keep the United States relevant to local nationalist and increasingly pan-Arab and pan-African conversations, rather than allow the US to be denounced as the home of exploitative neocolonial racists. At a critical moment like the Suez crisis, for example, they made a promising beginning by emphasizing how much the United Nations and the Americans understood and respected Egyptian authority. However, their efforts led not so much to a vigorous alliance between the United States and the nationalists as to a "ham-handed" set of aid programs viewed by Egyptians as "at best paternalism or at worst bribery" (103). And despite high-profile efforts that included sending Vice President Richard Nixon to Ghana's independence celebrations, local press coverage focused less on Americans than on the Duchess of Kent (107–8).

Cultural diplomacy, from jazz to films, may have positively shaped the world's images of the United States, but in Parker's portrayal of American initiatives abroad, official political efforts did startlingly little and did it poorly. When Parker points to the Bandung movement, the dynamic voices of Nasser, Nehru, and Nkrumah, or the "rise of the newly independent, race conscious, non-aligned, and impoverished Third World," he emphasizes the unexpected power and consequence of all sorts of actors other than American officials (169).

It is refreshing to see a historian of the United States acknowledge that American initiatives were not especially successful or relevant. Parker delineates the gaps in the American side's knowledge with admirable clarity. He

is less clear, though, on how diverse local actors shaped American failures. His focus is on states and their leadership, and his portrayal of the broader world seems curiously flat. His analysis differs from that of historians who focus on non-American actors not in its conclusions, but in its understandings of causes and its evidence. Parker acknowledges these problems, noting that his analysis is about Americans, not about the "backstory" of the other actors on the scene (172–3). To some degree, though, this admission misses the point. What is missing is not simply "backstory" in the sense of biographies of key actors or chronologies of colonial crises, but a re-thinking of how information and media worked—and how people worked with a startlingly varied set of tools—both before, during, and after their interactions with American spin-mongers.

Parker's depiction of non-American actors is generally confined to the actions they took within the short chronological frame of the book, and he is primarily interested in important individuals (e.g., Nasser and Nehru), particular states (e.g., Korea and Ghana), and the occasional major meeting (Bandung). The populations of most nations appear only as rather passive and naïve targets for media campaigns. Recently, though, new ideas about diasporas, networks, expertise, medicine and technology, and media, along with newly opened official and unofficial archives that range from the massive secret Hanslope Park stash to tiny "tin box" treasures from throughout the British empire and beyond, have allowed historians to reconstruct more complicated stories.¹

Parker points toward a changing global media landscape, but its changes are ultimately documented not in the official American archives he deploys, but through more diverse collections generated by the very actors who consumed or rejected American initiatives. In unofficial letters and correspondence, security intelligence policing documents, and locally held private papers, diasporic networks emerge, suggesting a longer history for the interconnected and informed colonized regions. These include politicized labor unions, as Frederick Cooper demonstrates; and cosmopolitan networks, as Nico Slate and Michael Goebel show.² Media consciousness and action was not brought to the Global South by Americans, but emerged through vigorous intellectual engagement by local activists whose critical technologies included the printing presses introduced by missionaries; mastery of imperial languages and discourses; and media networks that included newspapers, oral news readers, and rumors (admittedly not always accurate) about the possibilities and dangers of a bigger world.³ Beyond examining mobilization around imagined communities, diasporic networks, and political initiatives, historians of the Global South have also tracked the networks and connections established through education, medical and scientific research, and faith associations that complicate efforts to tell state-based political histories.⁴

Even a superficial examination of the world beyond the United States thus points to a noisy and complicated space full of its own actors and initiatives and fully capable, both intellectually and technologically, of interpreting and assessing alien public diplomacy in complex ways, rather than simply consuming it. Once acknowledged, that complexity makes it difficult to conclude that in the Cold War era, bipolar ideas from American officials bumbled

This book is also a study of American officials' profound lack of expertise and their difficulties in learning enough about the world to affect it in a particular way. The central problem, Parker observes, is that most political actors in the post-World War II era were focused on anticolonialism and nationalism rather than on the Americans' Cold War. Furthermore, guided by Soviet propaganda, they perceived the Soviets as potential allies in struggles against the colonial powers, while the United States was formally allied with Britain and other colonizers.

their way into the Global South's construction of pan-Africanism, the non-aligned movement, and the Third World.

The view of the world beyond the United States could be complicated further with more attention to the dark side of the era's informational and media initiatives. Work on British imperialism, from at least the nineteenth century onward, has emphasized informational campaigns, knowledge networks, and media initiatives as part of imperial divide-and-rule strategies. Rather than constructing solidarities, media—especially those sponsored from outside—have built knowledge for the external rulers but have also fostered divisions, sectarianism, and distrust in colonial and counterinsurgency contexts.⁵ Exploring such divisions has been part of a major move by historians to abandon naïvely celebratory nationalist histories in favor of explorations of local agencies, interests, and values.⁶ Had Parker acknowledged imperial tendencies to foster division, he might have been able to support a different argument for the significance of U.S. policy. He might have argued, for example, that it resembled Soviet policy, in that its oversimplifications nurtured more autocratic activists seeking to suppress internal divisions around region, ethnicity, faith, class, and culture in favor of external coherence.

Parker's work deconstructs the public diplomacy campaign from official America. That campaign was a fairly unsophisticated one, though; and it encountered a world full of its own dynamics, initiatives, cross-linkages, and concerns. Americans saw a simple world of governments and states. Looking at this official state-to-state campaign, Parker is able to acknowledge—but not fully explain—how American efforts failed. Engaging with historical work that has explored newly complicated visions of indigenous, colonial, nationalist, and postcolonial cultures, societies and networks might have enabled Parker to make a more vigorous escape from the assumptions of official American sources. Local individuals, associations, networks, states, ideas, values, and even means and technologies were more than American officials could control, not because the region's states were strong and their leaders resisted and aligned themselves in new ways, but because people, diasporas, social, cultural and economic networks were critical actors in a complex world. American officials seem to have oversimplified, blinded by their own state-centered bipolar vision of the Cold War. I am not yet convinced that American public diplomacy had much to do with the emergence of a coherent Third World.

Notes:

1. For a vivid discussion of the Hanslope Park migrated archives, listen to the "Mau Mau" episode, *Radiolab*, National Public Radio, 3 July 2015, <http://www.radiolab.org/story/mau-mau/>. A key text on tin box archives and other new explorations in political consciousness in the colonized world is Karin Barber, ed., *Africa's Hidden Histories* (Bloomington, IN, 2006).

2. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge, UK, 1996); Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, MA, 2012); Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (Cambridge, UK, 2015).

3. See, for example, Paul la Hausse de Lavoulière, *Restless Identities: Signatures of Nationalism, Zulu Ethnicity and History in the Lives of Petros Lamula (c.1881–1948) and Lymon Maling (1889–c.1936)* (Durban, South Africa, 2000) and much of my own recent work, most explicitly Carol Summers, "Slander, Buzz and Spin: Telegrams, Politics and Global Communications in the Uganda Protectorate, 1945–9," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 16: 3 (Winter 2015).

4. Key works include Nancy Leys Stepan, *Eradication: Ridding the World of Diseases Forever?* (Ithaca, NY, 2011) and Derek Peterson, *Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, c.1935–1972* (Cambridge, UK, 2012).

5. An early classic is C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870* (Cambridge, UK, 1997). This theme has reemerged in discussions of counterinsurgency and nationalism. See, for example, Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York, 2005), which delineates efforts to separate loyalists and "Mau Mau" activists and notes the roots of such practices in official and individual experience garnered in the earlier "Malayan Emergency."

6. Histories of Ghana demonstrate this turn emphatically. See Jean Marie Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana* (Madison, WI, 1993); and Richard Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951–60* (Athens, Ohio, 2000).

Review of Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, and Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*

Andrew J. Rotter

Jason Parker's well-written new book does what good books do: it offers fresh ways of looking at seemingly familiar subjects. Its subject is the emergence during the Cold War of the Third World as a term, an imaginary, and a place. It also examines the role that public diplomacy played in the Third World's construction—American diplomacy, yes, as the book's title indicates, but also that of the Soviet Union and the non-European nations for whose benefit such diplomacy was meant to be conducted.

Parker argues that people in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean experienced the Cold War mainly as a "media war" fought by leading adversaries to sway the opinions of those in the Global South. The men and women of these areas "responded to this media war by joining it," establishing their own organs of information aimed largely at each other and thus forming a common identity and purpose (3). In this way great power public diplomacy helped bring the Third World into being. Parker explores a series of events that took place during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations to depict the evolution of U.S. public diplomacy toward the Third World, with its attendant successes and failures.

Hearts, Minds, and Voices contributes admirably to a growing body of work on the significance of Cold War public diplomacy. Its readers are likely to know books by Frank Ninkovich, Walter Hixson, Kenneth Osgood and Brian Etheridge, Laura Belmonte, Nicholas Cull, and Justin Hart.¹ Parker advances this work in several ways. First, he is especially alert to the role of race in the tensions between American interests and Third World aspirations. On this question he fully engages with another literature that has in the past seemed to hover just beyond the work on public diplomacy. That literature includes titles by Brenda Gayle Plummer, Mary Dudziak, Thomas Borstelmann, Penny von Eschen, Nico Slate, and others.²

Racism at home plagued Americans' efforts to portray themselves as champions of freedom and gave the Soviets an opportunity to claim that they alone were supporters of the racial equality that was a necessary condition for the liberation of people of color in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. For Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru especially, colonialism was inseparable from racism; where the latter still existed there could be no genuine repudiation of the former. As Parker notes, when Little Rock erupted in clashes over school desegregation in 1957, the Soviets "had a field day" exposing American hypocrisy, although the Third World hardly needed the Russians' help to see it (109). American racial diplomacy worked best when it proceeded from the inside out, as when President Kennedy turned his administration toward the pursuit of civil rights.

Second, Parker acknowledges disagreements within administrations concerning the importance of public diplomacy generally and the efficacy of particular initiatives. He makes no fetish of bureaucratic politics—for which I, at least, am grateful—but he also reminds us gently that policymaking is never linear and is always subject to human influence. Thus, for example, he tells us that the Truman administration's public diplomacy toward the (not quite yet) Third World "started late, lacked coherence, and suffered from chronic bureaucratic turmoil" (17). This bumbling was to some extent rectified by the president's announcement of the Point Four program in early 1949. Parker perhaps makes a bit too much of this program, and certainly the non-European nations were to be disappointed that Point Four never produced U.S. aid on the scale of the Marshall Plan, to which it was inevitably compared. It is well worth remembering that differences between the stakeholders persisted through the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

Finally, *Hearts, Minds, and Voices* follows the best recent scholarship by de-centering its analysis. It shows the ways in which public diplomacy was received, appropriated, and to some extent mimicked by those at whom it was aimed. Whether

or not particular approaches were effective, governments in Africa and elsewhere were impressed with the energy of the great power public relations campaigns directed at them. They realized quickly that they had their own stories to tell and that it was not difficult to use radio, for example, to broadcast them. Parker recounts an anecdote told by the radio director of the United States Information Agency, who in 1959 encountered, "in the bush of Tanganyika," a young man who told him that he listened to "BBC, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, VOA, Moscow, Salisbury, Leopoldville, Brazzaville, Cairo, and Peking," and was disappointed only that he could not tune in Accra too (163). Perhaps he could have put his hands on one of fifteen of Ghana's print publications concerning Pan-Africanism. Here, it seems to me, is what makes Parker's contribution most valuable: his willingness to describe not only the public diplomacy that issued from Washington and Moscow but how it was perceived and transformed outside the Cold War nexus.

First conceptualized by French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952, the Third World was a "cryptic southward vision" (8) characterized by a series of overlapping discourses, including race, decolonization, nationalism, development, and non-alignment in the Cold War. The significance of these issues waxed and waned according to time and place. The Bandung Conference stressed non-alignment, a reasonably common denominator for twenty-nine nations ranging from Japan to Yemen. Latin America, which was drawn fully into the Third World by Fidel Castro and John F. Kennedy, was most interested in economic development and independence, which concerns Kennedy sought to address with the Alliance for Progress. Race formed the principal obstacle to U.S. diplomacy in Africa.

Given the differences among regions, it is hard to credit Parker's frequent references to "the Third World project" (see, for example, 169). While there can be no question that solidarities formed among the non-European nations and made them a collectivity of some kind, they clearly had their own interests and their own reasons to pursue them, and the differences and discontinuities among their pursuits seem to me at least as compelling as the similarities. The

overlapping discourses that constituted the Third World made for a shaggy and stubborn thing, one unlikely to be harnessed to a single "project." This seems to me more than a semantic issue. For all its faults, nationalism was an organizing principle for the Global South after 1945, just as it was for First and Second World countries. National "projects" were not always coterminous with regional or international ones. It is hard to envision a single common purpose and a single path toward it among a diverse gathering of states anxious about their security and identity. Each state had its own project(s). Some were consistent with those of other Third World countries, others not so much.

Partha Chatterjee has argued that nationalism in colonial states was "a derivative discourse," ironically (given its connection to independence movements) "a prisoner of prevalent European intellectual fashions."³ Parker implies something similar here: the superpowers' insistence on imposing the Cold War on the Global South "prompted a reaction from their counterparts in newly developed states, helping to catalyze a collective identity among impoverished, imperialized areas" (168). That may well have been true. But what does the argument mean for indigenous sources of political organization that may

have found root in local histories and cultures? Postcolonial state formation in India, for example, followed to some extent patterns established by the Mughals and, later, provincial princes, not the British, whose rule was never as wide-ranging or as complete as might be supposed.⁴ In the Philippines, the United States built government from the grass roots up, partly out of deference to elite *caciques* who held local power long before the start of the Philippine insurrection in 1899.⁵ A book that concerns public diplomacy may be forgiven for neglecting such matters. Still, the de-centering of the postcolonial would seem to require that attention be paid to Third World thinking that was not, perhaps, wholly derived from elsewhere.

Finally, to what extent is Parker's story bounded by the Cold War? I recently had an interesting conversation with a former SHAFR president (who shall remain nameless for his own safety), in which he said casually that within twenty years we would no longer be talking much about the Cold War. That surprised me, and I suspect it would surprise Parker, for the Cold War seems to have a critical part to play in his story. Without it, apparently, there would have been no need for public diplomacy campaigns designed to win hearts and minds in the Third World. Even as the Eisenhower administration (for example) grasped "the broader, world-historical dynamics of race and decolonization independent of the Cold War," Parker writes, it understood "that these dynamics would never, in practice, operate independently of the conflict" (70). So if there had been no Cold War—if, say, Franklin Roosevelt had lived through the end of his fourth term and Stalin trusted him, or if someone had poisoned Stalin in Potsdam in 1945—would there now be a literature on public diplomacy after 1945? And, more pointedly, would there have been a Third World? Jason Parker's well-researched, eminently readable, and plain smart book is the place to begin the search for answers to these questions.

Notes:

1. Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938–1950* (New York, 1981); Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War* (New

York, 1997); Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS, 2006); Laura Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia, PA, 2008); Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (New York, 2008); Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge, eds., *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and Intellectual History* (Leiden, 2010); Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 2013).

2. See, for example, Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996); Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA, 2004); Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, MA, 2012).

3. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought in the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis, MN, 1993), 10.

4. Jon Wilson, *The Chaos of Empire: The British Raj and the Conquest of India* (New York, 2016).

5. Michael Cullinane, "Playing the Game: the Rise of Sergio Osmeña, 1898–1907," in *Philippine Colonial Democracy*, ed. Ruby R. Pareles (Quezon City, 1989).

Review of Jason C. Parker, *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*

Elizabeth Schmidt

In *Hearts, Minds, Voices*, Jason Parker investigates an understudied aspect of the Cold War: the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union to win the hearts and minds of populations in the Global South. The Cold War superpowers sought to replace European imperial powers as the dominant forces in Africa and Asia. The Soviets tried to challenge American dominance in Latin America and the Caribbean, while the Americans tried to retain it. Both engaged in political and military interventions to install or overthrow governments in the vast southern regions then called the Third World.

The superpowers also waged massive campaigns of public diplomacy to win popular allegiance. Parker argues that the U.S. propaganda war, which has received less scholarly attention than U.S. military and covert operations, played a far greater role in American Cold War strategy than previously recognized. Moreover, he contends, a careful examination of Washington's efforts in this realm leads to a revised understanding of the turning points in American foreign policy during the first two decades of the Cold War. Finally, the American propaganda war, in particular, was a major impetus for emergent Third World self-imagining, which resulted in the growth of transcontinental solidarity.

Parker's objectives are twofold. First, he aspires to cast light on American endeavors to present the United States and its policies toward the Global South in a positive light. Second, he aims to showcase the historical agency of actors in that region as they responded to U.S. and Soviet initiatives. Although the Cold War began as a struggle between two superpowers, Parker argues that it became a "multiparty colloquy," largely as a result of the public diplomacy campaign (viii). In fact, he contends, the Third World as an imagined entity in many ways took shape in response to superpower efforts to win the loyalty of Global

South populations. Although the new identity built on those previously generated by indigenous movements, the superpower struggle for hearts and minds pushed African, Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean actors to shape their own vision of a postcolonial world and to unite around shared concerns, including political independence, alternative models of economic development and modernization, transcontinental solidarity in common struggles against racism, colonialism, imperialism, and finally, nonalignment in the superpower contest.

Employing case studies that span the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations, Parker aims to show that inhabitants of the Global South were not merely recipients of superpower messages. Rather, they were historical agents who waged their own public diplomacy campaigns in response to the superpower media war. In other words, the actions of powerful northern governments provided southern peoples with a new focus that rejected both colonialism and the Cold War binary. In this scenario, Parker gives special weight to the role of the United States; Washington's attempt to counter its problematic image, marred by racial discrimination at home and strong ties to imperial Europe, helped to strengthen the imagined community of the Third World. While Truman was late to understand the importance of the emergent Global South, Eisenhower did grasp its importance, and Kennedy was even more prescient—as Parker demonstrates in his chapters on the Korean War (Eisenhower) and the Alliance for Progress in Latin America (Kennedy).

Parker's case studies highlight events in Asia and Latin America. Although these regions loomed large during the period under consideration, the relatively scant attention paid to Africa is unfortunate. The book does include brief sections on the Suez Crisis, Ghana's political independence, and that nation's leadership in the Pan-African and transcontinental decolonization movements. It also touches on the Congo Crisis, a pivotal moment in African decolonization history. However, sources for Parker's assessment of the early stages of the Congo Crisis (153) are not cited, and the most notable scholarship on the topic is absent from the bibliography. The brief summary assumes the Belgian government's perspective on the conflict and its causes. There is no mention of Western mining companies' support for the secessionists who attempted to hive off the mineral-rich Katanga province,

the role the Belgian and U.S. governments played in the assassination of the elected prime minister, the support of those governments for a military coup, and their installation of a government that had little popular backing.

Coverage of these issues would render African popular opinion toward the United States more comprehensible. The absence of consideration of Southern Africa is also surprising. The fate of apartheid South Africa and the Portuguese colonies was of critical concern to Global South activists during this period, and debates over the proper approach to these entities split the Kennedy administration. Some government officials attempted to rally support for the white minority settler and colonial regimes, while others hoped to burnish America's image in Africa by pushing for arms embargos and economic sanctions.

Parker's new book unquestionably contributes to a greater understanding of the propaganda war waged by the United States to win hearts and minds in the Global South during the Cold War. However, Parker does not have the evidentiary base to support his claim that the American public diplomacy campaign was a major motivator for Third World self-imagining. His book is grounded in a thorough

investigation of American archives, presidential libraries, and manuscript and oral history collections, from which he reconstructs U.S. views and practices. However, he did not consult African, Asian, or Latin American archives—with their rich collections of official documents, speeches, newspapers, and oral histories. Although actors from these regions are sometimes cited—their words often filtered through American lenses—their voices are decidedly muted. As a result, the book falls short in its assessment of the political thinkers and activists from the Global South, whose perceptions, voices, reactions, and responses are largely absent. (The author's unfortunate use of terms such as "nonwhites" and "non-Europeans," which in Africa are associated with the nomenclature of apartheid South Africa, is emblematic of this weakness.) The outcome is a top-down account that is heavily weighted toward official U.S. perspectives, with the views of American actors standing in for those of the populations they are purportedly describing. Parker's book has laid a solid foundation, but the "multiparty colloquy" has yet to be launched.

Author's Response

Jason C. Parker

My warmest thanks to *Passport* editor Andy Johns for putting together a dream team for this discussion, and thanks equally to the contributors for their insights. It is a privilege to receive such attention for my book, and I am grateful for it. Having bounced my thesis around conference panels and lecture halls on three continents over the last near-decade, I find it gratifying that it still retains the power to generate novel critiques and lively discussion. It gives me hope that the book can achieve one of its intended purposes, which is to stimulate an ongoing "multiparty colloquy" that leads in unexpected and rewarding directions.

In the interest of full disclosure, I must say that was not my original purpose. When I sketched my research design and began mining the archives, I was somewhat less ambitious: I wanted to fill a gap in the literature on U.S. Cold War public diplomacy by recovering how Washington sought to win hearts and minds outside of Europe and the East Bloc. Influenced in part by innovative scholarship on the nexus of race and foreign affairs, I sought especially to trace how the USIA handled that nexus, given the nature of its domestic front in the Jim Crow South. This scholarship, combined with other works that I encountered along the way and with my archival findings, led me to a more provocative conclusion: that the real story was not simply what the United States said to the decolonizing world but rather the interaction between that outreach and the responses it generated—the ideas and the conversations sparked in the proverbial space between.

Aware of the limitations of my U.S.-centric archival base, I wanted to avoid falling into the trap of arguing that the concept of the Third World sprang, Athena-like, full grown from the head of the USIA. Neither evidence nor logic suggests that it did. Nor does my reading of the evidence support the notion that the Third World project was entirely self-generated within the global South. Just as scholarship on the Cold War eventually concluded that the superpowers ultimately shared responsibility for its origins, so too do I think we can securely argue for the essential interactivity of the Third World's creation.

It takes nothing away from long-running global South conversations to note that Northern attentions affected them. This idea, of course, did not originate with the Cold War. W.E.B. DuBois long ago traced the global color line connecting Jim Crow to the European empires. His views, like those of thinkers from Aimé Césaire to Marcus Garvey

to Rabindranath Tagore, reverberated within diasporan networks connecting metropolitan to colonial nodes. Michel Gobat has recently shown how "Latin America" took shape partly in response to U.S. expansionism of various kinds. Erez Manela brilliantly showed the impact of Wilsonian rhetoric on the nationalism and proto-nationalism stirring in Asia and the Middle East.

The power differentials in these exchanges are obvious. But they are not necessarily dispositive. Each of these exchanges raises fascinating questions: What does it mean for an outside power to intrude upon inside and diasporan conversations? Does it matter whether the outsiders dismiss the insiders' contentions, or whether they, however indirectly or incompletely, affirm them? Either course can offer a kind of external validation. Such validation may not be quite the lifeblood of aspirational movements, but it can serve as adrenaline for them. I found that superpowers' public diplomacy promotion of the Cold War to global South audiences roughly followed this template. This promotion sought to make the superpowers into lodestars for the Third World to navigate by in its way forward. Audiences there deemed them instead more of a foil, and defined their interests essentially and collectively in opposition.

"Audiences" may not be the right term, since the central conceit of the argument is that these were not just listeners but speakers. Moreover, given Carol Summers's critique that the book is overly state- and elite-centered, there would seem to be little room in my telling for audiences in the mass sense. A finer-grained bottom-up history drawn from foreign archives might be able to capture those voices. These can be elusive, but I hope that area specialists will use their expertise in the locales of my book's case studies to pursue them. This would shed useful light on what the worldwide conversation animating the rise of the Third World meant to its non-elite citizens. In the present book, however, attending to those voices would have risked blurring my focus on the regimes—the elites—who claimed to speak for them abroad through public diplomacy, which is by definition a state-based activity. If these area sources are incomplete or unavailable, though, the USIA records can help to fill the gap. American public diplomats, although themselves "elites" by and large, were preoccupied with divining mass and niche opinion among foreign publics. Whatever the shortcomings of the American analyses, they offer a reasonably systematic record of that opinion over time as it encountered the public diplomacy output of the USIA as well as its competitors East and South.

Indeed, despite their "imperial eyes," USIA officials observing the new states' networks detected a competing consciousness emerging through them. It is true that USIA officials rarely had anything resembling insider information about the new regimes' public diplomacy decision-making, or any knowledge more intimate than a survey questionnaire about how foreign publics heard the media cacophony. But if U.S. officials could only speculate on the new states' motives and strategies, they could and did document their broadcasts. It is possible that Nkrumah, Nasser, et al. were deploying Third Worldist rhetoric cynically, or that everyday Africans and Arabs rolled their eyes when they heard it. Perhaps they thought their leaders misguided, and wished for greater attention to the global North's chess match than to issues of race, decolonization, development, and nonalignment. But I rather suspect that their blind spots notwithstanding, U.S. public diplomats were largely correct in their reading of the crowded conversations in which they found themselves immersed overseas. I agree that ultimate validation of my thesis at particular sites will have to come from foreign archives, but I would find it surprising if these sources showed the new regimes not seeking to advance Third Worldist agendas, or their peoples not for the most part on board.

My research suggests that American diplomats were

on the whole right about public attitudes toward the more galvanizing issues included in my account, such as the Congo Crisis, as well as some of those left out, such as apartheid. Elizabeth Schmidt notes that I missed some of the “most notable scholarship” on the Congo, which I regret. (My timing also led me to miss other books—by Timothy Barney, Gregg Brazinsky, and Jeremy Friedman, among others—that would have helped my study, alas!) I certainly did not intend to “assum[e] the Belgian perspective” or to overlook the Belgian and American roles in the story. I chalk those lapses up to my desire to remain consistent regarding state actors and archival limitations—that is, to be consistent in focusing on how this tumultuous world looked from official Washington.

Moreover, the Congo having been well covered elsewhere, the capsule history included here was meant to serve as a jumping-off point for exploring its often-overlooked public diplomacy aspect—namely, how American, Ghanaian, and other spin doctors responded to the crisis. For all the violence and tragedy of the crisis itself, as far as both the USIA and Nkrumah’s African Bureau were concerned, Lumumba’s murder was a public relations turning point. The USIA tracked its impact predominantly but by no means exclusively in Ghana’s public diplomacy, which made it a centerpiece of the Pan-African gospel. It remained so as apartheid and the outbreak of war in Portuguese Africa began to assume increasing importance in continental conversations. Either of these issues are among dozens that would have made good case studies to include in a much longer version of the book, although of the two issues, the USIA devoted considerably more attention later in the 1960s to apartheid.

I cannot really dispute Schmidt’s charge that my account is “top down and heavily weighted to official U.S. perspectives and actors,” or that the global South needed no motivation to impel its “self-imagining.” But I am persuaded that the Cold War’s intrusion could not help but influence that self-imagining. The North insisted on the global stakes; the South disagreed, and their replies were carefully monitored by U.S. officials who wondered why they were unable to get through to audiences there. Whether this amounts to a U.S. role in what Summers refers to as the “emergence of a coherent Third World” depends on how one defines and dates that entity. Given the “trinity” definition—nonalignment, development, and transracial solidarity (the “spirit of Bandung”)—that I and other scholars lean on, it would seem difficult to argue for a Third World project wholly or even mostly self-generated. Two of the three constituent parts of the trinity were deeply Cold War-inflected. Only nonalignment did not have the obvious precursors that “Bandung” and development did. It took the Cold War to fuse the three together in the minds of both North and South alike, and for the latter to broadcast that fusion worldwide as soon as independence enabled them to do so. As Andrew Rotter asks, “if there had never been a Cold War, would there be a Third World?”

I conclude that there would have been something semi-collective and aspirational that rose as the European

empires fell. But I think it would have been a different thing absent the Cold War. The Third World project, as Rotter notes, was a “shaggy and stubborn thing” whose layers, dimensions, and nuances were often internally at odds. Nationalist projects, whether political, economic, cultural, or other in nature, were “not always coterminous” with regional, international, or “bloc” ones. This goes some way toward explaining why the Third World splintered and faltered in the two decades after my account ends. For all its at-times electrifying rhetoric and its near-ecclesiastical sense of destiny, the rival identities and agendas of its members (including the clashing “personality politics” that Jeffrey Byrne notes), the divides separating elites from their peoples, the imbalances of power, and the often-immanent violence of both decolonization and Cold War left its imagined potentialities unfulfilled.

Writing this history of the concurrent first halves of the Cold War and of the postwar Third World project convinced me that they are best viewed with what Rotter and Byrne properly call a de-centered perspective. This approach best encompasses the crucial processes of interaction between indigenous and exogenous elements, agendas, interests, and voices. Where these intersect—either in accord or in dispute—they can have large, unpredictable, and improbable repercussions. New media technologies can exacerbate these yet further. One thinks of the disruptive impact of the radio, television, and internet revolutions on the circulation of ideas.

Some of these ideas or events—say, the Russian Revolution, the atomic age, anticolonial nationalism, or globalization—are capable of altering the parameters of the imagined and of the possible, even absent the aforementioned media revolutions. With those revolutions, however, such events could change what was possible with unfamiliar speed and reach. Neither the Cold War nor decolonization on its own had power of this magnitude. Their collision on a crowded global media stage unleashed such power.

In addition to historicizing the Third World’s rise in the context of the Cold War, part of my purpose in writing the book was to reimagine that conflict as a media war rather than just a strategic, frequently militarized one. Much bloody suffering was inflicted in its name. But embedded within its conflicts over strategy, security, and ideology were arguments over independence, identity, and modernity. In this regard I am most gratified by Byrne’s judgment that “this is a post-Connelly, post-Cullather, post-Westad book, in the best way.” This is exactly what I sought to produce, though at the risk of pressing my luck I would hope to add post-Prashad and possibly post-Cull as well. The hearty exchange on this roundtable, for which I again thank my colleagues, is doubly gratifying in that I wanted the book, like its subject, to start a conversation. It has done so here in most satisfying ways; may it continue to do so in the years to come.

I cannot really dispute Schmidt’s charge that my account is “top down and heavily weighted to official U.S. perspectives and actors,” or that the global South needed no motivation to impel its “self-imagining.” But I am persuaded that the Cold War’s intrusion could not help but influence that self-imagining. The North insisted on the global stakes; the South disagreed, and their replies were carefully monitored by U.S. officials who wondered why they were unable to get through to audiences there.

Congratulations!

2017 SHAFR Election Results

President: **Peter Hahn**, The Ohio State University
Vice President: **Barbara Keys**, University of Melbourne
Council **Adriane Lentz-Smith**, Duke University
Council: **Lien-Hang Nguyen**, Columbia University
Council (graduate student):
Brian McNamara, Temple University
Nominating Committee:
Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University

In addition, the referendum to amend the SHAFR By-Laws passed.

*Thank you to the 605 members of SHAFR
who voted in the election.*

SHAFR

The By-Laws Amendment on Advocacy Resolution

Paul A. Kramer

This past January, SHAFR president Mary Dudziak, approached me asking if I would chair a task force on the question of the organization's taking of advocacy positions. In doing so, she was following up on a Council discussion about the absence in the SHAFR By-Laws of policies and procedures on this issue. She asked this task force to make recommendations and, if it decided new procedures were necessary, to draft an amendment to the by-laws.

I agreed to serve, and Dirk Bönker, Amy Greenberg, and Sam Lebovic generously signed on. We first decided to find out how other societies of professional historians approached this question. We got in touch with the officers of five other organizations and discovered wide variation: some did not issue advocacy resolutions at all as a matter of policy; some allowed their presidents or executive directors to speak out in individual, non-representative capacities; some allowed their elected councils to put forward resolutions, and established protocols for membership votes. Some organizations established formal boundaries around appropriate themes of advocacy, and others didn't. Taken together, these rules provided us models to worth with.

In crafting a resolution process, we sought to maximize democratic access and maintain a threshold of representativeness, while keeping practical questions of organizational efficiency in mind. We decided we did not want our proposal to stipulate any formal topical limits to advocacy, that it would be best if SHAFR's membership itself decided what kinds of concerns merited an advocacy statement by the organization. We proposed that it should be possible to initiate resolutions by both SHAFR's membership and by Council, but in either case require approval by the other. When it came to setting the number of signatures required for petitions by the membership, we

tried to set the threshold high enough to prevent clearly non-representative proposals from moving forward, but low enough that it would not discourage less well-connected SHAFR members from initiating the process. We ultimately concluded that requiring ten signatures should be sufficient to put a petition to a simple-majority vote by the members. To ensure the representativeness of member votes (whether in moving a member-initiated resolution to council, or in voting on a council-initiated one), we decided to require a minimum turnout for these referenda. We set this threshold at 30% of SHAFR's membership, the average turnout in SHAFR elections. When it came to Council votes on resolutions, we decided on a 2/3 threshold for passage, with 80% voting.

We also proposed that, apart from the question of formal resolutions, it made sense to authorize SHAFR's president to speak publicly on issues of vital interest to the organization without consulting the Council or membership, in her/his capacity as president, but not as representing the opinion of SHAFR's membership. Our thinking was that there might conceivably be instances in which urgency and timing of an issue might call for a more rapid response than the pursuit of a resolution (by either path) would permit. We felt this arrangement balanced a concern for speed of response with questions of representativeness. (The AHA empowers its executive director in this way.)

The Council discussed the resolution and passed it with strong support. Presented to SHAFR's membership, it was passed by a wide margin (493-73, or 87.1%). I'm happy to have had the opportunity to participate in drafting the resolution, and grateful to my partners for their insights and dedication. I hope that, put into practice from here on, the new by-law successfully enables SHAFR members to advocate on matters they decide are of collective concern to the organization.

Assessing Burns and Novick's *The Vietnam War*

Jessica M. Chapman and Amanda C. Demmer

Ken Burns and Lynn Novick, *The Vietnam War* (PBS)

Jessica M. Chapman

“There is no single truth in war.” In many ways, Ken Burns and Lynn Novick’s documentary film series *The Vietnam War* does justice to this tag line. It features an impressive range of interviews with Vietnamese and American politicians, political activists, military leaders, soldiers, authors, and families affected by the war. It bears the imprint of the most recent scholarship on the Vietnam War, much of which focuses on the Vietnamese sides of the conflict.

Historians remain behind the scenes, however, as Burns and Novick clearly prefer to tell their tale through the words of the war’s participants rather than its analysts.¹ To bring in the testimony of deceased players like John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and Richard Nixon—and to lay bare their deceptions—the filmmakers put to good use materials from U.S. government archives and the Miller Center’s Presidential Recordings Project. The eighteen-hour, ten-episode series is filled with extensive film footage of political protests and battles in Vietnam, as well as television broadcasts and footage of anti-war demonstrations in the U.S., that is unrivalled by any Vietnam War documentary of which I am aware.

On the other hand, this documentary contains a set of arguments about the U.S. decision to go to war in Vietnam, and the consequences of that decision, that elevates one truth above all others: America’s war in Vietnam was a tragic mistake, a mistake based on inherited Cold War assumptions that made some sense as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and JFK gradually but grudgingly escalated the American commitment to South Vietnam. But by the time Lyndon Johnson took the helm, the wisdom of American involvement could have and should have been subjected to greater scrutiny. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and General William Westmoreland face particularly harsh criticisms for deceiving the American public as they escalated and Americanized a war about which they had grave trepidations from the start, and for continuing that deception by boasting of military progress towards victory as the war dragged on without meaningful successes.

Somewhat more muted scorn is reserved for Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who continued and even expanded what was by 1969 a senseless and unwinnable war that wreaked catastrophic human and social effects on both the United States and Vietnam. U.S. Marine veteran and *Matterhorn* author Karl Marlantes seems to speak for the filmmakers when he says, “Making a mistake, people can do that. But covering up mistakes, then you’re killing people for your own ego.”² In the same vein, Tim O’Brien, the famed novelist of the Vietnam War, criticizes his own conduct in Vietnam in a way that might as well be applied to LBJ and his advisors,

as they escalated what they knew to be an ill-fated war out of sheer cowardice: “The nightmare of Vietnam for me is not the bombs and the bullets . . . it’s that failure of nerve that I so regret.”³

Most offensively, in Burns and Novick’s view, even as officials in Washington dithered because of their own moral weakness, they continued to send hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to the front lines of a violent, disorienting war that lacked the type of moral logic or strategic value that had underpinned World War II. As soft-spoken veteran John Musgrave put it, “If it ain’t worth winning, it ain’t worth dying for.” By the thousands, American boys lost their lives, their limbs, their innocence, their patriotism, their faith, and even their humanity in the jungles of Vietnam.

The filmmakers touch on the all-too-frequent commission of atrocities by American soldiers but suggest that when they committed evil acts, they were not to blame. There is a strong hint of Nick Turse’s argument that these incidents resulted from systematic military training to “kill anything that moves” and from the sheer incomprehensibility of the chaotic battlefield scenes in which young American men found themselves. In their treatment of My Lai, Burns and Novick do achieve greater balance than Turse—and fidelity to the notion of multiple truths in war—by interviewing a Marine who describes such acts of brutality as isolated incidents carried out by a few bad apples.⁴

The filmmakers never let the viewer lose sight of the fact that American soldiers were the victims of this war, victims whose trauma they seek to illuminate. Moreover, they set out to understand the war’s devastating effect on the cohesiveness of American society and its citizens’ basic faith in their civilian and military leaders. The question posed in the documentary’s opening scenes—“What happened?”—is one that Americans have asked, and avoided asking, about the Vietnam War for decades.

With its extensive coverage of the antiwar movement and the domestic conflict that the prolonged fighting in Vietnam engendered, the documentary makes it clear that the war shattered Americans’ faith in their leaders’ credibility and judgment. What was once a given—that U.S. presidents and generals could be trusted to deliberate carefully about and explain honestly their decisions to send American troops into battle in the service of American security and the country’s most cherished ideals—came to seem impossible in the era of cynicism inaugurated by the war. American ideals and American leadership seem to have been mortally wounded in the jungles of Vietnam.

Although this national crisis of foreign policy leadership has been amplified exponentially by events that have occurred since, one can clearly detect the impact of the Vietnam era in today’s news cycles. The recent national dialogue surrounding the unexpected deaths of four U.S. soldiers conducting a routine reconnaissance mission in Niger reflects many of the same questions Burns and Novick ask about Vietnam: Why were they there? Why

didn't the American public know the full truth about their mission? Why wasn't the Pentagon more transparent about what happened? What are American leaders hiding? And why don't our leaders seem to exude greater remorse over the loss of American soldiers? Burns and Novick, I suspect, would argue that Americans will never approach the possibility of national healing necessary to avoid such controversies unless they understand and reconcile themselves fully to what happened in Vietnam.

The documentary's focus is squarely on U.S. troops and American society. It continually turns back to scenes of protest on American streets, with too little mention of the bombs, napalm, and Agent Orange unrelentingly raining down on Vietnam. The hardships and moral ambiguity of the warring Vietnamese contingents are highlighted, but to a lesser extent. In words that echo those of many of the American veterans interviewed, North Vietnamese Army veteran Nguyen Ngoc observes that "war awakens a savagery in people." And Bao Ninh, acclaimed author of *The Sorrow of War*, is quoted as saying that "in war, no one wins or loses. In a war there is only destruction."⁵

Snippets like these challenge the impression that for the Vietnamese communists this was a straightforward and morally clear war of national liberation—or national reunification under communist rule. The men and women who fought and lived amidst the war experienced a far less coherent reality. Although the framing of the series is regrettably self-referential, focused on American trauma in ways that continue to marginalize the destruction of Vietnamese lives, ecology, economy, and society, the Vietnamese people shown and interviewed here are humanized to a far greater extent than they have been in any previous documentary. Burns and Novick invite them to speak for themselves, thereby avoiding the caricatures that so often envelop Vietnamese people in American narratives.

Indeed, Burns and Novick deserve high praise for exploring the Vietnamese sides of the war and for turning to the most recent and authoritative scholarly accounts to understand those perspectives, albeit with mixed results. Their decision to cover the entire French colonial period, French War, and most of the Diem years (1858–1961) in the first episode, and to frame that material with reference to the American war to come, results in an unfortunately vague and hasty treatment of some of the critical events that led up to the American war in Vietnam: events that could have helped an American audience grasp what really happened there.

Some important nuances of Vietnamese nationalism are lost in the film. The North Vietnamese communists emerge as Vietnam's sole postcolonial nationalist voice. We get very little discussion of the National Liberation Front as anything other than an extension of Hanoi's war effort. Anticommunist opponents of the southern government are stingily discussed, and their role in the insurgency—or South Vietnam's series of post-Diem governments—remains murky. Although there may be little to object to by way of factual errors in the early episodes, by making the decision to fast forward to the beginning of the American war, the filmmakers missed an opportunity to fully explain the contours of the complicated Vietnamese civil conflict that fueled the quagmire.

As tempting as it is to see this war simply as one of American imperialism, it was also one that the United

States was invited to fight by patriotic allies who dreaded the outcome of a communist victory. Those allies, whose betrayal Burns and Novick so clearly lament in the final episode dealing with the fall of Saigon, are all too absent from much of the series. The opportunity to illuminate Washington's relationships with those allies, and with the full range of Vietnamese political actors, is therefore lost.

One can detect the influence in early episodes of recent work by Edward Miller, Philip Catton, myself, and others in the treatment of Diem's government and its troubled alliance with the United States.⁶ However, the nuances of the mismatched political ideologies, divergent understandings of democracy, and conflicting visions for modernization and development that historians have illuminated get lost in a narrative that focuses overwhelmingly on Diem's shortcomings. Viewers could easily walk away from this

film with the flawed impression that the following oversimplified statement by former Defense and State Department official Leslie Gelb tells the story of the U.S.-GVN alliance: "He became our ally, or even our master. . . Diem started to boss us around."⁷

Burns and Novick give little sense of what was at the heart of the conflict between the United States and Diem. It was more than just a simple case of the tail wagging the dog. Indeed, the film never mentions the South Vietnamese leader's flawed but deeply held governing philosophy of Personalism. Perhaps most glaringly, the filmmakers fail to address the Eisenhower administration's heavy-handed role in Diem's appointment during the Geneva Conference of 1954. This oversight is especially

striking in light of the extensive attention devoted to the Kennedy administration's role in Diem's ouster in late 1963.

Burns and Novick make the best use of scholarship on the Vietnamese sides of the war when they take on the subject of North Vietnamese strategy. They draw heavily and profitably on the work of Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Pierre Asselin, and others to paint a complicated picture of North Vietnam's decision making process.⁸ Contrary to popular conceptions of an almost mythically righteous revolutionary President Ho Chi Minh at the helm of North Vietnam until his death in 1969, this film reflects what we now know about the ascendance of Le Duan, a southerner, and his cohort of war hawks, who had come to power by the early 1960s. Burns and Novick incorporate Asselin's compelling claim that Le Duan and the North Vietnamese Politburo chose to risk war with the United States as early as 1963, upping the ante in ways that forced Washington's hand. Drawing on the work of Fredrik Logevall, the film also makes it clear that LBJ responded by choosing war over other viable options.⁹

The filmmakers should also be commended for their treatment of North Vietnamese strategic thinking leading up to, during, and after the Tet Offensive. Drawing heavily on material from Nguyen's *Hanoi's War*, the film conveys the optimism of North Vietnamese officials that their plans for a General Offensive-General Uprising would lead to a war-ending victory. It also conveys the devastating blow dealt to North Vietnamese strategy and morale by the profound losses incurred during the offensive and by the failure of the general uprising to materialize. The explanation given, that the people of South Vietnam, although dissatisfied by their own government, were totally lacking in sympathy for the communists, drives home the point that every corner of this conflict is a grey area. The search for good guys and

bad guys, right and wrong, proves fruitless.

Burns and Novick make a foray into the perennial debate over the political role played by journalists who reported negatively about the war and its progress. Should journalists assume at least part of the blame for America's defeat in Vietnam, as they helped erode public confidence in the war effort with their pessimistic reportage and thereby hamstring political and military leaders who were trying to capitalize on the American strategic advantage at key points in the war? Or did a few brave journalists, later joined by a larger chorus, merely report truthfully about the grim prospects for American victory in Vietnam? Consistent with their overall thesis that the war was a mistake, Burns and Novick align themselves clearly with the latter view. To make their point, they highlight reportage by Neil Sheehan, David Halberstam, and Malcom Browne that was conducted while South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and JFK were still alive. Well before Johnson Americanized the war, these men laid bare the contrast between the rosy pronouncements about political and military progress coming from Washington and the reality of the Diem regime's deep unpopularity, the inefficacy of joint U.S.-ARVN strategies for winning hearts and minds, and the overall unlikelihood that the United States would achieve its objective of propping up an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam.

This message is carried throughout the film, unrelentingly, by cuts between official pronouncements of progress contrasted with chaotic battlefield footage and interviews with veterans that convey a sense of hopelessness and despair. From the Battle of Ap Bac in 1963 to the Tet Offensive in 1968 and beyond, Burns and Novick show American officials lying through their teeth while people—American and Vietnamese—continue to suffer unimaginable violence and loss in a war unmoored. In the process, they unmask a curious instance of LBJ responding to one of journalist Morley Safer's more damning reports during the critical escalatory period by calling CBS and accusing Safer of being an agent of the Kremlin. He also said that Safer had provided Marines with a zippo lighter and asked them to light a hut on fire in order to stage anti-war propaganda. It seems that presidents' concerns about fake news—or more accurately their efforts to undermine contrary reports from the independent press corps—have a longer history than we might imagine.

Burns and Novick have given us a fairly orthodox interpretation of the Vietnam War and its consequences for American society. Historians of the Vietnam War will recognize the voices of many of their colleagues—far more than I have mentioned in this review—in the narrative. Revisionist scholars who find some merit in America's military project in Vietnam will find this documentary highly objectionable. For the broader viewing public, this series promises to introduce a nuanced picture of an extremely complicated conflict, rooted in extensive scholarly research, veterans' memoirs, and English translations of the Vietnamese books that have proliferated in recent decades.

With this project, Burns and Novick seek to launch a long-avoided national conversation about the Vietnam War. They have certainly provided viewers with extensive fodder to fuel that discussion, beginning with the assertion

by the film's narrator that "the Vietnam War was a tragedy, immeasurable and irredeemable. But meaning can be found in the individual stories of those who lived through it." While I confess deep skepticism that such a conversation can take place at this difficult political moment, perhaps this series will provide the very sober reflection the country needs to crawl out of its current political morass. If there is any hope of that, it rests in the dignity and respect with which Burns and Novick have treated all their subjects, Vietnamese and American, regardless of their politics or even their actions. As Barack Obama says in the closing moments of the series, "We have shown that hearts can change, and a different future is possible when we refuse to be prisoners of the past."

Notes:

1. Several prominent historians served as advisors for the film, including Gregory Daddis, David Elliott, William Leuchtenburg, Fredrik Logevall, Edward Miller, and Ronald Spector.
2. See Karl Marlantes, *Matterhorn*: A Novel of the Vietnam War (New York, 2010).
3. See Tim O'Brien, *The Things They Carried* (New York, 2009); *Going after Cacciato* (New York, 1999); *If I Die in a Combat Zone: Box Me Up and Ship Me Home* (New York, 1999).
4. Nick Turse, *Kill Anything that Moves* (New York, 2013).
5. See Bao Ninh, *The Sorrow of War: A Novel of North Vietnam* (New York, 1996).
6. See Philip E. Catton, *Diem's Final Failure: Prelude to America's War in Vietnam* (Lawrence, KS, 2003); Jessica Chapman, *Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam* (Ithaca, NY, 2013); Edward Miller, *Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA, 2013).
7. See Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, DC, 1979).
8. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2012); Pierre Asselin, *Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965* (Berkeley, CA, 2013).
9. Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA, 1999).

Review of Ken Burns and Lynn Novick, *The Vietnam War* (PBS)

Amanda C. Demmer

Like the war itself, Ken Burns and Lynn Novick's *The Vietnam War* has inspired a great deal of interest, comment and controversy. The ten-episode, eighteen-hour film has generated a flood of reviews, including episode-by-episode evaluations and more pointed critiques tracing a single theme throughout the documentary series.¹ Rather than attempt to replicate those efforts here, I will direct my attention to the film's general structure and chronological organization.

"The Vietnam War was a tragedy, immeasurable and irredeemable," narrator Peter Coyote asserts in the film's final minutes, "but meaning can be found in the individual stories of those who lived through it." As is evident from the series' opening scenes to the final credits, the latter half of this statement could also sum up the filmmakers' modus operandi. Although Burns and Novick organized the episodes chronologically and do a good job of keeping a broad timeline of events in front of the viewer, it is obvious from the outset that individuals, whom the filmmakers refer to as "witnesses," form the scaffolding upon which

the rest of the series is built.

The selection of interviewees is thus especially important. One of the film's strengths is that Vietnamese from both North and South, usually soldiers but also often civilians, serve as talking heads in each episode. Speaking sometimes in English but most frequently in Vietnamese, these interviewees provide insights into the varied experiences of daily life in wartime Vietnam, assessments of Hanoi and Saigon's military strategy, and reflections on war's meanings and costs. If audience members did not serve in Vietnam or are not of Indochinese ancestry, The Vietnam War might very well mark the first time they have heard spoken Vietnamese in any sustained fashion.

There is no doubt, however, that *The Vietnam War* is primarily focused on American history and American audiences. This is obvious from the PBS website, which describes the film's topic as "one of the most consequential, divisive, and controversial events in American history."² Although the film regularly features Vietnamese perspectives, then, there is no question that the American interviewees are the stars of the show. They enjoy the most airtime and are given the first and last word, quite literally, in almost every episode.

Karl Marlantes, who audiences later learn joined the Marines the summer before his freshman year at Yale and eventually gave up a Rhodes Scholarship to serve in Vietnam, is the first to speak in *The Vietnam War*. "Coming home from Vietnam was close to as traumatic as the war itself. For years, nobody talked about Vietnam," he says. He compares the experience to "living in a family with an alcoholic father. . . . 'Shh, we don't talk about that. . . .' It's only been very recently . . . that the Baby Boomers are starting to say, 'What happened? What happened?'"

The film answers Marlantes's question not only by telling but by showing. Of all the film's merits, the one that seems to draw the most universal approbation is the "rarely seen and digitally re-mastered archival footage." Visually, the film is stunning. Burns and Novick did a wonderful job of collecting news clips, warzone footage, home videos, and family photographs to create a truly striking visual and auditory experience. Most Americans, especially the growing majority that have no living memory of the conflict, will likely learn a great deal from the film. The question of why Americans know so little about the war in the first place, however, goes unanswered.

The Vietnam War devotes most of its attention to military strategy and those who fought or witnessed the fighting firsthand. Even though episode 5 explains that only 20 percent of Americans served in combat units, the series centers on the experience of combat veterans. Servicemen and their family members appear on screen the most, followed by journalists who covered the war and then civilians, including anti-war protesters and those who resisted the draft. Collectively, Burns and Novick selected diverse individuals who could offer thoughtful critiques of the war and their involvement in it. As others have observed, however, this diversity is far less apparent if the viewer sees a single episode in isolation.

Many of the interviewees that audiences become most familiar with by the film's end blur the lines between what are often depicted as binary opposites. Viewers hear soldiers praise the skill and poise of their enemies; watch the transformation of servicemen from initially gung-ho enlistees to antiwar protesters; encounter former protesters who express remorse about the way they treated veterans; witness veterans who confess they regret that they answered their country's call to serve; and face deserters ambivalent about their refusal to serve.

There is something especially powerful about not just hearing each individual's voice but watching them as they speak. Interviewees' hand gestures, their skyward looks as they struggle to find the right words, the emotions in their voices overtaking their faces—these provide a human context that would be difficult to convey in other ways. Watching interviewees on screen also prompts additional questions, however. Many of the Vietnamese interviewees, for instance, appear in uniform, while not single American servicemen don a uniform or any sort of veteran's apparel. I found myself constantly wondering who got to make such wardrobe choices and what messages they intended those choices to convey.

As has been widely noted, not a single historian appears as a talking head in the ten-episode series. Despite their absence from the screen, the fact that historians served as consultants on the film is everywhere apparent. Audiences see the imprint of recent advances in the Vietnam War historiography, for example, in the series' detailed discussion of Le Duan's preeminence in Hanoi. Newer historical methodologies, particularly recent advances in the digital humanities, also made significant contributions to the film, as the series makes widespread use of the Johnson and Nixon tapes, which are housed in the Miller Center's Presidential Recordings Program.³

In these ways, then, historians worked in a behind-the-scenes fashion to tangibly improve the film. There is, of course, great value in allowing individual servicemen, journalists, civilians and protesters to explain what the war means in their own words, and to their credit, the film's "witnesses" are often quite thoughtful and nuanced in their insights and critiques. Yet by casting individual experiences as not only a valuable perspective but the primary source of authority, the film undercuts its own ability to draw larger conclusions, a handicap that manifests itself most obviously in the film's final episode.

Each of *The Vietnam War's* ten episodes covers a period of six months to three years, except for episode 1 (1858–1961) and episode 10 (March 1973 onward). Distributing the film's chronological coverage this way put a great deal of pressure on the series' first and final installments, and each of these episodes cracks a bit under the strain. Episode 1, for instance, spends precious little time on the First Indochina War, a decision that conveys the filmmakers' decision to privilege the American combat experience above all others.

Although there is much to applaud about the film, Burns and Novick's choice to relegate the entire period from 1973 to the present to a single episode is disappointing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, episode 10 makes a series of noteworthy omissions. Despite its detailed discussion of the U.S. evacuation from Vietnam, the film makes no mention of the goals of or tensions inherent in Operation Babylift, a program that that brought between two and three thousand Vietnamese children to the United States in South Vietnam's final weeks.⁴

In addition, although the film covers Hanoi's use of transportation routes through Cambodia, the Nixon administration's secret expansion of the war into that country, and the uproar Nixon's policy provoked at home once the American public found out, *The Vietnam War* does not discuss the Cambodian genocide that that claimed the lives of between one and three million people, out of a total population of seven million, in the three years after 1975.⁵ Perhaps most shocking to scholars of American foreign relations, *The Vietnam War* does not discuss the "Vietnam Syndrome." Although episode 10 describes the creation of the Vietnam Memorial and the normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations, the final episode does not offer any

Of all the film's merits, the one that seems to draw the most universal approbation is the "rarely seen and digitally re-mastered archival footage." Visually, the film is stunning.

insight into how the U.S. experience in Vietnam influenced subsequent U.S. policy.

Overall, the film devotes significant time to American servicemen held as prisoners of war (POW). Viewers follow the journeys of Everett Alvarez, a Navy pilot who became the first American POW, and Hal Kushner, a doctor who provides gruesome details about his time as a prisoner, over multiple episodes. Episode 10, however, does not reflect the most recent scholarship on how and why the prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) issue remained a domestic force after the fall of Saigon. To cite just one of many possible critiques, the film states that 2,500 Americans remained listed as POW/MIA in the 1980s. Although this is accurate, the film does not mention that in December 1978, long after the war ended, the total number of American POW/MIAs stood at 224. The over 1000 percent increase came in December 1980, when U.S. officials merged those previously listed as KIA/BRN—killed in action/body not recovered—with POW/MIAs, bringing the total list of those “unaccounted for” in Southeast Asia up to 2,500.

Although this decision was prompted by the conclusion that “by 1980 . . . all but a handful of MIAs must be presumed dead,” the surge in the official count of POW/MIAs had the opposite effect in the popular imagination, as hopeful families assumed that out of 2,500 men, surely some still had to be alive and awaiting rescue.⁶ *The Vietnam War* does not share this information with viewers. Given that public opinion polls taken in April 1993 revealed that 67 percent of Americans continued to believe that there were Americans “still being held in Southeast Asia,” the film’s sidestepping of the issue is, at the very least, a missed opportunity.⁷

In addition to these conspicuous omissions, there are a number of policies, events and issues that the film mentions only briefly and that viewers would have benefited from hearing more about. Although the film acknowledges the American embargo on Vietnam, it does not detail the full scope and scale of the collective weight of the policies that Edwin Martini calls “the American War on Vietnam.”⁸ Also, the film devotes only a single sentence to Amerasians, or children fathered by American servicemen and Vietnamese women, and notes simply that “thousands . . . were left behind.” Scholars estimate the number of Vietnamese Amerasians to be between 30,000 and 50,000.⁹

Finally, the film does not detail the full scope of Indochinese refugee resettlement in the United States. Although episode 10 describes the massive migration the world came to call the “boat people crisis,” the final episode does not explain that the oceanic exodus was accompanied by an overland migration. According to the film, “some 400,000” Vietnamese “eventually made it to America.” But in addition, 248,147 Laotian and 150,240 Cambodian boat and land people emigrated; 130,000 Vietnamese resettled in the United States in April 1975; over 500,000 Indochinese emigrated through the Orderly Departure Program (including Amerasians, former reeducation camp prisoners and would-be boat people); and tens of thousands more arrived through the Comprehensive Plan of Action (1989–1996) and the Resettlement Opportunities for Vietnamese Refugees Program (1996–2004).¹⁰ Over 1.4 million members of the Indochinese diaspora resettled in the United States, but viewers are not given the opportunity to ponder this fact or its implications.

“All wars are fought twice, the first time on the battlefield, the second time in memory,” Viet Thanh Nguyen argues.¹¹ If we are persuaded by Nguyen’s argument, then the series of omissions in episode 10—and the relegation of the entire post-1973 period to a single episode—amounts

to a critical failure. The filmmakers give no sense of how the war is connected to the present other than through the personal details of individual stories.

This disjuncture is most obvious in the series’ closing minutes. In the end, audiences learn “where they are now”—what the most recognizable individuals in the series are doing today—instead of being invited to think critically about where the United States is now. Viewers, in short, do not enjoy exposure to any of the recent scholarship that demonstrates the ways in which post-1975 presidents, policymakers and pundits deliberately mischaracterized and misremembered the conflict Americans call *the Vietnam War*.¹²

Although the film is relatively consistent in its critique of U.S. politicians and U.S. strategy prior to 1973, it concludes with the Beatles singing “Let It Be.” Whether trying to learn from, avoid or rewrite the war, it is obvious that Americans have not been willing or able to “Let it Be.” To depict this reality with the same care that they devote to the experiences of American combat veterans, Burns and Novick would have had to produce a very different film.

Notes:

1. There are multiple editions of the film, including an abbreviated series for international viewers. This review is based on the United States broadcast version.
2. *The Vietnam War*, a film by Ken Burns & Lynn Novick, <http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/the-vietnam-war/about/>.
3. Katie McNally, “Miller Center Experts Aid PBS Production of ‘The Vietnam War,’” *UVA Today*, October 3, 2017, https://news.virginia.edu/content/miller-center-experts-aid-pbs-production-vietnam-war?utm_source=UTwitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=news.
4. Gerald Ford, “166—The President’s News Conference,” April 3, 1975, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4812>. Dana Sachs’ *The Life We Were Given: Operation Babylift, International Adoption, and the Children of War in Vietnam* (Boston, MA, 2011) is the best account of this initiative. See also Yen Le Espiritu, *Body Counts: The Vietnam War and Militarized Refuge(es)* (Berkeley, CA, 2014), 40–43.
5. “Kampuchea: Famine, Fighting, and Refugees,” Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the CIA, September, 1979, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980*, Vol. XXII: Southeast Asia and the Pacific, eds. David P. Nickles and Melissa Jane Taylor (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), Doc. 56.
6. Michael J. Allen, *Until the Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2009), 209–10.
7. Public Opinion Poll, Folder, “April 1993 (#4038),” Box 85, Robert M. Teeter Papers, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
8. Edwin A. Martini, *The American War on Vietnam, 1975–2000* (Amherst, MA, 2007), 2.
9. Sabrina Thomas, “The Value of Dust: Policy, Citizenship, and Vietnam’s Amerasian Children” (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2015), x; Kieu-Linh Caroline Valverde, “From Dust to Gold: The Vietnamese American Experience,” in *Racially Mixed People in America*, ed. Maria P. P. Root (Newbury Park, CA, 1992), 144.
10. “Flight From Indochina,” in UNHCR, *State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, January 1, 2000, e-book*: <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/sowr/4a4c754a9/state-worlds-refugees-2000-fifty-years-humanitarian-action.html>, 99, 90; “Refugee Admissions Programs for East Asia,” Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, January 16, 2004, U.S. Department of State Archive, <https://2001–2009.state.gov/g/prm/rls/fs/2004/28212.htm>.
11. Viet Thanh Nguyen, *Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War* (Cambridge, MA, 2016), 4.
12. In addition to the works already listed, see Christian G. Appy, *American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity* (London, 2015).

The 2018 SHAFR annual meeting
June 21-23 , 2018
at the Sheraton Society Hill in
Philadelphia.

We hope you will join us there!

SHAFR 2018 Annual Meeting

The Program Committee is excited to announce featured sessions exploring the United States as a revolutionary nation, war and consumer culture, presidential policymaking, capitalism's role in American foreign relations, technology's

influence on the same, the art and science of writing and publishing a second monograph, and many others.

The 2018 keynote, co-sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, will be a Conversation with **General David H. Petraeus**, U.S. Army (Retired), Member, KKR and Chairman, KKR Global Institute. The conversation will be moderated by **Lt. Col. John Nagl**, D.Phil., U.S. Army (Retired), Headmaster, The Haverford School. This keynote will take place at the Friday luncheon.

The Presidential luncheon address will be delivered at the Saturday luncheon by SHAFR President **Peter Hahn**, Professor of History and Divisional Dean of Arts and Humanities at The Ohio State University. In his address, Hahn will explore the purpose and mission of SHAFR in light of the challenges posed by our turbulent times.

This year's Friday night social event will be at Moshulu Restaurant. Located at the Penn's Landing Marina, Moshulu serves a classic American cuisine and boasts a stunning view of the Delaware River waterfront. The Moshulu is the "world's oldest and largest square rigged sailing vessel still afloat."

The conference will be held at the Sheraton Society Hill. The venue is located in the Old City District of Philadelphia, just a short distance away from attractions such as the Liberty Bell, Independence Hall, The National Constitution Center, and Penn's Landing. Located inside the hotel, the Taste Restaurant offers Philadelphia favorites and contemporary American dining.

To get our group rate book here: <https://www.starwoodmeeting.com/Book/2018SHAFRannualmeeting>.

The deadline for panel and individual paper proposals is December 1. Online registration for the conference and for ticketed events will be available in early April. Tickets for the keynote luncheon, Presidential luncheon, and the social event will be sold separately. For more details about conference arrangements, visit: <https://shafir.org/conferences/annual/2018-annual-meeting> or follow us on twitter @SHAFRConference.

For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Mark Sanchez, Conference Coordinator, at conference@shafir.org.

Philadelphia 2018

Welcome to Philadelphia. We're often introduced as the city of brotherly love, which is true—but no longer our only claim to fame. As you take to our streets in your free time, you'll discover that our neighborhoods are as lively and colorful as the people who inhabit them. Dine in any of our restaurants and you'll see that the flourishing food scene leaves a lot to be desired, craved, and devoured. We're also the mural capital of the United States so take a stroll and find the painted treasures that can be found around every corner—from gnawing squirrels to a trail of love letters.

To help guide your exploration here are a few suggestions of what to see, what to eat, and what not to miss.

Museums

Wander collections ranging from the bizarre to the beautiful. The Philadelphia College of Physicians, Mütter Museum, houses some of the oldest and most peculiar medical anomalies. Then walk across the parkway to tour a Philadelphia billionaire's collection of impressionist art at the Barnes Foundation. The Philadelphia Museum of Art, the city's largest art collection, is a short distance farther along the Parkway. You will also find crowds at the foot of the steps to the Museum posing in front of the Rocky Statue. Among the newest additions to the local museum scene is the Museum of the American Revolution, located on 101 S. 3rd Street, a short distance from the conference hotel. Walk a bit farther and you can find the National Museum of American Jewish History (101 South Independence Mall), National Constitution Center (525 Arch Street) and the African American Museum (701 Arch Street).

Historical Sites

Make friends with Ben Franklin and Betsy Ross by the Liberty Bell or take a stroll down the oldest inhabited street in the country. History comes to life on every corner. Many of the historic sites are in the immediate vicinity of the conference hotel, among them Independence Hall, Elfreth's Alley, and Christ Church, founded in 1695, and the Tomb of the Unknown Revolutionary Soldier in Washington Square Park.

Archives

For those who want to dig deeper into Philadelphia's history while attending SHAFR, there are many excellent archives and collections to choose from, including the papers housed at the American Philosophical Society, Library Company, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, as well as Temple University's Blockson collection (African American sources), urban archives, and contemporary culture collection.

Restaurants & Bars

Philadelphia boasts one of the best restaurant scenes in the country. Whether you want local fare such as a Philly Cheesesteak, or are looking for a more upscale dining experience, you have dozens of options to choose from. The Spruce Street Harbor Park, located on the Delaware river, offers a boardwalk-type atmosphere with a wide variety of foods and beverages. The best cheesesteaks are supposed to be had on South Street, at Jim's Cheesesteaks. Reading Terminal Market on North Street, an urban farmers' Market, includes many options for lunch. Dinner options close to the conference hotel include Cuba Libre, Amada, a great Tapas Bar, Zahav, which in the opinion of many boasts the finest modern Israeli fare in the country, Talula's Garden, which features outdoor dining on Washington Square, Han Dynasty, for those who like their Chinese food hot, and Panorama, with its unique custom-built wine dispensary that offers over 120 wines by the glass. This is just a small sample of the many wonderful "neighborhood" restaurants. There are countless more in Center City—less than a 30-minute walk or 10-minute cab ride away.

The Philadelphia Local Arrangements Committee

Before you hit the pavement, we do need to get a few things straight about the city.

- 1) The cheesesteak is not the sacred sandwich of Philadelphia. Yes, you read that right—you've been duped. If you want the real deal Philly sandwich grab yourself a roast pork with provolone and broccoli rabe. Mmmm taste that? Tastes like freedom.
- 2) We're a city of champions. We're not talking about Rocky, but the reigning champs of arena football, the Philadelphia Soul. For a city who is consistently let down by our pro-sports teams we'll take a win where we can get it. Trust the process.
- 3) 2nd street is pronounced "Two street" and 14th street doesn't exist. If you're looking for the block in between 13th and 15th, you're looking for Broad Street.
- 4) If you hang around city hall you may run into Philly Jesus. The friendly cross-bearing, skateboard riding, reenactor has become a fixture of the pop culture scene of the city.
- 5) The slang word "Jawn" can be used to describe a person, place, or object in any circumstance.
- 6) "Yizz" is how we say Y'all, Youse, or Youins.

In Everest's Shadow: Reflections on Service Learning in Nepal

Rachel Mihalovich Osgood

What follows is a story of discovery. It is the tale of three semesters of planning and executing student service learning trips to rural Nepal. It's an experience that changed me and transformed my students, with more than a few lessons learned along the way. It's a story that involved the most dangerous airport in the world, hikes to almost 15,000 feet, bouts of extreme intestinal distress, demanding trials of physical endurance, and falling in love with a people and a place.

But it's also a story of big questions, hard questions, and personal questions—the probing inquiries about the self and about the society that shapes us. “Why is it,” asked my student Landen, “that we as a culture glorify changing the world instead of ourselves?” How can we as a human race advance, wondered Catherine, “if a middle-class American cannot acknowledge the value in a life led by a potato farmer halfway across the world?” Meagan asked a more personal question: “What good is my life if I do not spend my time making it a good life?”

I don't know that any of us, myself included, expected to ask these kinds of deep and unanswerable questions, but we did. What was it, I find myself wondering now, that led us to think so existentially?

It all began with a chemical engineering student who graduated this past spring from the Colorado School of Mines (Mines). Chase didn't look or act like a typical student on our campus. He was one of only two students with dreadlocks, and he regularly sought adventure in faraway places. Everyone knew him, even our university president, who mentioned him three times during the graduation ceremony last spring. It's tempting to blame it on the hair. But that was not it. He had a passion and determination about him, and it was infectious.

Chase stopped by my office one frosty afternoon

with an idea. He had just returned from a trip to Nepal that had been organized by a 501(c)(3) group called Hike for Help. Based close to our campus in Golden, Colorado, the organization was founded by a Sherpa émigré in our community, Lhakpa Sherpa, to help bring jobs, revenue, and development to the impoverished people of the Khumbu Valley, which lies on the main trekking route to Mt. Everest.

Hike for Help partners with Nepali community and local government leaders to design and execute low-cost, high-impact projects that benefit everyone in the Khumbu. The goal is “self-enabling help.” It built a handicraft workshop for Dalits (the lowest caste in the Khumbu) to make and sell their metal wares, rebuilt a high school after the 2015 earthquake, and funded the construction of a dormitory so that young students can board at school instead of commuting four to five hours a day. Chase was so inspired by the organization that he reached out to me to find a way to expand its impact by developing a closer relationship with CSM.

Over the next two years, inspired by Chase's enthusiasm and the potential I saw for an exceptional experiential learning opportunity, I partnered with Lhakpa and Hike for Help to develop an international service learning course that links our community in Golden with that of the Khumbu Valley. So far, we have taken forty-two excited (and slightly terrified) individuals to Nepal, and we have plans to bring another thirty to forty this academic year.

Students casually describe the course as a “trip,” but that word does not quite capture it. The learning process spans more than a semester. Students first enroll in my three-credit service learning course. Now on its third go, the course and subsequent service trips, offered twice a year, have been through several iterations, evolving to maximize student learning and engagement and to better meet the needs of the people of the Khumbu.

Before officially joining the 2016 team, the students were interviewed by Lhakpa and Chase, now the president of the Mines chapter of Hike for Help, to evaluate their reasons for joining the trip. They were also required to complete a one-thousand-foot climb to ensure everyone could handle the trip's physical demands. At the end of the hike, Lhakpa proudly announced that he had a good team and they were officially approved for the winter trip. This exercise was key to forcing the students to reflect on why they chose to take this course and go to Nepal. Knowing that Lhakpa believed in their abilities to further the Hike for Help mission also gave them confidence.

Over the sixteen-week term that preceded our travel to Nepal, students learned the basics of Nepali history, language, and culture. Lhakpa frequently came to our class meetings, as did his daughter, Mendo. She hosted language lessons for our team, thus nurturing close cooperation between students and Hike for Help. The students were required to record their expectations and to complete several discussion posts in which they explored and evaluated their success to date in the class. They



Students survey the site of the first public restroom in the Khumbu Valley, located in Ghat, Nepal. In the foreground is a school dormitory that Hike for Help built in spring 2017.



At the Kopan Monastery in Kathmandu, Lama Pasang Gyaljen Sherpa and Rachel Osgood work together to introduce students to the basics of Tibetan Buddhism.

also studied international service learning and discussed the perils of “voluntourism.” Finally, they learned about travel and trekking, wilderness first aid, backpacking and packing for a trek, and how to show respect for different cultures and religions.

The process of self-evaluation and reflection would not end when the students arrived in Nepal. In addition to contributing their labor to our current project, the students had to keep a journal and experience as much of Nepali culture as they could. Our groups have participated in the celebration of a Sherpa wedding, attended a cleansing festival at a Lukla monastery, played games and danced with the Sherpas, gathered firewood and carried water with our staff, and even prepared an authentic Sherpa meal for our guides.

Just as important, the students were required to develop and implement small service projects in Colorado to raise funds for their Hike for Help projects. They organized and executed a crowdfunding campaign and an off-campus fund-raising event to strengthen the connections between our local Sherpa community and the residents of Golden. In addition to making videos, drafting promotional material, and coordinating event logistics, they were required to do something that made every single one of them uncomfortable: ask for money.

Actively seeking donations can be a painful process, but it is key to the success of our service projects. Ours would cost about \$12,000, so the students had to buckle down and sacrifice their personal comfort for the sake of others. They had to go to local businesses, speak to people they didn't know, and try to solicit donations for our Himalayan Oktoberfest's Silent Auction. They had to reach out to their parents' friends and colleagues for donations.

The students discovered that there are many people in our communities who want to help those less fortunate than themselves but lack the time. Some can't even spare a few hours, and they often welcome the chance to support those who can give their time. People also donate goods. We collected enough clothes, shoes, and blankets to fill twenty-five extra-large duffel bags that we will carry to villages in Nepal. Through this fundraising process, students learned how to craft a confident and professional pitch to get others involved, how to form partnerships with local businesses, and how to make community connections. These are valuable professional skills that build confidence and competence.

When at long last the team got to Nepal, we made our base camp in a very small village, Syngma, that was

founded by Lhakpa Sherpa's grandfather. Lhakpa was born and raised there. We stayed with the five or six Sherpa families who live in the village. From there, we trekked to another village, Ghat, which is located directly on the trail to Everest Base Camp (EBC), to work on our project.

Historically, most travelers intending to summit Mt. Everest or trek to EBC #1 at 17,600 feet have taken a small plane from Kathmandu to Lukla, home of Tenzing-Hillary Airport, which has had more crashes than any other air field in the world. From there, they typically spend eight to ten days hiking along the EBC trail from Lukla to EBC #1. (It is worth noting that one of my Sherpa friends, Phorge, does the trip to EBC #1 in one day.) It is a thirty-eight-mile trip, with an elevation gain of more than 9,000 feet. Climbers then need to make it to EBC #2 and #3 before they summit.

Since Tenzing Norgay and Sir Edmund Hillary summited Everest in 1953, the Sherpa economy in the Khumbu Valley has been shifting from subsistence agriculture and trade between China and India to tourism. The area supports 40,000-plus tourists who trek to EBC #1 each year. The trekking industry includes not only the guides, porters, and support staff, but also the supply shops, lodges, and restaurants along the trail. The lodges and restaurants sometimes have restroom facilities, but they are seldom, if ever, on a par with Western-style toilets. Along the entire thirty-eight-mile trail there is not a single public restroom.

When Lhakpa introduced his proposal for building a public restroom, complete with septic system, the students immediately understood the public health and environmental concerns. But Lhakpa had something else on his mind. He remembered how embarrassed he and other Sherpas were about some of the facilities in the Khumbu Valley. On a previous trip, his team stopped to use an outhouse that was almost at capacity. Team members thoughtlessly complained about the unpleasantness. For Lhakpa, this was a turning point. The pride he felt over sharing the beauty of his homeland with visitors from the United States vanished. He felt shame. “I was so embarrassed,” he said. His reaction was an indication of how important hospitality is to Sherpa culture. It also hinted at how the expectations of people from affluent societies affected the local population.

Lhakpa did not dwell on his embarrassment. Instead, like the creative, thoughtful, and forward-thinking man he is, he recognized an opportunity to help his community and those who worked in the trekking and tourist industry. After a short time working with local leaders in the villages from Lukla to Namche Bazaar, the last town on the EBC trail, Lhakpa devised a plan to build forty public restrooms in various locations. The service project he proposed to my team was to be the first. Thus, in December 2016, we hand-carried stainless steel toilets and hardware with us from Denver to Nepal and began work on the foundation for the public restroom.

The very first lesson I learned when organizing the first service trip is how time consuming these endeavors can be. To be sure, Lhakpa and Chase planned most of the logistics for our travel in Nepal (no small feat even for an experienced trek planner), but I had to recruit, intellectually prepare, and shepherd students through multiple stages to prime them for their time working and engaging with communities in Nepal. In addition to the actual time I spent in meeting with Hike for Help or in class with students, planning the first iteration of the course and service trip for the winter of 2016 sapped most of my mental and emotional energy. Some of my other courses suffered. In hindsight, I should have sought more institutional support for the first iteration of this course. Perhaps it would not have mattered; universities, mine especially, don't seem to know how to “count” this type of activity in their workload formulas. The credit hours delivered did not correspond to the time

students and I invested in the course, nor the learning value we took out of it.

Another lesson I learned: plans will change, frequently, and without warning. Six months after my first meeting with Chase, the whirlwind started when I found myself holding informational meetings about a service course and winter break trip to Nepal—a place I had not yet been. I was fielding questions about vaccinations, the schedule and intensity of work for our proposed service project, sleeping bag temperature ratings, and dietary restrictions.

Since Lhakpa and Chase handled the in-country logistics, I deferred all questions about our travel dates within Nepal or our service work itinerary to them. But neither could give satisfactory answers. I could see the frustration in the faces of students as Chase and Lhakpa threw out a slew of conditional phrases like “maybe” and “hopefully.” I was puzzled. Chase and Lhakpa had done a version of this trip the previous year, so it seemed to me that they should have had the trip and itinerary pretty well locked in.

The conditional answers didn’t make sense until we arrived in Nepal. There, in one of the world’s poorest countries with the toughest terrain, anything can force a change in plans: rain, road conditions, celebrations, religious events, politics, clouds—you name it. We had our plans change four times in a single hour one morning as Lhakpa and the local staff tried to arrange for helicopter flights for our team to Everest Base Camp. A combination of weather at the airport in Lukla, varying per-person pricing, cloud coverage on Everest, and the changing availability of choppers had us planning variously to leave from our remote location in Syngma within twenty minutes; hike two hours back to the Lukla airport to meet the choppers; fly several hours later from a third location; and, finally, to give up our flight because of an emergency situation with some trekkers elsewhere in the valley. Because our first option involved us departing so quickly, I had to gather the students and get them moving. But then I had to keep re-gathering them to let them know that our plans had changed. Again. And again.

Now, after having been to Nepal twice, I introduce the Nepal portion of the course with a disclaimer: “These are the things we hope to do while in Nepal, but we have no way of knowing what will happen until we are actually doing it.” The trip motto is “roll with it.” I have apparently done a very good job of communicating this to students. According to my friend in our study abroad office, students filling out their university paperwork have warned her that our “itinerary” is not just subject to change, but very likely to change.

My second trip to Nepal only served to reinforce my “roll-with-it” rule after our plane was diverted to Bangladesh and we were forced to miss one of our three days in Kathmandu. We remained calm and took advantage of our time on the tarmac to make friends with the other passengers and learn from their stories. “Roll with it” also means seizing unexpected moments for learning.

Adaptability, I discovered, is its own lesson. It sounds trite, but it was one of the most impactful things my students learned. Keep in mind here that CSM is an intense place, one of the toughest STEM institutions in the country. I am going to overgeneralize here to make a point: the students are slaves to their self-created schedules, parceling out any free minutes in their days to activities to add to their résumés. Sometimes we get a glimpse of a student’s planner during a meeting, and students have actually scheduled “sleep” on their calendars, or, even worse, added it to their “to-do” lists.


All our students are high-achieving and highly motivated. They all enter Mines knowing it is going to be rough, and they have resigned themselves to four years of constant work. They have their sights set on landing a high-

paying job before they graduate. And for the most part, that is how our students’ four years go. The lucky ones will even have signed job contracts before they enter their senior year. Students typically don’t welcome deviations from this standard track.

Yet these are the young adults that I take to rural Nepal, where deviations are the norm. One of the learning objectives for my course is for students to develop “greater flexibility in managing their personal comfort and desires, as well as an improved appreciation for the fluid nature of time and schedules outside the United States.” In Nepal, this goal is partially accomplished simply by existing. We spend two weeks living and working alongside Sherpa Buddhists, sleeping on the same wooden benches, eating the same meals, and attempting to abide by their more “fluid” schedules.

When students reflect on their experience, they see it: they’ve changed and grown. And they all have an “Ah-ha!” moment when they realize that many, many people live their lives quite differently from the way they live theirs, and those people are okay. They are even happy. The students see how they have been slaves to their schedules and their goals of landing jobs, but they have rarely stopped to consider what happens next. Being in the Khumbu Valley, planting potatoes and harvesting wheat with local farmers, students are confronted with a new and typically never heretofore considered reality: there are other ways to purposefully organize their lives that do not revolve around being stressed to the max and constantly thinking about the future. They learn to be in the moment. They appreciate what is going on around them.

One of my students, Landen, even found value waiting



Chase Li, founder of the Mines Hike for Help student organization, hauls a duffle bag filled with flour to our camp.



Lhakpa Sherpa explains to Mines students the construction of a handicraft workshop in Phakding, Nepal, funded by Hike for Help, where Dalit locals will be able to produce metal cooking tools and containers and sell them to tourists on the Everest Base Camp trail.

in the airport for eight hours from a flight we didn't end up taking. There, with nothing to do but wait, he learned "the value of finding happiness in simply being, making use of seemingly wasted time, and most importantly being grateful for what I have instead of [being] upset at what I don't have." For my part, I try, as an educator, to create opportunities for this kind of self-discovery and awareness. Experiential learning revolves around students learning by doing and then reflecting on what they did, but it also requires that students have time to engage in metacognition—to think about how they think and to understand the processes behind how they learn. Teaching this course through three iterations, I can see even more clearly how important it is for students to have time off from activities to sit and contemplate.

The capstone assignment for my course is a "travel zine" in which students share and reflect on some of their experiences in Nepal and talk about the person they were before traveling to the country. Some entries in the travel zines come from journal entries written in Nepal, like Landen's selection about "making use of seemingly wasted time." In addition to writing the entry, he spent time drawing the inside of the terminal. Unlike most other students on the trip, he was enrolled in a freshman honors course that utilized the "City as Text" pedagogy developed by Bernice Baird and others from the National Collegiate Honors Council, which teaches students structured explorations of their environment.

In each iteration of my course, I am able to increase my use of the "City as Text" pedagogy, which requires the instructor to be familiar with the area they have traveled to. I couldn't use it on my first trip. However, I did ask students not just to write down observations of what they saw and did and felt, but to think about what such things meant. Even with such a vague prompt, they developed sophisticated observation skills to gather information and a deeper understanding of Nepal.

Students also used recursive writing to understand, explain, and assess their observations. Catherine thought critically about her experiences: "The world today seems full of differences. We focus on the ways in which differences can hurt us, and ignore the amazing opportunity that different cultures and perspectives bring when they collide." Another student, Connor, reflected on how his observations of Nepal led him to discover flaws in his own thinking:

The Khumbu Valley is no longer just a pretty picture of mountains in my head. I now see the people and places that sit below the mountains. The farmers and porters are just as much a part of the region as is Mt. Everest. I have realized on this trip the hollowness that exists in my understanding of the world. I've seen pictures of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and after years of history classes, I have convinced myself that I am in some way familiar with these places. However, I have realized that until I can experience these places myself, my understanding will be superficial.

It may sound simple enough to structure time for this type of reflection, but there is a big hurdle I am still working to surmount when I teach this type of course: physical exhaustion. The students and I both struggled with exhaustion after our more physical days, like hiking four thousand feet up over seven miles. It was hard to bring students together for any meaningful discussions. But fortunately, during the times when I couldn't organize something more formal, I had the chance to have many one-on-one conversations with students over a cup of tea or while hiking along the trails. I realized I could sneak the learning in as we went, which fits well with the "roll-with-it" concept.

I learned other pedagogical lessons, too. When I first taught the course, I had students focus primarily on the service project and on fundraising. After coming to terms with the fact that students cannot build a public restroom in two weeks and that hiring locals to do the construction is more beneficial to the community, I have come to see that there is a more valuable way we can contribute to Hike for Help's mission. I now focus my teaching lessons less on how we can help Nepal and more on what we can learn from Nepal. The students participating in this semester's course more fully explore and analyze topics in Nepali and Sherpa history, culture, and social structures through more and varied readings; they study development theory and its critiques; and they learn by interacting with Sherpas in Golden.

There is a moral side to any service learning course, and it is important that we consider our impact on the peoples and communities with whom we interact. Who benefits from our work? This is the question I pose to students in their final reflections. I have required my team to read an article about "voluntourism," and this fall we will also watch *Poverty, Inc.*, a documentary that examines the role of the West as the "development protagonist" that has created a multimillion-dollar poverty industry. An oft-levied criticism of service trips is that it would be better to give the money to a community than to spend it on traveling to the area to offer our help. And let's face it, it is expensive to travel to the other side of the world.

So why don't we just send the money we raise and stay home? After all, the locals have the expertise and physical ability to build their own public restrooms, but they just don't have the funds. While my tougher students can haul a thirty-pound bag of sand two miles up from the river to the new restroom location, it is well-documented that most Sherpas can carry 90 to 125 percent of their body weight over very long distances with increasing levels of elevation. So what can we do that they can't? Not much. So what are we doing for the Khumbu Valley?

The simple answer is that we are building a sustainable relationship between the CSM community and the people in the Khumbu. Yes, we benefit more because of all our amazing experiences, but at the same time we are developing a growing cadre of community members who

sincerely care about the people we help. The students who go to Nepal to help the Sherpas and others in the Khumbu come home with an even greater desire to do more. I currently have a group of Hike for Help alums, some who have graduated and some who are still students, and they remain actively involved in our fundraising efforts, even though their course is over and their grades are in.

Another group of students is working to record the stories of Danaru Sherpa, an amazing man who works at the Sherpa House restaurant. He has summited Mt. Everest sixteen times. These engineering and science students are spending their free time transcribing interviews with Danaru and some of his clients from around the world. Their goal is to produce a book and donate any proceeds to help the people of the Khumbu. The head of the project, Peter, graduated this past spring with a degree in physics and is a newly commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, stationed in Spain. I met with Peter a few weeks back to discuss the project. I gently explained that writing a book often takes years, but he responded that he is in it for the long haul: "I want to help. I want to continue to give back because they gave me so much."

I have another group of alums whom I plan to take back to Nepal next summer to intern at Lhakpa's high school. They aren't going to compete with Sherpas carrying supplies for the next public restroom. Instead, they want to share skills needed in the valley in which they have expertise: computer literacy and speaking English. The students going do not plan to become teachers, but they have committed to Teaching English as a Foreign Language training, as well as classroom management training. It is this continued commitment to support the work of Hike for Help by so many of my students who have gone and returned that we give to the people of the Khumbu.

A quiet Sherpa living in Golden offered our group this piece of wisdom. "You can't go to Nepal to change Nepal. Nepal will change you." Truer words haven't been spoken to my team. Yes, we can make a difference, and our projects are having a positive impact. But we don't return smugly congratulating ourselves on how we have changed Nepal. Students recognize many of the good ways that life is different, and they find meaning in that understanding. They learn to recognize the humanity in others. Perhaps we have the ability to change the world, but first we must look inward and change ourselves. Catherine wrote about this in her travel zine:

People enjoy hearing the mechanics of a journey: viewing pictures and hearing stories that make them feel "as if they were there." And yet, the greatest tool for understanding possessed by humans—empathy—is not awakened by simple storytelling. It is born out of dialogue and questions, a desire to fully adopt another's perspective, and the abandonment of ego and all sense of entitlement over others. . . . [T]his practice of growing with a culture rather than simply studying it as a passive observer is the essence of what I gathered from my travels. And it is this same idea that I wish to pass onto those I share my story with, but the question is: how? . . . Stop acting as an observer [and] start living as a participant in our global community that is being shaped even as you read this. Allow yourself to be touched by the words of another, and return the sentiment by freely sharing your experiences in a way that inspires empathy, not competition.

While involving myself in this new service learning course and trip seemed overwhelming at times, it has been the most rewarding experience I have had in academia. I encourage others to say "YES!" when a student or organization approaches them with an opportunity that seems outside their area of expertise or outside their comfort zone—especially the latter. By taking that step into the unknown, I now have in me a new passion for experiential learning—one that even inspired my upcoming research project on U.S.-Nepali relations in the 1960s and '70s.

Meagan's Question

One night I turned to my friend and expressed my displeasure with the fact that I did not cook for myself nearly as often as I would like. She turned to me and said, "Well, what are you doing that you are not home to cook?" I couldn't think of a single reason I was not home.

My planner is filled from top to bottom every day. There are classes, work, and meeting after meeting. However, none of these held enough meaning for me to even remember how I was spending my time. Why did I not remember doing anything significant in the last month?

Ultimately, I came to the realization that I have spent too much time doing things simply to put them on a résumé. Little of my time is spent doing things I am passionate about, and that is something I have resolved to change. What good is my life if I do not spend my time making it a good life?



Chhiring Sherpa and other local Hike for Help staff members in Chuserma, Nepal, distribute to local Dalits the clothing donations collected and transported from Colorado to Nepal by Mines students.

Making the Case: Using Case Studies in the Classroom

Kelly M. McFarland and Vanessa Lide

We've all been there. It's late August or early January, and you find yourself scrambling to finalize syllabi for the semester's classes. Whether you need to upload the final reading assignments or find new ways to facilitate discussion and create student participation, your upcoming class is stressing you out as you juggle writing deadlines, research, and a variety of other responsibilities. So you reach for the sources and teaching methods that feel most comfortable to you.

To many diplomatic historians, or professors of international history more generally, case studies may not fall under the definition of something that we routinely assign to students. Business and law school instructors have used case studies for decades. Ask your friendly local history professor if they have used case studies in the classroom, though, and most will likely say no (some may even get increased blood pressure and a clammy sheen to their skin). We tend to see case studies as something foreign, something that works in other disciplines but does not fit easily into our neat little worlds of lectures and colloquia.

This needn't be the case, however. Looking more closely, case studies can be just as useful in the history classroom, as they "combine the power of storytelling with critical discussion, shared experiences, and rigorous academic practice and theory."¹

Case studies can be as long or as short as they need to be, and can tackle broad, general topics or focus in on one particular issue: the creation of the International Criminal Court, for example, or how the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved. Most case studies fall into two different types: retrospective or decision-forcing cases. According to University of Southern California professor Steve Lamy, a renowned author and user of case studies and a proponent of case study teaching methods,

retrospective cases present the history of an important issue or event. These cases may tell a story of a crisis, conflict, policy debates, or policy problems from the perspective of all relevant actors. The story is told in great detail, focusing on the competing interests and tough choices faced by the critical decision makers. These cases usually provide excellent reviews of historical events.²

In contrast, Lamy notes that "decision-forcing cases encourage students to find answers to complex problems. These cases pose a problem with no obvious right answers."³

However, retrospective cases can easily become decision-forcing cases if the teacher stops at certain points and asks students questions. This flexibility is one of the best aspects of case studies, particularly those that involve the complexities of international diplomacy, where there are often no simple solutions to problems or crises that affect untold human lives. Instructors can use most cases

involving diplomacy and foreign relations in multiple ways.

Some cases, by design, are simulations of negotiations or multiparty talks, designed to teach students through a role-playing exercise. Your job, as instructor, is to assign roles to each group, hand out any "secrets" or unexpected new developments that the case study may include, and then let students dive into their roles. Other cases are not written as simulations, but instead provide concise, detailed background reading about a specific country, issue, bilateral or multilateral relationship, or crisis. Case studies can also serve as real-world examples of how a more general theory may play out, perhaps illustrating an instance of successful or unsuccessful conflict resolution, multilateral or bilateral mediation, or great power rivalry.

Both retrospective and decision-forcing cases can be used in the classroom in the traditional case study approach to set the stage for students to engage actively in an in-depth discussion of a particular event or crisis and analyze critical turning points or tipping points, while instructors moderate the discussion to focus on many different aspects of the problem or issue at hand.⁴

This engagement, this "active learning" or experiential learning in the classroom, is what sets case study teaching apart from other methods. There are excellent reasons to broaden your teaching repertoire to include case studies. They encourage students to learn by doing, and they hone critical thinking skills in a way that sitting and listening to lectures rarely can. According to the Harvard Business School (famous for its use of the case study method), when teachers use cases, "there are no simple solutions; yet through the dynamic process of exchanging perspectives, countering and defending points, and building on each other's ideas, students become adept at analyzing issues, exercising judgement, and making difficult decisions—the hallmarks of skillful leadership."⁵

Vicki Golich, who was an early adopter of the case study method and runs workshops on how to implement it in the classroom, lists four key reasons to use case studies:

- First, they provide detailed descriptions of issues and factors that help shape foreign policy decision-making.
- Second, students are provided with examples of how theory can be used to explain and understand complex international issues.
- Third, students are put in decision-making situations and are asked to make difficult decisions.
- Fourth, students receive an opportunity to evaluate decision making and to suggest ways of improving the decision-making process and policy outcomes.⁶

These are exactly the types of critical thinking skills we seek to instill in our students. The case method, in which “the teacher helps students work collectively through the material to understand it,” enables students to “both learn and apply the theory.”⁷

Of course, the case study method requires teachers to make some changes in the way they teach. “A case teacher resembles an orchestra conductor,” as one group of case study experts explains: “Much as a conductor creates music by coordinating individual performances, providing key signals, and knowing what the outcome should sound like, a case teacher generates learning by eliciting individual observations and analyses, asking key questions, and knowing what learning outcomes s/he wants students to achieve.”⁸ Although the learning objectives for any given day’s class—whether lecture or case method—will be the same, the method by which students build and absorb that knowledge differs.

To use case studies effectively, it’s important to prepare the students. Be upfront and specific about what participation in class means. It also helps to provide details in the syllabus and to use the first class session to break the ice. You can do this by asking students to state their name, class, major, hometown, and, briefly, some interesting fact about themselves (you can then do the same). This always eases fears about talking in class and usually ends on a lighthearted note.

As you approach the actual class session in which you plan to use a case study, sometimes it is best to provide study questions for students as they read the case—and reiterate that it is essential that they read the case study prior to the class. You may find discussion questions included in the case study itself, or there may be an instructor version or teaching notes. Discussion questions help direct the students’ thinking and reading, but they don’t give away any key points you want to pry out of them during the actual class discussion.⁹

For instructors, case studies are meant to be more than substitutes for articles or texts. It is important to be fully prepared to use the case study. First, know the substance: Read the case study thoroughly, make notes, and take a look at the deeper sources you may find in the footnotes or recommendations for additional reading. Before going into class, know what you want students to learn that day and how this case helps achieve that goal.

Second, have a fairly clear idea of the timeline of the class and how the discussion should progress. The teaching notes/instructor copies may include helpful guidelines. The actual classroom discussion may wind and weave its way from point A to point B, but you need to know where to start, how to keep the class moving toward point B and,

ultimately, how to land at the finish line. Questions are the key—again, teaching notes/instructor copies often include more detailed questions for instructors. And third, you need to know your audience. Knowing which students participate in which ways and who holds what beliefs, for instance, goes a long way toward fostering a good learning environment and creating a successful class.¹⁰

Case studies can seem daunting if you have never used them. They can be a bit more work at first, and they take some getting used to if you have taught only reading seminars and lecture courses. But case studies are well worth the effort. Instructors and students alike gain from the opportunity to engage in an active learning scenario. This is not to say that you should stop lecturing. On the contrary, cases are meant to be interspersed throughout a course so students can actively learn what they have been taking notes on for weeks.

There will be times when case studies won’t run quite the way you want them to, and for a multitude of reasons there will be times when your students just don’t respond on a given day. Always be prepared to punt. But if you know why you are using a given case, and you are well prepped with good questions (remember, those are the key), these moments will be few and far between. And remember the quote so often attributed to one of America’s first diplomats, Benjamin Franklin: “Tell me and I forget. Teach me and I remember. Involve me and I learn.”


For more information on case studies and to find case studies in diplomatic history and international affairs, please visit Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy’s website at ISD.Georgetown.edu. Instructors can sign up to review free instructor copies in the online “Faculty Lounge.”

Notes:

1. “Teaching cases: a brief guide,” The Case Centre, <https://www.thecasecentre.org/educators/casemethod/resources/teaching-cases>.
2. Steven L. Lamy, “Conclusion: Teaching Foreign Policy Cases,” in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford, UK, 2008), 381–2.
3. Ibid.
4. Lamy, 378.
5. “The HBS Case Method,” Harvard Business School, <http://www.hbs.edu/mba/academic-experience/Pages/the-hbs-case-method.aspx>.
6. Lamy, 379.
7. Vicki L. Golich, Mark Boyer, Patrice Franko, and Steve Lamy, *The ABCs of Case Teaching* (Washington DC, The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000), 4.
8. Ibid., 3.
9. Ibid., 15–18.
10. Ibid., 37.

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
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
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
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
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Reflections on the SHAFR 2017 Summer Institute

David Allen, Betsy A. Beasley, James T. Bradford, Malcolm M. Craig, Gaetano Di Tommaso, Michael Graziano, Elizabeth Ingleson, Calra Konta, Evan D. McCormick, Nathaniel L. Moir, Jayita Sarkar, Aileen Teague, and Stephen Wertheim

Ask anyone who has been to Cambridge University, and they will tell you: the Eagle is more than a pub, it's a 350-year-old institution. Known for the graffiti plastered on the ceilings by allied airmen in World War II, it is also the site where biologists Francis Crick and James Watson famously announced their discovery of the "secret of life"—DNA. It was only fitting, then, that attendees of the 2017 SHAFR Summer Institute—a cohort of young scholars from universities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Italy—met at the Eagle before kicking off their week-long foray into the "secrets" underlying this year's theme: Cultures of National Security.

In our first formal meeting, co-organizers Andrew Preston and Mario del Pero led the participants in a lively discussion on the opportunities and challenges of an expansive understanding of national security. Preston's 2014 *Diplomatic History* article, "Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security," together with his current research for his forthcoming book and del Pero's relevant past research—notably, *The Eccentric Realist: Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy*—provided the initial framework. We discussed the need for a capacious definition of national security while also noting the risks of an approach without limits. Del Pero prodded us to consider what we *wouldn't* include in an analysis of national security, asking how broadly the term can be construed before it loses coherence. It was a provocative question to ask of a rising generation of scholars eager to think in terms of the possibilities rendered by multi-lingual, multi-archival research, and in that regard, it set the tone for the institute.

We identified two insights in this first session that were particularly valuable to our conversations in the week ahead. The first was a recognition that the definition of national security is something that changes over time. This is true both from a historical standpoint, as contingent threats and cultural circumstances affect what constitutes security, and from a historiographical perspective, as more issues fall under the scholarly rubric of national security and there is a growing emphasis on topics like public health, the environment, and identity. The second insight was an acknowledgement that we shouldn't focus simply on security. Instead, we should ask how cultures of national security have defined loyalty and thus constricted who is inside—and outside—the nation-state.



With these guideposts in mind, subsequent discussions took us across a vast historical and intellectual terrain, from questions about American leadership in the interwar years to debates over counterinsurgency theory in the Vietnam War and, finally, to U.S. involvement in Mexico's war on drugs. Far from floating through an intellectual nebula, however, our interrogation of national security directed us to a number of subfields, including intellectual, cultural, and religious history, where we drew upon specific insights and methodological contributions.

Surrounded by the historical and picturesque sandstone walls of Clare College, we found it easy to appreciate just how drastically the meaning of national security has changed for historians in the last two decades. Our task for the week was not just to explore our own role in that rupture, but also to reflect on what is gained and lost in the subject's evolution. One participant described the discussions as illuminating the "intellectual archaeology" of national security—the ways in which the remnants of the past are constantly being reformulated and refashioned in the face of new threats and older, resurgent ones.

During the week, we had the chance to participate in seminars with several scholars whose work embodies the shifting landscape of national security. Cambridge Historian John Thompson presented a skeptical view of the definition of national security based on his work on the World War II period in *A Sense of Power: The Roots of America's Global Role*. Kaetan Mistry of the University of East Anglia discussed his research on whistleblowers as agents who cross the boundaries of loyalty, thus causing state insecurity. David Milne, also of East Anglia, led a discussion on the role of U.S. defense intellectuals informed by his book, *America's*

Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War. A particular highlight of the Summer Institute was our session with Odd Arne Westad, where we had the opportunity to get a glimpse of and to draw intellectual inspiration from his most recent masterpiece, *The Cold War: A World History*.

These seminars gave SHAFR participants a chance to see their work in conversation with that of more advanced scholars who are approaching questions in broader and more synthetic ways. Thompson's talk, for example, spoke directly to participant Stephen Wertheim's work on the U.S. turn to global political and military supremacy between the late 1930s and the end of World War II. David Allen's work, which looks at nongovernmental organizations interested in adult education about foreign affairs, was corroborated by insights from Katharina Rietzler's presentation on the role of foundations in promoting internationalism after World War I, particularly through groups such as the Carnegie Endowment's International Relations Clubs. Rietzler was especially attentive to the ways in which the idea and function of public opinion changed over time, and how the contradictions within it—such as whose opinions count at any given time, and whether the public leads or is led—could not survive a Second World War without being put to the test.

Westad's session was perhaps the most generally useful in this regard, as his argument about the global Cold War as a long-running competition between competing modernisms rooted in the late nineteenth century tied many of the participants' efforts together: from Carla Konta's work on nuclear research as a pillar of Yugoslav national identity to Gaetano di Tommaso's work on the "oil security nexus," Liz Ingleson's research on Sino-American trade relations in the 1970s, and finally, Nate Moir's work on the counterinsurgency doctrine of Bernard Fall. These sessions were as intellectually challenging as they were stimulating. Paul André-Rosental, from SciencesPo Paris, introduced the biopolitics of national security and challenged many of the traditional geopolitical boundaries that remain fixtures even in the contemporary understanding of national security. Drawing on his groundbreaking research in eugenics, social policy and sanitary health, he urged participants to think about whether the security of individuals should be considered the domain of "national security."

Undoubtedly, the highlight of the institute was the opportunity to present, review, and comment on each

other's work. In addition to the chance to collect feedback from other emerging scholars, these daily meetings provided fruitful discussions of methodologies, underlying intellectual frameworks, and broader implications for scholarship in international history. We also addressed questions of professional development, including publications, teaching, and archival work.

In our discussions, many of us recognized the strong potential for collaborative scholarship in our own work. Some of us made thematic connections on topics such as nuclear proliferation or work dealing with non-state actors. Others, like James Bradford, who writes on Afghanistan's role in Richard Nixon's war on drugs, and Aileen Teague, whose work explores the transnational history of the U.S.-Mexican counternarcotics efforts, made cross-regional comparisons. Even more of us, including those working on the interwar years and the Cold War, drew temporal parallels.

It was rewarding to witness participants realize these synergies and begin to draw from each other's work in real time. For example, Malcolm Craig noted that his thinking on the relationship between U.S.-UK nuclear nonproliferation policy and the rise of modern political Islam had been spurred in new and interesting directions by Michael Graziano's writing on religion and intelligence. Graziano's research into how the Central Intelligence Agency interpreted and operationalized religion in foreign countries during the Cold War, which was informed by his background in religious studies, opened up analytical approaches different from those normally found in intelligence and national security history. While scholars such as Andrew Preston have previously done pathbreaking work on demonstrating the importance of religion in U.S. foreign policy, the discussion of Graziano's paper highlighted the work yet to be done on how different institutions and individuals drew upon and made use of religion within a national security framework. This was just one illustration of how face-to-face discussions about our work led to a fruitful cross-pollination across intellectual boundaries.

We consistently found that the methodologies underlying new research on national security were the centerpiece of these discussions. Reviewing each other's work allowed us to really dig in to the immense range of sources being used by scholars to interrogate actors, sources that are often confounding to the boundaries of the national security state. Most scholars at the institute continue to scour national archives, but they have augmented this research with the records of private institutes and organizations, philanthropies, businesses, and popular culture. For example, Evan McCormick, writing on the relationship between "quasi-nongovernmental" U.S. democracy promotion assistance in Latin America, brought together State Department records with those of the civil society groups in Latin America that benefited from U.S. assistance. Jayita Sarkar's work on U.S. nonproliferation policy toward suppliers in the 1970s examined the role of firms in providing nuclear assistance to governments and the impact that the nature of government-industry relations has on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As scholars shared ideas about innovative sources for narrating national





security, it became clear that the theme is no longer defined by a methodology that replicates the privileged role of the state to define its boundaries.

Energized by the week's conversations and ideas, we decided to make an addition to the schedule: a session on teaching national security. At this participant-organized meeting, we discussed several ways in which we could bring the insights from the institute to our classrooms and influence the new generation of students and neophytes to ensure lasting change in the way the field is defined. Here we discussed innovative teaching methods we have used ourselves or benefited from in the classroom, including in-class simulations, that could be effective in educating

students about national security.

The most enduring takeaway from our time in Cambridge was a basic one: the institute brought together up-and-coming scholars from universities across the globe, working on questions of national security from a variety of different directions. Not even the finest British cuisine (note: more sophisticated than you think), nor the Aussie biscuits—Tim Tams, brought to us all the way from Sydney (still more sophisticated!)—could interrupt the ongoing conversations. After an entire week with each other, incredibly, we left with a sense that there was *more* work to be done to realize the potential within this field and that collaborations can help to further that work.

To that end, efforts are already underway to maintain the friendships and associations that were made at the Summer Institute. Panels are being organized for the 2018 SHAFR conference, jointly authored articles are in the works, and return visits to the United Kingdom are being planned. These will help to strengthen not only personal and professional relationships, but intersections between SHAFR and other professional organizations, such as the UK-based Historians of the Twentieth Century United States (HOTCUS). These world-spanning connections and boundary-breaking intellectual pursuits are a fitting outcome for both the field of national security, once defined by secrecy and constriction, and for the 2017 SHAFR Summer Institute. We thank SHAFR for its support and generosity in providing us with such a truly enriching and memorable week.

Is There “Systemic Inequality” in the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

*Nicholas Evan Sarantakes*¹

For the past fifty years, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations has been an exceptionally strong and well-led organization that has offered its members many advantages, both tangible and intangible, that vastly exceed those of similar organizations. It is well funded, thanks to the contributions of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath; it has a number of honors to recognize exceptional scholarship; and it has a well-managed journal that publishes a lot of good articles *and* historiographies. (Reviews of the literature are rarer in other fields than one might expect). The society also holds its annual meetings every other year in the Washington D.C. area, allowing many of us to use these trips for research rather than just a conference.

The organization is also highly professional. We have our differences, but we manage to discuss them “diplomatically.” I believe that is because we study how governments work, which gives us an advantage over our colleagues in other fields. Yet SHAFR is what it is—an American, academic organization—and it ultimately reflects larger trends in the academic profession as a whole. The question for today is: does SHAFR reflect the steep and regular inequality that recent studies have found in American academia in general, and history in particular?

In 2015, the three-man team of Aaron Clauset, Samuel Arbesman and Daniel B. Larremore set out to measure academic prestige. Theirs is an interesting project, but how do you measure prestige? Arbesman explains that he and his colleagues “developed a new ranking methodology based on a simple idea: a school’s prestige (and rank) is determined by where its graduates go. If a school is good, then lots of other schools will want to hire its graduates.”²

They studied the practices in business, computer science, and history, because these fields represent very different academic traditions. They created a poll ranking all the Ph.D.-granting programs in the country and tracked where graduates landed. Schools moved up or down in the rankings based on where their alumni found jobs. If the graduate found employment at a school high in the poll, then that improved the ranking of their alma mater, and vice versa.

What they found is profoundly disturbing. As they put it in their article, “Systematic Inequality and Hierarchy in Faculty Hiring Networks,” academic hiring is a “steeply hierarchical structure that reflects profound social inequality.”³ That the system is unfair is hardly news, but how biased the system is towards a very few schools is eye-opening. Eighteen schools produce half of all computer science positions, sixteen schools produce half of all the business professors, and eight schools—yes, that is right, eight—account for half of all history professors. Those eight schools are Harvard, Yale, California at Berkeley, Princeton, Stanford, Chicago, Columbia, and Brandeis.

These findings are in keeping with those of other studies that used different methodologies and looked

at single disciplines like mathematics, economics, law, sociology, and political science.⁴ “We show that faculty hiring follows a common and steeply hierarchical structure that reflects profound social inequality among institutions,” the authors state. Clauset was blunter in an article he co-wrote in *Slate*, the online magazine, where he explained that the “findings suggest that upward career mobility in the world of professors is mostly a myth.”⁵

There are problems with the study—at least in the area of history—that are worth mentioning. Several schools that should be counted are missing. Oregon State, Southern Methodist, and Baylor all grant the Ph.D. in history and are absent. A second consideration to keep in mind is that if historians find employment at a good school that does not grant the Ph.D., neither they nor the school count in this study. Even though places like Brigham Young, Dartmouth, Villanova, West Point, and Annapolis do not have Ph.D. programs, you can still have a very good career there and teach high-caliber students.

That said, this study is important, because it makes the intangible tangible. The complete list of history department rankings based on job placement is as follows:

1. Harvard University
2. Yale University
3. U.C., Berkeley
4. Princeton University
5. Stanford University
6. University of Chicago
7. Columbia University
8. Brandeis University
9. The Johns Hopkins University
10. University of Pennsylvania
11. University of Wisconsin
12. University of Michigan
13. UCLA
14. Northwestern University
15. Cornell University
16. Brown University
17. University of California at Davis
18. University of Rochester
19. New York University
20. University of California at San Diego
21. Duke University
22. University of Minnesota
23. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
24. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
25. University of Virginia
26. University of Southern California
27. University of Washington
28. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
29. University of Texas
30. Emory University
31. Indiana University

32. Stony Brook University-State University of New York
33. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
34. Washington University in St. Louis
35. University of California at Riverside
36. Michigan State University
37. University of California at Irvine
38. University of California at Santa Barbara
39. Binghamton University-State University of New York
40. Georgetown University
41. University of Arizona
42. University of Maryland
43. Catholic University
44. University of Florida
45. Carnegie Mellon University
46. University of Pittsburgh
47. Tufts University
48. University of Notre Dame
49. Rice University
50. University at Buffalo-State University of New York
51. University of California at Santa Cruz
52. Boston University
53. Vanderbilt University
54. George Washington University
55. University of Connecticut
56. University of New Mexico
57. The Ohio State University
58. University of Georgia
59. University of Iowa
60. University of Massachusetts
61. Northern Illinois University
62. University of Miami
63. Boston College
64. University of Illinois at Chicago
65. Temple University
66. Claremont McKenna College
67. Louisiana State University
68. University of Kansas
69. University of Hawaii
70. Case Western Reserve University
71. Tulane University
72. Wayne State University
73. Florida State University
74. Drew University
75. Pennsylvania State University
76. Princeton Theological Seminary
77. College of William and Mary
78. University of Cincinnati
79. Florida International University
80. University of Tennessee
81. University of Colorado
82. Ohio University
83. University of Delaware
84. University of Oregon
85. University of Kentucky
86. University of Toledo
87. American University
88. Georgia State University
89. Arizona State University
90. University of Missouri
91. University of Utah
92. University of New Hampshire
93. University at Albany-State University of New York
94. City University of New York Graduate Center
95. Clark University
96. University of Houston
97. Syracuse University
98. Marquette University
99. Kent State University
100. Bowling Green State University
101. University of Maine
102. University of Mississippi
103. Washington State University
104. Miami University
105. Kansas State University
106. University of Oklahoma
107. Howard University
108. University of Missouri—Kansas City
109. University of Nebraska
110. Jewish Theological Seminary of America
111. Saint John's University
112. Northeastern University
113. Texas Christian University
114. Auburn University
115. Iowa State University
116. Graduate Theological Union
117. Lehigh University
118. Purdue University
119. University of South Carolina
120. University of North Texas
121. Loyola University Chicago
122. Texas A&M University
123. University of Arkansas
124. University of Northern Arizona
125. West Virginia University
126. Fordham University
127. University of Alabama
128. University of Southern Mississippi
129. University of Akron
130. University of Texas at Dallas
131. University of Nevada
132. Illinois State University
133. Southern Illinois University Carbondale
134. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
135. Western Michigan University
136. Saint Louis University
137. University of Texas at Arlington
138. University of Idaho
139. Texas Tech University
140. University of Memphis
141. Mississippi State University
142. George Mason University
143. Oklahoma State University
144. Middle Tennessee State University

What these rankings do not show is that there are some fairly big gaps between various schools. The number 1 school on the list, Harvard, placed 324 of its graduates in other history departments, while the number 10 school on the list, the University of Pennsylvania, placed less than half that figure, with 128. The number 20 school, the University of California at San Diego, had less than half of that number, with 35. Of course, with the weighted system that Clauzet, Arbesman, and Larremore use, some alumni count more than others, which is why Brandeis is on the list at number 8 even though it has placed only 43 graduates.

While who gets hired is a pretty good indicator of prestige, it is not the only one. This article aims to examine if the prestige factors that Clauzet, Arbesman, and Larremore found in history departments are present in the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. There are many ways to measure this, but in this study it was done by using a simple statistical analysis of the scholars who received the Bernath Book Prize, which goes to the author of a first book. SHAFR has awarded the prize for 45 years. During that time, 54 different people have won the award. The award was shared 9 times and 1 person (somehow) won it twice. Those 54 were the alumni of 32 different institutions. If the co-winners are treated as a half win, then the top schools in the Clauzet, Arbesman, and Larremore rankings account for 22.5 wins, which is exactly 50 percent of the winners, a reproduction of the bias in employment:

Yale	7 (6 wins and two half wins)
Columbia	5
Harvard	4.5
Duke	2.5
Stanford	2.5
U.C., Berkeley	2 (1 win and two half wins)
Northwestern	1 (2 half wins)
Boston College	1
Boston University	1
UCLA	1
Cambridge	1
Colorado	1
Connecticut	1
Florida	1
Georgetown	1
Iowa	1
Minnesota	1
North Carolina	1
Ohio	1
Ohio State	1
Princeton	1
Pennsylvania	1
Texas	1
American	0.5
Chicago	0.5
Illinois	0.5
Indiana	0.5
Johns Hopkins	0.5
Salzburg	0.5
Southern California	0.5
Tufts	0.5
Virginia	0.5

The short answer to the question asked in the title of this article is “yes.” The advantage that Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore found that the top schools enjoy in the hiring process extends to their alumni within SHAFR.

This finding leads to another question: does this lead carry through a career? Do scholars from these schools sustain their edge over time? The Bernath Lecture is the perfect mechanism to measure that question. The society generally awards the lecture to scholars who are junior associate professors. The requirements for this honor is that the recipient must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the Ph.D..

A statistical analysis indicates that the advantage that the top schools in the Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore rankings enjoy actually increases with time. The society has awarded this prize 30 times to 30 different men and women. Five of the top eight schools in the study account for 53.3 percent of the recipients:

Yale	5
Harvard	3
Princeton	3
U.C., Berkeley	3
Stanford	2
Ohio State	2
Connecticut	2
Boston College	1
Boston University	1
Cambridge	1
Georgetown	1
Massachusetts	1
North Carolina	1
Northwestern	1
Texas	1
Vanderbilt	1
Wisconsin	1

The Bernath Lecture draws upon the graduates of far

fewer schools than the book prize. The top eight schools have actually become the top five. It is worth observing that no Columbia, Chicago or Brandeis graduates have given the lecture. The lecturers have been alumni of 17 schools, compared to 32 for the book prize. That is a shrinkage of almost half.

Does the advantage that the alumni of the eight top schools enjoy within SHAFR extend over the course of a career? Who has SHAFR elected to serve as president?

The results are somewhat mixed. Since the society was formed in 1968, 51 men and women have served as president of the organization. They have come from 24 schools. Worth noting is that the Berkeley has produced only two SHAFR presidents and Columbia University has produced only one. Several schools have done better than these two institutions, even though they were ranked much lower in the Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore poll. In fact, this statistical analysis confirms to a degree—but only to a degree—what many people have claimed in response to “Systematic Inequality”: mentorship counts. The University of Wisconsin has produced 4 SHAFR presidents and the University of Texas has produced 2. Three of the 4 Wisconsin Badgers were students of William Appleman Williams, and the 2 Longhorns were Robert A. Divine students. Duke and Virginia each have also produced more than Berkeley and Columbia. In fact, Wisconsin is in a three-way tie with Stanford and Chicago for third place.

Despite those facts, this statistical analysis confirms more of the Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore study than it challenges. Six of the top eight schools combined account for 24 of the 51 SHAFR presidents, or 47 percent. In a statistical sense, that figure is *basically* in keeping with the findings of “Systematic Inequality,” even if the advantage that these schools have declines a bit during the progression of a career:

Yale	7
Harvard	6
Stanford	4
Chicago	4
Wisconsin	4
Duke	3
Virginia	3
U.C., Berkeley	2
Texas	2
Washington	2
Boston College	1
UCLA	1
Columbia	1
Connecticut	1
Cornell	1
Georgetown	1
Indiana	1
Iowa	1
Massachusetts	1
Nebraska	1
Northwestern	1
Ohio State	1
SUNY Stonybrook	1
Vanderbilt	1

How should we respond to this information? The first and most obvious conclusion is that a professor mentoring undergraduate and graduate students should point them towards the top eight schools if these budding scholars want to earn a Ph.D. and have a good career using that degree. Failing that, faculty should encourage students to apply to schools with real strengths and/or programs in the fields in which they want to study. To give one example, although the University of Texas is only 29th on the Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore rankings, it has 5 diplomatic

historians (3 in the history department and 2 in other colleges/departments).

Another point that needs to be stressed is that numbers can be misleading. While the alumni from eight schools have an advantage over the rest of the society, only three people have performed the hat trick and received the Bernath Book Prize, given the Bernath Lecture, and been SHAFR president. There are an even one hundred scholars on these three lists. One of the striking things about looking at the winners of the Bernath Book Prize from the 1970s and 1980s is how many of them faded over time. Put another way, they did not produce second or third books worthy of notice. A few appear to have ceased scholarly production after converting their dissertations into books.

It also appears that SHAFR is more globally minded than other scholarly organizations. A number of foreign scholars have received recognition from the society. As many as nine of the hundred people who are on one of these three lists are foreign scholars. Much of that figure turns on the definition of citizenship status and what it is to be an "American," and it seemed too intrusive to inquire about such issues for the purposes of this study. While several of these nine have Ph.D. degrees from American universities and some have stayed in the United States since they graduated, others are making contributions to the historiography of U.S. foreign relations from abroad and have received recognition for that effort from SHAFR.

This study also raises historiographical questions. Have we debated ideas or rejected them because of where certain scholars did or did not go to school? As Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore contend,

a strong core-periphery pattern has profound implications for the free exchange of ideas. Research interests, collaboration networks, and academic norms are often cemented during doctoral training. . . . Thus, the centralized and highly connected positions of higher-prestige institutions enable substantial influence, via doctoral placement, over the research agendas, research communities, and departmental norms throughout a discipline. . . . The close proximity of the core to the entire network implies that ideas originating in the high-prestige core, regardless of their merit, spread more easily throughout the discipline, whereas ideas originating from low-prestige institutions must filter through many more intermediaries.⁶

A superficial examination of the historiography of U.S. diplomatic history suggests there is some merit to this concern. The challenge that William Appleman Williams and the Wisconsin school made to early views on the origins of the Cold War comes to mind immediately. The "Beyond Vietnam" argument about Lyndon Johnson's foreign policies and the dismissal of some of its advocates because they had lived in Texas too long is another good example. We need more historiographies to answer this question.

A final consideration for all of SHAFR—and the nominating and selection committees in particular—is the

question of who are we honoring and why. In an interview with *Inside Higher Ed*, Clauset explains that when people are working within a meritocracy, they have an even chance of ending up in a program ranked higher or lower than their school. The Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore study makes it clear that is not happening. "Under a meritocracy, the observed placement rates would imply that faculty with doctorates from the top 10 units are inherently two to six times more productive than faculty with doctorates from the third 10 units. The magnitude of these differences makes a pure meritocracy seem implausible, suggesting the influence of nonmeritocratic factors like social status."

That begs the question: is SHAFR honoring people because they have come up with truly innovative ways of understanding the past, or because their study seems to be keeping with fashionable trends and was done at one of the "cool schools"? I suspect most people on awards and honors committees would give—and believe—the response that they are trying to determine the books and/or people that have had the biggest impact on the discipline. I am willing to accept that response on an individual basis, but an unconscious or systematic bias is still a bias.

Notes:

1. The author wants to thank Kyle Longley of Arizona State University, Mike Creswell of Florida State University, and Mitch Lerner of The Ohio State University for their comments on earlier drafts of this study. Any problems that remain are the fault of the author alone.
2. Samuel Arbesman, "Academic Hiring Is an Uphill Battle," *Wired* (February 19, 2015), <https://www.wired.com/2015/02/academic-hiring-uphill-battle/>.
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5. Joel Warner and Aaron Clauset, "The Academy's Dirty Secret: An Astonishingly Small Number of Elite Universities Produce an Overwhelming Number of America's Professors," *Slate* (February 23, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2015/02/university_hiring_if_you_didn_t_get_your_ph_d_at_an_elite_university_good.html.
6. Clauset, Arbesman and Larremore, "Systematic Inequality."

Some Articles, A Book, and a Speech

Wyatt Wells

Between 1938 and 1961, Herbert Hoover, Robert Taft, and Dwight Eisenhower—arguably the three most influential Republicans of the age—each offered a critique of American foreign policy.¹ Hoover weighed in first. In a series of articles written in 1938, he came out publicly against American involvement in the brewing war in Europe. He was still bitter over his defeat in the 1932 presidential election at the hands of Franklin Roosevelt, and he feared that Roosevelt would lead the country into an unnecessary war. Senator Robert Taft, the unofficial leader of conservatives in Congress (whose nickname was “Mr. Republican”), expressed his views on U.S. foreign policy in 1951, when he published *A Foreign Policy for Americans*. He planned to run for president in 1952, and he used the book to differentiate his foreign policy positions from President Truman’s and to lay out his vision of the proper role of the United States in the world.² In 1961, on the eve of leaving office, President Eisenhower delivered his views in what became known as the “military-industrial complex” speech. Eisenhower’s successor, Democrat John F. Kennedy, had been quite critical of Eisenhower’s foreign policy during the 1960 campaign, and in this address, Eisenhower defended his policies and warned of the dangers he saw in Kennedy’s alternative. Though separated by many years and made under very different circumstances, these statements reflected similar concerns and objectives.

All three men respected the ideals of President Woodrow Wilson but recognized that circumstances prevented their realization. They particularly admired the League of Nations. In 1939, Hoover praised the League as “a heroic attempt to build peace by associating all nations, whether democracies, kingdoms, or dictatorships. Its purpose was to replace the theory of the balance of power.”³ Unfortunately, after the Great War, Britain and France sought to extract the maximum possible advantage from victory rather than try to construct a better world, and the League never functioned as Wilson intended. In retrospect, Hoover judged the effort futile. “All European history is a treadmill of war for power and mastery” that admitted no progress, he said.⁴

When Taft wrote his foreign policy book a dozen years later, the world had changed. The United States had won the Second World War and, in its wake, had organized the United Nations, an updated version of Wilson’s League. Taft, however, did not consider the UN an improvement. “It is not based,” he complained, “primarily on an underlying law and an administration of justice under that law.”⁵ Instead, it represented a new forum for power politics. It gave permanent members of the Security Council a veto over decisions, and as a result, it was little more than “a diplomatic weapon” that the United States might wield in its own interest if it was sufficiently deft.⁶

When Eisenhower gave his final speech as president almost a decade later, he did not mention the UN, but he did endorse Wilson’s concept of the equality of nations. Ideally, he said, “the weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as we do, protected as we are by

our moral, economic, and military strength.”⁷ In practice, of course, his administration did use U.S. power to intervene in the affairs of other nations. Yet in each case it convinced itself, rightly or not, that vital American interests were at stake and that it was resisting another outside force—communism. Eisenhower demonstrated limited interest in the internal affairs of other nations per se. Ideas of development, modernization, and nation-building had a relatively small place in his foreign policy, at least compared to that of the Truman and Kennedy administrations. Supporters described this attitude as prudent; critics called it small-minded; but it probably owed a good deal to the idea that each nation should chart its own course—an idea that was the centerpiece of Wilson’s thinking.

All three men also believed that Congress should have a significant voice in foreign policy. “Our foreign policy in these major dimensions [war and peace,]” Hoover wrote in 1939, “must be determined by the American people and by Congress, not by the President alone.”⁸ He deeply distrusted Franklin Roosevelt, whom he considered an unprincipled adventurer, and he feared that Roosevelt would drag the country into war merely to strengthen his own political position at home. In fact, Roosevelt often did make policy without consulting Congress. In 1940, he gave Britain American warships in exchange for bases in British possessions, and in 1941, he deployed U.S. Navy ships against German submarines. Both actions were taken on his own authority. In other cases, however, most notably Lend-Lease, the president did secure legislative approval.

Taft went further than Hoover, asserting at the height of the Korean War that “if the present trend continues, it seems to me obvious that the President will become a complete dictator in the entire field of foreign policy and thereby acquire powers to force upon Congress all kinds of domestic policy which must necessarily follow.”⁹ President Truman was actually more careful than Roosevelt about securing congressional support for important initiatives; he went to Congress to get approval for aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example. Yet he ordered American soldiers into Korea in 1950 without seeking congressional approval, even though he almost certainly could have secured it.¹⁰ In that instance Truman presented Congress with a *fait accompli*, leaving it little choice but to vote money and other support for a war that, as it dragged on, became ever less popular.

In his farewell address, Eisenhower expressed satisfaction that “the Congress and the administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship.”¹¹ This statement is remarkable chiefly because Eisenhower included it in a brief speech focused on other topics. In reality, he often found dealing with Congress frustrating. Speaking about Senator William Knowland, who succeeded Taft as the leader of Senate Republicans after the latter’s sudden death in 1953, Eisenhower confided to his diary that “in his case, there seems to be no final answer to the question, ‘How

stupid can you get?"¹² Nevertheless, Eisenhower regularly consulted leading members of Congress on major foreign policy questions; and in cases that involved the deployment of American forces, such as reinforcing Taiwan against the communist Chinese in 1955 and sending soldiers to Lebanon in 1958, he secured formal endorsement for his actions. Moreover, he actually listened to legislators, or at least some of them. In 1954, as the French position in Vietnam collapsed and a communist takeover there seemed likely, Eisenhower faced strong pressure to send American forces to the country. He refused, in part because senators and representatives warned him that the country simply was not ready for another foreign conflict so soon after the end of the Korean War.¹³

Hoover, Taft, and Eisenhower all feared that the United States might overextend itself. "America," Hoover insisted, "has not the power to impose a course of action upon the nations of Europe which would end war for the future or would make the world safe for democracy."¹⁴ Any such crusade also risked a backlash. "The idea of America sitting alone determining who and what in the world shall stop and go would make us suspect of the whole world. . . . It is certain that a combination of power will arise against a nation which did that, no matter how good and neighborly its words may be."¹⁵ Hoover put his case in extreme terms, but he had a valid point. In the late 1930s, many—though by no means all—of those in favor of intervention in the brewing European war justified action on the principle of "resisting aggression," a formulation that could lead the United States almost anywhere. Hoover insisted that the real question was whether German (or Japanese) expansion threatened the United States and if so, what the country could do about it. In retrospect, he severely underestimated the threat, but he asked the right question.

Taft addressed the same issue in more concrete terms. By 1951, the Cold War was well under way, and the United States had spent vast sums on aid to rehabilitate the economies of allies and former enemies in Europe and Asia to turn them into bulwarks against the Soviet Union. The United States was fighting a "hot" war in Korea against the North Korean and Chinese communists and had launched an immense, across-the-board military buildup. In 1952, defense outlays would total about 14 percent of national output, and at least some in the Truman administration imagined the total going even higher. NSC-68, the document that laid out the rationale for the buildup, suggested that defense spending might consume as much as 25 percent of national output. This prospect appalled Taft, who noted that the United States was "not at war [with the Soviet Union], and the condition we face may go on for five, ten, and even twenty years."¹⁶ The Truman administration sought a position of absolute security, but the senator insisted that even "the most foresighted person could not set up a preparation that would protect us against every conceivable contingency."¹⁷ Americans had to realize, he added, "that there are definite economic and manpower limits to American strategy. . . . We are forced to be selective in determining the relative value and cost of each project."¹⁸

As president, Eisenhower struggled for eight years to keep military spending under 10 percent of total national output. He succeeded, but at some political cost. Strange as it might seem from the perspective of the early twenty-first century, many at the time considered this high level of

outlays inadequate. In his valedictory address, Eisenhower warned that the Cold War "promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle."¹⁹ He cautioned against "a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties."²⁰

Finally, Hoover, Taft, and Eisenhower focused on the domestic implications of foreign policy. Few would disagree with Taft's assertion that "the ultimate purpose of our foreign policy must be to protect the liberty of the people of the United States."²¹ But like Hoover and Eisenhower, Taft feared that measures designed to protect the country from foreign enemies could undermine freedom at home. In 1939, Hoover warned that "personal liberty and free economic life are not built for modern war. A great war today is the mobilization of the whole people. That means democracy must temporarily surrender to dictatorship no matter what one may call it. . . . A war to save liberty would probably destroy

liberty."²² He reminded his audience that during the First World War, "we created great propaganda agencies. . . . [T]hey distorted fact and created news without truth. They built hate . . . as a necessary emotional foundation for modern war. And no man dared question or answer under this fierce organized condemnation."²³

The experience of World War II demonstrated that Hoover's fears were exaggerated but not unfounded. The country avoided the sort of wholesale repression witnessed in World War I, both because President Roosevelt made a point of reaching out to his political opponents—Hoover was a notable exception—and because the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor convinced the vast majority of the population that the United States was the victim of aggression. Yet the country nevertheless saw ugly incidents like the internment of Japanese civilians and the exclusion of the children of Jehovah's Witnesses from public schools. From Hoover's perspective, the most encouraging aspect of the war was the unpopularity of economic controls, which the population tolerated only as long as they seemed necessary for victory and no longer.

In 1951, Taft considered the prospect of a long, drawn-out Cold War at least as daunting as the two world wars, which, however destructive, were at least finite. It threatened permanent mobilization, which, Taft warned, "requires a complete surrender of liberty and the turning over to the central government of power to control in detail the lives of people and their activities."²⁴ For someone like Taft—or Hoover or Eisenhower, for that matter—who believed that economic freedom and personal liberty were closely linked, the situation was alarming. What was at stake, Taft thought, was "the liberty of the individual to think his own thoughts and live his own life as he desires to think and live; the liberty of the family to decide how they wish to live, what they want to eat for breakfast and dinner, and how they wish to spend their time; . . . liberty of a man to choose his own occupation, and liberty of a man to run his own business as he thinks it ought to be run."²⁵ Again, Taft's fears, though exaggerated, were not unfounded. After 1950, mobilization brought government control of wages and prices; and a 1952 strike by steelworkers led President

Truman to seize control of the entire steel industry, though the Supreme Court soon ruled his action unconstitutional.

Eisenhower advanced a subtler version of this argument. In 1961, he contended that the Cold War had given birth to “an immense military establishment and a large arms industry.” The conjunction between the two was “new in American experience,”²⁶ and he worried about its effect on American society. “We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”²⁷ Foreign policy, Eisenhower insisted, had to focus on “the need to maintain balance in and among national programs—balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped-for advantage—balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable—balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual.”²⁸ Such a nuanced argument defies easy proof. There is no question, however, that heavy defense spending gave rise to industries entirely dependent on military procurement and communities heavily reliant on military installations and that these interests strongly influenced political life and government policy.

In his famous taxonomy, philosopher Isaiah Berlin grouped intellectuals into two categories: foxes and hedgehogs. The former draw from a variety of intellectual traditions as they see fit, while the latter work from one big idea. Usually, conservatives count as hedgehogs, but on foreign policy, Hoover, Taft, and Eisenhower were foxes. They recognized the moral shortcomings of conventional power politics, the risk of allowing the president too much latitude in foreign policy, the limits of American power, and the social, political, and economic dangers of mobilization. Yet their opponents had grasped the big truth. Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia were aggressive tyrannies that, if they could, would subdue Europe from the Atlantic to Siberia, creating a superpower that would pose a major, ongoing threat to the United States—and murdering millions of people in the process.²⁹ An effective foreign policy had to address these threats.

Robert Taft’s *A Foreign Policy for Americans* did not, in fact, offer a foreign policy for Americans. The book critiqued the Truman administration’s policies, in some cases perceptively, but had few positive suggestions. Hoover did have an alternative to the policies of the Roosevelt administration, which he laid out in a massive, turgid volume, *Freedom Betrayed*, published after his death.³⁰ He argued that in the late 1930s the Western democracies should have abandoned Eastern Europe, which they could not defend in any case, and let Nazi Germany move into the region, where it would ultimately have collided with the Soviet Union. The two would then have fought to a stalemate that would have severely—perhaps fatally—weakened both, leaving the democracies in a dominant position.

Hoover’s policy might well have led to such an outcome, but it could also have resulted in a decisive Nazi or Soviet victory. The Germans had defeated the Russians in 1917, and they had nearly done so again in 1941, while in 1814, the Russians had marched all the way to Paris. In either case, the winner would then unite German technical expertise with Russian natural resources, creating a superpower capable not only of dominating Europe but of directly threatening the United States. The United States might have withstood such a power, but only at the cost of the sort of permanent mobilization that Hoover dreaded. Despite misgivings, most Americans ultimately concluded that direct intervention was the safer course.

Dwight Eisenhower emerges both as a fox and a hedgehog. He led the campaign that liberated Western Europe from the Nazis; served as the first commander of

NATO; and as president, proved a resolute, even ruthless Cold Warrior. Indeed, he ran for president in 1952 in part because he feared that otherwise Robert Taft would win both the Republican nomination and the election and would, as president, retreat from foreign commitments.³¹ At the same time, however, Eisenhower sympathized with Hoover’s and Taft’s concerns. As president, he forged a good working relationship with Hoover and was in the process of doing so with Taft when the senator died suddenly in 1953. Eisenhower recognized that by 1952, the United States was overextended, largely because of the Korean War. Many Americans—perhaps most—simply did not think the war worth the costs the government was asking them to bear, and this discontent manifested itself in the Red Scare and McCarthyism, which did considerable damage to the country’s political and social fabric.³² As president, Eisenhower negotiated a truce in Korea, significantly cut military spending, reduced tensions with the Soviet Union, and avoided direct intervention in “hot spots” like Vietnam.

Statesmanship entails not only resolving difficult issues but recognizing when they defy resolution. In the 1950s, Eisenhower understood that the United States could not settle the Cold War on acceptable terms but that actively waging the Cold War risked overextending the country and transforming it in unattractive ways. He responded with a delicate balancing act, relying on relatively inexpensive expedients such as foreign alliances, military aid, and covert operations to deal with problems as they arose while ignoring hypothetical threats that might never materialize. He refused to let erroneous calculations of a “bomber gap” or a “missile gap” affect policy and was reluctant to get involved in a “space race,” a “kilowatt race,” or any other expensive contest for prestige with the Soviet Union. Critics of his foreign policy saw indecision and improvisation, but for Eisenhower, these qualities were part of a broader strategy that had been defined, in part, by concerns expressed by Republicans like Hoover and Taft over the previous twenty years.

Notes:

1. Thomas Dewey, the governor of New York from 1943 to 1955 and the GOP presidential nominee in 1944 and 1948, equaled these three in influence, but he did not weigh in heavily on foreign affairs.
2. Robert A. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (Garden City, NY, 1951).
3. Herbert Hoover, “Foreign Policies Today,” in *Further Addresses Upon the American Road, 1938–1940* (New York, 1940), 105–6.
4. *Ibid.*, 113.
5. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans*, 39.
6. *Ibid.*, 43.
7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–1961* (Washington DC: Office of the Federal Register, 1961), 1039.
8. Hoover, “Foreign Policies Today,” 93–4.
9. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans*, 21.
10. The Korean War developed very fast, and in the press of events, Truman and his advisors apparently concluded that they did not have time to secure congressional approval for intervention, instead citing a UN resolution condemning North Korea’s invasion of the South as legal justification to act. This approach was understandable, but it was almost certainly a mistake. Despite some misgivings, large majorities in Congress believed that the United States had little choice but to intervene in the conflict and almost certainly would have acted rapidly to approve action. By waging war on his own authority, Truman set a worrisome precedent that left his administration politically vulnerable should opinion turn against the war, which it did.
11. Eisenhower, *Public Papers*, 1036.
12. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. Robert Ferrell (New York, 1981), 291.
13. The reluctance of the British government to become involved also gave Eisenhower pause, as did the Army’s calculation that victory in Vietnam might require the commitment of as many as

300,000 soldiers for several years.

14. Hoover, "Foreign Policies Today," 113.

15. Hoover, "President Roosevelt's New Foreign Policies," in *Further Addresses*, 97.

16. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans*, 68.

17. *Ibid.*, 69.

18. *Ibid.*, 66–7.

19. Eisenhower, *Public Papers*, 1037.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans*, 11.

22. Hoover, "President Roosevelt's New Foreign Policies," 102.

23. Hoover, "Shall We Send Our Youth to War?" in *Further Addresses*, 124.

24. Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans*, 68.

25. *Ibid.*, 115.

26. Eisenhower, *Public Papers*, 1038.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*, 1037.

29. Joseph Stalin was far less reckless than Adolph Hitler, but he was happy to expand where resistance was lacking, as certainly would have been the case in Western Europe in the wake of World War II had the United States not strongly supported West Germany.

30. Herbert Hoover, *Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and its Aftermath*, ed. George Nash (Stanford, CA, 2011). Hoover finished the book shortly before his death in 1964; his heirs delayed decades before publishing it.

31. Eisenhower also feared that Taft might get the nomination and lose the election. He believed that if the GOP could not secure the presidency after two decades out of power, it would cease to be a credible opposition party, leaving the United States a de facto one-party state—a situation Eisenhower considered inimical to political democracy. He was also skeptical of the New Deal and Harry Truman's Fair Deal reforms and hoped to contain them and, ideally, roll them back. Ego played a role as well—Eisenhower never doubted that he was supremely qualified for the presidency.

32. The Red Scare represented more than a reaction to the Korean War, but it was most intense from 1950 through 1954—that is, from the start of the Korean War to soon after its end. The war, and the heavy losses it entailed, created the emotional environment in which many Americans were willing to credit the most outlandish accusations of Senator Joe McCarthy.

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SHAFR and Community Colleges

Hal M. Friedman

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to describe for SHAFR members the function of community colleges and the role that they play in the nation's higher education system and to suggest what SHAFR can do to recruit more community college historians into its ranks.

I teach at Henry Ford College (HFC) in Dearborn, Michigan, and my remarks are based on my experience there. But my descriptions of the conditions under which community college historians operate and the problems they face are applicable to most community colleges in the United States. Most of those problems are also fairly typical of those encountered elsewhere in American higher education. However, for reasons that are summarized below, community colleges are disproportionately burdened with the problems that affect us all.

One unusual aspect of teaching at a community college stems from the fact that the college is, literally, a college of the community. Most community colleges started either as extensions of local high schools—typical for junior colleges that were founded in the first half of the twentieth century—or as county-based institutions that accompanied the expansion of higher education in the 1960s. HFC is one of the former. It was created in 1938 as Fordson Junior College, became Dearborn Junior College in 1947, then Henry Ford Community College (HFCC) in 1954, and finally HFC in 2013. It is, in fact, the last community college in the state of Michigan that is still part of a K-12 district, and it is one of only two community colleges in the state that is not county-based.

Being part of a K-12 district brought significant advantages to junior and community colleges prior to 1970, especially if the community college was in a prosperous community that had well-funded schools. Now, however, there are problems. There is a stigma attached to being connected with a public K-12 school, as those institutions are increasingly under attack by politicians, pundits, and the public. Community colleges also tend to be very vulnerable financially. They are supported partially by federal aid, which comes primarily in terms of financial aid to students, who then supply the college with tuition and fees. The colleges are also supported by local property taxes. Operating budgets typically rely heavily on both, and property tax revenue can be particularly vulnerable to the gyrations of the economy, the anti-tax rhetoric of politicians, and the whims and fears of the public.

There are nearly a thousand community colleges in the United States, and they are truly reflections of their communities. Therefore, they tend to be very different from each other because of the communities in which they are located. Some of these colleges are actually technical institutions that specialize in what are called "career" fields, such as first responder training, health care, and industrial technology. These colleges tend to have very small, and in some cases, practically non-existent liberal arts areas beyond their math and science departments and communications departments (which include English and foreign language instruction). Other community colleges, however, are practically two-year liberal arts colleges in that they offer a full range of the kind of lower-division courses one would find at a four-year college or university.

These colleges also have very high transfer rates to four-year institutions. Still others are what are called "comprehensive community colleges." They combine technical instruction with two years of liberal arts programs. They also field centers of lifelong learning and outreach programs for local communities.

One of the most noticeable features of Henry Ford College is its student demographics. Most community colleges have student bodies that reflect their local communities, but HFC's student composition is unique because of the ethnic and racial demographics of southeastern Michigan. At HFC, roughly one-third of the students are African American, which is not surprising, given that the campus is a mile from the city of Detroit. Another one-third of the student body is European-American. These students come primarily from area suburbs. Another third of the student body is Arab and Arab American. That is not surprising either since Dearborn has the largest Arab community in the world outside the Middle East.

Like most community colleges, HFC has a significant number of non-traditional students. These students have come to a community college to begin their college careers or start new ones. Often, they have little or no money to go to college right after high school or they are married and have families. Sometimes, they have tried college and failed and are back for a second try as more mature adults. Non-traditional students, in fact, are some of our most successful ones, as they are eager to learn, willing to do the work, and very much aware of the alternatives to not getting an education or at least developing marketable skills.

Because of the Global War on Terrorism, we also have a conspicuous—though not very large—group of military veterans, most of whom are noticeable because they tend to be the best performers in their classes. Other community colleges near major American military bases, of course, have very large numbers of veterans in their student bodies. These veterans can often be of great assistance in the classroom, as the maturity they demonstrate serves as an example to younger students and they can provide operational perspectives on much of the international relations history many of us teach in our courses.

Many of the students, however, face multiple challenges: they may be minorities, immigrants, first-generation college students, working class, or some combination thereof. Some will succeed. Others won't. While the national transfer rate from community colleges to four-year colleges and universities has been only about 24 percent since the 1970s, community college transfer students tend to be more successful in their studies than students at four-year colleges who spent their first two years there. Community college transfer students also tend to have higher GPAs as well as better rates of four-year degree completion, and they are more likely to go on to graduate and professional schools. These rates go up even more for community college transfer students who complete associate's degrees rather than just transfer credits to a four-year college. So there is success, but it tends to come for the talented, committed individuals rather than for the preponderance of the student body.

Another major concern for professors at community

colleges is the number of full-time and part-time instructors. It is not surprising that there are many part-time faculty at Henry Ford College, since part-time faculty are common at all levels of higher education. However, as in other academic venues, that number has grown tremendously in the last forty-five years or so. What is particularly alarming at community colleges is that the majority of professors are often part-time. I suspect that four-year colleges with administrators looking to cut costs see community colleges as a model for operating an institution with full-time administrators and part-time professors, since community colleges have been moving in that direction since the 1970s.

Henry Ford Community College—now HFC—is a typical example of this transition. As far as I know, there were no part-time professors at the college prior to 1959. One of our now-deceased part-time professors joined the Department of History in that year, and he was the first part-time professor in the entire Social Science Division. With the enrollments of the 1950s and 1960s, the History Department continued to grow and at one point had seven full-time professors. However, as the Nixon administration began to reduce federal and state subsidies to colleges and as college administrators began to notice in the 1970s how much cheaper it was to employ part-time professors, retiring full-time professors were replaced by poorly paid part-timers.

At one point in the 1980s, the History Department at HFCC still had six full-timers, but in high enrollment periods it had as many as eighteen part-time professors. By the 1990s, the History Department consisted of four full-timers and anywhere from twelve to eighteen part-time professors. Today, the History Program in the new Department of Social Sciences employs four full-time professors, one of whom is on permanent medical leave. In the last couple of years, we have had very poor enrollment (in the Fall 2016 term, the history faculty taught only thirteen course sections), and the program may shrink even more. As the youngest of the remaining full-time professors, I expect to be the last remaining full-time member.

Readers should understand, however, that HFCC was highly unusual in having once had seven full-time professors. Most community colleges had and continue to have only one or two full-time professors; the rest are part-time. Professors at research universities or mid-level schools who are often the only diplomatic historian in their departments should try to imagine what it would be like to be the only full-time historian at their institutions—or perhaps the only historian at all.

There are many problems associated with having a department where part-time professors predominate. First, scheduling becomes a nightmare, since most part-timers need to teach on anywhere from two to five campuses to make a living. Many full-time faculty do not even know the part-time faculty, and the part-timers may not know each other, even if they are in the same department. People come in, teach their classes, and leave. Another problem is that few part-time instructors keep office hours, because they are not paid for anything done outside their classroom contact hours and because they often have to commute to their next campus. The teaching load at community colleges is very heavy. Full-time professors teach anywhere from four to six courses per semester. Imagine the difficulty of connecting to students while carrying that kind of load on several different campuses.

These problems will not go away. Community colleges teach half of the nation's undergraduates and do so on shoestring budgets much smaller than those of many four-year colleges and especially research institutions. These colleges and universities are feeling the financial pinch as well, but their budgets still appear lavish to community college faculty.

What can SHAFR do to assist these beleaguered community college historians? I would like to suggest several initiatives that might make their lives easier and would help integrate them into the profession. First, a number of community college historians who are currently SHAFR members are hoping to establish a group within SHAFR modeled after the Committee on Women in SHAFR. If they are successful, the Council could ask them to spearhead some sort of membership drive, mostly likely in conjunction with the Membership Committee.

In addition, either this group or the Membership Committee could create a database of community college historians around the country. My guess is that the AHA and OAH already have similar databases; if they are willing to cooperate, putting together a database for SHAFR might not be too onerous a task. SHAFR could then send targeted emails to community college historians about the value of joining the organization.

Given the teaching load and the other difficulties of community college faculty life, SHAFR's Teaching Committee could spearhead an effort to demonstrate to community college historians the work that SHAFR has done to connect good scholarship to effective teaching, especially with projects like the syllabus website. In addition, SHAFR could try to illustrate through examples from current members how SHAFR membership has made professors more proficient and has helped make their professional lives more fulfilling. Current members who are community college historians might spearhead this project.

SHAFR could also host sessions on teaching. It has done that in the past, but these sessions could be oriented toward teaching at community colleges. We could even have a roundtable or two on the subject. Of course, some community college historians are able to take part in significant professional development activities, like publishing books. Several of them are already members of SHAFR, in fact. Those scholars might be asked to organize a roundtable on scholarship in the community college—something that community college historians are not often asked to do—and that roundtable might be marketed particularly to community college historians who are not currently SHAFR members.

Finally, SHAFR could begin forging a closer relationship to other professional societies, and not just the AHA and OAH. I am thinking of the Community College Humanities Association, which reaches out to community college historians, and the World History Association, which has typically reached out very aggressively to K-12 teachers, community college historians, and historians at small four-year colleges. These two scholarly societies might have databases on community college historians around the country and might have already done much of the legwork in attempting to recruit from this group.

Many of the problems at community colleges are the same ones faculty face at four-year colleges, even research institutions. However, SHAFR members need to realize that the problems are proportionately greater at community colleges. With even less funding, with huge numbers of ill-prepared students, with faculty that are increasingly part-timers, and with instructional assessment models that crudely employ statistics to award funding, community college historians, in most cases, have little time and energy left over for professional development activities such as research and scholarship with organizations like SHAFR. It is hoped, however, that SHAFR can develop some ways to reach out to this community of historians that now represents such a large proportion of the faculty who are teaching history to college students in the United States.

A Report on the SHAFR/Miller Center Workshop of Public Engagement

Stefanie Georgakis Abbott

After a campaign in which many Americans assumed the country would wake up on November 10, 2016 with Hillary Clinton as president-elect, the election of Donald Trump left pundits, and much of the populace, shocked and confused. How could the polls have been so wrong?, they asked. But more important questions were now pressing: What would a Trump presidency look like? And how would the country mend and move forward following such a divisive campaign?

At a moment when the word “unprecedented” was deployed on a seemingly daily basis, when people craved context, and when “alternative facts” circulated alongside actual ones, the need for historians to make sense of these developments seemed as vital as ever. Professor Kimber Quinney (California State University, San Marcos) articulated the challenge facing historians as public intellectuals in the post-election world. In an e-mail to some fellow SHAFR members, she observed:

“For the past fifty years, policy makers—let alone the general public—rarely seek out or pay much attention to historians’ views. Why is that? Why do historians today seem to have less influence over public policy than, say, economists or journalists? I am eager to facilitate a conversation about the notable lack of influence among historians in the public sphere and, in particular how historians of American foreign relations can break the silence. Our expertise can be leveraged and conveyed in new ways to emphasize the essential importance of historical perspective, evidence-based analysis, and sound policy-making in a healthy democracy.”

This e-mail sparked a conversation that quickly developed into a workshop, co-hosted by SHAFR and the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, devoted to the topic of public engagement. Miller Center faculty members Marc Selverstone, Mel Leffler, and Will Hitchcock recognized that Quinney’s concerns fit squarely within the Center’s mission, which is to promote scholarship in the public interest and explore contemporary political and policy challenges through a historical lens. At the same time, the leadership of SHAFR recognized the workshop as an opportunity to pursue its own mission of disseminating knowledge about the history of U.S. foreign relations and helping its members develop the tools and strategies necessary to project their collective expertise into the public sphere.

As a result of this partnership, historians from around the country gathered from June 19-20 in Charlottesville, Virginia to address Quinney’s original question: How should scholars engage the public at a time when “post-truth” is the word of the year?¹²

The workshop approached this question from two angles. The first half of the program featured panels of historians and journalists discussing the pursuit of scholarship in the public interest. The questions animating

these sessions included: How are historians engaging in dialogue with the “general public” in conversations about America and the world? How can they do this more effectively? And, significantly, should this type of engagement be a primary goal of the profession? The second half of the meeting explored the merits of various platforms for public engagement. Participants discussed the benefits and drawbacks of social media, op-eds, websites, interviews, and podcasts. The lessons, recommendations, and cautions that emerged illustrated several considerations and cautionary tales for the historian who wants to engage the public more deeply in public and/or policy discussions.

Framing the Message

As the session began, Marc Selverstone noted that historians are well-positioned to answer key questions about the current historical moment. How many of Trump’s actions during his first six months in office really are unprecedented? How novel is his approach to governing and to policy? Can we point to historical episodes that might be useful in contextualizing his foreign policy views, or the dysfunction between the Democrats and Republicans in Congress? The challenge for scholars to consider resides not just how they might answer these questions, but in how they might do so for audiences other than the ones they normally address. While acknowledging the roadblocks that stand in the way of greater engagement, including, for some audiences, the very identity of scholars as voices of trust and authority, historians should nevertheless pursue those avenues that seem most promising.

It is important to remember, as Kimber Quinney reminded us, that historians have long debated the merits of engaging more directly with the public. In 1978, the AHA actually urged its members to educate the public on the importance of history—recognizing that a working knowledge of history is vital to a well-functioning democracy. In this regard, Quinney called our attention to Italian philosopher-historian Benedetto Croce, who maintained that “all history is contemporary history.”¹³ Croce believed that history could not be studied in a vacuum, but must be understood within its own unique context. Yet, if the job of the historian, as Croce argued, is to arrive at an ultimate “truth,” how do contemporary historians engage in a “post-truth world”? Quinney offered a solution: because the work of historians relies on a degree of detachment from the subject, this impartiality allows for “a unique perspective that allows us to contribute tools and dispositions for much-needed public conversations that are constructive and informative and based on evidence, a practice that is sorely lacking in a post-truth society.”

Paul Kramer, associate professor of history at Vanderbilt University, flipped the question. Instead of asking how to better engage with the public, he challenged the group to think about different kinds of publics. As he argued, university students are not distinct from the broader world, but are instead very much part of the general public.

Teaching, Kramer continued, should be considered a dimension of public engagement, with the goal being for students to apply the skills learned in the classroom to other aspects of their lives. For scholars, too, the lessons learned from engaging students in the classroom transfer to the general public: know your audience; work towards inclusion, rather than alienation; avoid jargon; humanize your argument. And rather than assuming the pose of impartial arbiters of truth, historians—and particularly those who want to engage the public—should acknowledge their own biases and remind audiences that they, too, come to these conversations from a particular point of view. Such intellectual honesty will help to foster deliberative discussions that are more likely to be well-received by a wider audience.

Carly Goodman, a historian as well as communications analyst and Mellon/ACLA public fellow at the American Friends Service Committee, approached the question from a slightly different perspective, focusing on what the research in communications tells us about how best to formulate arguments for a mass audience. The principal concern, she argued, is to think about how to frame an argument. Framing is more persuasive than facts alone. Myth-busting and “throwing” facts at people simply does not work. In fact, these tactics could have the unintended consequence of reinforcing previously held views. Instead of focusing on dispelling myths, writers should concentrate on telling a new story. Research shows that emphasizing shared values and offering solutions is the best way to shift the narrative. For example, Goodman said that instead of “retweeting” a negative tweet, it is better to provide a new, positive comment to reframe the debate.

Laura Belmonte, professor of history at Oklahoma State University, cited the erosion of media literacy and civics education as part of the problem of the “post-truth” era. People are craving historical content, she argued, and are eager to learn about the historical context of contemporary events. In providing that context, however, publicly engaged scholars must decide whether their want to write from a partisan political perspective. Likewise, scholars should consider the propriety of also being activists, as well as the extent to which the power of their voices reside in the presumption of scholarly impartiality. The historian who is writing for the wider public must be mindful of audience and venue when making these decisions.

Maintaining a healthy tension with the past, allowing facts to corroborate other facts, and applying nuance and complexity to contemporary debates allow scholars to help to create a de-politicized dialogue that engages wider audiences in more productive ways.

Forming the Message

In addition to reflecting on what they might want to say, scholars should also think about what audiences might want to know. What is it, exactly, that policymakers, or the media—local as well as national—are looking for from scholars? What kinds of knowledge or arguments would these audiences find most valuable? To answer these questions, the workshop brought together a panel of publicly engaged scholars, editors, and journalists.

Nicole Hemmer is an assistant professor of presidential studies at the Miller Center, as well as a columnist for *U.S. News & World Report*, host of the “PastPresent” podcast, and co-editor of the *Washington Post* blog, “Made By History.” She noted that in times of confusion, people often seek out experts. Historians, in particular, can therefore help to contextualize the “unprecedented” nature of some of President Trump’s actions. The key question, she noted, is not whether historians have something to offer, but how to better connect historians to a broader public. Writing for a public audience, Hemmer argued, is very different

from scholarly writing; it is a separate skill that must be honed and developed. Historians must “set the stage” their audience and and persuasive. They must provide historical context without getting mired in details.

James Gibney, the former executive editor of *Foreign Policy* now writing for *Bloomberg View*, emphasized the need for historians to be objective. By avoiding an overly political approach, scholars can maintain their credibility and have a better chance of breaking through the noise. Gibney observed that the degradation of standards and the decline of fact-checking, largely the result of the hyper-speed at which the media functions, have rendered the role of the scholar even more important in public conversations. He also offered a counter-intuitive word of caution for historians: avoid the temptation to publish anniversary pieces. The bar for these pieces is usually quite high and analogies can be tricky. Gibney also urged scholars to refrain from making pieces overly-complex. Instead of trying to on expand on several arguments, choose one and flesh it out completely.

Dahlia Lithwick, a senior editor at *Slate* who writes on the courts and the law, noted that many outlets are actually starved for expert content, despite the flood of material that they receive. Opportunities do exist for historians to enter this space, but obstacles make it difficult for well-researched, thoughtful pieces to be published. The most significant is the pace of publication. As stories break, news outlets find themselves racing to upload content online. Lithwick offered these words of advice: scholars should turn answers around as quickly as possible. When a journalist reaches out, be sure to supply a quote on the spot. You can always follow up with additional details and links. Whenever possible, skip the historiography and put the lede prominently in the first paragraph. Distinguish between mediums; analyses should be tailored to specific platforms and the audiences that use them. The audience for an op-ed is not necessarily the same audience for a podcast, so it is important to experiment with as many formats as possible.

Siva Vaidhyanathan, the Roberston Professor in the Department of Media Studies at the University of Virginia, rounded out the conversation with a warning to historians writing for public consumption: beware of the erosion of credibility, and challenge “the nonsense.” Vaidhyanathan highlighted recent attacks on the norms of reputation and the expertise of scholars in the public sphere. To counter this assault, scholars must be prepared to “be radical” by calling attention to alternative, less credible histories, and to refer their audiences to larger fields of information. In other words, the historian should not only make the reader aware of historical context, but provide audiences with access to more information—offering a larger body of knowledge that might add to the discussion.

Formatting the Message

Putting these lessons into practice can be challenging. Historians must not only navigate professional constraints, but must also develop new muscles. Learning to write for a public audience is often a new skill for those who have built careers on writing for a scholarly audience. Furthermore, with the proliferation of media platforms, challenges abound in deciding how best to get one’s message out. Deciding which platform best suits you and your message is critical.

Facebook

Some scholars choose to have public Facebook pages, while others do not. There are certainly benefits and drawbacks of having a public page. While Facebook can be a good platform to disseminate information and provoke

dialogue, it can also be difficult to manage. Laura Belmonte noted that, much like Twitter, it is important to be aware of your “public” persona on Facebook. One potentially beneficial approach is to offer a “Daily News Summary” on Facebook that includes a discussion of four or five news stories from the day. Always be sure to check the settings on posts so that they can be shared outside of your “friends” list.

Op-eds

Op-eds are perhaps the most common and obvious platform for scholars to engage in broader public discussions. Nicole Hemmer discussed her experience writing and editing op-eds. As the co-editor of the *Washington Post* blog, “Made By History,” she can be reached at madebyhistory@washingtontpost.com. Her advice included the following recommendations:

- Focus on shorter sentences and shorter paragraphs.
- Limit your piece to one argument, using one clear example to illustrate.
- Give the *least* amount of information needed to sustain your argument.
- Remember: op-eds are persuasive forms of writing.
- Avoid the overly-used “5 key takeaways” and “5 analogies” models.
- Time your piece well. Either write it quickly as news breaks, or write a piece and hold it for the “right time.”
- Consider placement. Wonkier pieces might fit better in *The Washington Post*, whereas more developed arguments are better for *The Atlantic*. Don’t be afraid of smaller, local venues.
- Remember: you are selling yourself as a writer to the editor.
- The pitch email should answer the questions: What is your argument? How are you going to make it? Who are you?
- Don’t be afraid of rejection. It will happen.

Hemmer also stressed the inclusion of these elements in a successful op-ed:

1. A passage laying out current thinking: “Conventional wisdom says...”
2. A passage depicting current political positions: “Partisan talking points are...”
3. A nuts and bolts paragraph with an argument.
4. The use of one to three examples in making an argument.

Podcasts

Hemmer is also the co-host of the weekly podcast “Past Present,” which discusses current events in a historical context. Podcasts, she noted, allow scholars to speak more generally about history. Unlike other platforms, they can be speculative or explore historical thinking through

conversation. Podcasts are accessible to a wide range of audiences, including high school students, teachers, and the general public. They also have the potential to reach a much larger audience than a written piece. Hemmer encourages scholars who are interested in podcasts to experiment with the format.

TED talks

Kathryn Statler introduced Professor Niall Ferguson’s TED talk on “The 6 Killer Apps” as an example of the power of the TED talk format. Ferguson was able to reach a broad audience with an easily comprehensible message. TED talks can be captivating, but to be successful, the speaker must be engaging and authoritative. The formula for a good TED talk includes drawing in the audience with a “hook,” posing some key questions, delivering the argument, providing evidence, and giving a twist or “catch” at the end—all in under twenty minutes. This is also a good model to consider when delivering lectures: short and powerful rather than rambling and speculative.

Twitter

Despite its bad reputation with many academics, Twitter can be a valuable platform for scholars. As Hemmer noted, it is both exciting and challenging to communicate an argument in 140 characters. Moreover, it is an effective platform for scholars to disseminate visual sources, including newspaper clips or archival photos. To have an effective Twitter page, scholars should consider their own time management and their use of Twitter when it is most active, usually in the early morning or late afternoon. Other suggestions include:

- Relying on visuals.
- Using a professional or semi-professional picture.
- Connecting a series of tweets in a “Tweet storm” to make a longer argument.
- Regarding Twitter as a form of micro-publishing, and being mindful of everything you say or retweet.
- Using hashtags to find a conversation and to enter it.
- Remembering that editors are on Twitter, too.

Websites

Roger Peace offered his personal website—<http://peacehistory-usfp.org/about/>—as an example of how to provide an alternative learning environment. He has carefully curated an online platform that serves as a history and resource guide for students and the general public on American foreign policy. His site is a good example of how to create a platform to offer resources for those interested in deeper discussions about history.

Lessons and Takeaways

The two-day workshop featured lots of fruitful conversation about the current need for historians to engage with the public, as well as about ways to pursue this type of engagement. Recommendations included the following bullet points:

1. Create a communications task force

SHAFR members might benefit from the creation of a task force or ad hoc committee dedicated to developing public outreach. The members of this task force should be able to leverage their connections with the media or other organizations to disseminate a list of SHAFR experts for various topics. This task force will help to connect SHAFR members to outlets.

2. *Keep the conversation going*

There are several ways to sustain the energy from the workshop. One potential idea is to create a private Facebook group that any interested SHAFR members could join. Members could use this space to suggest ideas for collaboration, work to stay engaged, share connections, and workshop ideas for future SHAFR meetings. There might also be interest in holding at least one workshop on public engagement at each SHAFR conference. Topics might include: op-ed writing 101, how to be a good interviewee, or creating a podcast.

3. *Develop SHAFR platforms*

Opportunities exist for SHAFR to help develop public outreach. For example, SHAFR conferences could feature a Facebook live booth where scholars could sign up for a brief Facebook live session to promote an upcoming book, talk about current research, current events, or participate in a more formal interview. These sessions would not only be shared on Facebook, but could also be broadcast on the SHAFR website or YouTube channel. SHAFR members could also deliver brief, twenty-minute lectures on camera and compile them in a database

that would be made available to all SHAFR members. This resource might be beneficial for use in the classroom. In addition to building out the experts page, SHAFR should cultivate relationships with members of the media so that the experts page is a known resource.

4. *Think globally, act locally*

The *New York Times* might not be the best place to publish an op-ed. Writers should be sure to shop around their pieces to local newspapers. Participate in your community and stay engaged with local news stations, give talks to local organizations, libraries, or museums. Stay engaged on a local level and it will help to develop public engagement.

This workshop, while a resounding success, was just the first step. It is important that SHAFR sustain the energy that brought this group together. Members and historians more generally should recognize that they have a lot to offer in public conversations. If deeper, more thoughtful public engagement is the goal, members will need to develop the necessary skills and tactics.

Notes:

1. Post-truth" was named Oxford Dictionary's International Word of 2016. Oxford defines "post-truth" as relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief." See <https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/press/news/2016/12/11/WOTY-16>.
2. Benedetto Croce, *History, Its Theory and Practice*, trans. Douglas Ainslie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921), 19.

A Review of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Iran, 1951-1954*

Gregory Brew

In June 2017, after a lengthy and somewhat inexplicable delay, the State Department's Office of the Historian published the long-awaited "retrospective" volume on Iran in its venerable *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series. The volume deals with U.S. involvement in the covert operations leading to the coup d'état of August 1953 that toppled the government of Mohammad Mosadeq. That event marked a crucial turning point in U.S.-Iran relations and has been subjected to intense historical analysis.¹ Despite memoirs from intelligence officers involved in the Anglo-American cover operation and the leak of the CIA "secret history" to the *New York Times* in 2000, the U.S. government denied official involvement for years.²

The release of this 1,007-page collection, which includes over three hundred recently or hitherto-classified documents, came with little fanfare and almost no warning. Originally prepared in 2014, the volume was postponed for a number of reasons, some of them linked to the Obama administration's in-progress negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The volume's release has brought renewed interest in the 1953 coup and the 1951-1954 oil nationalization crisis in Iran, both pivotal moments in the early Cold War and incidents of immense importance in modern Iranian history.

In May 1951, Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mosadeq nationalized the country's British-owned oil industry, sparking an international diplomatic crisis involving oil companies, Great Britain, and the United States, which attempted to mediate the dispute. The oil dispute brought on an economic crisis, as a British-backed embargo of Iran's nationalized oil sapped the Mosadeq government of badly needed revenues. After more than two years of fruitless diplomacy, the United States grew concerned that Mosadeq's government was becoming unstable and falling under communist influence.

When a final attempt at negotiating a settlement with Iran failed in early 1953, the Eisenhower administration decided to remove Mosadeq from power through covert action. In August, the CIA, working with anti-Mosadeq elements and the British intelligence services, engineered a coup d'état that removed Mosadeq from power. They replaced him with a new regime built around Iran's king, or shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The original FRUS volume covering U.S. relations with Iran in the early 1950s was released in 1989.³ That document collection covered the oil negotiations between the United States, Great Britain and Iran, yet omitted any mention of the CIA's involvement in the August 1953 coup. Other documents were heavily edited to protect the reputations of U.S. officials, particularly the ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson. The FRUS publication was condemned as a "fraud" by historian Bruce Kuniholm.⁴ Allegations that the volume had been compiled in a way that clearly obscured the true course of events eventually compelled Congress to pass new legislation in 1991, mandating that all subsequent

FRUS volumes offer "a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy."

As a "retrospective" volume, the new FRUS work should be read in conjunction with the 1989 documents. It focuses on covert operations, the role of the CIA, and U.S. actions inside Iran, rather than the oil dispute, which is covered in detail by the original volume. While the new volume largely confirms much of the existing consensus on the coup, and while it comes with several significant omissions, it nevertheless contributes considerable background detail to the events of these years. It fleshes out the decision-making processes of the U.S. government in the days leading up to the coup, both in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The volume also contains documents related to other U.S. activities in Iran. They indicate that the United States had a much larger role in Iranian politics before and after the coup than has often been assumed.

The inclusion of numerous CIA documents is the new FRUS volume's strongest contribution to the historical record. The volume indicates a strong antipathy for Mosadeq within the CIA from 1951 onwards. Allen W. Dulles and Kermit Roosevelt both argued that Mosadeq should be removed, and the Office of National Estimates argued that a "semi-dictatorial" regime led by the shah could reverse nationalization and allow the British oil company to remain in Iran.⁵ Throughout 1952, as the U.S. government attempted to negotiate a settlement to the oil crisis, officials within the CIA doubted the ability of the Mosadeq regime to maintain Iran's internal stability and a pro-Western orientation. CIA consultants such as Max W. Thornburg, an oil executive with extensive experience in Iranian politics, advised the agency to back the shah over the National Front, Mosadeq's political coalition. Thornburg argued that Iran did not need a "democratic government" but rather a "stable government . . . capable of responsible behavior." Mosadeq's inability to agree to an oil settlement offered proof that he was too "irresponsible" to be allowed to govern Iran.⁶

The FRUS volume contains documents relating specifically to the August 1953 operation, code-named TPAJAX. Many of these documents were transcribed by hand from microfilms and, according to the volume's preface, constitute the only remaining operational records. The rest were destroyed in the early 1960s. The documents confirm that the CIA used agents inside Iran to engineer a military coup led by General Fazlollah Zahedi. After a failed attempt on August 16, the agency's operatives inside Iran, including coup architect Kermit Roosevelt, pressed on and succeeded in toppling Mosadeq on August 19.⁷

While the documents included in the new FRUS volume shed light on operational details of the August coup, they chiefly corroborate existing accounts, including recent contributions by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Fakhreddin Azimi.⁸ Although Iranian forces, particularly those aligned with General Zahedi, were keen to oust Mosadeq, the documents indicate that CIA operations were crucial in

preparing the way for the coup to succeed. CIA-sponsored propaganda and targeted bribery had been eroding support for Mosadeq for months before the coup. Zahedi and his son Ardeshir, who later served as Iran's ambassador to the United States, were handled by the CIA and the U.S. Embassy throughout the coup, while the agency's operatives worked diligently to disseminate the shah's *firman*, a document pronouncing Mosadeq's government to be illegitimate.⁹ The documents indicate that the shah was intensely reluctant to support the coup for months before August but that the United States was willing to carry out the operation against Mosadeq without him, if necessary.¹⁰

Along with TPAJAX, the *FRUS* volume contains documents relating to other CIA covert campaigns inside Iran. Several years before the nationalization of the oil industry, the agency began operations designed to prevent Iran's communist organization, the Tudeh Party, from increasing its influence. The operation to block the spread of the Tudeh, code-named TPBEDAMN, was carried out through the dissemination of "black" propaganda, the infiltration of Tudeh networks and the gathering of intelligence related to Tudeh activities. The network of assets in place was then utilized to carry out the coup of August 1953. Anti-Tudeh operations shifted towards undermining the Mosadeq regime.¹¹

In addition to TPBEDAMN, the CIA ran a "stay-behind" operation inside Iran. In the event that a Tudeh-controlled government took over in Tehran, the CIA had plans to train and arm Iran's Qashqai tribesmen.¹² One document in this volume indicates that the agency was stockpiling arms to distribute among the Qashqai, who were anti-communist, should a Tudeh government emerge in the capital.¹³ By March 1953, the CIA reported to the National Security Council (NSC) that it had the capability "to supply a 10,000-man guerrilla force for six months without resupply."¹⁴

This volume also sheds further light on the activities of the U.S. Embassy, particularly its participation in Iranian politics during the Mosadeq period. Ambassador Loy Henderson emerges as an important figure, particularly during February 1953, when he intervened personally in a dispute between the shah and Mosadeq and convinced Iran's monarch to remain in the country.¹⁵

In July 1952, Mosadeq was replaced as prime minister by Ahmed Qavam, a conservative politician, only to return to power days later on the back of immense popular support from street crowds. While the 1989 volume included no documents that dealt with this episode, known as 30 Tir after its date on the Iranian calendar, the new *FRUS* indicates that the United States supported Qavam and planned on delivering emergency financial aid to his government.¹⁶ Henderson indicated to the shah in May 1952 that Mosadeq's "retirement" would be necessary for Iran to reach an oil settlement.¹⁷ Qavam's failure to hold on to power and prevent Mosadeq's resurgence was blamed on the shah's "vacillation."¹⁸

Based on these new documents, the July episode emerges as a pivotal point for the United States. It was then that it became clear that an alternative to Mosadeq would not emerge from the Iranian political class. The United States needed a more active policy. For the rest of 1952, U.S. officials worked hard to settle the oil dispute between Iran and Great Britain, but when those attempts ended in failure, the Eisenhower administration decided to remove Mosadeq by covert action.

Precisely when this decision was made remains a mystery: there is no smoking gun in the new *FRUS*

collection, no record of a meeting between Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles or CIA Director Allen Dulles that indicates when covert action became the preferred course. There are clues, however, in the records of two NSC meetings, which appear in un-redacted form.¹⁹ During the first meeting on March 4 Eisenhower appears determined to reach an oil settlement or furnish Mosadeq with economic aid to prevent his government's collapse. But when the NSC reconvened on March 11, the president was much more skeptical of the prime minister and more inclined to listen to John Foster Dulles, who advocated for Mosadeq's removal. Based on a close reading of these documents and other sources, it would appear likely that the coup decision was made shortly thereafter, in mid-to-late March 1953.

This volume shows clearly that it was fear of communism that drove the United States to unseat Mosadeq. However, oil was not a secondary concern. Forcing Iran to reach an oil settlement with Britain was a central component of American policy. Without a settlement, the pressures on Iran's economy made increasing communist influence more of a

threat. It was widely feared that an economic "collapse" would presage the rise of a Tudeh- or Soviet-controlled regime, though how long that would take was subject to debate. As soon as Zahedi was installed as prime minister, Secretary of State Dulles indicated that the new problem "was how to develop revenues for Iran out of her oil." The coup itself did not erase the communist threat to Iran, as the oil question remained of "paramount importance in the immediate welfare of Iran."²⁰ Thus, oil and communism were *both* crucial components in the coup of August 1953.

This *FRUS* volume is not without its flaws. There remains no mention of British involvement in the August 1953 coup, despite the clear evidence that has emerged tying the British intelligence services to TPAJAX. It had been British policy since the May 1951 nationalization to remove Mosadeq from power, yet repeated attempts to do so through Iran's political system, including the Qavam episode in July 1952, had been unsuccessful. The British Embassy in Iran was closed in October. Shortly thereafter, the British forwarded a memo to the United States entitled "The Communist Danger in Persia."²¹ Having failed to remove Mosadeq themselves, the British now attempted to enlist the support of the Americans by convincing them that Mosadeq's regime was accelerating Iran's fall to communism.

Two recently discovered documents from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, published by the National Security Archive, reveal for the first time a British entreaty to the United States from late 1952, suggesting that Mosadeq could be removed via an engineered coup d'état.²² The two documents are referenced in the new *FRUS* but do not appear. Why they were not included is not altogether clear, though it would appear likely that the British government, which has yet to admit to any involvement in the August 1953 coup, requested they be excluded.

While the long-awaited retrospective volume comes with some notable omissions, and largely confirms an existing scholarly consensus on the coup rather than offering any bombshell revelations, it nevertheless provides a welcome resource. Read in conjunction with the original *FRUS* volume from 1989, it offers a fairly complete picture of the 1953 *coup d'état* and will prove immensely useful for scholars who continue to study this critical event, which continues to inform how the United States and Iran view one another seventy years later.

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Notes:

1. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *Mohammed Mossaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (Syracuse, NY, 2004). A few more recent works on the coup included Ali Rahnema, *Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, Spooks* (Cambridge, UK, 2015); Ervand Abrahamian, *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations* (New York, 2013).
2. The best known are Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran* (New York, 1979); and C.M. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured* (London, 1982). One of the CIA's official histories of the coup was leaked in its entirety in 2000 and is available online on the *National Security Archive* website. See "The Secret CIA history of the Iran Coup, 1953," *National Security Archive*, November 29, 2000, <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/>.
3. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. X, Iran, 1951–1954*, ed. Carl N. Raether and Charles S. Sampson (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) (hereafter, *FRUS*).
4. Bruce Kuniholm, "Foreign Relations, Public Relations, Accountability, and Understanding," *Perspectives* (May–June 1990):1–12, <http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/1990/9005/9005NOTE1.cfm>.
5. *FRUS, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954*, ed. James C. Van Hook (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2017), Docs. 20, 25, 26, 28.
6. *Ibid.*, Docs. 116, 118.
7. *Ibid.*, Docs. 169–308; see Docs. 280–295 for the events of August 19.
8. Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'État in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19:3 (August 1987): 261–86; Fakhreddin Azimi, "The Overthrow of the Government of Mosaddeq Reconsidered," *Iranian Studies* 45:5 (September 2012): 693–712.
9. *FRUS, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954* (2017), Docs. 266, 269, 274.
10. *Ibid.*, Doc. 280.
11. See Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup in Iran," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15:4 (Fall 2013): 4–24.
12. For details, see *FRUS, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954* (2017), Doc. 40.
13. *Ibid.*, Doc. 105.
14. *Ibid.*, Doc. 180.
15. *Ibid.*, Docs. 157–67. Henderson's role in this episode was left purposefully vague in the 1989 *FRUS* volume, but it is clear in the new volume that he directly intervened in the shah's favor in the political competition between the shah and Mosaddeq.
16. *FRUS, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954* (2017), Docs. 84, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91.
17. *Ibid.*, Doc. 75.
18. *Ibid.*, Doc. 96.
19. *Ibid.*, Docs. 171, 176.
20. *Ibid.*, Docs. 304, 326.
21. *Ibid.*, Doc. 133.
22. National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1950–54, Central Decimal File, 788.00/11-2652 and 788.00/12-352. See "1953 Iran Coup: New U.S. Documents Confirm British Approached U.S. in Late 1952 About Ousting Mosaddeq," *National Security Archive*, August 8, 2017, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late>.

Book Reviews

Review of Andrew Johnstone and Andrew Priest, eds., *US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017)

Brian McNamara

In recent years, some members of our field have called for historians of American foreign relations to focus more clearly on issues of politics and “more traditional political explanations” in our work. Along with Kenneth Osgood, former SHAFR president Fred Logevall wrote an essay for the *New York Times* in 2016 asking why American colleges and universities had stopped teaching political history. For those historians who yearn for the rigorous consideration of politics alongside the study of foreign relations, Andrew Johnstone and Andrew Priest’s new edited collection, *US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy*, will come as a welcome corrective. Detailed in its scholarship and impressive in its chronological scope, the volume sets a baseline for the consideration of the reciprocal relationship between presidential elections and foreign policy from 1940 until 1992, while asking new questions that open up fruitful avenues for future study.

The editors make the historiographical and methodological stakes clear in a cogently written introductory essay. Johnstone and Priest identify a “persistent lack of attention to the relationship between foreign policy and American presidential elections . . . in both popular attitudes and scholarly studies” (1). They lament this lacuna, noting that “foreign policy concerns have been central to American national life since 1940” (4), and they set forth in this volume to help remedy the situation.

The contributors to this volume share Johnstone and Priest’s ability to clearly explain what the stakes are and what contributions their essays make. Two essays in particular, those by Andrew Johnstone on 1940 and Thomas Schwartz on 1972, force us to fundamentally reconsider the role that foreign policy played in deciding the presidential elections of those years. But the contributors to this volume do not endeavor to fit square pegs into round holes. Essays on the 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections, while attempting to differentiate the role of foreign policy from other factors, all make it clear that it was far from a decisive or even a prominent issue.

US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy also raises a number of questions that will no doubt help guide future studies of the relationship between those two subjects. The first is a historiographical question. While the editors note that little sustained scholarly study has considered presidential elections and foreign policy together (highlighting Robert Divine’s 1974 work *Foreign Policy and US Presidential Elections* as a rare exception), in his concluding essay, Robert David Johnson argues that our field once paid greater attention to politics before “race, gender, ethnicity, and other such questions” worked to restrict “the sort of topics that fit into mainstream diplomatic history” (344–5).

He highlights especially Ernest May’s work on the Monroe Doctrine as an example of this earlier sort of history.

While this reviewer would argue that the cultural turn had an expansive rather than chilling effect on our field, Johnson does raise a different and valuable question that this study largely ignores: how have studies of pre-1940 foreign relations treated electoral politics? This is not to suggest that Johnstone and Priest’s chronologically ambitious volume should have extended even further into the past, but rather to point out that its conception of U.S. history, and consequently, the historiography with which it engages, seems to begin at 1940. The space between Johnstone and Priest’s view of the field and Johnson’s would allow for fruitful comparisons about methodology and change over time when we study presidential elections and foreign policy. In other words: even though this volume starts in 1940, what insights might it have drawn about its own time period by considering the work of scholars who focus on earlier eras?

The other major questions that this volume raises are intertwined. How do we define a presidential election and how do we measure its effects on foreign policy? In an era in which the incumbent president has already staged numerous re-election rallies less than a year into his term, the first question has become ever more important. Indeed, while some of the essays in this collection limit their analyses to the months leading up to the election, the most effective essays consider a broader swath of time. Thomas Schwartz’s essay on the 1972 election begins at the 1970 midterms and considers how the packaging and presentation of Nixon’s foreign policy—and most especially, his use of Henry Kissinger as a special envoy—was aimed at positioning Nixon as a “peace” candidate. Steven Casey, meanwhile, considers the factors that shifted what was likely to be a Truman-Taft election in 1952 to a contest between Stevenson and Eisenhower and looks at how the election forced Eisenhower to maintain the Cold War consensus in his early months as president.

The question of gauging impact is a difficult one. As Thomas Tunstall Allcock avers in his chapter on the 1964 election, “accurately judging the impact of various issues is all but impossible” (155). Some of Allcock’s fellow authors seem to agree with him. They focus mostly on a factual, almost narrative recounting of their particular campaign in a way that makes it clear that foreign policy was a point of discussion, but harder to know where they draw their conclusions about the impact of foreign policy from.

As I have indicated, impact is also tied to the question of chronology. The essays with a more capacious chronological scope are the ones that best make clear the reciprocal relationship between foreign policy and presidential elections, because they allow for the consideration of a broader range of events and themes. For example, Allcock’s idea of “ambivalent impact” helps to situate his study of LBJ’s foreign policy toward Vietnam and Panama alongside the influence of the “daisy” advertisement in 1964 (156). Meanwhile, Sandra Scanlon’s treatment of the Vietnam War as a “domestic social issue” allows her to draw out how the conduct of the war influenced both parties’ choice of candidates and their policy positions

in 1968 (182). Throughout the volume, the recurring idea of “statesmanship”—defined most simply as whether or not a presidential candidate possesses the prudence and intelligence to earn the public’s trust with the power of the office, particularly in the nuclear era—provides a welcome concept with which to measure the impact of foreign policy on elections and vice versa.

In sum, Johnstone and Priest have provided readers with a comprehensive volume that sets out a clear baseline for the relationship between U.S. presidential elections and foreign policy. The contributions to this volume not only make their historiographical interventions clear, they also raise questions that will force us to continue to consider closely the relationship between politics and foreign relations in future scholarship.

Review of Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., *Trust, but Verify: The Politics of Uncertainty and the Transformation of the Cold War Order, 1969–1991* (Washington, D.C. and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2016)

Stephanie Freeman

T*rust, but Verify* is a collection of essays that considers the ways in which trust and distrust shaped the second half of the Cold War. Although its title is taken from Ronald Reagan’s oft-repeated translation of the Russian proverb “doveryai, no proveryai,” this volume seeks to move beyond an examination of the personal relationship between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, which has received significant attention in the literature on trust and distrust during the Cold War.¹ It accomplishes this aim by considering the attempts of other world leaders to foster trust with their adversaries or allies and looking at European and American public attitudes about the trustworthiness of foreign governments. Some of the essays also examine the role of trust in the multilateral Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations and the relationship between trust and verification in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations.

The book is divided into four parts. The first section features three essays that consider trust-building efforts between individual leaders. Sergey Radchenko demonstrates that the growing mistrust between Chinese and Soviet leaders in the 1950s and 1960s prompted the two sides to misread each other’s intentions during the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, resulting in a war scare. Sarah B. Snyder convincingly argues that Reagan’s promise to refrain from “crowing” about improvements in the Soviet human rights record enabled him to build trust with Gorbachev and facilitated Soviet concessions on human rights.

In the last essay of this section, J. Simon Rofe emphasizes the important role that trust-building played in George H. W. Bush’s foreign policy. Dismissing the criticism that Bush pursued an excessively cautious foreign policy and missed opportunities for greater cooperation with the Soviet Union, particularly during his first year in the White House, Rofe argues that “the Bush administration failed to trust Moscow to the degree that would have seen further improvements of substance in relations between the two

superpowers and former adversaries” (65–6). Yet Rofe does not evaluate whether Bush’s skepticism of Gorbachev’s trustworthiness in 1989 was reasonable, especially in light of Soviet announcements of unilateral reductions in conventional and tactical nuclear forces and Gorbachev’s support for freedom of choice in Europe.

The second part of the book consists of three essays that examine the SALT, CSCE, and INF talks and analyze the role of trust in negotiations between the blocs. The four essays that constitute the third section of the book focus on trust within the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Jens Gieseke traces East Germans’ views on the trustworthiness of East German, Soviet, and West German leaders, and Jens Boysen illuminates the distrust that existed between the German Democratic Republic and Poland throughout the Cold War. Noël Bonhomme and Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol show that the G7 and European Council summits aimed to build trust among Western leaders and in the Western liberal capitalist system. Reinhild Kreis convincingly demonstrates that the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany launched elaborate public diplomacy programs in the 1980s to create familiarity between Americans and West Germans in order to rebuild trust and repair their deteriorating relationship. The fourth and final part of the book examines the ways in which trust and distrust shaped the foreign policies of small and neutral states. It features two essays, the first focusing on Denmark and Greece, the second on Switzerland.

One of the most interesting arguments raised in this volume is that efforts by the Soviets and the Americans to build trust and improve their relationship often prompted heightened distrust and strained relations within NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In an excellent essay on the CSCE talks, Michael Cotey Morgan demonstrates that many West European officials did not trust the Nixon administration to work with them to secure Soviet commitments to confidence-building measures and the free movement of people and ideas.

These West European diplomats feared that their American allies would undercut Western priorities in the CSCE negotiations as part of the Nixon administration’s efforts to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. When Henry Kissinger did pursue backchannel deals with the Soviets during the CSCE talks and pressured the allies to accept compromises on freer movement and confidence-building measures, the West Europeans were livid.

Effie G. H. Pedaliu convincingly shows that the superpower détente initially contributed to a growing distrust of the United States among the Danes and the Greeks. Located on NATO’s flanks, Denmark and Greece felt acutely vulnerable to a Soviet attack and feared that the U.S. pursuit of détente would undermine American willingness to safeguard Danish and Greek interests. Boysen demonstrates that Gorbachev’s pursuit of improved relations with the United States and advocacy of a defensive military doctrine and unilateral arms reduction led East German officials to distrust the Soviets. East German leaders feared a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, as they recognized it would threaten the survival of their communist regime. While this volume nicely illuminates the distrust that emerged within NATO and the Warsaw Pact during periods of superpower détente, it does not examine how U.S. or Soviet officials handled their allies’ misgivings while continuing to build trust with the adversary.

The editors write that this collection aims “to

demonstrate the usefulness of 'trust' and 'distrust' as fundamental categories in explaining the Cold War and its demise from the early 1970s to 1990–91 by looking at specific historical cases" (11). The book's subtitle also suggests that there is a relationship between trust-building efforts and the "transformation of the Cold War order." Yet this volume does not offer a clear thesis to explain the role that trust played in the Cold War's endgame. While it might be tempting to argue that increasing levels of trust between U.S. and Soviet leaders led to the Cold War's end, the reality was more complicated.

Although Reagan and Gorbachev developed a trusting relationship that enabled them to reverse the nuclear arms race, the Cold War ended during Bush's presidency. As Rofe acknowledges, for most of his first year as president, Bush was skeptical of Gorbachev's dedication to reform, and he did not begin to build trust with the Soviet leader until the December 1989 Malta summit (69). By that point, Gorbachev already had completed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and refused to intervene militarily to stop the East European revolutions. In other words, Gorbachev took dramatic steps to end the Cold War before he had established a trusting relationship with Bush.

Nevertheless, this book makes an important contribution to scholars' recent efforts to consider the role of emotions in the history of U.S. foreign relations.² Rather than simply examining trust as a goal or a strategy for achieving other Cold War objectives, the contributors also analyze the emotional dimension of trust. Gieseke convincingly demonstrates that East Germans felt a strong emotional connection with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt that facilitated the development of intense trust in the West German government among ordinary East Germans. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Joshua Baker, and Laura Considine show that the emotional bonds that Gorbachev forged with Reagan during their summit meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik prompted him to view the U.S. president as trustworthy and made him willing to offer the concessions that enabled the two leaders to conclude the INF Treaty. This examination of the impact that the emotions of trust and distrust had on foreign policy and public attitudes from 1969 through 1991 makes this volume a useful addition to the literature on the late Cold War and the scholarship on the history of emotions.

Notes:

1. See, for example, Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ, 2005); Tuomas Forsberg, "Power, Interests and Trust: Explaining Gorbachev's Choices at the End of the Cold War," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 4 (1999): 603–21; and Deborah Welch Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 1997).

2. Efforts from this decade include Frank Costigliola, "'I React Intensely to Everything': Russia and the Frustrated Emotions of George F. Kennan, 1933–1958," *Journal of American History* 102, no. 4 (2016): 1075–1101; Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ, 2012); and Barbara Keys, "Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman," *Diplomatic History* 35, no. 4 (2011): 587–609.

Review of Michael F. Hopkins, *Dean Acheson and the Obligations of Power* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017)

John McNay

Michael F. Hopkins's new book, which is part of Rowman & Littlefield's *Biographies in American Foreign Policy Series*, is an important contribution to the historiography of the early Cold War. Its meticulous research and analysis of the documentary record provides additional clarity to Dean G. Acheson's diplomatic design. Hopkins is to be commended in covering so much of Acheson's life and career in this slim volume, which runs to only 263 pages of text and notes.

In his introduction, Hopkins writes that he has three objectives in this book. He wants first to try to "understand Acheson as a man, his character, talents, emotional baggage, his social attitudes, and his ideas about government and foreign affairs—especially his perspectives on America's place in the world" (xiii). He also wants to recreate a sense of contemporary opinion and to consider Acheson's thinking in that context. And finally, he aims to scrutinize the evolving framework of foreign policymaking during Acheson's involvement in it. The book largely succeeds in these objectives.

Hopkins briefly covers Acheson's development as a young man and his education at Yale University and Harvard Law School before moving quickly to his government service. He outlines in great detail the role Acheson played in the Treasury Department and at State before he became secretary of state. These years were an important and formative experience that is sometimes overlooked by historians, and it is here that this fine book makes perhaps its strongest contribution.

Acheson had resigned from an early role in Roosevelt's Treasury Department over a currency devaluation dispute, but he rendered assistance from his private legal practice on the destroyers-for-bases deal by contributing to the legal argument that justified the arrangement. He thereby gained FDR's favorable attention. In February 1941 he joined the State Department. Hopkins's research skills are on display as he carefully lays out a paper trail to illustrate how several particular policy decisions came about through Acheson's efforts. Early on, for example, he reviews how Acheson worked on trade restrictions against Japan and Germany, how he was involved with negotiations with Lord Keynes over Lend-Lease details, how he played an important role in negotiations over the UNRRA and the World Bank, and how he helped reorganize the State Department.

The death of FDR opened more opportunities for Acheson. President Harry Truman's first two secretaries of state, James Byrnes and George Marshall, traveled a great deal, and in their absence Acheson seized the moment and took on an enormous amount of authority. Hopkins quotes Acheson's good friend Archibald MacLeish as saying that Acheson showed "remarkable personal growth" during this period. "He took on a style and a stature I had not expected," MacLeish said (62).

Chief among Acheson's accomplishments during this period was the role he played in the early Cold War crisis with the Soviet Union over the Turkish Straits. It was Acheson who drafted a strong reply to the Soviets, endorsed by Truman, over the pressure they were applying to Turkey, and it was he who encouraged Truman to send additional

naval forces to join the USS *Missouri* in the Dardanelles.

A particularly strong section of the book outlines Acheson's role in the drafting of the Truman Doctrine speech and describes his important contribution to the policy. Acheson inserted the line during the drafting that is at the heart of the doctrine: "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to give support to free peoples who are attempting to resist subjugation by armed minorities and outside forces." Some would argue that it is the lack of limits in that statement that provided the grounds for the future militarization of the Cold War as well as the extension of the conflict into areas and activities not imagined by policymakers in 1946.

Acheson took control of the State Department in 1949 as Truman's secretary of state. Hopkins outlines how he hired key figures and came to a clear understanding on how best to serve Truman. The president did not want to make foreign policy in the White House. "He wanted close consultation and the right to make decisions," Hopkins writes (99).

Hopkins reviews most of the high points and conflicts of Acheson's period in power and details how he sought to create a foreign policy built on "situations of strength." The section regarding the NATO treaty is particularly revealing of Acheson's ability to negotiate creative solutions.

There is much to praise in a book that so succinctly covers so many complex issues, but Hopkins often seems reluctant to point to errors in judgment or understanding. In the colonial world, for example, Acheson usually pursued policies that tied American actions to supporting local imperial powers, thereby burdening the United States with discredited or collapsing regimes and allowing Americans to inherit the resentment of imperialism. Others in the State Department criticized this approach—no one more than the ambassador to Iran, Henry Grady. But Hopkins dismisses Grady's powerful first-hand critique that Acheson was too wedded to defending British imperial interests.

However, Acheson's consistent dismissal of indigenous nationalism in various parts of the world is a fact that needs to be confronted. Acheson's ardent support for the white-minority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa in his last years is not the aberration of age that Hopkins suggests but is actually quite consistent with his earlier policies and attitudes, despite the evidence of his moderate attitude on domestic civil rights. At the end of Acheson's term as secretary, various crises were underway across the former colonial world that a U.S. policy of cooperating with the colonial powers may well have worsened.¹

Hopkins also praises Acheson at several points for his skill at working with Congress. Yet Acheson badly miscalculated the impact of the China Paper, which outraged rather than soothed his congressional opponents. And then there is the Korean War. As General Douglas MacArthur crossed the 38th parallel, advanced to the Yalu and dismissed warnings of a Chinese invasion, Acheson did nothing to try to rein him in. Acheson was famous for standing up to bullies in Congress and elsewhere, yet he failed to lead at this crucial point, and Hopkins offers little criticism of him.

Hopkins closes the book with a powerful conclusion that deftly explains how Acheson understood the use of power. In several sections, Hopkins demonstrates how Acheson grew through his experience and developed some key principles that drove him toward an engaged and active diplomatic strategy. Hopkins argues that this

gradual change came partly from Acheson's perception of threats but also from the belief "that American power brought an obligation to act. His motivation owed more to a desire for stability than anti-communism. And he believed that American leadership should be in pursuit of important goals, not just the exercise of power" (259).

Hopkins repeatedly notes throughout the study that Acheson's understanding of history drove his understanding of the world. "Acheson favored continued engagement because of his wider concerns for the state of the world," he argues (259). But Acheson realized that American leadership in pursuit of key principles would work only if it was based on cooperation with other countries. "The collaboration was more than simply a means to an end. He wanted allies to trust American leaders" (261).

In 2017, when American foreign policy seems devoid of principles and even competence, Acheson gives us hope that the country may still be capable of generating his kind of sophisticated leadership.

Note:

1. For more on Acheson's admiration for empire see Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* (New York, 2006) 639-40; Robert J. McMahon, *Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order* (Potomac, MD, 2009), 215-16; John T. McNay, *Acheson and Empire: The British Accent in American Foreign Policy* (Columbia, MO, 2001).

Review of John R. Haddad, *America's First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013)

Thomas H. Cox

Unlike previous accounts, however, Haddad's book discusses the expedition from the perspective of Samuel Shaw, Continental Army veteran, merchant and supercargo for the *Empress*. Haddad describes the efforts by Shaw and his backers not just to clear a profit or establish diplomatic relations with the Qing Empire, but also to help project the power and influence of the young American nation abroad.

Untangling the complex web of commercial, diplomatic and personal ties that characterized early Sino-American relations has always represented a daunting task. Progressive Era historians such as Sydney Greenbie and Foster Rhea Dulles focused on the exploits of dashing American merchant princes who pursued profits in the Far East to secure rank and station back home. More recently, scholars such as Jacques

Downs, James Fichter, Kendall Johnson and Paul Van Dyke have brought a variety of techniques—cultural history, risk theory, literary criticism—to bear on our understanding of the roles of American merchants and missionaries in the Middle Kingdom.

A decade ago, John R. Haddad's first book, *The Romance of China: Excursions to China in U.S. Culture, 1776-1876* (2005), constituted a pathbreaking work in an emerging field dubbed the "Pacific World." It examined early Americans' perceptions of China. By contrast, his current volume, *America's First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation*, seeks to "address the larger historical, economic, and religious forces driving American activity . . . through the lens of individual lives" (2). It represents an important, if at times uneven, contribution to our understanding of U.S.-Chinese relations from the 1780s to the 1870s.

Haddad sketches biographies of leading American merchants, missionaries, mercenaries, and diplomats and, to a much lesser extent, their Chinese counterparts. He begins his work by recounting the well-known voyage of the *Empress of China*, the first American ship to journey to China after the Revolution. Unlike previous accounts, however, Haddad's book discusses the expedition from the perspective of Samuel Shaw, Continental Army veteran, merchant and supercargo for the *Empress*. Haddad describes

the efforts by Shaw and his backers not just to clear a profit or establish diplomatic relations with the Qing Empire, but also to help project the power and influence of the young American nation abroad.

Similarly, Haddad uses the life of merchant Thomas Perkins to discuss the often cutthroat tactics by which American merchant houses, most notably Perkins & Company, established themselves in the port city of Canton. Chapter 3 captures the frustration of John Jacob Astor as he attempted to find American trade goods that would fetch a competitive price in China. A subsequent chapter on American missionaries in China likewise reveals the influence of American-style evangelical millennialism on the rise of Hong Xiuquan and his "Kingdom of Heavenly Peace."

Chapter 5, entitled "Rising on Smoke: Opium and Identity in Canton," is the strongest portion of the monograph. Although centering on well-known opium traders like Robert Bennet Forbes and William Low, it also investigates the ways in which American merchants D.W.C. Olyphant and Nathan Dunn successfully cultivated respect and business opportunities with Chinese hong merchants and officials precisely because they took a moral stand against the opium trade. Thus, as Haddad shrewdly observes, "one group sold opium and another protested its sale; yet all Americans viewed opium as indispensable to their plans to self-actualize" (111).

Chapter 6 provides an engaging account of the drafting of the Treaty of Wanghsia, the first formal treaty between the Qing and American governments. Haddad examines the creation of the treaty through the eyes of Caleb Cushing, the American envoy to China, and shows

how Cushing used the treaty negotiations to push for the rights of American expatriates in China. However, he also showcases Cushing's views of America as a dynamic, growing nation whose future lay in carving out territories and spheres of commercial interest throughout Asia. The following chapter reveals the ways in which both American missionaries such as David Abeel and businessmen like Edward Cunningham attempted to create Cushing's vision of a rapidly modernizing China under American technical and spiritual guidance.

Surprisingly, Haddad's discussion of American involvement in the Taiping Rebellion proves somewhat anticlimactic. Although Haddad accurately chronicles the lives of Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan and American mercenary-turned-Qing-general Frederick Townsend Ward, his depiction of these two men is almost entirely based on well-known secondary accounts. It thus provides no new insights on how these essential figures viewed one another or China in general.

Although much of his work deals with a century of cultural misunderstanding, missed strategic opportunities, and economic exploitation between Americans and Chinese, Haddad ends his book on a hopeful note. He cites the influence of early American sojourners in China as creating the infrastructure and perceptions that future generations of Americans would use to establish full-blown diplomatic relations with the Middle Kingdom. Above all, these early Americans tantalized ordinary Chinese with the possibilities inherent in the cultivation of closer relations with the United States. That fascination continues to define Sino-American relations to this day.



Professional Notes

Todd Bennett and **Luke Nichter** won 2017-2018 Public Scholar Awards from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The award supports well-researched books in the humanities aimed at a broad public audience.

Patrick Chung accepted a position as Assistant Professor of History at the University of North Florida.



Recent Books of Interest

Aldous, Richard. *Schlesinger: The Imperial Historian*, (W.W. Norton, 2017).

Ambrose, Matthew J. *The Control Agenda: A History of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*, (Cornell, 2018).

Asselin, Pierre. *Vietnam's American War: A History*, (Cambridge, 2017).

Berk, van den Jorrit. *Becoming a Good Neighbor among Dictators: the U.S. Foreign Service in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Blaustein, George. *Nightmare Envoy and Other Stories: American Culture and European Reconstruction*, (Oxford, 2018).

Blumenau, Bernhard, Jussi Hahnimaki, and Barbara Zanchetta, eds. *New Perspectives on the End of the Cold War: Unexpected Transformations*, (Routledge, 2018).

Bowman, Stephen. *The Pilgrims Society and Public Diplomacy, 1895-1945*, (Edinburgh, 2018).

Braithwaite, Rodric. *Armageddon and Paranoia: Nuclear Confrontation from 1945 to the Present*, (Oxford, 2018).

Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. *Empire in Retreat: The Past, Present, and Future of the United States*, (Yale, 2018).

Burk, Kathleen. *The Lion and the Eagle: The Interaction of the British and American Empires, 1783-1972*, (Bloomsbury, 2018).

Burke, Colin B. *America's Information Wars: The Untold Story of Information Systems in America's Conflicts and Politics from World War II to the Internet Age*, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

Cabrita, Joel. *The People's Zion: Southern Africa, the United States, and a Transatlantic Faith-Healing Movement*, (Harvard, 2018).

Chua, Daniel Wei Boon. *US-Singapore Relations, 1965-1975: Strategic Non-Alignment in the Cold War*, (Singapore, 2017).

Curtis, Heather D. *Holy Humanitarians: American Evangelicals and Global Aid*, (Harvard, 2018).

D'Haeseleer, Brian. *The Salvadoran Crucible: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency in El Salvador, 1979-1992*, (Kansas, 2017).

DeRoche, Andy. *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States and Southern Africa*, (Bloomsbury, 2017).

Dickinson, Edward Ross. *The World in the Long Twentieth Century: An Interpretive History*, (California, 2018).

Dunn, David. *Rethinking Transatlanticism*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Dunn, Susan. *A Blueprint for War: FDR and the Hundred Days That Mobilized America*, (Yale, 2018).

Elgindy, Khaled. *Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians, from Balfour to Obama*, (Brookings, 2017).

Engerman, David C. *The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India*, (Harvard, 2018).

Fenzel, Michael R. *No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War*, (Stanford, 2017).

Ford, Eugene. *Cold War Monks: Buddhism and America's Secret Strategy in Southeast Asia*, (Yale, 2017).

Frymer, Paul. *Building an American Empire: The Era of Territorial and Political Expansion*, (Princeton, 2017).

Galambos, Louis. *Eisenhower: Becoming the Leader of the Free World*, (Johns Hopkins, 2017).

Gobat, Michel. *Empire by Invitation: William Walker and Manifest Destiny in Central America*, (Harvard, 2018).

Grant, Nicholas. *Winning Our Freedoms Together: African Americans and Apartheid, 1945-1960*, (UNC, 2017).

Grimm, Kevin E. *America Enters the Cold War: The Road to Global Commitment*, (Routledge, 2017).

Hammond, Andrew. *Struggles for Freedom: Afghanistan and US Foreign Policy Since 1979*, (Edinburgh, 2018).

Hitchcock, William I. *The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s*, (Simon & Schuster, 2018).

Immerwahr, Daniel. *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development*, (Harvard, 2018).

Judge, Edward H. and John W. Langdon. *The Cold War Through Documents: A Global History*, 3rd ed, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

Kahin, Audrey, and George Kahin. *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, (Washington, 2018).

Kaplan, Lawrence. *Harold Stassen: Eisenhower, The Cold War, and the Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament*, (Kentucky, 2018).

Kidd, Geraldine. *Eleanor Roosevelt: Palestine, Israel, and Human Rights*, (Routledge, 2017).

Kurtz-Phelan, Daniel. *The China Mission: George C. Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947*, (W.W. North, 2018).

Latner, Teishan A. *Cuban Revolution in America: Havana and the Making of a United States Left, 1968-1990*, (UNC, 2018).

Marsden, Lee. *United States-Irish Relations: From JFK to the Present Day*, (Routledge, 2018).

Mayers, David. *America and the Postwar World: Remaking International Society, 1945-1956*, (Routledge, 2018).

McKevitt, Andrew C. *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America*, (UNC, 2017).

Moise, Edwin. *The Myths of Tet: The Most Misunderstood Event of the Vietnam War*, (Kansas, 2017).

Morgan, Michael Cotey. *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War*, (Princeton, 2018).

Moyn, Samuel. *Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World*, (Harvard, 2018).

Murrin, John M. *Rethinking America: From Empire to Republic*, (Oxford, 2017).

Navari, Cornelia, ed. *Hans J. Morgenthau and the American Experience*, (Palgrave, 2017).

O'Malley, Alanna. *The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations During the Congo Crisis, 1960-1964*, (Manchester, 2018).

Paravantes, Spero Simeon Z. *Britain, the US and Greece after World War II: Anglo-American Relations and the Cold War*, (Tauris, 2018).

Pardew, James W. *Peacemakers: American Leadership and the End of Genocide in the Balkans*, (Kentucky, 2018).

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SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship Report

I write to convey my sincere gratitude to SHAFR and its members for their generous support of my research. The Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship allowed me to complete my dissertation, "Building Global Capitalism: Militarization, Standardization, and U.S.-South Korean Relations, 1945-present." Over the course of my fellowship year (June 2016-May 2017), I completed the final stages of my research in Seoul, South Korea and wrote and revised my dissertation in Providence, RI. I am happy to report that my committee approved my dissertation in May 2017.

My dissertation uses South Korea as a case study for understanding the U.S. military's role in the global expansion of capitalism during the Cold War. The opening chapters use Korea as a site for examining how the U.S. military consumption helped revive the world economy following World War II. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. government invested hundreds of millions of dollars in South Korea to support American troop deployments and fund a wide range of defense-related construction projects. Underwritten by American tax dollars, these projects provided a lucrative market for not only American businesses but also those from around the U.S.-led "Free World." Furthermore, through its extensive procurement and contracting system, the U.S. military was able to establish standardized practices for the manufacture, production, and distribution of a dizzying array of goods and services (everything from cast iron pipes to women's footwear.) In promoting such standardization, U.S. military consumption helped provide the technical and administrative mechanisms necessary to conduct business across international borders. In other words, postwar South Korea served as an incubator for the later development of multi-national corporations and transnational supply chains that characterize today's global economy.

The second half of my work turns to how the U.S. military's presence in Korea facilitated the participation of Korean corporations in the global economy. Throughout the 1950s, American soldiers oversaw the construction, expansion, and standardization of the country's transportation system, public utilities, and industrial facilities. In addition to providing the infrastructure necessary to support industrial growth, these efforts provided fledgling Korean businesses with opportunities to learn how to produce goods and perform services that met the international standards (i.e., those of the U.S. military). My concluding chapter, for example, focuses on the entry of Hyundai into the U.S. market and its opening of a billion-dollar manufacturing plant in Montgomery, Alabama. I document how the company drew from experience working for the U.S. military to establish a transnational supply chain dependent on advanced technology and low-cost labor. Ultimately, I argue the U.S. military was the key driver of South Korean economic development and the globalization of Korean companies because it promoted the standardization of South Korean industries and provided the capital, technology, and experience necessary for Korean companies to produce standardized (and therefore globally competitive) products.

In conclusion, I would like to thank SHAFR again. The Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship, as well as the 2014 Michael Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship, greatly enhanced the scope and depth of my dissertation. It made possible the transnational research and provided the uninterrupted time necessary to complete my project. I cannot say enough about the society's commitment to fostering graduate student research and scholarship.

Sincerely,

Patrick Chung
10/14/2017



In February 1946, President Harry Truman lifted a ban on food shipments to the US Zone of occupied Germany and publically endorsed the Council for Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany (CRALOG), allowing the organization to solicit donations for German civilians. While the severity of the German food crisis varied, officials recognized that hunger posed a serious threat to the peace. My dissertation examines the political, cultural, and emotional impact of this decision. I argue that the origins of food relief as an anti-Communist strategy are located in postwar Germany, where the mission to feed civilians began as a stability-seeking endeavor before becoming a political tool and propaganda weapon. Food aid not only transformed the relationship between the two nations but it adapted American humanitarian ideals to Cold War interests, providing a model for later use across the globe.

The Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant defrayed the cost of a research trip to Germany, where I gathered primary source material on German perspectives of US food aid. German historiography on the postwar years identifies important links between food and identity, with much of it also highlighting the significant role US food played in the emergence of a repaired and strengthened US-West German relationship. My work bridges diplomatic history and food studies for a more nuanced understanding of food and feeding practices in the US Zone. The German point of view is a

crucial component of this story, complementing the American narrative of food relief with the personal stories of those who received this aid.

My research took me to the Federal Archive and several state and city archives in the former US Zone. At the Federal Archive in Koblenz I sought information on the German nutritionists and agriculture experts who worked alongside Military Government. In Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Stuttgart I located material that conveyed how these cities and the surrounding areas confronted issues of food scarcity and cooperated with American civilian and military agencies to ensure the successful distribution of relief. Highlights include detailed food and nutrition surveys, foreign aid appeals from the University of Heidelberg, and evidence of the strong rapport between the mayor of Mannheim and American soldiers who sent CARE packages for distribution among the city's needy. The archivists at the Stadtarchiv Stuttgart were exceptionally helpful, pulling countless volumes from their library and introducing me to local scholars. I concluded my research trip at the Landesarchiv in Berlin where I found material documenting food's role in the burgeoning conflict with the Soviet Union. I anticipated Soviet criticism of American aid agencies, but was surprised to find evidence of early cooperation between East and West with food from the Soviet Zone delivered to all four sectors of occupied Berlin.

In the last year, I have conducted research in more than two dozen archives located across Germany and the United States, amassing the bulk of my primary resources. This research would not have been possible without the support of organizations like the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. The material gathered on this trip reveals the complexities inherent in food negotiations between former enemies, former allies, and even former neighbors in divided Berlin. I am deeply appreciative of SHAFR's interest in my project and their financial support, which made archival research in Germany possible.

Kaete O'Connell
PhD Candidate
Temple University



I. Accomplishments

With the support of the Samuel F. Bemis Research Grant, I conducted two weeks of research at both the National Archives and Record Administration (NARA) in College Park and the Hoover Institution Library and Archives at Stanford University with the assistance of a private researcher. Based on multi-archival, multi-lingual research, my dissertation, *Americanizing Mexican Drug Enforcement: The War on Drugs in Mexican Politics and Society, 1964–1982, examines how United States drug control ideas shaped Mexican political and social institutions during the 1970s.* Prior to being awarded the Bemis Grant, I had completed all of the Mexico portions of archival research. The materials I acquired with SHAFR's support allowed me to complete the U.S. portions of my research in preparation for my dissertation defense in 2018, as well as to add texture to the materials I collected previously in Mexico.

The Bemis Grant supported a trip to NARA to research 1970s drug policy records. The historian, Daniel Weimer, who wrote a book on drug policy during the same time period as my project pointed me to a number of files on 1970s Mexican drug enforcement in the State Department's Record Group (RG)-59, files of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), 1970-1978, which I spent most of my time researching while at NARA. The files were rich with documentation on Mexican drug enforcement statistics, operations, meetings, and the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) involvements in Mexican drug control during the period. These files will not only contrast nicely with the materials I have acquired in Mexico, they will also facilitate the completion of my third dissertation chapter. In researching these files, I was also able to submit declassification requests that may yield fruitful materials for my project as I write it into book manuscript form. I was also able to conduct research in NARA's CIA database, which yielded some fruitful documents, as well as research in P-Reels and other documents I had submitted for declassification in previous trips to NARA.

The Bemis Grant also supported research at the Hoover Institution Library. A colleague who works at the State Department's Historians office told me that the Edwin Meese Papers contained a number of recently declassified drug policy documents from the 1980s. As one approaches the 1980s, documents on U.S. drug enforcement and drug control become more and more difficult to access, which is why I was interested in seeing what the Hoover Library and Edwin Meese papers had. By hiring a private researcher, I found valuable materials on the DEA's role in drug enforcement with Mexico. I found documents that explained what the DEA was doing both domestically and overseas during the 1980s, the agency's use of force in overseas operations, and how the DEA was evolving under the Ronald Reagan administration. I plan to integrate many of the materials I found into the fourth and fifth chapters of my dissertation.

II. Note on Travel Budget

The Bemis Grant's generous support covered my expenses for a plane ticket to Washington, D.C. from Nashville, Tennessee (\$405), transportation to and from NARA (\$300), and approximately 13 days of lodging (\$500). It also granted me the funds to hire a private researcher at the Hoover Library (\$400).

In Memoriam: Marilyn Young Scholar-Activist/Activist-Scholar

Robert Buzzanco

More than a few times since Marilyn Young's death on February 19, 2017, I wished she were around to comment on some of the bigger issues facing us—most recently, the ramped-up tensions with North Korea, Ken Burns's PBS series on Vietnam, and the Harvey Weinstein controversy. There have been countless words spilled on all those topics, but Marilyn Young's voice was different, unique in a time of great conformity and social media cacophony. She saw things that many of us didn't, asked different questions than most of us would, made insights that few could. But even in her absence, her legacy is still powerful. As I ponder not just her rich life but look with discomfort at the world we have inherited, her books, articles, talks, and personal memories remain relevant.



Marilyn was a great historian, a public intellectual, a cultural critic, a literary theorist, a clarion call for gender equality, a political firebrand. From her writings and conversations, I learned, or learned more, about T.S. Eliot, Denise Levertov, Jorge Luis Borges, Rene Magritte, post-war liberal culture wars, the American Left, U.S. imperialism, and of course the Vietnam War. No words, and no amount of words, can really convey her life, her career, but for those of us who knew her, we can remember what she taught us; for those who did not, we can help introduce them to one of the bright lights in not just our field but in U.S. history generally.

And she believed, as did so many scholars who came of age during the heyday of the New Left, that history and knowledge generally had a larger purpose, a political purpose—that our past was usable, a tool to create a better world of peace and justice. Thus her books and articles and interviews are not just full of historical analyses that are vital to an understanding of the past, but they offer an often-pointed critique of the power elite who made decisions for war or injustice of gender inequity, and informed us of the people who challenged them. And she showed up the continuities in American life, especially how the same ideas that existed in the 1898 quest for power in China were still powerful as the United States invaded Vietnam and, beyond that, intervened in Iraq and elsewhere.

Marilyn became known to the world of diplomatic

history in the late 1960s. She graduated from Vassar and then took her Ph.D. from Harvard. She was on the faculty of the University of Michigan, and later New York University, where she was also chair. In her first published monograph, *The Rhetoric of Empire*, Professor Young explored a subject that had recently emerged in the 1960s in the study of U.S. foreign relations—American policies toward China and the quest for an Open Door for investment, trade, resources, and labor.¹ Joining a group that included scholars like Thomas McCormick, Walter LaFeber, and William Appleman Williams, Young produced what the well-known Asia scholar Paul Varg called “the best of the available accounts,” with an analysis of the Open Door Notes that was

particularly “praiseworthy.”² Young's account did not emphasize economics to the extent of the other so-called Wisconsin School historians, but, while examining the role of commercial investors and missionaries in China and the growing levels of speculation in banking and railroad, concluded that most of the economic goals of American capitalists were not met.

Yet those bankers and businessmen in China did create a public interest, a rhetoric of empire, that would be used to justify a more activist China policy and the Open Door. Her conclusion, a half-century later, is still compelling and prescient: “Tragically, definitions of the precise nature of America's vital interests in Asia have been rare, yet the idea that this country has a major role to play there remains fixed in the foreign policy of the United States.”³ That theme—that America assumed a major role, often coercive, in Asia—would inform much of her scholarship from that point forward.

Just after that, already established as a leading authority in the field, Professor Young, in a review of books on China in *The New York Times*, explained with an insight, and at times sarcasm, that would guide her work going forward, that

Given enough time, America has found it possible to adjust to successful revolutions. The pattern of our policy since at least 1917 has been to employ outright force, and when this fails, to

use the full extent of our power and influence to isolate and damage emerging revolutionary governments by nonmilitary means. Finally, though it may take decades, an Administration gathers the courage to accept the accomplished reality. We are then expected to cheer.

She described the United States as “a nation dedicated to counterrevolutionary violence” and made it clear that the dilemmas of American foreign policy did not involve developing relationships with other big powers, “but our persistent refusal to allow revolutionary change and self-determination in smaller ones.”⁴

Professor Young wrote and edited prolifically. Many of us in this field are familiar with her work, so rather than give an account of everything she did, I think it’s useful to talk about some of her major publications and then some of her writing that wasn’t as well-known, but was incredibly insightful and continues to give us ideas to ponder about the world we live in about war and peace and about the role of power versus people.

Along with *The Rhetoric of Empire*, Marilyn Young’s other most significant work is *The Vietnam Wars*, published in 1991 as the Gulf War—with all its comparisons to Vietnam—was still fresh in American minds.⁵ *The Vietnam Wars* not only became a well-regarded and often-assigned book in history classes all over, but reached a large public reading audience. Much of the book is derivative, but its analysis and emphases are fresh and innovative. Building on the work of historians of Vietnam like George Herring and Gabriel Kolko, along with those of the public intellectual Noam Chomsky, she offered ideas and themes that are essential to understanding the Vietnam War and gave advice to those of us studying Vietnam in the future.

In Professor Young’s analysis, the Vietnamese conflict was a revolution that was a popular movement representing the hopes of the Vietnamese people, to which the United States had no useful response because there was no real American concern in that country other than maintaining its power in Asia, a theme that had been a consistent part of her work since *The Rhetoric of Empire*. The war between the RVN and the southern insurgents was *the* core struggle, and it was Washington, D.C., not Hanoi, that brought on war by invading the south—more than ironic since it was the “ally” that Americans had invented. This was not a civil war, as so many others had contended (and has now been revived by the Ken Burns’ PBS series on the Vietnam War). And to the Americans, the regime they had created under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem was “nationalist,” and therefore not a collection of “communist stooges” like the government in the North led by Ho Chi Minh.⁶

Professor Young’s criticism of the war was not unique to the literature; most scholars, with the exception of some right-wing revisionism in the 1980s by the likes of Harry Summers and Guenter Lewy, had found the war to be a mistake of serious proportions. Yet *The Vietnam Wars* moved beyond the basic ideas and questions that had informed much of the scholarship to that point—Was Ho a nationalist or communist? Did the north “invade” the south? What was the nature of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem?—and examined issues that were not as popular—What were the larger imperial motives that brought the US to conduct a war on a small Asian country? What was the role of dissent, both by administration figures like George Ball and outside groups like student protestors or the Vietnam Veterans Against the War or Winter Soldier Investigation? How did popular culture reflect American views of war while it was being fought, and afterward?

One of the real strengths of the book was her careful weaving of politics and events in the United States, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam. Gabriel Kolko had done this in *Anatomy of a War*, so *The Vietnam Wars* was not reinventing

the wheel. But it offered a compelling and harshly critical review of the war from the end of World War II until 1990, right before it was published (though, to be honest, the bulk of the war covers the period from around 1960 until the American withdrawal in 1975).⁷ And its title is reflective of her approach, to discuss the *Wars*, plural, of that era—inside Vietnam, from the outside with the U.S. invasion, sectarian conflicts in the southern state the United States had created below the 17th parallel; and at home between Americans struggling with the growing bloodshed and discord of the war. Over a quarter-century later, it remains the best single source for an overview of the Vietnam War for college classes and for someone who asks, “what’s a good book to read to learn about Vietnam?”

Professor Young also edited a significant number works on Vietnam and other related topics.⁸ In all of them you see the traits that infused her work—intellectual curiosity, great scholarship, and commitment to use history for larger, i.e. social and political, ends. She saw the past as a way to awaken people to the reality of decisions made on a grand scale. Where our political, education, and media systems would tell us that our exceptionalism gave us a special duty to bring democracy and liberty to the world, Marilyn exposed such rationales and showed how economic interests, military power, and the fear of nationalist and neutralist states led to American aggression on countless occasions in too many places to easily mention.

It’s safe to say that *The Vietnam Wars* is her best-known work and will be her long-lasting legacy, but she did so much more than that, on so many other topics. Continuing on Vietnam, she wrote an essay about the films of Vietnam, “Now Playing: Vietnam,” which was the best review of Vietnam-related cinema I had read, showing a deep understand of movies that Pauline Kael or Rogert Ebert would envy, but also with an understanding of war than no film critic would possess.⁹

As noted above, some of Professor Young’s most incisive and important work came in venues with which many of us are not as familiar and which were not widely known, but are tremendously important. She wrote about the Korean War in ways that few scholars not named Bruce Cumings have. In a specially-edited issue of *The Journal of Korean Studies* on the 60th anniversary of the armistice, she wrote an introduction that should be required reading at this very moment in the White House, Foggy Bottom, JCS Headquarters, and in every media outlet.¹⁰ If one wants to understand the current state of U.S.-North Korean relations, and the behavior of the “crazy” Kim Jong-un regime, he or she would do well to read this piece. The South (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) never signed the ceasefire in mid-1953—although the U.N. Command, the People’s Republic of China, and the North (The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) did.

In the aftermath of that ceasefire, the United States, in a “pivot to Asia,” escalated conflict in the region immediately as it took over the French role in Indochina, blocked the PRC from a seat at the U.N., trained ROK forces, supported Taiwan’s sabotage in the PRC, made sure there was no rapprochement between Japan and the PRC, and encouraged Japan to develop a self-defense force. Then, from the 1958 introduction of nuclear weapons until the 1976 crisis brought on by the axe murders of two American soldiers by DPRK soldiers in the Demilitarized Zone, tensions heightened and “peace on the peninsula has been hostage to America’s larger political and strategic needs.”

Taking the story up to the present when published in 2013, she then pointed out that the Obama administration had increased U.S.-ROK cooperation, held joint military exercises with B-52 bombers and B-2 Stealth planes, conducted joint naval exercises in the East Sea, and had computerized war games that simulated various scenarios for an invasion and occupation of North Korea. “In short,”

she observed, "the United States pursued a militarized policy in the region in the name of anticommunism, stability, and order. Now, sixty years later, the United States is back in the same place." So today, as Kim Jong-un is derided by the global media for the north's nuclear program, this history should be essential learning. As Marilyn would surely point out, the world isn't made safer by more nuclear weapons, but the regime in Pyongyang has long and powerful historical reasons to seek a nuclear deterrent against any possible U.S. actions, especially in the age of Trump.

Professor Young also pondered the Korean War, but in a literary analysis more than a study of history. In "Korea: The Post-War War," she conveyed a history of the war little-discussed: the atrocities committed by U.S. and ROK troops during the occupation of the north in late 1950 and early 1951, the air attacks against civilian populations, the napalm, the savagery that is generally ignored or dismissed when brought up by North Korean officials today.¹¹ But the core of her work is a focus on special 1952 issues of *Partisan Review* which featured 25 well-known intellectuals, including Norman Mailer, C. Wright Mills, Lionel Trilling, David Riesman, and Irving Howe, ruminating on "Our Country and Our Culture" (and became a book *America and the Intellectuals*).

There was no mention of Korean War in the articles. There were debates over homogeneity and conformity but "the country with which the intellectuals identified, 'our country, our culture,' was cast in their own image: liberal, cosmopolitan, urban." And "the range of the responses was narrow." All were anti-Stalinist of course, but also rejected Marxism and even the politics of the Popular Front. There was a total exclusion of Korea from the issues, though the war was still a pressing issue, especially as part of the 1952 election, and Young situates this dismissal in American culture.

The usual, if circular, argument given for the broad acceptability of the Korean war (despite contemporary evidence of its unpopularity), has been the fact of the Cold War itself. I think that, for American intellectuals, the power of the Cold War paradigm lay in the way it reclaimed an American centrality, and with it their own. Custodians, now, of American culture, their culture, their country, American intellectuals need not fear a provincial, nativist, anti-semitic, rural America whose day had clearly ended. As Jacques Barzun put it, America, by 1945, "having won a war on both her oceans, and finding herself involved in the four quarters of the earth, was quite simply the world power, which means: the center of world awareness."

As America entered its next series of wars in the Middle East in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Professor Young remained a visible and important source of information and dissent. One of the best essays she wrote, which she sent to me not long after we met, was a historical comparison of Vietnam and the Gulf War of 1990-91, titled "This Is Not Vietnam: This Is Not A Pipe."¹² Using Magritte's famous work, "This is not a pipe," she tore apart the idea that "victory" in Iraq had ended the so-called Vietnam Syndrome. "In 1991 George Bush began a war in the Persian Gulf which, he insisted, was not Vietnam"; and, she cleverly noted, "It was at this point that Iraq became Vietnam." Young explained, "The difference between Iraq and Vietnam, according to the president and his men, did not lie in their histories, cultures, political ideologies or geographies, but only in what the U.S. had not done to one and would most certainly do to the other."

"'Iraq is not Vietnam' embodied the willful, indeed necessary, indifference to the specific historical realities of both countries." The United States, she importantly pointed out, obliterated large parts of Vietnam, dropping over 15 million tons of explosives in Indochina, about half from the air (the equivalent of 700 Hiroshimas), over 400,000 tons of napalm and nearly 20 million gallons of herbicides, creating 25 million bomb craters, all on a country about 4 percent of the size of the United States. The American ally, and invention, South Vietnam, was hit with overwhelming force too, with the United States unleashing 3.6 million tons of bombs (far more than the one million tons dropped on the north, 1.5 million in Laos, and half-million in Cambodia). "In other words, Vietnam was not spared U.S. military prowess. Short of obliterating the country, it is difficult to see what more could have been done."

U.S. leaders proclaimed that success in the Gulf finally "kicked" the Vietnam Syndrome, "but the shame of Vietnam was the intervention, not the defeat, and not only the intervention but the punishment the U.S. has meted out to Vietnam ever since." Then, juxtaposing common ideas and misperceptions, held by Americans, she cited the Soviet foreign minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, who proclaimed that the war on Afghanistan had "violated the norms of proper behavior," contravened "general human values," and had begun and was conducted "behind the backs of the party and the people." Moreover, she compared this to Jimmy Carter saying that the destruction had been "mutual" and Ronald Reagan calling it a "noble crusade."

Nearly two decades later, she revisited Iraq and Afghanistan in an interview on *Bill Moyers Journal*.¹³ She and Lloyd Gardner had recently co-edited *Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam: Or, How Not To Learn From the Past*, a book of essays exploring the comparisons of the two conflicts.¹⁴ To begin, Marilyn observed that "The specter of Vietnam looms darkly over Baghdad." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had recently asserted that the Iraqis had "invited" the United States into their country, and Young compared it to claims that the Ngo Dinh Diem regime had invited U.S. intervention in the 1950s. She also compared the hysteria over WMDs in Iraq to the contrived Gulf of Tonkin crisis. "Condoleezza Rice says, you ask anybody in the region and they say please, don't leave. Well, where exactly is she walking around in the region? In Iraq, she's only walking in the green zone. She can't walk anywhere else. And it's likely that the odd person she meets in the green zone is going to say, yes, yes, welcome, welcome, please don't go. But this is nonsense as a measure of who wants the United States to stay and who wants the United States to leave." Turning phrases like few others could, Marilyn cut to the bone about the comparisons between the two wars: "If Vietnam was Korea in slow motion, then Operation Iraqi Freedom is Vietnam on crack cocaine. In less than two weeks a 30 year old vocabulary is back: credibility gap, seek and destroy, hard to tell friend from foe, civilian interference in military affairs, the dominance of domestic politics, winning, or more often, losing hearts and minds."

In her entire career, her whole life, she combined an acute understanding of the past with the political needs for human liberation and peace. Her work backed up a life-long commitment to peace and justice. "I find that I have spent most of my life as a teacher and scholar thinking and writing about war," she said in her 2011 SHAFR presidential address (she was just the third woman to hold that position). "I moved from war to war, from the War of 1898 and U.S. participation in the Boxer Expedition and the Chinese civil war, to the Vietnam War, back to the Korean War, then further back to World War II and forward to the wars of the 20th and early 21st centuries." She added, "Initially, I wrote about all these as if war and peace were discrete: prewar, war, peace or postwar," she said. "Over

time, this progression of wars has looked to me less like a progression than a continuation: as if between one war and the next, the country was on hold."¹⁵

While she was best-known for her work on wars, and peace, she had so many other academic-political issues of importance too—gender equality in particular. I had not known until preparing this tribute that in 1973 she authored *Women in China: Studies in Social Change and Feminism* and ten years later, with Rayna Rapp and Sonia Kruks, *Promissory Notes: Women and the Transition to Socialism*.¹⁶ When I began going to SHAFR conferences in the 1980s, there were few women in the field of U.S. foreign relations—Marilyn, Anna Nelson, Betty Unterberger, and Joan Hoff stand out in my memory. There were also a few graduate students, but there was nothing close to any kind of parity. That became a major issue for her, and she typically made an impact, as some of the women in the field today have noted.

For example, Laura Belmonte of Oklahoma State said, "It would be difficult to overstate how much Marilyn's encouragement and example meant to me and other women in SHAFR at a time when we could easily be counted on two hands. Her brilliance, fierce commitment to social justice, and immense personal and professional generosity were nonpareil." Ann Heiss of Kent State likewise observed, "My sentiments are similar to Laura's: I saw Marilyn as a model of many things: a passionate and committed scholar; an unapologetic activist for progressive causes; and a supportive and encouraging mentor. She not only blazed her own trail as one of the first women to lead SHAFR but also showed real interest in the many women who followed her—asking about their work, cheering their successes, dispensing sage advice when they needed it." "I echo all that," added Anne Foster of Indiana State, who included a personal anecdote that reflected on how Marilyn could have so many different roles in our lives.

"A little more personally, the essay I wrote for the Blackwell companion you and she put together... I sent it in one week before Naomi's due date and, as it turned out, about 24 hours before Naomi actually arrived. I had written that I might be a little slow to respond to any revision requests because I was having a baby. Marilyn wrote back with this great story about having one of her kids when she was in Japan, and how none of her doctors spoke English and she didn't speak Japanese. Part of me was in awe. Part of me was inspired. Mostly though, I felt a huge sense of relief. It was possible to be a successful academic, even in our male-dominated field, and mom. And to be an activist, and fun. She lived life to the absolute fullest, and brought out the best in us all. At a moment I worried might be a forced choice of career or parent, her story let me know I could do both, and in a way I felt even more included, more connected, to a group of women who were succeeding in transforming our field."¹⁷

Customarily, when one writes a tribute of this type, the author offers personal accounts of his/her relationship with the person being remembered, and I do want to briefly talk about the way I met Marilyn and how much she helped me. At the first SHAFR conference after *The Vietnam Wars* came out, I introduced myself and told her I was writing a dissertation on the Vietnam War. The military officers I was studying were telling their civilian bosses how badly the war was going, and Marilyn cited an ARVN general who said, "we are very weak politically and without the strong political support of the population with the NLF have," which helped reinforce what I was finding.¹⁸ I told her that and she offered her best wishes and told me to feel

free to ask for help going forward. So, in the spirit of "no good deed goes unpunished," I began to send questions to her (via mail, since I did not have email yet) and she became a great critic and mentor.

When my dissertation was complete and I was preparing to submit it to publishers, I asked her to read it. Of course she did, and within about a month sent it back (again via the mails) with several pages of outstanding suggestions. She then agreed to write letters of recommendation for me as I applied for jobs. A few years later, after I published another book on Vietnam, an editor at Blackwell (now Wiley) said they were considering a series of books with essays on major topics, including Vietnam. She asked if I had ideas for an editor (they wanted senior people) and I suggested Marilyn. About a week later, the editor called and said Marilyn had agreed to do it, and wanted to know if I wanted to come on as co-editor, a request I immediately accepted.

During the process of seeking authors, putting topics together, reading drafts and all the other work involved in editing a collection of that sort (far more difficult than writing a book, I believe) Marilyn never pulled rank. She surely did far more than I did; she knew which young scholars were doing new work in the field, she read drafts, she got comments back to the authors, and in all ways was just on top of things.¹⁹ For me, the experience of working with her, talking to her about so many different facets of Vietnam, and knocking back a few scotches while she made jokes about my fashion choices (she *always* had a comment about the suits I wore) are memories, and lessons, that will never leave me.

It's fair to say that I owe as much to her for whatever has happened since then as to anyone. And she was a mentor in that manner to so many of us. As Ann Heiss wrote to me, one of the hallmarks of SHAFR is the way that senior members help out younger scholars and graduate students, and "Marilyn truly epitomized that part of the Society. Paying it forward is certainly the best tribute I can think of." Laura Belmonte had the same idea, "The best tribute I think we can all pay to her remarkable legacy is to carry forward that passion for making a better world and mentoring the young scholars that follow us."

For a half-century, Marilyn Young was both a scholar and activist of the highest order. She wrote with intelligence and passion about the large world we inhabit and the particular responsibility of the U.S. government in creating more distress and instability through interventions and wars. Since her childhood, as she explained in 2012, the United States had been at war: "the wars were not really limited and were never cold and in many places have not ended — in Latin America, in Africa, in East, South and Southeast Asia." Her mission, in her writing and in her deeds, was to make us all aware of that and to help us think of a different world where we could find ways to make peace and work for justice and equality of all kinds. She was well-known in history circles, but it was not unusual at all for me to be asked about her by young people working on issues of war and peace, racial justice, gender equality, or environmentalism when they heard I knew her. For those of us who are "scholar radicals," a term I have heard often, she really was a bright light, a teacher and a mentor.

(It's worth relating too that she was adept at university politics when it served a larger purpose. McGeorge Bundy, one of the architects of the Vietnam War who she condemned so virulently, was on the History Department faculty at NYU, and I asked her how she managed what I thought would be an obviously very awkward and difficult relationship. She said "we don't talk about the war and he's a good liberal, so we can work together to do good things for the young faculty and students.")

Writing in *Jacobin*, Christy Thornton and Stuart Schrader commented, "The countless students she mentored,

formally and informally, found her wise, generous, and always forthright. She pulled no punches, and she was as direct in a graduate seminar as she was on a public stage. As a writer and a teacher, she pushed generations of scholars to forefront the political implications of their work, imploring her fellow historians 'to speak and write so that a time of war not be mistaken for peacetime, nor waging war for making peace.' . . . To those of us lucky enough to study with her, she was more than a mentor: she was a model, of a scholarly life lived in the pursuit of peace and justice, at home and abroad. As we take up her mantle, Young's legacy will live on."²⁰

For those who knew her, we have lost a great friend and colleague. For those who read her books and articles, it will be a difficult task to find someone as perceptive and passionate to teach about the world. But all of us can continue to learn from her and think about the life she lived, not only giving us the information we need to make a better world, but going beyond the office to make it happen.

Notes:

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3. *Rhetoric of Empire*, 231.
4. Marilyn Young, "Adjusting to Peking," Review of November 21, 1971, <http://www.nytimes.com/1971/11/21/archives/a-new-us-policy-toward-china-by-a-doak-barnett-132-pp-washington.html>.
5. Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991)
6. *The Vietnam Wars*, 24.
7. Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, The United States, and the Modern Historical Experience* (New York: Pantheon, 1985).
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19. *Blackwell Companion to Vietnam* (Boston: Blackwell (Wiley), 2002).
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The Last Word: Facing North Korea with Both Eyes Open

Kirk W. Larsen

Hardly a day passes without North Korea appearing in news headlines. Most of the American coverage focuses on the ways in which the DPRK, particularly its development of a nuclear weapons and ICBM delivery capacity, is thought to pose a threat to the United States and its interests. But what of the North Koreans? Would P'yongyang have any rational reason to consider the outside world, and particularly the United States, as a threat to its interests or even its very survival?

While determining actual North Korean public opinion is a difficult if not impossible task, I suspect that—at least based on official DPRK rhetoric and North Korean history textbooks—the average North Korean would be able to easily rattle off a litany of moments in history that contribute to a general sense of threat posed by the United States. A partial list of such moments might include:

- 1866, when an American merchant ship, the *General Sherman*, sailed up the Taedong River to P'yongyang and attacked local Koreans. This unfortunate encounter, which ended with the destruction of the ship and the death of its crew, ushered in what Kim Il Sung described as more than “150 years of enmity between Korea and the United States.”
- 1871, when the United States attacked Korea again, this time with the largest overseas deployment of American military might between the Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars and resulting in more than 300 Korean soldiers and civilians perishing.
- 1905, when, despite having signed a treaty that recognized the independence and sovereignty of Korea in 1882, the United States was the first foreign power to accede to Japan's claim of a protectorate over Korea its protectorate and withdrew its ambassador from Seoul accordingly.
- 1919, when, motivated by Woodrow Wilson's idealistic rhetoric about self-determination of peoples, hundreds of thousands of Koreans took the streets to protest nearly a decade of Japan's harsh colonial rule. The Japanese responded to the protests by killing hundreds if not thousands of Koreans. Wilson and the treaty-makers at Versailles responded to the protests by more or less ignoring them.
- 1945, when two U.S. Army officers, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel, were tasked with proposing to the Soviets a joint occupation of the Korean peninsula at the end of World War II. Knowing next to nothing about Korean history, geography, or culture, they suggested the 38th parallel as the dividing line between the Soviet and American occupation zones, putting in motion a process that would result in the division that still remains to this day.
- 1950-53, when as part of its resistance to North Korea's attempts to unify the two Koreas under Kim Il Sung's rule, the United States dropped more bombs on North Korea than had been used in the entire Pacific theater of World War II. Few are the North Koreans who do not have stories of family members killed as American bombs rained down on North Korean cities and towns, roads and bridges, schools and hospitals.
- 1958, when the United States first placed nuclear weapons, including nuclear artillery shells and nuclear-tipped short-range rockets, in South Korea. U.S. nuclear weapons would remain in South Korea until 1991.
- 1976, when the United States, in response to the “ax murders” of two American soldiers, amassed considerable land, sea, and air forces (including “nuclear ready” B-52s) to carry out “Operation PAUL BUNYAN” on the DMZ.
- 1993, when, speaking of North Korea, U.S. president Bill Clinton declared “We would overwhelmingly retaliate if they were ... to develop and use nuclear weapons. It would mean the end of their country as they know it.”
- 1994, when, worried about the beginnings of a North Korean nuclear weapons program, the Clinton administration had more or less decided on a preemptive strike on the DPRK's Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facility, stopped only at the last second by Jimmy Carter's mediation with Kim Il Sung.
- 1994-2001, when the United States consistently dragged its feet in implementing its set of obligations that emerged from Carter's brokered Agreed Framework, being consistently late on promised deliveries of heavy fuel oil and slowing the construction of the promised light water reactors.
- 2002, when U.S. president George W. Bush gave his “Axis of Evil” speech in which he declared that three nations—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—were “arming to threaten the peace of the world.”
- 2003, when Bush demonstrated his determination to eliminate “Axis of Evil” nations by invading one of them: Iraq.
- 2006, when former Defense Department officials William Perry and Ashton Carter publicly called for an attack on any North Korean ICBM before it could be launched.

- 2011, when, despite Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's 2003 decision to abandon Libya's nuclear weapons program, the United States agreed to and supported a NATO-led effort to oust Gaddafi.
- 2014, when U.S. president Barack Obama declared that the Americans "will not hesitate to use our military might" to defend the United States and its allies against North Korea.
- 2017, when, in a speech to the United Nations, U.S. president Donald Trump declared "if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea."

To be sure, the typical depiction of these events in North Korea is swathed in exaggeration and hyperbole. Yet even when one strips away the rhetorical excess, a simple recitation of the actual history of Korean-American relations could easily lead North Koreans, people and policymakers alike, to rationally conclude that the United States constitutes an existential threat to the nation and its people. This threat clearly transcends the rhetoric or decisions of a single American leader or party, no matter how troubling such rhetoric or decisions (such as those of the current occupant of the White House) may be.

Acknowledging that fearing the United States and seeking means to guarantee North Korea's security (such

as acquiring nuclear weapons and ICBMs; North Korean officials speak openly of having learned lessons from the demise of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi—they didn't have nuclear weapons and they paid the price) is a rational course of action and one that demonstrates having learned lessons from history does not mean that P'yongyang is an innocent bystander or simple victim. The DPRK has engaged in any number of provocative, aggressive, and otherwise unhelpful actions over the nearly seven decades of its existence. The Korean War has never been formally ended; soldiers and civilians, including South Koreans and Americans, have died at the hands of North Korea. Indeed, many of the American actions noted above can reasonably be explained as rational responses to North Korean actions. But this logic works both ways. So, too, have many of North Korea's actions, both past and present, been the rational response to American actions and threats.

Recognizing the rational roots of North Korea's insecurity does not immediately and obviously point to a solution to the dilemma posed by the DPRK. Both carrots and sticks have been tried in various combinations over at least the past two and a half decades and all have been found more or less wanting. But understanding the sources and even legitimacy of North Korea's insecurity is certainly a vital first step in whatever solutions might be crafted. Copernicus had it right when he was said to have declared that we need to "face the facts, as they say, 'with both eyes open.'"

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