PASSPORT

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The Battle FDR Lost
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Passport

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A Roundtable on Melvyn P. Leffler, *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-2015*

Kristin L. Ahlberg, Chester J. Pach, Gretchen Heefner, Kelly Shannon, Campbell Craig, and Melvyn P. Leffler

Introduction to the Roundtable on Melvyn Leffler, *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-2015*

Kristin L. Ahlberg

The views expressed in this introduction are my own and not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of State and the United States Government

Some eighteen years after I read *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*[1] as a graduate student at the University of Nebraska, I was delighted to read Melvyn Leffler's newest work, *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-2015.* In it, Leffler has selected, and Princeton University Press has published, five decades worth of his writing, ranging from journal articles to book chapters, accompanied by a thought-provoking introduction and individual chapter introductions. Four distinguished historians—experts on national security, gender and human rights; the Cold War and U.S. presidency, and international relations—have written reviews that laud Leffler's intellectual accomplishments, while also posing questions about Leffler's approaches and interpretative lenses.

Gretchen Heefner acknowledges that the volume functions both as an interpretation of twentieth century foreign policy and Leffler's personal intellectual history as he attempts to determine why U.S. policy makers act in the ways that they do. She sees much merit in the volume's construction, notably the introduction and explanatory essays accompanying each chapter, stressing that by including such material, Leffler has produced a useful "teaching text." By admitting his intellectual doubts and acknowledging the times he felt rejection and experienced criticism, Leffler, she asserts, serves as a model for how graduate students and young career professionals can manage and productively channel their disappointment. Returning to the theme of personal history, Heefner argues that the volume is important for what it says about the practice of history from the vantage point of an entire career. Leffler was not timid in advancing his thesis in earlier works and adopted new methods and approaches as his topics and subjects moved through the Cold War and post-Cold War era. Her main criticism of the volume stems from Leffler's failure to comment on alternative intellectual paths he might have taken or on the interpretative frameworks used by other historians.

Kelly Shannon asserts that the volume offers the reader the ability to understand both the "trajectory and importance" of Leffler's evolving scholarship. Leffler's use of the introductory and chapter essays also merit praise from Shannon, especially Leffler's candor in recalling setbacks and disappointments, which underscores the reality that even the luminaries in the field experienced challenges as younger scholars. In assessing the remaining chapters, Shannon notes Leffler's continued, careful use of newly-declassified archival materials before focusing her critique on Leffler's post-Cold War scholarship. Unlike Leffler, Shannon does not detect continuity between the foreign policies of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, as she sees the State Department's organizational changes during the Clinton administration as reflective of a greater prioritization of human rights, the environment, and global women's issues, in a way in which they weren't during the previous administration. At the conclusion of her review, she poses a thoughtful question related to the ability of a individual historian to change the field over time: is change based on a historian's willingness to modify her or his approach throughout a career, or does the field expand and grow because younger historians employ new methodologies and sources?

Leffler's drive to understand the sources of American power, Chester Pach suggests, has characterized his career and his "quest for complexity" both in analyzing U.S. foreign policy and developing empathy for foreign policy makers. Pach, in chronicling Leffler's Cold War writings, reveals that Leffler influenced him as a scholar at the precise time that Pach was revising his dissertation for publication, which echoes a theme Leffler develops in the introduction. Like Heefner and Shannon, Pach accounts for Leffler's intellectual trajectory, stating that Leffler's later writings emphasized human agency, structure, and contingency in terms of how they shaped foreign policy. Here, Pach seems to express his reservations concerning national security as an interpretative framework. Similar to Shannon, he ends his review by pondering what this selection of Leffler's scholarship says about the field, concluding that it illustrates the interplay between past and present and demonstrates the inherent value in analyzing and testing analytical frameworks and refining them when appropriate.

Although Campbell Craig describes the introduction as "lively," he raises important questions about the volume's purpose. Craig, noting the absence of "intellectual fireworks," writes that he had hoped that Leffler would have engaged more with his critics within the volume's pages. In addition, while Craig underscores the importance of the

essays and articles comprising each chapter, noting that they demonstrate how historians are influenced by "events, theories, and even simple vocational circumstances," he remains somewhat skeptical of printing these writings verbatim from the original versions. Craig's greatest reservation, however, relates to Leffler's conceptualization of "realism" and "revisionism."

Leffler, in his response, engages thoughtfully with his reviewers. He writes that his overarching goal in producing the volume was explaining "how and why" he gravitated to a national security framework and acknowledges that the reviewers grasped this and similar themes. He also respectfully addresses their criticisms. In terms of Heefner's and Shannon's statements that he failed, at times, to incorporate "religion, identity, and culture" in his scholarship, Leffler makes a fair claim that he chooses to focus on "why policy makers acted as they did." While noting Pach's reservations concerning the national security framework, Leffler argues that the "ambiguity" embodied by the term is its "strength," as national security is a fluid and dynamic concept. He acknowledges Craig's disappointment over the absence of "intellectual fireworks," but Leffler explains that the volume was not meant to rehash old arguments. Instead, he intended it to be reflective of his own intellectual and historiographical journey and the choices and challenges embedded in it. Lastly, he addresses Craig's unease concerning the terms "revisionism" and "realism," by reiterating that his approach combined strands of both thus erasing the "artificial binary" between them.

By way of conclusion, several reviewers referenced Leffler's acknowledgement that he had developed a heightened sense of empathy while serving as a dean at the University of Virginia during the late 1990s. As a result, Leffler was more inclined to be empathetic towards the policy makers he chronicled as they often struggled with agonizing choices. In the introductory essay, Leffler stresses that this also reinforced his belief that "there is no substitute for the written record," thus underscoring the importance of declassification of official documents to enable other scholars to produce their own sophisticated histories of U.S. decision-making. (26)

Note:
1. Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

Melvyn P. Leffler's Core Historical Values

Chester J. Pach

For more than four decades, Mel Leffler has been one of the very best historians of U.S. involvement in international affairs, but his career could easily have followed a different trajectory. He applied to law school and to graduate programs in international affairs, but chose to enter the Ph.D. program in history at The Ohio State University for a very practical reason: the offer of admission came with funding. Leffler's main interest as an undergraduate had been labor history, but David Brody, Ohio State's specialist in that field, was on leave and then departed for the University of California, Davis. Leffler recalls feeling "adrift" (2), but he found new direction by taking courses from Marvin Zahniser and David Green and reading William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*.

The growing horrors of the Vietnam War also pushed Leffler toward his new field of study. Leffler began his graduate education in 1966, participated in a few antiwar demonstrations, and searched for answers about how a war he found so appalling could endure longer than he ever thought possible. Green, as much an activist as a scholar, asked students to give him their draft cards so he could burn them during a campus demonstration. Leffler was "unprepared for Green's bold assault on my conscience" (3), but he was ready to commit himself to the study of U.S. foreign relations in hopes of understanding the sources of American power. The rest, as they say, is history.

Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism is as much an account of the evolution of Leffler's career as it is a study of U.S. national security policy during the past century. The book consists of eleven articles that were published between 1972 and 2016. Many helped to define the contours of specific fields or shape the debates about subjects as diverse as Republican foreign policy in the 1920s, the end of the Cold War, and the 9/11 attacks. At least one, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–1948" (originally published in 1984 in the *American Historical Review*), is a classic work, familiar to every serious historian who subsequently addressed the Cold War's origins.

What is new in this volume are Leffler's reflections on these articles. In an introduction and in brief remarks that precede each essay, Leffler presents these individual works as landmarks in his "intellectual journey" (x) from aspiring graduate student to esteemed senior scholar, from disciple of Williams to leading exponent of the national security framework for understanding U.S. foreign relations. Together they reveal Leffler's inductive quest for complexity in the analysis of international relations and for empathy in understanding the decisions of U.S. officials.

Leffler's earliest scholarly publications examined U.S.-European relations during the 1920s. His research on war debts, reparations, and trade and their connections to security issues contributed to a sweeping reinterpretation of U.S. involvement in European affairs in the decade after the First World War. Along with Joan Hoff Wilson, Michael J. Hogan, and Frank Costigliola, Leffler challenged the prevailing view that the United States turned its back on Europe after the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles. "I found that isolationism was a myth," he explains (5). Leffler also concluded that the formulators of U.S. foreign policy, such as President Warren G. Harding, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, and Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, considered fostering economic stability in Europe important to prosperity at home.

The first three chapters in *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism* reveal how Leffler challenged the open door thesis that the search for foreign markets dominated U.S. foreign policy. In an article on Republican war debt policy, 1921–1923, Leffler tests Williams's thesis and finds that many members of cabinet departments, Congress, and the business community were more concerned about low taxes or domestic investment opportunities than overseas markets. Policy emerged from "uneasy compromises between hostile branches of government, which themselves were wracked by a multitude of conflicting pressures and irreconcilable goals" (29–30).

In the second article in the collection, Leffler portrays Herbert Hoover as a pivotal figure whose progressive faith in scientific management and disinterested solutions to complex political problems shaped Republican approaches to international economic and security issues during both the Harding and Coolidge administrations, in which Hoover served as secretary of commerce, and his own term as president. Hoover valued overseas markets, but not enough to make commitments to French or European security that he considered unnecessary or unwise.

This study of Hoover, along with an article entitled "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism," led to further criticism of Williams for dwelling on the importance of U.S. economic expansionism while discounting political isolationism and overlooking

American economic nationalism. In these early articles, Leffler grounded his conclusions in extensive archival research and expressed them in the thick description and uninspiring prose of political economy.

After publishing *The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919–1933* (1979), Leffler shifted his attention to the origins of the Cold War. A series of articles during the 1980s provided the foundation for his next book, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (1992). Leffler calls "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–1948" (chapter 4) the "most important article of my career" (15). Drawing on extensive research in military records, he argues in this article that an expansive conception of postwar U.S. security requirements—including a worldwide system of bases, strategic dominance in the Western Hemisphere, and a Eurasian balance of power—arose not from hostile Soviet actions but the putative lessons of World War II.

The Cold War ended as Leffler completed his study of its origins, and he shifted his focus, as he explained, to "why its winners prevailed." One of the first results of this new direction was "Victory, the 'State,' the 'West,' and the Cold War," an article in which Leffler contested the triumphalism of the 1990s by arguing that victory in the Cold War did not arise from the superiority of free markets over command economies but from the use of state power to ensure that democratic capitalism provided both personal and national security. The idea that the Cold War was a contest between different political economies or, more accurately, two ways of life culminated in Leffler's superb book, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (2007).

Leffler's article was an important influence on my own career, since I was then a young historian who had recently completed a dissertation but not yet finished revising it for publication as *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945–1950* (1991). It reinforced my conclusions that the most immediate and important goal of U.S. military aid programs was demonstrating American resolve and reliability, not countering communist challenges. In *Preponderance of Power*, Leffler tempered the boldness of his earlier article, famously arguing that U.S. policymakers were not so much foolish or wise as prudent. Two other articles of lesser magnitude—one about Turkey and U.S. security, the other about the Yalta agreements and their role in widening Cold War divisions—are also included in *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism* (chapters 5 and 6).

The Cold War ended as Leffler completed his study of its origins, and he shifted his focus, as he explained, to "why its winners prevailed" (21). One of the first results of this new direction was "Victory, the 'State,' the 'West,' and the Cold War" (chapter 7), an article in which Leffler contested the triumphalism of the 1990s by arguing that victory in the Cold War did not arise from the superiority of free markets over command economies but from the use of state power to ensure that democratic capitalism provided both personal and national security. The idea that the Cold War was a contest between different political economies or, more accurately, two ways of life culminated in Leffler's superb book, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (2007).

In that book Leffler assesses the importance of individuals, especially Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, in ending the Cold War. The emphasis in Leffler's scholarship was shifting once more. "Much of my intellectual energy had been spent writing and thinking about structures, interests, and processes," he explains. "Now, I was enticed to think more systematically about human agency and contingency" (21). A four-year stint as dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Virginia deepened Leffler's experience with policymaking. Expecting that historical training would enhance his administrative skills, Leffler found instead that service as a dean made him a better historian. "I learned empathy," (22) he declares.

The result of that experience was a series of textured studies that probed how structure *and* contingency shaped recent U.S. foreign policy. "Dreams of Freedom, Temptations of Power" (chapter 8) probes the ways that culture, values, and memory affected decisions to use U.S. military power between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks of September 11, 2001. In "9/11 and American Foreign Policy" (chapter 9), Leffler maintains that continuities—including maintaining military superiority and protecting democratic capitalism—rather than changes characterized President George W. Bush's National Security Strategy Statement of 2002. Even Bush's willingness to sanction preemptive or preventative military action had precedents in earlier eras.

What was new was how heightened threat perceptions affected calculations of national interest and the willingness to use military power. "Outcomes were contingent; human agents were critical" (22). Leffler may be right that U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 was no revolutionary departure from the past. Still, there seems to be a vast difference between contemplating preemptive or preventative war, as Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy did, and taking disastrous action, as Bush did by attacking Iraq.

In the last chapter of the book, Leffler gathers his thinking about national security into an interpretive framework for studying U.S. foreign policy. This version, like a predecessor published twenty-five years earlier, provides a vague definition—that national security is "the defense of core values from external threats" (317)—and offers useful, if obvious, advice: historians should think carefully about threats, interests, and priorities.

In contrast, Leffler's essay on "Austerity and U.S. Strategy: Lessons of the Past" (chapter 10) may be the hidden gem of this book. To academic historians, it is probably the least known article in *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism*, as it was a lecture to the Aspen Strategy Group later published in a volume of papers from the Aspen Institute. The essay lacks notes and any explicit discussion of relevant scholarly literature. But it begins with a riveting analysis of how the depression and suicide of James Forrestal, the first secretary of defense, occurred during disputes over military roles, missions, and budgets in the late 1940s, when President Truman set stringent limits on defense spending.

Leffler uses Forrestal's tribulations to make the provocative argument that austerity more often than abundance encourages creative thinking in national security policy. Probably because the essay was written to be spoken rather than read, the prose is highly engaging. The essay also makes Forrestal a fully human, if tragic, figure, whose wrenching experiences illustrate the difficulties of policy choices. The essay constitutes a telling example of the enormous dividends of what Leffler calls "embracing complexity" in historical analysis.

What do these essays, written over more than forty years, reveal about Leffler's intellectual journey and, more broadly, the evolution of the field of U.S. international history? First, they illustrate the continuing dialogue between past and present. Leffler decided to study U.S. foreign relations because of his concern about the Vietnam War. The emergence in the mid-1970s of an influential group of neoconservatives who warned that Soviet strategic capabilities posed a clear and present danger to U.S. security encouraged him to examine the origins of the Cold War. Western triumphalism in the 1990s led him

to study why the Cold War ended, and the 9/11 attacks prompted him to analyze change and continuity in U.S. national security policy during the war on terror. Leffler's use of history to understand the contemporary world shows how much the present influences the past we study, the issues we address, the conclusions we find instructive or relevant. Like Leffler, we continue to search, in Henry Steele Commager's felicitous phrase, for a usable past.

Second, Leffler's career shows the value of testing and refining interpretive frameworks for understanding the sources and uses of American power. The open door thesis inspired Leffler's early research, yet he understood its limits once he conducted archival research to explain how Hoover and his Republican colleagues made decisions about reparations, war debts, currency stabilization, and trade in the 1920s. Yet Leffler resisted choosing between alternative approaches to explaining the history of U.S. foreign relations. Decades of mining archives and refining arguments persuaded him that "revisionism and realism were not alternative interpretive frames but complementary" (25) (Some readers will nonetheless continue to think the differences are far more striking than the commonalities). Leffler's embrace of the national security framework arose from a desire to forge a new synthesis from existing interpretive lenses, one that included the three levels of analysis on which international relations scholars rely: the individual, the state, and the international system. The national security paradigm is one of many such frameworks—some of them recent innovations—for the study of U.S. international history.

Finally, while methodological innovation has been essential, some traditional values endure. For Leffler, they are "seeking truth, questing for objectivity" (27). These may be elusive, even impossible goals, but, for Leffler, they have produced a body of scholarship that has deservedly brought accolades and acclaim. We should all be so lucky as to experience an intellectual journey with such rich rewards.

"It's Complicated": A Review of Melvyn P. Leffler, *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920–2015*

Gretchen Heefner

In a recent opinion piece in *USA Today*, Melvyn P. Leffler weighed in on some of today's most pressing issues. Leffler wrote not about North Korea or Iran, as one might expect from a renowned diplomatic historian, but about taxes. The current administration's plan to cut corporate taxes, Leffler declared, is "crazy." The U.S. government needs more money, not less; programs need to be funded, not starved. "We Americans," Leffler concluded, "need to get a grip on reality."[1*]

There is actually a link between Leffler's take on taxation and his scholarship on U.S. foreign policy. In fact, the opinion piece would be a fitting final chapter for Leffler's newest book, *Safeguarding Capitalist Democracy*. This volume is a compilation of eleven essays, all previously published, that span his distinguished career. It is really two books in one: it is a sweeping interpretation of twentieth-century American foreign policy, and an intimate reminiscence about the nature and purpose of historical inquiry.

I should note that nowhere in this volume does Leffler actually mention corporate taxes. But his recent opinion article on the subject is indicative of the complexity and sophistication of his approach to the foreign policy, core values, and national security of the United States. Taxes matter because they are an important component of domestic stability, and, as Leffler writes, the "credibility of the system at home . . . is as important as credibility of commitments abroad" (27). Moreover, the opinion piece emphasizes Leffler's increasing interest in advocacy and in using the tools of history to weigh in on the issues of today.

While the individual essays in *Safeguarding Capitalist Democracy* are worth revisiting on their own merits, the volume is most interesting and fresh when read in one broad sweep. Of particular note are the brief, retrospective explanations at the beginning of each essay (or chapter) and of Leffler's new introduction (titled, appropriately, "Embracing Complexity"). These recent additions transform what could have been merely a string of scholarly essays into a vivid and compelling intellectual journey.

The volume is also a carefully curated teaching text. Leffler frequently signals lessons he has learned and dispenses advice. The introductory essay and chapter openings are filled with morsels of wisdom: how to deal with academic disappointment; the travails of publishing in academic journals; the importance of mining new archival materials; the utility of real-world experience in developing empathy; how to chart a middle road through scholarly disagreements—the list goes on.

Indeed, the real contribution of this volume is what it shows us about the *practice* of history: how and why a historian's perceptions, customs, and interpretations have evolved over a long career. Leffler's trajectory reminds us that history is an iterative and collaborative process, a plodding work of discovery and interpretation that can lead to unexpected results. This review will therefore focus on what is new in the book—the lessons and ideas about history that emerge when *Safeguarding Capitalist Democracy* is read as the sum of its parts.

The volume can be broken roughly into three sections that track Leffler's professional development and intellectual interests. The first three essays (chapters 1–3) represent Leffler's earliest writings on interwar foreign policy. All three are models for graduate students on how to frame an argument, enter into contemporaneous historical conversations, and mobilize evidence to answer a particular question. In each essay Leffler's strategy is similar: he tests prevailing views and charts his own course—usually down the middle.

For example, when Leffler was in graduate school the open door thesis was popular. Leffler was attracted to its interpretive power, but wary of its ubiquity. Chapter 1, "The Origins of Republican Debt Policy, 1921–1923" (originally published in 1972), uses a specific case study—war debt repayment—to test the open door idea. While economics were important, Leffler finds, domestic considerations were even more so when shaping congressional legislation over war debts.

Similarly, in chapter 3, "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism: American Policy toward Western Europe, 1921–1933," Leffler examines what popular theories of the interwar period (listed in the essay's title) best characterized U.S. policy toward Western Europe in the 1920s. His conclusion: it's complicated. No theory quite captures how pragmatic and opportunistic Republican officials could be.

This intellectual ecumenicalism and quest for nuance only deepens as Leffler moves from concerns with interwar foreign policy to debates about the origins of the Cold War. The three essays of section two (chapters 4–6), all written in the mid-1980s, deal with how and why United States policy shifted so dramatically after World War Two. Here Leffler shows himself a more assertive scholar. Rather than dipping his toe gently into scholarly discussions, he dives into arguments about the origins of the Cold War. Like anyone involved in this particular debate, he took his knocks. His work was alternately labeled revisionist and realist; he was criticized by each side in turn. At points, Leffler admits, the criticism "stung." But it also made his

work stronger. Here, too, is another important lesson about the nature of historical inquiry: good criticism is vital. It sharpens arguments, forces another look at evidence, and demands that we imagine alternate outcomes.

Chapter 6, "Adherence to Agreements," is a pivot point. Although it is also about the Cold War, it is the first time in the volume that Leffler engages directly with questions of contemporary relevance. The reader can see Leffler grapple with broader issues about the impact of history on foreign policy, the power of misplaced ideas, and the importance of constantly reinterpreting what we think we know.

When he wrote this article in 1986, Leffler's immediate concern was how officials in the Reagan administration were using allegations of Soviet noncompliance with arms limitation agreements to scuttle existing treaties and commitments. He sees a precedent for such actions: in the years just after World War II, he argues, everyone was violating international agreements. In the 1940s, the Americans were particularly adept at using Soviet noncompliance as a smokescreen for their own unilateralism. Leffler used "Adherence to Agreements" to warn Reagan-era policymakers about the temptation of a "self-righteous hypocrisy" that endangers compromise and distracts from real national security concerns.

Leffler is even more explicitly prescriptive in chapter 10, "Austerity and U.S. Strategy" (published in 2014). Through four case studies he demonstrates that contrary to expectations, austerity can be quite good for U.S. interests around the world. It leads to creativity and realistic options. It imposes discipline on policymakers who might otherwise be prone to expansive planning. From a practical point of view, it focuses attention on economic health rather than military supremacy, and it cautions against military adventurism. What are the "appropriate lessons to be learned?" Leffler asks at the end of "Austerity." The big one is that the real source of American national security is economic vitality at home, not military power or reach abroad.

Indeed, the final five essays of *Safeguarding Capitalist Democracy*, including "Austerity," all focus on the post-Cold War world and follow the lead of "Adherence to Agreements." If, as Leffler writes, "the mystic chords of memory" run "deep and long" (280), then figuring out how they function, where they lead people astray, and how to correct misinformation, are important. The end of the Cold War seemed to have crystallized Leffler's thinking about the importance of memory and the role of historians in assessing U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter 7, "Victory," is a cautionary tale about how the standard myth of who "won" the Cold War has dangerous implications. The myth lauds free-market capitalism while ignoring—or purposefully erasing—the state. The reality, Leffler argues, is more complicated: the West "won" because its governments created successful democratic capitalist societies. The partnership between state and citizenry was vital to victory, not secondary. More damning, Leffler writes, the erasure of the state has led to hubris and misaligned priorities. As he urges in the introduction, "officials must recognize that full employment, income fairness, educational opportunity, health insurance, and security in old age are the prerequisites for a satisfied citizenry" (27).

It is not much of a leap to imagine where corporate tax cuts fit into this equation. If national security is truly about protecting core values, then those core values must be supported and fostered. As Leffler recounts, this is something that policymakers in the 1920s grappled with when they contemplated World War I debt repayment. When policymakers are unable to maintain a credible system at home, foreign policy becomes meaningless. To that end, Leffler writes that instead of cutting corporate taxes, "[w]e need to spur economic growth by cutting the burden on workers and middle class Americans, boosting the burden on the wealthy, and stimulating overall demand."

Given that this book is in part an intellectual autobiography, I am disappointed that in revisiting older writings and in crafting his own introduction, Leffler did not take more time to comment on the paths not taken, or the paths since taken by others. In not doing so, he missed a chance to engage with a wider audience of scholars interested in U.S. relations with the rest of the world outside the high politics of Washington, D.C. Chapter 11, "National Security," nods to this potential. Leffler writes that the articulation of core values depends on domestic realities and constituents. As a result, attention to things such as religion, ideology, and culture are important. Indeed, if, as Leffler asserts, individual judgment matters (and from his discussion of George W. Bush in chapter 9, it seems it does) then how individuals arrive at decisions matters as much as the international milieu in which they operate.

I would have liked Leffler to extend the intellectual journey forward a bit and to imagine where and how new scholarship might push his ideas even further. This is not merely a criticism about a few footnotes. It gets to the heart of Leffler's larger query about how historians can, in fact, make their lessons of the past relevant to policymakers and people today. If core values are about preserving the "American way of life," then demonstrating how that way of life is influenced and altered by the operation of U.S. foreign policy might be a way to more firmly engage with an audience outside the ivory tower.

This is, of course, really a quibble with where one could take this material, not with what is here. The volume amply demonstrates how Leffler has always sought more complete and satisfying means of answering the central question of his career: why do U.S. policymakers act the way they do? In the end, his conclusions are about as satisfying as all historically honest ones: it's complicated. Historians have to be comfortable with ambiguity, finding more questions than certainties. But for Leffler this ambiguity does not mean futility. On the contrary, the ultimate point of this volume is that history—or more precisely, the work that historians do—matters: something all the more apparent when it is erased and ignored by the people making decisions. "It is worth remembering the past when contemplating the future," he cautioned back in 1986, when officials seemed unwilling to accurately assess the past. Based on his recent opinion piece about taxes, it is safe to assume Leffler believes this even more today.

Note:
1. Melvyn P. Leffler, "Corporate Tax Cuts Are a Crazy Idea. We Need More Money, Not Less." *USA Today*, 9 October 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/10/09/corporate-tax-cuts-crazy-idea-we-need-more-money-not-less-melvyn-leffler-column/729213001/.

Review of Melvyn P. Leffler, *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920–2015*

Kelly J. Shannon

It is a rare treat to read a book like Melvyn Leffler's *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism*. The volume not only provides the insights of one of the most preeminent diplomatic historians on some of the most pressing questions in the field, but it also provides a retrospective of Leffler's long and distinguished career. The book therefore should be read on two levels. Regardless of whether readers accept all of Leffler's claims, he is a giant in U.S. foreign relations history, and the field owes much to his exemplary

body of scholarship. *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism* makes Leffler's significance obvious and offers an exciting window into the evolution of his thinking that we should all find instructive.

This book is neither a monograph nor a comprehensive overview of the history of U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it is a collection of Leffler's wide-ranging journal articles and book chapters published since the early 1970s on various aspects of American policymaking from the 1920s through the post-9/11 period. Although the chapters are organized by the chronology of their subjects, they also appear in roughly chronological order according to original publication date, simultaneously moving the reader through the history of American foreign policy and the history of Leffler himself. The author helpfully provides new introductions to each chapter that explain what he was thinking about at the time he wrote each piece. Many readers no doubt will have read some or all of these essays before, but reading them together allows one truly to grasp the trajectory and importance of Leffler's scholarship as it has evolved over the past several decades.

The most interesting and valuable part of the book may be its introduction. Leffler provides a thoughtful meditation on how and why he came to study U.S. foreign relations history and how the Vietnam War influenced his worldview as a young man. The introduction then walks the reader through Leffler's long and illustrious career, explaining his thought processes and delineating his scholarly influences at each stage. As he explains, he came to see revisionism and realism as complementary and therefore sought to combine both interpretive frameworks in his work. The result, as we know, was some of the most influential and groundbreaking scholarship in the field.

The volume's introduction also details rejected articles and critical reader reports over the years. These passages should provide hope to junior scholars; they prove that even great historians sometimes faced rejection. How Leffler responded to criticism provides a model for others to follow. He recounts how he used these moments as opportunities to learn and improve. "If you have something good, you should stick with it and not get dissuaded by a sequence of rejections," he advises; even "biting critiques" of his work "exerted a tremendous impact on my subsequent research" (11–12, 17). It is unusual that a historian has a chance to provide such an account of his or her own intellectual development. This introduction is therefore invaluable for its glimpse into Leffler's mind. It also does the necessary work of tying the rest of the volume together.

Because of its nature, the volume understandably has no central argument, but some common themes emerge across the chapters that illustrate Leffler's broader analysis of American foreign policy: the importance of having prudent policymakers; the centrality of economic interests in U.S. decision making; and the salience of the concept of national security for both policymakers and historians. While Leffler's interpretations evolved, as did his topical focus and methodology, his appreciation for wise decision making remained consistent. The chapters in this volume make this worldview readily apparent and also show Leffler's relentless pursuit of answers to difficult questions about U.S. policymaking, like why the United States pursued contradictory policies toward Europe during the interwar period, why and how the Cold War began, and what lessons policymakers should learn from the Cold War.

The first three chapters, all published in the 1970s, investigate U.S. policy toward Europe between 1920 and 1933. Collectively, they reveal how Republican policymakers like Herbert Hoover were not isolationist, overly concerned with promoting the Open Door, or ignorant of the true reality of international affairs, as earlier historians had claimed. Instead, according to Leffler, these policymakers were pragmatists who sought "to promote European stability and American self-interest. Their dilemma was to accomplish this foreign policy goal without sacrificing domestic economic and political objectives and without involving the United States in European political and territorial controversies that were considered unrelated to vital American interests" (80).

Today, it is common wisdom that U.S. isolationism after World War I is a myth, but that was not the case at the time Leffler wrote these articles. These chapters demonstrate how Leffler's well-researched and persuasively argued scholarship made a crucial contribution to advancing a nuanced understanding of just how engaged Americans were in European affairs during the interwar period.

Today, it is common wisdom that U.S. isolationism after World War I is a myth, but that was not the case at the time Leffler wrote these articles. These chapters demonstrate how Leffler's well-researched and persuasively argued scholarship made a crucial contribution to advancing a nuanced understanding of just how engaged Americans were in European affairs during the interwar period.

Leffler's arguments in these early chapters are well supported but cautiously advanced; the reader can trace his increasing confidence as his claims become bolder over the course of the volume. Its middle section, chapters 4 through 6, examines the early Cold War and moves the reader into 1980s Leffler. These chapters investigate why U.S. policymakers were so concerned with the Soviet Union after World War II; why they focused attention on Turkey during the early Cold War; and how and why they deployed accusations that the Soviets violated wartime accords such as the Yalta agreements.

Chapter 4 in particular manifests Leffler's burgeoning interest in the concept of national security, a concept that would become a hallmark of his scholarship. Drawing on what were at the time newly declassified U.S. military records, which were underutilized by historians of U.S. foreign relations, Leffler argued that the Truman administration did not believe that a Soviet attack was imminent. Instead, American policymakers feared losing Eurasia because of "economic and political conditions throughout Europe and Asia." Their clear-eyed appraisals of the "prospects of famine, disease, anarchy, and revolution" in the aftermath of the war led them to conclude that "communist parties could exploit the distress" in these nations (140). Thus, based on their careful weighing of the national interest, American policymakers identified key economic and strategic goals—ranging from creating a system of overseas U.S. bases to rebuilding the Western European economy—that would prevent Eurasia from turning to communism. Chapters 5 and 6 advance similar appraisals that U.S. policies during the early Cold War were carefully considered.

The final section of the book contains Leffler's publications since 9/11 and centers on the post-Cold War period. Chapters 7 through 10 examine why the West won the Cold War and the role of the state in that victory; the influence of the fall of the Berlin Wall on the foreign policy approaches of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush; the continuities between George W. Bush's foreign policy and earlier U.S. policies; and the impact of military budget cuts on U.S. strategy. The volume then ends, appropriately, with the most recent version of Leffler's iconic essay "National Security" from *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*.[1]

These later chapters may be the least familiar to readers, and they contain perhaps the most provocative arguments in the volume. This section is also less archivally grounded

and more impressionistic than his earlier work, which is understandable given the relative paucity of declassified documents from this era. Most of these chapters are characteristically strong, but they did leave me with questions.

Chapter 9, which centers on the Bush administration's September 2002 National Security Strategy Statement, is puzzling. The NSSS alarmed many with its calls for preemptive war, but Leffler asserts that "none of this is really revolutionary. Preemptive military action is not new" (285). He contends that earlier events like Kennedy's blockade of Cuba, Lyndon Johnson's invasion of the Dominican Republic, and the Vietnam War were "preventative in nature," but he does not explain his reasoning to my satisfaction (289). How were these events preventative or preemptive? How were they akin to the NSSS and the resulting Iraq War? Leffler's assertion that "Bush's rhetoric and action have deep roots in the history of American foreign policy" would be more convincing if he had linked Bush's policies to a different type of precedent—U.S. imperialism, for instance, or presidents manufacturing reasons for war (283). Polk's 1846 claim that Mexico had "shed American blood on American soil" and the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident come to mind.[2]

The Clinton administration attempted to reorient U.S. priorities toward common global concerns and transnational phenomena, ranging from environmental issues to population and development to human rights. That his first secretary of state, Warren Christopher, was a human rights advocate and his second, Madeleine Albright, was a feminist (and the first woman to hold the position) indicated that a policy shift was underway.

Chapter 8 raises other challenging questions. Leffler argues that George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush's differing understandings of the legacy of the end of the Cold War deeply influenced their approach to foreign policymaking. In a nod to the cultural turn, Leffler seeks to examine "how the discourse of the events of 1989 and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall assumed distinctive meanings and shaped distinctive policies in the United States" (247). He concludes that the elder Bush's and Clinton's understandings of 1989 caused them to adopt prudent and cautious approaches, whereas George W. Bush characterized the end of the Cold War as the triumph of "freedom" to justify his reckless wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Adopting a realist perspective, the author sees the prudence of the 1990s as superior to W's lack of caution.

This chapter is more a study of presidential rhetoric than discourse, however, and Leffler does not exploit the scholarship that utilizes discourse analysis.[3] While his assessments of both Bush administrations are persuasive, my own research leads to a different reading of Clinton. Leffler characterizes Clinton's foreign policies as basically the continuation of George H. W. Bush's. While there was undoubtedly some continuity, Leffler misses the distinction between Clinton's approach to foreign policy—including his definition of national security—and his predecessor's.

The Clinton administration attempted to reorient U.S. priorities toward common global concerns and transnational phenomena, ranging from environmental issues to population and development to human rights. That his first secretary of state, Warren Christopher, was a human rights advocate and his second, Madeleine Albright, was a feminist (and the first woman to hold the position) indicated that a policy shift was underway. As administration officials declared repeatedly during Clinton's two terms, they saw issues such as women's rights as very much in the U.S. national interest. Clinton also reorganized the State Department by creating new bureaus under the Office of Global Affairs that were dedicated to issues that did not fit into State's existing regional bureaus: Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime; Population, Refugees, and Migration; and Oceans, Environment, and Science.[4]

A more comprehensive examination of the administration's policy statements and actions would reveal that the rapidly changing post-Cold War international system, as well as his own inclinations, caused Clinton to redefine national security in innovative ways that went beyond traditional economic and strategic concerns. Although Leffler recommends reexamining traditional assumptions about national security in the essay that concludes this volume, it seems to me that he does not do so sufficiently when writing about the early post-Cold War era and the transition from the first Bush administration to Clinton's.

These are minor flaws, however, in an excellent and important book. When reading the volume as a retrospective of Leffler's career, one can trace the development of his highly influential methodologies and interpretations, particularly his use of the concept of national security. Seeing Leffler's scholarly evolution laid out in one volume makes his commendable consistency over several decades apparent. This is a strength, but it also raises questions—which I do not intend as a criticism of Leffler—about how much we individual historians change our interpretations, methodologies, and worldviews over time.

Since the start of Leffler's career, the field of U.S. foreign relations history (and even the name of the field) has changed dramatically. The final chapter, "National Security," explains that change, and the difference between this version of the essay and Leffler's 1991 and 2004 versions underscores just how much Leffler himself has changed. In his 1995 SHAFR presidential address, he criticized the cultural turn and described his skepticism about the utility of applying newer approaches, like gender or linguistic analysis, to diplomatic history.[5] In the 2016 version of "National Security," Leffler makes room for these methods: "The national security approach . . . should be conceived as perfectly congruent with the new directions of scholarship that dwell on culture, identity, religion, and emotion . . . because they help to illuminate the construction, meaning, and implications of America's core values" (330–31). However, this remarkable expansion in his viewpoint is less explicit in the preceding chapters.

Leffler's approach has transformed a great deal over time, but this volume raises fundamental questions about how the field evolves. How much change in the field is driven by individual historians' evolving interpretations and approaches? How much is driven by new people entering the field and examining history in new ways? How much is driven by new evidence or the redefinition of what constitutes evidence? Leffler's collection of essays shows the soaring heights of an important scholar's career, but it should also prompt us to assess our own scholarly journeys.

Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism is invaluable. It is a delight to read and underscores why Leffler is a titan in the field. His calls for prudent decision making are perhaps more necessary now than ever before. While all historians—and, one can hope, policymakers too—can learn from this volume, it would work particularly well in a graduate seminar and for undergraduates in a diplomatic history or methods course. It offers many things at once: exemplary scholarship on U.S. policy since 1920; a model of how to employ methodologies like economic analysis and national security approaches; a rare behind-the-scenes understanding of a deservedly renowned historian's career; and a prompt for each of us to reflect on how we practice our craft. It is a special kind of book, and I wish more senior

scholars will have the opportunity to publish books like it.

Notes:
1. Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations,* 3rd ed., eds. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge, UK, 2016), 25–41. See also Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK, 2004); and Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, UK, 1991).
2. Starting in 2002, John Lewis Gaddis controversially advanced arguments similar to Leffler's about the Bush Doctrine. See John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy* (November-December 2002); and John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).
3. For examples, see Frank Costigliola, "Reading for Meaning," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed., eds. Hogan and Paterson, 279*–303; Frank Costigliola, "'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration': Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War," *Journal of American History 83*, no. 4 (March 1997): 1309–39; Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945,* updated ed. (Berkeley, CA, 2005); Frank Ninkovich, "Interests and Discourse in Diplomatic History," *Diplomatic History* 13, no. 3 (April 1989): *135*–61; Emily S. Rosenberg, "Commentary: The Cold War and the Discourse of National Security," *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 2 (April 1993): 277–84; and Emily S. Rosenberg, "Rescuing Women and Children," *Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (2002): 456–65.
4. "History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993–2001)," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/c6059.htm; Karen Garner, *Gender & Foreign Policy in the Clinton Administration* (Boulder, CO, 2013); and Kelly J. Shannon, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Muslim Women's Human Rights* (Philadelphia, PA, 2017), 125–57.
5. Melvyn P. Leffler, "Presidential Address: New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations," *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 2 (March 1995): 173–96.

Review of Melvyn Leffler, *Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920–2015*

Campbell Craig

It is a bit unclear what Melvyn Leffler, one of the giants of U.S. Cold War historiography over the past forty years, intends with the present volume. On one hand, it is a straightforward reprint of some of his most important articles and chapters since the 1970s, with a relatively brief introduction outlining his intellectual journey and no new conclusion at all. On the other, there are inklings of a larger aim: to use his previous work as a means of bringing together and illustrating his thinking about Cold War historiography and, in particular, the concept of national security in the history of U.S. foreign policy.

As a compendium of some of his key work the book serves an evident purpose: to provide students of U.S. foreign policy with a useful overview of his writing in one book. It begins with a lively introductory memoir, taking us from his undergraduate days during the Vietnam War (Leffler is refreshingly candid about his ambivalent politics then), through his Ph.D. work, his transition from historian of U.S. foreign policy during the interwar period to Cold War historian, and his critical work on American diplomacy after the Cold War.

I am sure that I am not the only reader who was hoping for a little more in the way of historiographical fireworks. Leffler mentions the critique of his pathbreaking 1984 article on the origins of the Cold War (reprinted in the volume) by established historians such as John Lewis Gaddis,[1] but he does not really delve into the debate; nor has he chosen to reprint the essay in the first edition of *America and the World* (1995) in which he responds to Michael Hunt's and Bruce Cumings's critique of Cold War "post-revisionism."[2] Leffler's response to Cumings's attack on mainstream national security scholarship is one of the best and most forceful things he has written, in my opinion, and while he mentions this debate briefly in his introduction (I will return to the point he makes there presently) I was disappointed not to see it featured.

The rest of the book consists of reprints of articles and chapters Leffler has written since the 1970s. Included here are his early works on U.S. policy during the 1920s and '30s, the aforementioned article on the Cold War from the *American Historical Review* (when that journal still accepted pieces on foreign policy), and several pieces on U.S. foreign relations after the Cold War, a topic on which Leffler has been a critic of neoconservative ideology and the disastrous policies of the George W. Bush administration.

To those unfamiliar with Leffler's writing I can recommend all these chapters, in particular the *AHR* article and the 2004 piece on continuity in U.S. foreign policy after 9/11 (though I personally do not agree with the argument here). They provide an interesting "primary document" of Cold War historiography over the past decades; and they show how historians are inevitably affected by events, theories, and even simple vocational circumstances, not just new archival evidence, in their intellectual evolution.

Nevertheless, the purpose of reprinting the chapters verbatim is not clear to me. I would presume that, like me, many scholars interested in this book will already have read most or all of them, and in these days of instant computer access to almost everything it is not as though they would otherwise be unavailable. The chapters were not updated or revised, which is unimportant for the latter work but a bit strange for the early pieces. It is odd to read a footnote referring to "recent work" published more than thirty years ago (see, for example, footnotes 2–4, pp. 119–21). I believe I own all Leffler's books (including a very beat-up copy of *A Preponderance of Power*), and I am happy to have a copy of this one as well, but I would have liked to see more original material and argumentation in it.

As he discusses in the introductory chapter, Leffler has carved out a niche in U.S. Cold War historiography as a practitioner of the "national security approach" to the subject, which in IR parlance is roughly equivalent to realism. His take on U.S. foreign policy, particularly in *Preponderance of Power* but also in his broader, episodic Cold War history, *For the Soul of Mankind*, and his co-authored edited volumes with IR theorist Jeffrey Legro,[3] is certainly more critical of American diplomacy than that of some other historians who focus on national security, but it all retains the realist assumption that policymakers in Washington were ultimately concerned with protecting the United States and its core values (i.e., "democratic capitalism") and that their errors stemmed from overreaction, foolishness, and poor judgment rather than ulterior motivations.

Nevertheless, Leffler argues that his relatively critical approach to U.S. national security policy represents, as he says on several occasions, a blend of "revisionism and realism." It is on this point that I find his larger conceptualization unclear. What does he mean by "revisionism"? That term is normally understood in U.S. diplomatic historiography as a Marxian[4] interpretation that characterizes American actions abroad as expansionist and explains them in terms of the imperatives of U.S. capitalist interests. For revisionists, the stated pursuit of national security serves as a cover for, or at the very least is secondary to, what is really happening, which is the pursuit of markets, labor, resources, hegemony, and the destruction of resistance to capitalism.

But it is clear that for Leffler, it is not this kind of revisionism that complements his realism. As he states

in the book, recounting his conclusions in *Preponderance of Power*, U.S. officials were "not primarily seeking to promote democracy or penetrate foreign markets" (he reiterates this argument in other chapters here and elsewhere). Insofar as capitalism plays a role in U.S. foreign policy, it is a component of what the United States is trying to protect, a core feature of its way of life, not the driving factor behind it.

There is nothing in this position that cannot be classified as 100 percent realist. Realism readily incorporates the idea of protecting core national values, including economic systems. As long as the goal is *protection* of these values in a dangerous world, an aim in which the physical survival of the state is necessary but not sufficient, then realists are happy to sign on.[5] If something other than national security, however broadly defined, plays a causational role, then one moves away from realism, but Leffler does not make that move.

If one of the goals of the pursuit of national security, the protection of democratic capitalism at home, is not an aim that any revisionist would see as fundamental, then what else about Leffler's take is revisionist? As far as I can tell, what he might also mean when he labels himself a revisionist is that he offers general criticisms of some aspects of U.S. security policy, most notably its inconsistencies since World War Two and the ongoing fiascos since the end of the Cold War. Why, he asks, has there been no coherent and consistent American strategy of protecting democratic capitalism? And what explains American foreign policy during the last fifteen years or so, with its purposeless and incessant wars and its "ominous overassertion of American power"?

The revisionists would have their own ready answer to these questions, of course, but if one rejects their argument that capitalism is the underlying cause, then a larger explanation becomes trickier. One answer, and the one Leffler seems to prefer, is atheoretical: the inconsistencies and recent disasters of U.S. foreign policy stem from foolish decisions, hubris, good intentions gone awry, the excessive influence of aggressive ideologies such as neoconservatism, and other "unit-level" factors that have to do with actual people making bad choices.

There is nothing wrong with this kind of idiographic explanation as such, but it does further weaken Leffler's claim that he is a revisionist. The problem with relying on unit-level explanation to solve puzzles like the one above is that it accepts, by definition, that better choices could have been made: people could have made wise rather than foolish decisions, officials could have resisted the temptation of hubris, less militaristic ideologies could have prevailed, and so the poor policymaking Leffler identifies could have been avoided. This is an inescapable problem: either they could have avoided these kinds of mistakes, in which case the policies Leffler criticizes would not have happened and there would be no reason for the other kind of revisionism at all; or they *could not* have avoided these kinds of mistakes, which means that there must be something about U.S. foreign policy, or American politics more generally, that makes officials prone to them.

Revisionists of the original kind can avoid contending with this second possibility by sticking to a Marxian determinist argument that in the end, capitalism is to blame, and the United States is only its agent. During their 1960s heyday many revisionists departed from that position and adopted an overtly anti-American stance, as Leffler himself relates in his account of his undergraduate days, but that was more about the Vietnam War and fashionable radicalism than the logic of Marxian revisionism.

Realists, however, cannot avoid contending with it. States are not supposed to pursue policies that damage their own security. If they do, realists must identify something that explains the adoption of those policies without undermining the larger assumption that security is the primary goal of all states—without, in other words, undermining realism.

There is an explanation that many realists, from George Kennan to John Mearsheimer, have resorted to in order to deal with this problem. Maybe, as Kennan lamented more times than can be counted (and as Fredrik Logevall and I argue in our book, *America's Cold War*[6]), there is something about U.S. domestic politics that accounts for America's inconsistent and overreactive foreign policy, and its incentivizing of threat inflation and fear-mongering. As this interpretation is not evident in the book under review or in others of his works I have read, I am pretty sure that Leffler does not accept this argument. But he does not provide an alternative conceptual explanation that explains the problems he identifies. Perhaps the explanation is that American officials have simply made many foolish decisions. That is fine, and certainly true, but it is neither a revisionist explanation, nor, really, a realist one either.

Notes:
1. See the forum on Leffler's article in *American Historical Review* 89 (April 1984), with a comment from John Lewis Gaddis and Leffler's reply.
2. See Michael Hogan, ed., *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (Cambridge, UK, 1995), especially chaps. 2, 3 and 5.
3. See their introduction, "Navigating the Unknown," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., *In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11* (Ithaca, NY, 2011). Also see Leffler and Legro, eds., To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine (New York, 2008).
4. By "Marxian" I mean a scholarly approach that regards capitalist economic interests as primary in explaining politics. Many U.S. foreign relations revisionists were not themselves Marxists, but did employ a Marxian analytic framework. For a recent example from an IR theorist who is certainly not a Marxist, see Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions* (Ithaca, NY, 2006). Thanks to Fred Logevall for comments on this matter.
5. The classic realist text here is Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, UK, 1981). Also see Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York, 1944) and, for the perspective of a realist policymaker, Dwight Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (New York, 1965). For an argument that the United States may have to decide between its core economic interests and its continued domination of the contemporary international political order (and that it should choose the latter), see Nuno Monteiro, *Theory of Unipolar Politics* (Cambridge, UK, 2014).
6. Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, MA, 2009).

Author's Response

Melvyn P. Leffler

I want to thank Andy Johns for organizing this roundtable. I would also like to express my appreciation to Princeton University Press for affording me the opportunity to publish this rather unusual book of essays.

I appreciate the succinct and expert ways in which Gretchen Heefner, Kelly Shannon, and Chester Pach summarize the aims of the book. As they note, I try to do several things. First, I try to provide answers to some of the most perplexing questions in twentieth-century American foreign policy. Why, for example, did the Republicans in the 1920s reject collective security commitments as well as a hegemonic role for the United States in the international political economy? Why did the Cold War occur? Why did the United States win the Cold War? Did 9/11 transform U.S. foreign policy? Is budgetary austerity bad for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy? Second, I seek to interrogate and reflect

on the evolution of my own thinking about U.S. foreign policy. Third, I try to underscore some lessons that might be extrapolated from studying the past and illuminate the importance of those insights for understanding the present. That is precisely what I tried to do in the op-ed piece that Heefner so kindly mentions at the beginning of her commentary.

It is very rewarding to read such positive comments about the volume. The reviewers note that it contains some familiar essays, but they also highlight some of the contributions that appeared in relatively obscure collections, especially the essay entitled "Victory: The 'State,' the West, and the Cold War" and the lecture I gave on "Austerity and U.S. Strategy." At the same time, they raise some important questions about my writings and the evolution of my thinking.

Kelly Shannon asks whether there is a central argument to the book. The answer is yes: I try to underscore how and why I gravitated toward a "national security" interpretation, one that integrates and synthesizes elements of revisionism and realism, embraces complexity, and highlights the importance of preserving core values from external threats. Shannon also focuses on some of the chapters that deal with post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy. She suggests that I exaggerate the continuities between George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton and correctly notes that Clinton tried to reorient the country toward more global and transnational concerns, such as protecting the environment and safeguarding human rights.

The new global and transnational issues (and the organizational changes that accompanied them) did not supplant traditional economic and strategic concerns. Nor did they absorb anywhere near the time or command anywhere near the resources that were bestowed on traditional issues like the development of the military budget, the configuration of forces, initiatives related to counter-proliferation, the making of trade policy, the identification of terrorist threats, and decisions about whether or not to intervene in places like Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. And despite all the talk, the Clinton administration's record in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia belied the rhetorical tropes about human rights.

I would still claim, however, that the continuities dwarf the discontinuities. The new global and transnational issues (and the organizational changes that accompanied them) did not supplant traditional economic and strategic concerns. Nor did they absorb anywhere near the time or command anywhere near the resources that were bestowed on traditional issues like the development of the military budget, the configuration of forces, initiatives related to counter-proliferation, the making of trade policy, the identification of terrorist threats, and decisions about whether or not to intervene in places like Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. And despite all the talk, the Clinton administration's record in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia belied the rhetorical tropes about human rights.

Although Shannon is right to stress my emphasis on the continuity of policy after 9/11, I do not overlook the precedents in the long history of U.S. imperialism. I write (285–86) that when Theodore Roosevelt "justified intervention in the Caribbean and Central America, it was explicitly a preemptive form of intervention," one that Samuel Flagg Bemis long ago labeled as "protective imperialism." I agree with her: the roots of preemption are long and deep.

Shannon and Gretchen Heefner make the larger point—a good one—that I do not sufficiently engage "with the world outside of high politics." Although in recent years I have woven issues of religion, identity, and culture into my thinking as I have grappled with the concept of core values, these matters have not constituted dominant themes in my writings. Heefner notes the reason: my central focus has always been on why policymakers acted as they did. Consequently, I have grappled with the role of emotions and memory, especially as they affected threat perception. For example, in explaining the differences between policy after World War I and after World War II, in interpreting the origins of the Cold War, and in analyzing the reactions to 9/11 by the George W. Bush administration, I stress the role of fear and of threat perception more than most authors.

As Chester Pach so rightly says, my focus has been on integrating human agency, structure, and contingency. This effort, he correctly writes, encouraged me "to forge a new synthesis from existing interpretive lenses, one that included as well the three levels of analysis on which international relations scholars rely—the individual, the state, and the international system." Like other smart commentators over the years, Pach seems to have his reservations about this approach. It is "vague," he writes, but it "offers useful, if obvious advice."

I appreciate this observation. In my introductory comments to the chapter on "national security," I acknowledge that the definition is vague, but I argue that its very ambiguity is its strength: "As understood by U.S. officials," I write, "national security was a dynamic, changing concept, responding to the evolution of threat abroad and the definition of core values at home. Core values themselves were elusive, forcing historians and scholars of international relations to discover and analyze precisely what interests, ideals, or values policymakers most wanted to defend. Similarly, external threats existed in the eyes of beholders; different observers perceived danger in dramatically different ways." And I point out that the "intensity of perceived threats might drastically influence the means embraced to pursue new (or old) goals." This framework, I conclude, "integrates external and internal developments and obligates analysts to illuminate how national security itself is a constructed concept" (317–18). The point I wish to reiterate here is that "national security" is not an interpretation of American foreign policy; rather, it offers a framework for studying the policymaking process.

Campbell Craig's comments are of a different nature. He says the goals of the book are not clear. He writes that there is only a "brief" introduction and no conclusion. He does not mention that there is a preface to the book that specifically states the objectives of the volume. The introduction, moreover, is not "brief"; it is twenty-seven pages. He disregards the new prefatory comments to each chapter that seek to contextualize each article or essay. And although there is no "new" conclusion, most readers of the preface, introduction, and contextualizing notes will readily understand why the essay on "national security" serves as an apt conclusion.

Craig is disappointed that there are not more "historiographical fireworks." He misses the point of the book. The volume is not intended to re-wage old historiographical controversies. It seeks to do something different. It is intended to interrogate and reflect on my own historiographical journey. That is why the chapters are not updated. I battle here with my own uncertainties, changing impulses, conflicting evidence, and intellectual challenges, and I struggle to explain why I made the choices I did at particular times in my career. Over the years I have done enough arguing with friends and foes, much of which is chronicled in the introduction; at this point it seemed more rewarding to reflect on the battles I have fought within my own mind.

Craig complains that I call myself a "revisionist." Here again, he is mistaken. My book explains how revisionism

shaped my thinking, but I explicitly write that "as I reassessed where I positioned myself in the interpretive wars about the origins of the Cold War, I realized that, unknowingly, I was marrying revisionism and realism" (19). And a few pages later, I write that "in my evolving thinking, revisionism and realism were not alternative interpretive frames, but complementary" (25).

Craig seems perplexed that I think revisionism remains an important ingredient of my approach, although not its defining character. He does not seem to realize that, according to the Wisconsin revisionists, the concern for the "system" was the driving force behind American foreign policy. Policymakers believed that industrial transformation and overproduction generated economic turmoil, social unrest, and political ferment that threatened the fundamentals of the American system of democratic capitalism.

In the preface to the twenty-fifth-anniversary edition of *The New Empire,* Walter LaFeber succinctly states that "the main thesis is that U.S. policymakers' great fear of domestic violence and radicalism, emerging out of the depression, drove them to the conclusion that imperialism was preferable to domestic reform (and economic redistribution) as a device to quell the danger" (xxv, xxix [1988]). They were "not economically motivated in the pocketbook sense," emphasizes William A. Williams in his iconic text, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* "Wanting democracy and social peace," he explains, "they argued that economic depression threatened those objectives, and concluded that overseas economic expansion provided a primary means of ending that danger" (30 [rev. ed., 1962]).

I share with these revisionists the view that the desire to preserve the fundamentals of democratic capitalism at home shaped American foreign policy. Where I came to disagree with them was in my assessment of the threat. I came to assign less importance to the domestic economic sources—overproduction—than to the external threats emanating from autarchy, aggression, and terrorism. I explain this at considerable length in the introduction to the book. But while embracing elements of "realism," based on perceptions of external threat, I still believed, as did the revisionists, that safeguarding democratic capitalism was the overriding goal—hence the title of the book.

In another way I am much like the revisionists. Like them, I do not see public opinion as the determinative factor in shaping foreign policy, which is the point that Craig most wants to argue. Like the revisionists, I consider public opinion part of a complex mix. This is evident in several of the chapters in my book that deal with war debts, Herbert Hoover, and 9/11. Like the revisionists, I see ideas, economic impulses, values, and perceptions as more important in most though not all circumstances. Here again I am inclined to agree with Walter LaFeber in *The New Empire:* "U.S. policymakers were pushed and pulled not by public opinion or Congress but by their own sophisticated worldviews" (xix [1988]).

Craig seems to think that revisionism "is a Marxian interpretation," although he then qualifies this in his footnote, correctly stating that "many U.S. foreign relations revisionists were not themselves Marxists." But by equating revisionism with Marxism (in this roundtable), he minimizes the provocative, tantalizing, and eclectic mix of ideas, beliefs, ideals, perceptions, and, most importantly, economic interests, that constituted the core of Wisconsin revisionism. Policy, wrote Williams on page two of the 1962 edition of *Tragedy,* "was not caused by purposeful malice, callous indifference, or ruthless and predatory exploitation. American leaders were not evil men. They did not conceive and execute some dreadful conspiracy. Nor were they treacherous hypocrites. They believed deeply in the ideals they proclaimed and their rhetoric as applied to the United States had substantial relation to the facts."

Revisionism, in fact, inspired me to think and rethink the roles of ideas, values, institutions, economic interests, and perceptions in the making of American foreign policy. Revisionism, as I recount in my introduction, impelled me to look at evidence closely; and the evidence, as I read it, encouraged me to abandon the artificial binary between realism and revisionism.

I want to thank my commentators for forcing me yet again to reflect on these matters. Writing history, however arduous (along with extrapolating meaningful lessons, however elusive), seems more important today, when the future of our way of life appears imperiled by threats from within as well as beyond our borders than it has ever been.

SHAFR 2018 Annual Meeting

The 2018 SHAFR annual meeting
will be held from June 21-23
at the Sheraton Society Hill in Philadelphia.

We hope you will join us there!

The Program Committee is excited to announce the conference plenary session "Is the United States a Revolutionary Power?" The session will feature **Amy Greenberg** (Pennsylvania State University), **Adriane Lentz-Smith** (Duke University), **Jack Rakove** (Stanford University), **Adam Tooze** (Columbia University), and be moderated by **Alan McPherson** (Temple University and Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy)

The conference will also feature sessions exploring war and consumer culture, presidential policy-making, capitalism's role in American foreign relations, technology's influence on the same, the art and science of writing and publishing a second monograph, and many others.

The 2018 keynote, co-sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, will be a Conversation with **General David H. Petraeus**, U.S. Army (Retired), Member, KKR and Chairman, KKR Global Institute. The conversation will be moderated by **Lt. Colonel John Nagl**, D.Phil., U.S. Army (Retired), Headmaster, The Haverford School. This keynote will take place at the Friday luncheon.

The Presidential luncheon address will be delivered at the Saturday luncheon by SHAFR President **Peter Hahn**, Professor of History and Divisional Dean of Arts and Humanities at The Ohio State University. In his address, Hahn will explore the purpose and mission of SHAFR in light of the challenges posed by our turbulent times.

This year's Friday night social event will be at Moshulu Restaurant. Located at the Penn's Landing Marina, Moshulu serves a classic American cuisine and boasts a stunning view of the Delaware River waterfront. The Moshulu is the "world's oldest and largest square rigged sailing vessel still afloat."

The conference will be held at the Sheraton Society Hill in Philadelphia. To get the SHAFR group rate book here: https://www.starwoodmeeting.com/Book/2018SHAFRannualmeeting

Online registration for the conference and for ticketed events will be available in early April. Tickets for the keynote luncheon, Presidential luncheon, and the social event will be sold separately.

For more details about conference arrangements, visit:
https://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2018-annual-meeting
or follow us on twitter @SHAFRConference.

If you are interested in participating in the job workshop (as a mentor or mentee), volunteering at the registration desk, or for questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Mark Sanchez, Conference Coordinator, at conference@shafr.org.

This is OUR Philadelphia

Welcome to Philadelphia – the City of Brotherly Love. It is indeed lovely. From the Schuylkill River in the west to the Delaware River in the east, and from north to south, Philly brings history to life through authentic period architecture, museums, and cherished artifacts (think Liberty Bell), while offering the innovations and excitement of world class sports teams (2018 Super Bowl winning Eagles!), university hospitals, chef-driven restaurants, and educational and cultural institutions.

EAST

Most of you will be staying at the Sheraton Society Hill adjacent to Old City, which, as the name implies, is where our historic city began. On the cobble-stoned streets, original homes not only still stand but also have been lovingly restored and are occupied by a current generation of Philadelphians. Elfreth's Alley, the oldest street in America, is one of them. Old City is also where you will find, among so much else, Independence Hall, the Liberty Bell, and the city's newest museum, the Museum of the American Revolution. It is a neighborhood that will take you back in time whether you walk it, ride through it in a horse drawn carriage, or settle back on a bench in Washington Square beside the eternal flame.

Continue east, through the historic residential neighborhood of Society Hill, and you will reach the Delaware River, which separates Philadelphia from Camden, New Jersey. Stroll the riverfront, rent a paddle boat, step aboard the U.S.S. *Olympia*, or have a drink at the new and fabulous Spruce Street Pier (We'll all spend Saturday night together aboard the Moshulu). Penn's Landing often features entertainment and outdoor movies. It is also where you can catch a quick ferry to Camden, which now boasts a lively waterfront within walking distance of the Rutgers campus. Take the ferry across the river to visit the New Jersey Aquarium or catch a concert at BB&T Pavilion.

CENTER CITY

As you travel west, and this is easily accomplished by foot, you reach what Philadelphians like to call "Center City." Center City is the business and shopping hub of the city. A walk down Walnut Street will take you past many fine stores and directly into the jewel of Rittenhouse Square. Many days a farmer's market is in full swing.

At the very center, at the crossroads of Broad and Market, sits the magnificent wedding cake of City Hall. Tours are available and encouraged. It is also the crossroads of both subway lines: the Broad Street Line (travelling north/south) and The Market-Frankford line (travelling east/west). Adjacent to City Hall, another outstanding tour can be taken at the Masonic Temple; its lavish rooms are sure to astound you. Between the two is the newly re-opened LOVE Park, so- named because of Robert Indiana's iconic LOVE sculpture, a reliable Philly photo-op.

Just east of City Hall is Reading Terminal Market. If you go nowhere else in Philadelphia, go there. It is a former train terminal long home to a bustling array of food stalls and shops selling everything you would ever want to eat or cook, including Philly favorites like Amish pretzels, local Old City coffee, Metropolitan Bakery breads and cakes, and of course cheese steaks. Other stalls display local crafts and jewelry. Not far from the market is Chinatown, another thriving hub of shops and cuisine.

If you are looking for music or theater or musical-theater, stretching south of City Hall on Broad Street is the Philadelphia Arts District. Here you will find the historic Academy of Music, The Merriam Theater, The Suzanne Roberts Theatre, The Wilma Theater, and the architecturally dazzling Kimmel Center for the Performing Arts. Check their websites to see what is playing when you are in town.

WEST
West of Center City, beginning some fifteen blocks from Old City (and absolutely walkable) is the museum district. Beginning on Benjamin Franklin Parkway and travelling west you will discover the Rodin Museum, The Franklin Institute, the Academy of Natural Sciences, the spectacular new Barnes Foundation, breathtaking Swann Fountain, The Free Library of Philadelphia, and at the end of the Parkway, the magnificent Philadelphia Museum of Art. Yes, these are the steps that Rocky climbed!

To the west you will also find 30th Street Station, where you arrived if travelling by train, the bustling campus of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Schuylkill Banks, a meandering biking and walking path along the river. From there you will see our famous boat house row, recently lit green to celebrate our Eagles' magnificent victory in the Super Bowl. The river wanders through Fairmount Park, reputed to be the largest urban park in the country, where you will find the outdoor Mann concert venue, the Philadelphia Zoo, playing fields, and hiking trails that let you forget you are in a city.

SOUTH
This still leaves the north and south of Philadelphia to explore. South Philadelphia, originally a spirited Italian enclave, now also embraces a thriving Vietnamese community. Stores and markets featuring both cuisines, as well as many upscale restaurants catering to the recent influx of younger Philadelphians, fill the streets with flavor! The Italian Market on 9th street between Christian and Washington is a fine place to walk to get a taste of what the old South Philly was all about. As is a walking tour of the Seventh Ward which includes Mother Bethel's, constructed in 1794, and the first African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in the country. This neighborhood provided the inspiration for Dubois's *The Philadelphia Negro*. And a stroll down Passyunk as it curves past all the trendy new restaurants and shops will provide a glimpse of the youthful infusion that is keeping Philadelphia current today.

South Philly is also home to all of Philadelphia's Sports arenas. The Phillies are in season during your visit, and if time allows, a game at Citizen's Bank Park, with the city lights glowing behind the ballfield, is not to be missed. They will be playing a home game the Wednesday night before the conference before the team takes to the road. Better yet, arrive a couple days earlier. Bruce won't be at the Wells Fargo Center, but Paul Simon will.

NORTH
Historically, North Philly has been the most underdeveloped and under-appreciated section of Philadelphia. But that's changing now. To the immediate northeast is Northern Liberties, another neighborhood teeming with youth and scores of restaurants, condos and bars. Just north is Fishtown, the first of the river wards and our own little Brooklyn. Travelling North on Broad Street you will pass the Philadelphia Convention Center, the Iconic Hotel Lorraine (recently restored into residences), and the Philadelphia Academy of Fine Arts, as beloved for its collections as for the Frank Furness building that houses them. In North Philly you will also find the Taller Puertorriqueño, the cultural heart of Latino Philadelphia.

Travelling Broad Street a little farther north will bring you to Temple University. Always beloved by Philadelphians, it now boasts a thriving campus with ambitious new constructions and a vibrant community of students who call it home. As it is throughout the city, food truck culture is particularly ambitious here and always delicious. A bit north and west of Temple are historic Germantown and Wissahickon Valley Park, with its 57 miles of lush trails.

Philadelphia abounds with delights to entertain you when you are ready for a break from the conference. We love our city and hope you do too!

Marion Immerman
For the Local Arrangements Committee

A Roundtable on Jeffrey A. Engel, *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*

Brian C. Etheridge, Thomas A. Schwartz, John Robert Greene, Dustin Walcher, Fritz Bartel, and Jeffrey A. Engel

Introduction to Roundtable on Jeffrey A. Engel, *When the World Seemed New*

Brian C. Etheridge

At a press conference after the Berlin Wall had been inexplicably breached by delirious Germans in the fall of 1989, a frustrated reporter from CBS pressed President George H.W. Bush about his apparent lack of enthusiasm: "This is sort of a great victory for our side in the East-West battle. But you don't seem elated." (267) Bush later explained to equally exasperated advisors that he refused to "dance on the Berlin Wall" and "stick a finger in Gorbachev's eye." This famous response epitomizes what Jeffrey Engel ultimately describes as Bush's "Hippocratic diplomacy" in his excellent new book about the president's handling of the end of the Cold War. For Engel, Hippocratic diplomacy meant that "he first strove to do no harm." (6) In short, Engel credits Bush's measured, patient approach with explaining the central issue around which, as he puts it in his rejoinder, he framed his story: "the wonder that that we all survived" the end of the Cold War. Although his thoughtful interlocutors find much to agree with in this interpretation of Bush's handling of the end of the conflict, they offer important commentary about how we might problematize or re-frame this era moving forward.

All of the commenters agree that Engel's work is an excellent example of traditional, narrative history. Almost uniformly, they admire the well-written prose, the absorbing narrative, and the strong pacing. Offering that he "would not be surprised if the book is in serious competition for major book awards and prizes, both scholarly and more popular," Tom Schwartz describes the book as "exceptionally well written, in an engrossing and consistently interesting and moving style." John Greene highlights on more than one occasion Engel's "well-developed ability to let telling quotes from the sources speak for themselves." Dustin Walcher shares a sentiment widely shared by the roundtable participants: "a masterpiece combining presidential and foreign policy history, the book will be a touchstone for future scholarship on the forty-first president."

While they all agree that the book is particularly well executed, many of them point out that there isn't anything necessarily new to the interpretation. In arguing for the success of Bush's diplomacy, Engel's book, according to Greene, "breaks no new theoretical ground." Schwartz declares "this is clearly the orthodox view of the Bush Presidency's foreign policy," while Walcher says "the picture that emerges of an experienced and careful policymaker will not surprise most *Passport* readers." Engel concedes as much in his response, when he says that his book "does not offer a truly innovative revision of Bush's leadership, whose caretake qualities, as Professor Greene and others note, was largely perceived by his contemporaries and the first scholars of his presidency." Instead, Engel offers that a major contribution of the book is a "deeper understanding of the quiet, subtle, and oftentimes behind-the-scenes way in which Bush put those key ideas into practice."

Nearly all praise the international dimensions to his story. Schwartz and Fritz Bartel respectively laud "diligent and painstaking research" and "detailed explanations (and groundbreaking evidence)" related to decision-making in China, the Soviet Union, and Europe. But Bartel and Walcher point out that this international perspective doesn't necessarily help further our understanding of why the Cold War ended; Bartel in particular contrasts Engel's work with H.W. Brands's *Unipolar Moment* to highlight the shortcoming of this personality-driven approach in this regard. Again, to his credit, Engel agrees about the value of such a structural approach, but avers that "to conduct that same search when trying to understand the individual thinking and decisions of global leaders mindful of the future yet largely consumed by managing the present, would have been less productive."

Each reviewer takes issue with something topical, geographical, or temporal that Engel left out that may complicate the positive portrayal of Bush. Bartel wants more about Bush's nuclear weapons policy, which might recast him more as a "an obstructionist who impeded progress towards a more peaceful world." Walcher finds that leaving out a discussion of events in Central America constitutes a "substantial" omission. And Schwartz wanted to learn more about the election of 1992: "Why did the American people come to reject George Bush overwhelmingly—he got less than 38 percent of the vote—despite what are arguably some of the most successful foreign policy achievements of any President?"

The biggest dispute in the roundtable, however, revolves around Greene, who in the most thorough critique takes issue with Engel's assessment of Bush's activism. Greene finds the author indecisive in his assessment of "the managerial and executive style" of Bush, arguing that parts of his narrative should "lead the reader to conclude

that Bush was an activist president," but other comments "would lead one to conclude that Engel sees Bush as a passive guardian president." "One can be an activist," Engel responds, "not only by acting, but also by recognizing that even limited action, even inaction, might produce the outcome one desires." "This non-binary activism I consider Bush's greatest attribute," concludes Engel. "Believing the stream of history flowed in a generally beneficial direction, he chose to float when no clear destination for vigorous paddling appeared."

The conversation around Bush's activism, or lack thereof, gets to what I think is the meatiest part of the roundtable, one that Schwartz and Bartel are particularly eager to sink their teeth into. To wit: what is the significance of Hippocratic diplomacy, the ride-the-stream-of-time, first-do-no-harm, approach in the era of Trump? Schwartz offers that "a book about an accomplished and dignified President, surrounded by experienced and astute advisers, analyzing problems with intellectual sophistication and political sensitivity" will draw considerable attention because it stands in "stark contrast" to the "current occupant of the White House." Bartel puts it more stridently when he observes "in a whirl of orange hair, tweeted vulgarity, and American carnage, the stream of history dramatically changed its course."

In our current context, Engel's emphasis on Bush's easy assumptions about the inexorable march of democracy and American-style capitalism becomes even more important. Social psychologists use the concept of "attribution theory" to understand how people seek to make sense of their behavior and the behavior of others. As they often point out, people are quick to credit their own success to internal or dispositional causes rather than external or situational ones. Along this vein, the critique of Jim Hightower that Bush someone who "was born on third base," but "who thought he'd hit a triple" (24) suggests Bush fell victim to this phenomenon; and Engel's book indicates that it could apply to the nation under Bush as well. In this sense, Bush's unshakeable faith in the inevitable victory of American values of democracy and market capitalism may betray a fundamental attribution bias, in which he and his advisors were content to ride the stream of history because they attributed the unfolding of events to the inevitable triumph of American values, rather than to possible situational/structural factors outside of American influence.

Engel's telling of this story helps us recognize that blindness. Riding the wave is not always a good strategy, as Bartel argues, especially when that wave "bodes ill" for democratic institutions as he suggests it does today. But another virtue of recognizing this blindness is revisiting the assumed success of Bush's stewardship of the Cold War. We survived, yes, true enough. And for that we should all be thankful. Was that enough? Is that a high enough bar for success? Were there opportunities missed? (Some of the reviewers suggest so.) Counterfactually speaking, could there have been even better stewardship by someone who wasn't as blinded by the belief in the inevitable march of American values? Are there moments when a different kind of activism could have produced better results, especially as we understand the fruits of those actions today?

These are big questions. And it's a testament to both Engel's book and this provocative roundtable based on his work that they raise and address them. It's clearly a debate we desperately need today as we attempt to chart a path forward.

Review of Jeffrey Engel, *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*

Thomas A. Schwartz

Reading a book about an accomplished and dignified president who surrounds himself with experienced and astute advisers and analyzes problems with intellectual sophistication and political sensitivity evokes a certain degree of nostalgia in me. I will try not to succumb to this particular occupational hazard in reviewing Jeffrey Engel's *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*.

When the World Seemed New (*WWSN*) is an impressive book. I would not be surprised if it turned out to be a serious competitor for major awards and prizes, both scholarly and more popular. For one thing, it is exceptionally well written; the style is engrossing and the narrative consistently interesting and moving. It is also a more traditional form of history, an examination of the foreign policy of President George H.W. Bush that uses an extensive range of primary sources to evaluate and provide an American perspective on his conduct in office and his historical legacy. But it is less traditional in the sense that through diligent and painstaking research, Engel has successfully incorporated the perspectives of Soviet, Chinese, and European leaders.

The research behind these foreign perspectives is impressive, although it is Engel's personal access to President Bush and his closest advisers that makes the book particularly valuable. The portrayal of Bush is generally quite favorable, although Engel does not shy away from criticizing what he sees as mistakes, such as Bush's failure to push the Chinese harder on human rights issues. This comes after a very compelling and moving narrative treatment of the crushing of the student movement in Tiananmen Square and an extensive consideration of Bush's agonized response to the massacre, including a long letter that he wrote to the Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping. Engel balances the outrage felt by many Americans at the repression of the protests and their hope for a tough response with the Bush viewpoint that China should not be isolated and that in the long run engagement was the better strategy. In some ways, the jury is still out on this question, which Engel freely admits.

One obvious reason this book will garner considerable public attention is the stark contrast between the personal and presidential style of George H.W. Bush and that of the current occupant of the White House. Even though Engel does criticize Bush on occasion, the sense that this is a favorable portrait of an underappreciated leader is probably intensified by the automatic comparison readers will make with President Trump. There is little question that George H.W. Bush was a competent, intelligent, and wise chief executive. CNN recently broadcast a series on the 1990s, and its assessment of the Bush foreign policy was overwhelmingly favorable. The talking heads included scholars such as Tim Naftali, who headed the Nixon Library, and Gil Troy of McGill University in Montreal. Their verdict echoes Engel's conclusions and makes me wonder why the book reviewer for Kirkus would label this a "revisionist" study of Bush's foreign policy.[1] Engel's is clearly the orthodox view of the Bush presidency's foreign policy.

Engel provides a particularly careful treatment of the transition period between the Reagan and Bush administrations. Some readers might see this as a relatively minor point, but it has become increasingly clear that the period in which political power in the United States is transferred to new officials, most often of a different political party, frequently has important historical consequences. Historians have studied this issue as far

back as the transition between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and have noted its significance for foreign policy issues since that time.

Engel has detailed the "pause," or the period in which the Bush administration sought to assess and critique the approach of the Reagan administration toward Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms. His account makes it clear that even though both presidents were Republicans, this was a "hostile takeover," with a degree of animus and a dismissal of the Reagan people that is remarkable in retrospect. (I was particularly struck by the harsh treatment accorded to the State Department's Roz Ridgway, the assistant secretary of state for European affairs.) This type of behavior may simply be inevitable, a product of a political system in which new officials feel the need to demonstrate their break with the past. But in the particular circumstances of 1989, the transition might have had disastrous consequences for American interests.

Engel's narrative is chronological, but he is very adept at interweaving background and context as he takes the reader through the Bush presidency. This facility is well displayed in his fascinating narrative of the events of late 1989 in Europe. He moves from Poland to East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania at the same time as he writes about the American invasion of Panama, the memory of which has faded with time. The narrative shows the contrast between Bush's caution in Europe and his boldness in authorizing the operation in Panama.

Engel's discussion of the Panama operation is one of the junctures in the book where he implicitly recognizes that interpreting the forty-first president is a complex undertaking. The unilateral intervention in Panama, precipitated by an attack on American citizens, caused many Panamanian casualties and considerable collateral damage. But Engel also quotes James Baker as explaining that Panama established an important "emotional predicate" that enabled the administration to build support among the public for the use of American military power after Vietnam (308). Of course, not only was it a precedent for Desert Storm, as Baker suggests, it was also a precedent for Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Bush presidency, though celebrated for its prudence in the use of military force, did establish precedents for future presidents who had less judgment and discretion.

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Engel does make a very effective case for Bush's approach to German reunification. His support proved far more insightful than the petulant opposition of Britain's Maggie Thatcher. I share with Engel his belief in the centrality of Germany for American foreign policy during this period. This point is often underappreciated by American scholarly audiences, largely because Germany is one of the great success stories of American diplomacy, and historians are not drawn to studying success.

WWSN makes it clear how essential Germany was to Bush's approach to European diplomacy. Bush's decision to accept and welcome German reunification was one of the wisest of his presidency, and it is a very clear example of what Engel calls Bush's "Hippocratic diplomacy"—i.e., first striving "to do no harm." Engel also makes it clear that Bush's support for German unity, a position that some might have argued went against the lessons of history, was tied to the president's certainty that the United States needed to continue to play a central role in helping to keep the peace among the fractious Europeans.

Engel is well aware of the various historiographical issues at stake in the interpretation of the first Bush presidency. His account is balanced and detailed, and he weaves the biography of George H.W. Bush into a larger story about the foreign policy assumptions of a generation of American leaders. These assumptions—about the importance of American power in guaranteeing international stability, the key role of the United States in "pacifying" Europe, the confidence in the triumph of democracy, and the belief in the universality of American values—constituted the unexamined belief system that American leaders brought into their dialogue with both Soviet and Allied officials during the tumultuous period from 1989 to 1991. Engel demonstrates how influential these beliefs were in the negotiations and actions of Bush and his team. He also clarifies the role they played in Bush's articulation of a "New World Order," a formulation that created controversy but disappeared into obscurity after the 1992 election. The election of 2016, with its criticism of this type of American "globalist" outlook, helps us to see more clearly the importance of this perspective for shaping the history of American foreign policy since the Bush years.

It is remarkable that so many foreign policy transformations occurred during one presidency. The Bush presidency confronted a set of international issues, from the collapse of communism, the Gulf War, the suppression of rebellion in China, and the reunification of Germany, any one of which would merit a separate volume. Engel manages to handle all of these in this book, creating a model of concise prose. Nevertheless, I disagree with some of his choices. For example, Bush's success in assembling the international coalition that defeated Saddam Hussein in the Gulf deserves more attention than Engel provides, although I think he is successful in demonstrating the effectiveness of the Bush approach. That approach, with its emphasis on personal diplomacy, receives an important endorsement in this study, much more so than in previous works on the period.

One small point indicates how careful Engel was in his research. In recapping the history of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet policy of military intervention to prevent any communist state from turning away from the true faith, Engel describes the Soviet intervention to crush the Prague Spring in 1968. He writes that "hundreds of civilians were killed, thousands imprisoned. Tens of thousands fled west" (93). Initially I thought he had erred and confused the results of this intervention with the results of the 1956 Hungarian incursion. However, when I checked this with the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center, I learned that these figures were accurate, although this information became widely known only after the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia. The number of lives lost and the degree of resistance have been generally ignored in many of the survey histories of the Cold War. However, Engel dug deeper than most of these writers did, and on a point that was not even central to his book. I was embarrassed that I had not known this.

If I wanted to offer one criticism of the Engel book, it would be that he does not take the story into the last year of the Bush presidency. I realize this is a somewhat unfair criticism, as the book is already almost five hundred pages, and an author should be able to stop when he or she chooses. But I would have liked to see Engel's assessment of what happened to the skillful and prudent George Bush and his team in 1992. Why did the American people reject

George Bush overwhelmingly (he got less than 38 percent of the vote), despite what were arguably some of the most successful foreign policy achievements of any president in history?

By way of an answer, Engel briefly comments on the continuing crises faced in Yugoslavia and Somalia, and he repeats the oft-expressed view that Bush suffered from the perception that he cared more about foreign affairs than domestic policies, a perception that was especially dangerous during an economic recession. That is the received wisdom, and there is undoubtedly great truth in it. However, one wonders if Bush's failure does not also reflect on the tensions inherent in the domestic politics of American foreign policy. Bush refused to "dance" on the Berlin Wall in a way that might have humiliated Gorbachev, and he resisted marching to Baghdad and deposing Saddam to seal the victory in the Gulf War. Both are actions for which he receives praise from historians, if not credit from his contemporaries.

Nevertheless, it also seems as though Bush was unable to convince the American people that his "New World Order" was worthy of their continuing support and that they had a stake in American leadership on the world stage. It is interesting that in 1992 Bush faced a brief primary challenge from Patrick Buchanan, who maintained Trump-like ideas on foreign involvements and international trade before Donald Trump. And in the general election, Ross Perot's views on NAFTA truly foreshadowed Trump's protectionism and rejection of the liberal world order Bush embraced. In this final year of the Bush presidency, the picture of Bush's achievements does become more mixed. It reflects ways in which his electoral failure was a warning to future American leaders about the danger of neglecting the domestic politics of foreign policy.

This unfair criticism aside, Jeff Engel has produced an outstanding book about an American president whose integrity and judgment we could admire and respect. Bigly.

Note:
1. https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/jeffrey-engel/when-the-world-seemed-new/

Review of Jeffrey A. Engel, *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*

John Robert Greene

Jeffrey A. Engel's new book, *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*, joins a rich and growing literature dealing with the foreign policy of the administration of the first George Bush. Engel's well-researched book breaks no new theoretical ground. He argues--as have many students of Bush-era diplomacy--that Bush's foreign policy was both nuanced and generally successful. Engel supports this point of view through a worthy survey treatment of the story of the implosion of Communism in Europe, one that shows the linkage of that event to events in the rest of the world (although Africa gets short shrift here). As is the case with any lengthy survey, one can quibble with judgments the author made along the way. But it is in his analysis of the managerial and executive style of the character of the title character of his book—ultimately, his view of whether or not George H.W. Bush was a guardian or an activist president--that Engel's work is less than convincing.

Engel begins with a useful review of the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan that downplays the impact that Reagan's policies had on ending the Cold War. Rather, Engel enshrines Mikhail Gorbachev as "the modern-day Prometheus of change" (18), contending that while "many thousands can take the credit" for the end to the Cold War, the credit belongs to "Gorbachev most of all" (19). In support of this view, he offers a useful and generally convincing outline of Gorbachev's mindsets of reform—labelled by many, though not all, as perestroika and glasnost. But his conclusion on the primacy of Gorbachev in the events that brought the Cold War to an end will be battered by those who believe that Reagan spent the Soviet Union into oblivion with an astronomical increase in American defense spending that, try as it might, the Soviet Union could never match.

Engel's look at "Bush's Rise" in chapter 2 of *When the World Seemed New* offers little that has not been told before, with one notable exception. Few would dispute Engel's place as the leading scholar of the first Bush and the People's Republic of China; his masterful editing of *The China Diary of George H.W. Bush* (Princeton, 2008) was a welcome addition to the literature. So it comes as no surprise that he tells the story of Bush's role as Gerald Ford's envoy to China (1974-1975) with a spirited breadth of detail that has not yet been seen from any Bush biographer. However, Engel's recounting of Bush's pre-presidential career curiously omits any serious detail on his time as Ford's Director of Central Intelligence—a role that allowed him to sharpen both his diplomatic and bureaucratic skills. Regardless, it can be said that George Bush was present at the creation of the post-Cold War world, and whether Reagan or Gorbachev was ultimately responsible for the set of circumstances that led to the end of that conflict, Bush, even as Reagan's loyal and trusted vice president, most certainly played no fundamental role in the formation of policies that led to communism's collapse—a point that Engel clearly and rightly makes.

Yet even with a breadth of training that led some in the press to dub him the "résumé candidate," the new president, according to Engel, came to office in January 1989 unsure of how to deal with the teetering Soviet Union. Inexplicably to some leaders, Bush's administration began by standing in place on Soviet policy—a regroup that became known as the *pauza*—the "pause." A "comprehensive review" was demanded, studies were made, meetings were held, and Margaret Thatcher fumed; the prime minister felt that Bush was not up to the task of pushing the USSR over the edge.

Engel hedges on whether or not he agrees with Thatcher's assessment, but he does make it clear that he sees Bush as stalling for time, waiting until his administration could create a plan. But others (including myself) have interpreted the *pauza* as a plan of its own. Bush wanted—needed, in his view—to distance himself from the policies of his predecessor, policies that had come under attack not only from the Democrats, but from the right wing of his own party, which had felt that Reagan's second term overtures to Gorbachev smacked of a Nixon-like détente.

The mere act of the regroup allowed Bush to position his administration as being different from that of his predecessor--as a welcome change from Reagan's perceived softness on communism. In this context, the *pauza* would be activist in nature, not passive, as Engel suggests. Indeed, the *pauza* did produce a serious policy shift, mentioned by Engel, when the Bush administration called for a reduction in the number of NATO forces stationed in Europe (139). Engel is clearly correct, however, in noting that on May 12, 1989, the *pauza* ended with a whimper, when Bush spoke at Texas A&M University and declared that his policy would go "beyond containment"—a phrase that meant little, and that Engel rightfully describes as little more than sloganizing.

Engel's study of the Bush administration's policy towards China and its reaction to the carnage of Tiananmen Square is little short of masterful. Given Engel's previous contribution to the literature, it is not surprising that this is the most detailed section of the book, and the most exciting. The cables sent by U.S. Ambassador James Lilley to the White House Situation Room are used with aplomb by Engel; they give the reader a minute-by-minute unfolding

of the crisis. Here, and throughout his book, Engel shows a well-developed ability to let telling quotes from the sources speak for themselves; thus, the drama of the situation literally works itself to a fever pitch.

One can, however, take issue with Engel's analysis of the administration's response to the slaughter at Tiananmen. It is both useful and telling that Engel demonstrates how Bush filtered the crisis in China through his memory of the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and was determined to avoid a repeat of that disaster. The fact that the disaster *was* repeated, however, left Bush with a crisis to manage. Echoing those contemporary observers who wanted Bush to issue a punitive response to the regime in Beijing and were critical of Bush's refusal to do so in the name of international stability, Engel judges Bush's reaction to the crisis as "comparatively weak." (178). But many have interpreted Bush's response as both a long- and short-range success. Rather than issue a knee-jerk response that would please his political base, Bush, no less revolted by the events in Tiananmen than were any of his critics, opted for a mild, patient response that kept the severely strained Sino-American relationship intact. This, like the *pauza*, can be seen as a strong, activist response—the response of a president with a long-term plan.

The story of Gorbachev's 1992 fall from power, and the concurrent dénouement of the Soviet Union, is told by Engel in four fast paced chapters. As with other crises, Engel tells the story of the aborted 1991 coup against Gorbachev with flair, once again letting the documentary evidence tell the tale of the Keystone Cops-like venture that left Gorbachev humiliated and in power in name only. Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev's foil and eventual successor, is not painted as fully by Engel as one might feel he deserves, especially since Gorbachev eventually lost his country to Yeltsin, who, in Engel's telling, "wanted to move past both socialism and *perestroika*."

After Tiananmen, Engel returns to Europe. His eight chapters on the final implosion of communism in East Germany, Eastern Europe, and ultimately the Soviet Union form the largest section of this book. In these pages, Engel presents a Gorbachev who is completely different from the man he describes in the beginning of the book. Now faced with the dissatisfaction of his satellites abroad and a sinking economy at home, Engel's Gorbachev evolves from a "Prometheus" to a rather reactive leader, one who faces pressure not only from his erstwhile opponents on the world stage, but from the right wing of his own party at home. In Engel's telling, Gorbachev proved to be an ineffective manager of the post-Cold War world, reduced to begging for money from Bush and his NATO colleagues as the communist world crumbles around him.

Engel tells the story of that crumbling well. His conclusion--that Bush approached the management of the disintegration of European communism with the desire to avoid another Tiananmen uppermost in his mind--is convincing, but Engel confuses the reader by arguing that the basic conditions in Beijing and East Germany were the same, then giving three reasons why they were not (255). I side with the latter position. Much like his treatment of the bloodbath at Tiananmen, Engel's telling of the high drama of the piercing of the borders and the opening of the Berlin Wall make for gripping reading, and his use of Ambassador Jack Matlock's memoir and reminiscences to offer first-hand testimony of the action is quite effective.

In the chapters on the unification of Germany—presented by Engel and most other observers as Bush's signal foreign policy accomplishment as president—Engel makes it clear that unification was far from a *fait accompli*. Everyone but Helmut Kohl—who comes to life here as he does in few other works—feared a united Germany: Gorbachev most of all, but closely followed by Thatcher. Engel shows that it was the decisions and machinations of Kohl that drove the process forward, and his claim that once the Germans had decided to unify, the issue was settled, is credible. (322). So it comes as a surprise to the reader when Engel abruptly asserts that Bush, "as much as anyone else, and certainly more than any other foreigner, can lay claim to being the father of modern Germany" (334)--a conclusion that his own evidence does not support.

Through his August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's Saddam Hussein would be the first to test the stability of the post-Cold war world. Engel does not pretend to offer a comprehensive military history of the Gulf War. Instead, he widens the historiographical offering by providing greater development of several incidents that have been underreported in the literature on the war. Engel analyzes the role of April Glaspie, the American ambassador to Iraq, and refutes the oft-leveled accusation that she inadvertently gave Hussein the "green light" to invade Kuwait by urging a speedy resolution to the crisis (381-383). He also documents, using declassified NSC minutes, how the administration needed to convince itself to come to the defense of a country it had little use for—except for its oil (386). By this point, Engel's Gorbachev has become a pitiable figure, reduced to an attempt to regain relevance by lobbying Bush to agree to a Soviet-sponsored diplomatic measure to calm the crisis. Gorbachev was coolly rebuffed by Bush, and Engel rightly concludes that Gorbachev was, himself, ultimately a casualty of the Gulf War.

The story of Gorbachev's 1992 fall from power, and the concurrent dénouement of the Soviet Union, is told by Engel in four fast paced chapters. As with other crises, Engel tells the story of the aborted 1991 coup against Gorbachev with flair, once again letting the documentary evidence tell the tale of the Keystone Cops-like venture that left Gorbachev humiliated and in power in name only. Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev's foil and eventual successor, is not painted as fully by Engel as one might feel he deserves, especially since Gorbachev eventually lost his country to Yeltsin, who, in Engel's telling, "wanted to move past both socialism and *perestroika*" (441). Engel convincingly argues that Gorbachev's fate was sealed when Bush refused to give a final shot of economic aid to the Soviet Union. The question that has plagued historians of this moment has been why Bush, certainly no fan of the mercurial Yeltsin, chose not to bail Gorbachev out. Engel concludes that it was the American domestic economy that led Bush to keep from giving Gorbachev a final shot of aid. He quotes the president as saying that "there is no economic logic in lending now" (448).

This, as well as other instances referred to by Engel, might lead the reader to conclude that Bush was an activist president—one with a pronounced desire and ability to activate the political system, regardless of his personal style. In fact, rather than joining the chorus of observers who see Bush as vision-challenged, Engel gives Bush credit for having a broad world view, arguing in his conclusion and elsewhere that Bush's policies finally put into practice Franklin D. Roosevelt's vision of a postwar world held together by a common belief in collective security (419). However, Engel stops well short of giving Bush the label of activist. Instead, he muddies his own waters when he makes many asides claiming that Bush's "doing nothing when there was no clear choice suited his general approach" (259) and that Bush merely "rode the stream of history" (484).

These comments would lead one to conclude that Engel sees Bush as a passive guardian president, but that thesis (popularized by David Mervin in his *George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency* [New York, 1996]), would seem to be at odds with the vast majority of Engel's evidence. Perhaps Bush's presidency had both qualities; perhaps Bush tended to be both a guardian president and an activist in the FDR

mold. Perhaps that is what Engel was trying to say. But he does not say that, and the reader is left to come up with a judgment on this key issue on their own.

When the World Seemed New would have benefited from a closer stylistic edit. Engel's use of contractions and his fondness for clichés (calling Bush's attempts to meet with as many world leaders as possible while attending the funeral of Emperor Hirohito "diplomatic speed dating," for example) are examples of his penchant for drifting into a casual tone that feels out of place for a serious monograph (112). Likewise, his aggravating use of disaggregated sentences for emphasis (for but one example: "Nemeth wanted to open the border. To everyone.") also detract from what is clearly a serious work (240).

While one can wish that Engel had taken a stronger stand on the matter of George Bush's activism, or the lack of same, this is on balance a fine book. Engel offers first-rate scholarship, a clear survey of events, a wide reading of the available sources, a close and interesting use of the telling quote, and an ability to bring the reader into the heart of a crisis. It will, for quite some time, stand as the indispensable first text on the diplomacy of the first Bush.

Review of Jeffrey A. Engel, *When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*

Dustin Walcher

During the 1988 presidential campaign, comedian Dana Carvey developed what came to be the defining impersonation of then-Vice President George H. W. Bush. Playing the Republican nominee as an empty suit, he simply repeated vacuous phrases such as "stay the course" and "a thousand points of light." Although Bush won the presidency in an electoral college landslide, Carvey's caricature—repeatedly featured on Saturday Night Live over the course of the next four years—captured the public imagination. Carvey's Bush was and remains to a considerable degree the country's vision of Bush—an affable and probably well-meaning but ultimately goofy and somewhat intellectually dull chief executive. It was among the best material *Saturday Night Live* ever produced.

The Bush that Jeffrey Engel's well-researched book portrays was far more commanding and successful, possessed better instincts, and was ultimately more interesting than Carvey's version. But it is unlikely that *When the World Seemed New* will reach the same mass audience that Carvey did from his perch at Saturday Night Live. A masterpiece combining presidential and foreign policy history, this book will be a touchstone for future scholarship on the forty-first president. It provides a detailed examination of Bush's handling of the end of the Cold War, with emphasis on the president's ideas, policy formulation, and, notably, the international context in which his administration acted. It is, to a great extent, the culmination of Engel's past research on the Gulf War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and Bush's experiences in China.

Engel carefully paints a thorough personal and political portrait of Bush. The picture that emerges of an experienced and careful policymaker will not surprise most *Passport* readers. Significantly, "Bush believed in the universality of American values," writes Engel, "and in their eventual acceptance around the world—in time—and he believed that the United States, and only the United States, could safely shepherd the world to that ultimate, more peaceful and prosperous destination" (479). But the characteristic that emerges as Bush's defining trait (and would probably surprise Dana Carvey the least) is prudence. Engel writes that "[f]aced with uncertainty, and unsure of the best response, [Bush] paused, considered, and learned" (477). He was conservative in the classic sense; he appreciated the limits of U.S. power and the exercise of restraint in its application.

Bush also comes across as having had a reasonably clear vision for a globally engaged role for the United States in the aftermath of the Cold War. The president was determined to maintain the country's international footing and its commitments after the demise of the Soviet threat. The United States must not make the mistake that it made after World War I and retreat from the world; positive U.S. power had forged two generations of peace in Europe and secured liberal capitalism around the world. Continued engagement also functioned as an end in itself. The president may have had difficulty explaining what the United States should do in the future, particularly militarily, but he consistently maintained that although he could not foresee the precise crises of the future, U.S. power would always be necessary to maintain order and stability. In the face of domestic calls for a peace dividend, Bush held that maintaining a future of peace and prosperity required that the United States remain engaged. That was, Engel argues, the fundamental lesson that Bush and others of his generation took from the experience of the Second World War.

Maintaining order was a critical objective of policy throughout the Bush years. Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft valued order and stability in a democratic and capitalist international system. More than some in the country, they were prepared for the United States to underwrite the security of the "New World Order." They were less prepared to underwrite a significant degree of the financial costs of bringing post-communist economies into the liberal international order. Bush was characteristically cautious about the use of U.S. power, and he understood that unintended consequences—sometimes detrimental to U.S. interests and the ordered system that he sought to forge—often accompanied interventions, or even careless statements. Restraint and "Hippocratic diplomacy," where policymakers first took care to do no harm, characterized the sensibly cautious administration.

That caution usually served the Bush team well as it confronted a rapidly changing world. Contrary to the views of those who believed that political, economic, and especially military power was sufficient to bend the course of history to America's will, Bush and his top advisors understood that events around the world were powered by their own dynamics. But from Bush's perspective, the trends were positive, and he was confident that increasing swaths of the world were moving toward democratic capitalism. His job was to avoid derailing that process. In particular, he must not give hardliners in the Soviet Union an excuse to reverse course on Gorbachev's reforms. He must not, in other words, "dance on the wall" (268).

One of the more interesting themes to emerge in Engel's book centers on the importance of personal relationships. The theme is highlighted in connection with the president's relationship with Baker and Scowcroft. Their friendships and the professional respect they had for each other engendered a high degree of trust and confidence that translated to the policymaking process. Engel develops the relationship between Baker and Bush especially well. He surveys their political partnership and examines their complementary qualities. Bush, for example, was better with people, whereas Baker was a strong tactician and a fierce negotiator.

Personal relationships with foreign leaders also mattered. The incredibly important Bush-Gorbachev relationship was not especially warm. Bush ultimately supported the Soviet leader's reform efforts—albeit without the financial resources that Gorbachev required—but

they had little personal chemistry. The president enjoyed better personal ties with leaders in China, ties that he had cultivated since his diplomatic posting to Beijing as chief of the Liaison Office (the equivalent of ambassador to a government that the United States did not formally recognize) under President Gerald Ford in 1974. Bush knew Deng Xiaoping; the two visited each other even when Bush was out of office. The strength of that and other personal relationships facilitated progress in and at times inhibited the collapse of the bilateral relationship.

Indeed, Engel's treatment of the Sino-American relationship is one of the book's best features. The lasting relationships with leading members of the Communist Party of China that Bush began to develop during the 1970s paid dividends after he became president. When China violently repressed pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, Bush faced nearly overwhelming domestic political pressure to denounce the Chinese leadership. While he was privately outraged by the events in Tiananmen Square, he was reluctant to sever the bilateral ties that had been meticulously constructed since Richard Nixon occupied the Oval Office. In typical fashion, Bush adopted a measured response that included public criticism, albeit so limited that it never satisfied China's U.S. critics, combined with private letters delivered through backchannels that drew upon personal connections.

Significantly, Engel stresses not only the considerations of Bush and his advisors, but the politics of China's Communist Party leadership. Chinese officials were certain that the only way to ensure the survival of the regime was to use violence to eliminate the opposition. Military leaders brought in troops from outlying areas whom they expected to be less sympathetic to the urban protesters.

Significantly, Engel stresses not only the considerations of Bush and his advisors, but the politics of China's Communist Party leadership. Chinese officials were certain that the only way to ensure the survival of the regime was to use violence to eliminate the opposition. Military leaders brought in troops from outlying areas whom they expected to be less sympathetic to the urban protesters. The tactic worked; the provincial Chinese troops attacked the protestors ruthlessly. Despite international condemnation, the regime survived and indeed prospered in subsequent decades.

Bush held fast against domestic pressure and continued to back China's inclusion in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The strained-but-not-broken relationship between Bush and Chinese leaders paid dividends when Bush needed the PRC, at a minimum, to abstain from key United Nations Security Council votes during the Gulf crisis. A Chinese veto would deny Bush the legitimacy that the supranational body could confer over an interventionist policy in Iraq. China abstained.

As the summary of Engel's treatment of Sino-American relations suggests, *When the World Seemed New* successfully situates U.S. policy in its broader international context. Insofar as Engel gives detailed and sustained attention to events and policymakers around the world, his accomplishment is unusual for studies that focus on presidential leadership, even when such studies concentrate on foreign policy. His greatest emphasis is on events in China, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the leading Middle East participants in the Gulf War. He stresses the policymaking process and politics in these states, and highlights the myriad ways in which dynamics in other parts of the world shaped policy formulation in the United States. The internationalist methodology also permits Engel to examine how U.S. actions were interpreted abroad. As a result, his ultimate assessments of the Bush administration's leadership emerge as much more firmly grounded.

Naturally, Engel provides detailed analysis of Soviet conditions and politics. Mikhail Gorbachev's reform strategy—*perestroika*—sought to restructure the Soviet political and economic system while maintaining a fundamentally communist system. It was a difficult balancing act that reflected the dire economic straits of the country. Even when Gorbachev retained enormous popularity throughout the West, food shortages and poor economic conditions caused great strife within the Soviet Union, and his popularity at home waned. Engel does a good job of explaining the competing centers of power that emerged, with particular emphasis on the conflict between Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The multiple and competing pressures on Gorbachev underline the precarious political position the Soviet leader was in throughout his tenure in office.

Despite the book's length and Engel's careful attention to the global context in which Bush's decisions were made, there remain important issues that are given short shrift. The most relevant one for a book on Bush and the end of the Cold War is the cursory attention paid to events in Central America. The Latin American Cold War of the 1980s wreaked havoc on the region. Engel surveys the Iran-Contra affair and emphasizes Bush's limited role in the scandal. However, the details of the Iran-Contra affair highlight the significance of the Cold War in Central America, and that larger story is not developed in *When the World Seemed New*.

The Bush administration ultimately reversed the Reagan administration's intractable opposition to peace initiatives pursued by Latin American leaders, many of whom were friendly to Washington. The results were striking. Democracy returned to Nicaragua and El Salvador (the process was slower in Guatemala) as the Bush administration stopped opposing a process meant to produce reconciliation between left and right. Civil wars in which the United States had provided substantial assistance to the political right (which was fighting against the government of Nicaragua and controlled the government of El Salvador)—sometimes in violation of U.S. law—came to an end. The change in policy was significant, as it permitted the peace process to proceed. The result was the emergence of democratically constituted governments and an end, at least for the time being, of widespread political violence in the region. Events in Central America constitute a Cold War story that would have dovetailed well with Engel's larger narrative. The omission is substantial.

Another area of opportunity for future scholars centers on the analysis of the structure of the international system as the Cold War came to a conclusion. Engel is interested in policymakers, their ideas, the decisions they made, and the consequences of those decisions. Left uninterrogated is the underlying structure of the international system in which those leaders operated. As a result, Engel tells an effective story of the ways in which policymakers— especially those within the Bush administration—reacted to and shaped events while in office. Bush was, at the same time, a product of the postwar liberal international consensus. As Engel makes clear, he had little interest in questioning basic assumptions about the U.S. role in the world. Historians can question the construction of those underlying structures, however. Doing so was not an objective of this book; future scholars are left with the opportunity to examine critically the structures in which Bush, Gorbachev, and other leaders operated.

Engel also covers a variety of other events that I do not have the space to recount in detail here. He surveys the Bush administration's intervention in Panama. He provides a wonderful survey of the diplomacy of the German unification, emphasizing the fact that Bush was the only

major leader (aside from Helmut Kohl) who truly desired a united Germany in the heart of Europe. And he provides a detailed account of the decision to go to war against Iraq. Notably, he highlights the administration's initial near-indifference to the Iraqi invasion. Bush eventually decided that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had acted like a latter-day Adolf Hitler and therefore must be confronted, but it took him some time to come to that conclusion. Engel also argues that the Gulf War symbolized the end of the Cold War, as the Soviet Union acquiesced to the U.S.-led coalition that crushed a onetime Soviet regional partner, and such an outcome in the Middle East would have been unthinkable in earlier years.

In the final analysis, Bush presided over the United States at a time of transition in a deeply unsettled international system. His greatest virtue was understanding that the United States possessed far greater capacity to do harm than it did to bend the world to its will. Another president might have "danced on the wall" in November 1989, done irreparable harm to the Sino-American relationship after Tiananmen Square, played into the hands of hardliners in the Soviet Union, or expanded the mission in the Gulf War from liberating Kuwait to regime change in Iraq. Indeed, both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush exercised considerably less restraint than did George H. W. Bush in international affairs. In light of the records of his successors, Bush's prudent, Hippocratic diplomacy has aged well. Unfortunately, too many people in Washington have had too much difficulty internalizing the fundamental lessons that the Bush administration offered.

Review of Jeffrey A. Engel, *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*

Fritz Bartel

"The stream of history": it is a phrase with a rather vintage ring to it, one that harkens back to the historicism of Hegel and Marx, the strategic musings of Bismarck, the revolutionary confidence of Lenin, or the realist meditations of Niebuhr. More recently, Francis Fukuyama provoked scholarly sensibilities with the claim that the stream had reached its end, and Barack Obama roused Americans to the polls with the assurance that the stream's long arc bent toward justice. But the question of whether history's waters can be directed to particular ends, are destined for some utopian ocean, or are simply full of hopelessly fallible actors navigating a permanently unpredictable current has not been at the forefront of historical debate for quite some time. Indeed, in the postmodern academy, the very idea that history maintains enough coherence to be called a stream (rather than raindrops, or smog, perhaps?), would probably be met with more than a few skeptical looks.

It was, therefore, a welcome surprise to see the phrase confidently resting at the heart of Jeffrey Engel's compelling new monograph, *When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War*. From almost the first page to the very last, the stream of history is the primary interpretative thread Engel uses to weave his narrative and shape his argument. George H.W. Bush went "with rather than against the stream of history, content to ride its current rather than speed recklessly at a faster clip," Engel writes approvingly in his introduction (10). The president "rode the stream of history," he concludes in the book's final sentences, "and we all survived the Cold War's surprisingly peaceful end" (484). In between these bookends, references to history's current run through the account like, well, a stream.

This recurrent reference to history's course fittingly reflects the strengths and shortcomings of Bush's worldview and points to the ironic relationship that he had to the global event that defined his time in office: the end of the Cold War. Both subjects are given equal weight in *When the World Seemed New*, which is both a history of the Bush administration's foreign policy and an international history of the end of the Cold War. Engel offers detailed explanations (and groundbreaking evidence) not only of decision-making in Washington, but also of machinations, anxieties, and decisions made in the ruling circles of Beijing, Moscow, East Berlin, and Baghdad, to name just a few of the world capitals he covers. Although it is based entirely on sources available in English, *When the World Seemed New* is stronger because of its broad international scope. This is a credit to the breadth of Engel's research and the judiciousness of his conclusions, but it is also a testament to the people and institutions who have long sought to make the international history of the end of the Cold War accessible through English translations of countless foreign sources. The most ardent practitioners of international history will likely come away frustrated by the linguistic limits of Engel's sources, but the internationalist scope of the narrative nevertheless strengthens the book's insights and—clearly important in a work aimed partially at a popular audience—broadens the reader's understanding of the world beyond America's shores.

The most important of these insights is simple yet fundamental: the U.S. presidency is at once the most powerful institution in the world and at the same time severely limited in its ability to influence the course of world events. As Engel notes in his introduction, because of the precipitous collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, George H. W. Bush had become "the most powerful man in human history" (4) by the end of his term in office. But Bush himself, and the U.S. government which he led, had done very little to cause this stunning turn in history's course. The most the president could do, as Engel aptly describes it, was pursue "Hippocratic diplomacy" and aim to avoid any misstep that would interrupt the onrush of events that were turning toward U.S. national interests. "Domestic forces invariably dictate events within any country, especially a revolutionary one, far more than foreign influences," Engel concludes in a section on China (193). This was a conviction shared equally, one senses, by his chief protagonist.

That is not to say that Bush lacked confidence in the ability of American capitalism and democracy to transform the world. "We know what works," Bush said in 1989. "Freedom works. We know what's right: Freedom's right" (73). Engel concludes that Bush believed American power and prosperity were "exportable" (22) and that the American system worked "for all" (73). Bush's perpetual confidence in the ultimate triumph of freedom, democracy, capitalism, and the United States' leadership of the world order is the clearest takeaway from Engel's portrait of the nation's forty-first president.

Bush has often been called a realist, but *When the World Seemed New* should make such a label untenable. Engel's use of "the stream of history" as an organizing principle clarifies why. Bush certainly shared the realist skepticism of individuals' and governments' ability to steer the stream of history, but he diverged widely from realists' understanding of the stream's final destination. Where realists saw (and see) a future defined by recurrent conflict and immutable national differences, Bush saw a future in which the world would one day be remade in America's image. Indeed, his ability to resist the presidential urge to alter the course of history directly depended on his steadfast confidence that the United States' values and interests would eventually prevail in every corner of the world. Where realists preach modesty in the face of

history's stream because they believe the stream leads to nowhere, Bush practiced modesty in the midst of history's stream because he was unwaveringly confident that the stream had only one possible destination: a U.S.-led world order comprised of democratic governments and capitalist economies. Was George H.W. Bush a prudent purveyor of American influence in the world? Absolutely. Was he a realist? No.

Such a distinction may appear to be of only academic importance, but it in fact helps us understand some of the most important decisions of Bush's presidency. Engel demonstrates that in these moments it was Bush's belief in the long-term power of capitalism and democracy to transform the world rather than realism that steered his course. First, when Bush faced a cacophony of domestic critics urging him to respond severely to the Tiananmen Square crackdown, he fell back on the fundamentals of his worldview to defend his policy of continued engagement with China. "As people have commercial incentive," he told the American public, "the move to democracy becomes more inexorable" (180).

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Six months later, as the haunting history of fascism and world war hung over the prospect of a unified Germany, Bush—alone among Western leaders and first in his own administration—welcomed the prospect because he believed that the Federal Republic's experience with postwar democracy under the umbrella of American security had transformed the German people for better and for good. While Margaret Thatcher echoed the realist perspective in resisting German unity—"national character basically doesn't change," she told reporters—Bush believed that "forty-plus years of democracy could not easily be overturned" (278).

Similarly, while analyzing Bush's decision to refrain from invading Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein at the end of the Gulf War, Engel writes that Bush was comfortable leaving Saddam in power because he believed the Iraqi dictator's days were numbered anyway. Democracy was destined to arrive in the Middle East eventually, Bush believed, because its residents were "as subject to the stream of history as any other" (438). Bush was uniquely responsible for each of these decisions, which set the course for the United States' engagement with Asia, Europe, and the Middle East in the post-Cold War world. Engel's nuanced account demonstrates that these decisions were underwritten by a boundless belief in the destiny of free-market capitalism and electoral democracy to transform the world.

In the late 1980s, of course, Bush was far from alone in this conviction, and the stunning course of world events appeared to only strengthen the claim. The democratic transitions from communism in East-Central Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification, and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself presented the world with astounding evidence that perhaps the future really did belong to democratic capitalism. No one could be sure why all these events were transpiring across the globe at the same time, so perhaps there really was a stream of history steering events toward an enlightened end.

In Engel's account, we get a full sense of this perception that the world was taking a democratic and capitalist turn, but we get less of an explanation for the turn itself. If it was this stream of history that ultimately produced the peaceful end of the Cold War, what forces propelled that stream forward? If Bush and the U.S. government were not the bellows behind the "breeze of freedom" (94) that blew so strongly in these years, then what was? *When the World Seemed New* does not offer an overarching explanation for history's benign turn during the Bush period. In this way, Engel's work contrasts with Hal Brands's recent monograph, *The Making of the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order,* which is more explicit in its attempt to evaluate the structural shifts in global politics and the world economy that brought about the end of the Cold War. To be sure, Engel provides detailed, concise, and persuasive accounts of the causes of each of the events he narrates (no small task considering the geographic scope of the book), but he refrains from making an argument about the causes of the end of the Cold War at a global level. Perhaps this was intentional, and Engel believes that what looks from afar like a coherent pattern in global history was in fact just a fortuitous confluence of disparate events. But it is difficult to know for sure. What we gain in *When the World Seemed New* from Engel's use of the "stream of history" in understanding Bush, we lose in understanding the nature of the stream itself.

There is another cost to Engel's approach as well. Because he largely shares Bush's conviction that presidents should refrain from boldly attempting to alter history's course, he is less attentive to and largely uncritical of the opportunities that Bush missed to improve the international order. The most glaring of these missed opportunities lay in the field of nuclear weapons, an issue that scarcely appears in *When the World Seemed New*. As Thomas Blanton has shown elsewhere, Bush had a unique chance upon entering office to build on the successful nuclear diplomacy of his predecessor and work with Mikhail Gorbachev to radically reduce nuclear weapons or even eliminate them from the planet.[1]

But because of their ingrained distrust of their erstwhile Soviet adversary, Bush and the top members of his administration showed scant interest in pursuing this opportunity that the stream of history had bequeathed to them. After dawdling on the issue for over two years, Bush finally signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in the summer of 1991, long after Gorbachev had lost the authority within the Soviet Union to pursue more radical measures. The START treaty receives a passing mention in *When the World Seemed New,* but the diplomacy of arms control is not discussed at all.

When dealing with the countless moving parts that comprised the end of the Cold War, Engel surely could not include them all and understandably had to cut some topics that he would have liked to address. But the omission of nuclear weapons and arms control does seem to influence the book's overall portrait of Bush. Scholars like Blanton who have considered the issue in greater depth have come away with a far less benign view of the forty-first president. Rather than looking like a leader prudently aware of the limits of his office and content to ride the waves of history, Bush appears in Blanton's work as an obstructionist who impeded progress towards a more peaceful world. As the leading expert on the Bush presidency, Engel surely has important opinions on this issue, but they do not appear in his final text.

Whatever the minor omissions of *When the World Seemed New* may be, the clearest impact that the book has on its reader is to signal just how different the world at the end of the Cold War was from the one we currently inhabit. In this way, Engel's book is the first that makes the end of the Cold War really feel like history, rather than simply a preface to the contemporary moment. This effect has less to do with how Engel composed his book than with how the

world changed in the years he spent composing it. For most of the post-Cold War period, the copious quotes from Bush and other officials espousing an unquestioned confidence in the superiority of free markets and democratic politics would have sounded familiar and contemporary to Engel's reader. Today, they read instead like the naive musings of a bygone era.

Engel's lessons about the constrained power of the U.S. presidency and the dangers of American ideological overconfidence clearly applied to the two and a half decades that followed the Cold War. During those years, the greatest mistake an American leader could make was indeed to brashly reach into the stream of history and try to alter or accelerate its course. This was because history, if it could only have been left alone, appeared to be heading toward a largely democratic peace and a mostly capitalist prosperity. Only the crimes and blunders committed by those who thought they could steer history's course—the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq being the two most prominent of this era—could divert the stream from its liberal end.

But then, in a whirl of orange hair, tweeted vulgarity, and American carnage, the stream of history dramatically changed its course. Future historians will attach many descriptors to the global history of the post-2016 world, but reflexive confidence in the superiority of democratic institutions, free markets, and American leadership of the international system will not be one of them. In a world dominated by Trump, Xi, Putin, Erdogan, Duterte, el-Sisi, Kaczyński, et al., the idea that history inevitably flows toward the values that Bush and many others so blithely took for granted has been exposed for the mirage that, in reality, it always was. Of even greater consequence, the values themselves are now profoundly and globally in doubt. Were it only so that the United States president faced a world in which his or her biggest challenge was simply allowing history to run its course. Were it only so that the United States had a president who was interested not in riding history's benevolent waves, but in resisting its pernicious turns. Such a world, to put it mildly, is not the one we currently inhabit.

This does not make the thrust of Engel's conclusion about the benefits of riding the waves of history wrong. It merely suggests that, like all the lessons of history, it applies only to certain times and certain places. Context, as always, matters. Through deep research, lively prose, and wise conclusions, *When the World Seemed New* offers those who occupy or study the U.S. presidency an important lesson in the merits of modesty, but it is a lesson that would have been best applied in the post-Cold War era that has recently come and gone. The world, once again, seems new. But this time, what's new bodes ill, and the stream of history must be actively resisted.

Note:
1. Thomas Blanton, "U.S. Policy and the Revolutions of 1989," in *Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989,* ed. Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok (Budapest, 2010).

Response to *Passport* Roundtable on *When the World Seemed New*

Jeffrey A. Engel

There is no greater honor for a scholar than the serious engagement of peers. This is especially the case with colleagues as esteemed and thoughtful as the reviewers commissioned by *Passport* for this roundtable. That they found more to commend than to criticize within *When the World Seems New* provides a level of personal satisfaction as well (and, of course, relief), and I appreciate this opportunity to honor their serious thinking with a few comments, offered less in the spirit of refutation than of conversation.

Replete with insights, the reviews offered by Professors Bartel, Greene, Schwartz and Walcher share to my eyes three particular points in common. First is recognition of the book's main purpose, which despite the large visage on its cover was never to reframe the foreign policy of a relatively recent president. It was instead to integrate a deep dive into one nation's records and history alongside an equally emphasized international history of the period. The Cold War's end offers a rich target for this approach. Records produced by the United States government remain a quarter century after their production still largely inaccessible. But they are coming. Similar rich archival reservoirs to the East and West of old Cold War divides already exist, explored by specialists trained to understand their national particularities.

This plethora of new and surveyed source material provides the opportunity to reconsider a tumultuous time in global affairs from a variety of national perspectives, from the halls of power down to the streets where so much of the action occurred. I thus encourage other *Passport* readers and fellow-travelers, no matter the strata of society they study, to dive headlong into this period. As several of the reviewers note, and I return to their sage observation later, *When the World Seemed New* was composed with an international eye, but is hardly universal. Guides exist in the form of regional and national experts whose work can now be synthesized as never before due to the interconnection of scholarly communities around the world. To abuse the prior metaphor to the fullest, perhaps it is better to call them lifeguards, providing experience for those eager to plunge headlong into the histories of more lands, with more languages, than any one person could hope to master in a lifetime, while also telling us when to stay off the ropes. Come on in, the water's fine.

Stepping down from my self-appointed soap-box I note a second theme consistently raised in this roundtable: the question of activism. Put simply, was Bush thoughtful, diligent, strategic, and ultimately capable of forming an agenda? No one can seriously contend he was not all of those things. But was Bush also an activist at the end of the day, pushing an agenda produced by the aforementioned qualities? Moreover, must an activist's agenda be original?

The answer to the last query, in Bush's case at least, has largely been settled. He was an implementer, not an innovator. Indeed, I leave this book more impressed than ever that the key ideas underlying his diplomacy were shared by all his predecessors and successors from 1945 until 2017. In this vein, *When the World Seemed New* does not offer a truly innovative revision of Bush's leadership, whose caretaker qualities—as Professor Greene and others note—was largely perceived by his contemporaries and the first scholars of his presidency. What is new, I like to think, is our deeper understanding of the quiet, subtle, and oftentimes behind-the-scenes way in which Bush put those key ideas into practice.

If the question of originality remains solved, how then might we define the necessary level of action within an activist agenda? Re-reading Professor Greene's thoughtful critique repeatedly, however, I remain uncertain how he might answer that question in regard to Bush. Does activism require that an agenda must be visibly pushed? As a noted scholar of Bush himself, I would value his answer. The clear activism Greene seems to yearn to see within my portrait of Bush I suggest is in fact displayed in multiple shades, but also to a different degree depending upon the context of each global crisis he faced in office. Bush at times led from the front (as in the Gulf War), from the shadows (as in German unification), or entirely out of sight

(in Tiananmen's wake). His was not the foolish consistency his fellow New Englander Thoreau once ridiculed. Indeed, like Thoreau—and here we can agree the similarities largely cease—Bush retreated from public view and also plunged into public debate not constantly, not even consistently, but instead situationally and thoughtfully.

One is tempted to employ the word "prudently" instead, even if my own attempt at that trait might leave readers to yearn for a more black and white presidential portrait. Reality requires a broader palate. One can be an activist, I contend, not only by acting, but also by recognizing that even limited action, even inaction, might produce the outcome one desires. This non-binary activism I consider Bush's greatest attribute. Believing the stream of history flowed in a generally beneficial direction, he chose to float when no clear destination for vigorous paddling appeared. Given what we have seen from his successors in particular, restraint appears increasingly admirable. To paraphrase the spirit of his initial successor, I would thus answer those who wonder if I consider Bush an activist president: it depends on your definition of activism. Newton argued that objects in motion tend to stay that way unless acted upon by an outside force. If said object approves of its direction, is it not an active decision to withstand the urge to steer, brake, or accelerate? What might appear lethargy or inaction to the outsider might well be the result of a decision to, well, just enjoy the ride.

That Bush never, that I saw, truly questioned the wisdom or the general desirability of the direction in which his stream of history flowed was also his greatest flaw. I am taken by the observation offered by Professors Bartel and Walcher in particular that my book focuses upon individuals and agency rather than broader structural change within the international system. I stand guilty as charged, and eagerly await what others more structurally-inclined might in time determine of this period. In weak defense I offer that my subject did not think structurally, either. To search for tectonic answers for why the Cold War shifted ground as profoundly and rapidly as it did strikes me as laudable. To conduct that same search when trying to understand the individual thinking and decisions of global leaders mindful of the future yet largely consumed by managing the present, would have been less productive.

Third, and finally, each of these reviewers longed for more. For Professor Walcher it was for greater attention to Latin and Central America. Professor Schwartz wished the book continued through Bush's final year in office, even as Professor Greene wished both for a different emphasis within his first. Professor Bartel wisely noted the book's relative paucity on strategic nuclear issues.

Again I plead only for the court's compassion. When interviewing veterans of the Bush 41 administration I often found myself noting, silently of course, that I was surely the only one in the room glad that Bill Clinton won in 1992. The sentiment has nothing to do with my own political proclivities. It grew instead from the stark realization that if it took a decade-plus to compose a history of Bush's first term, I shudder at my ultimate age upon publication if he'd earned a second. Each of the reviewer's observations of where the book is thematically deficient—its scant attention paid to the Western Hemisphere, nuclear diplomacy, or I shall add the Madrid peace process—I clearly concede. I shall instead conclude with a poignant moment from its composition. Originally intended to be a comprehensive history of Bush's foreign policy, the manuscript's length soared to twice its current length…for my treatment of Bush's first year in office alone. Called onto the proverbial carpet by a terrified publisher, he asked the clarifying question: what do YOU really care about in this story? "The end of the Cold War," I offered, "and the wonder that we all survived." That is the story, framed as an international history, I attempted to offer. Or as Professor Greene would no doubt object to reading, it is in fact the story I attempted to offer. For everyone.

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

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The Battle FDR Lost: The Failed Nomination of Boss Ed Flynn as Minister to Australia

Michael J. Birkner

Shortly after Christmas in 1942, the U.S. minister to Australia, Nelson Trusler Johnson, decided the time was right for a break from his wartime duties. Johnson and his wife, Jane, agreed that a seaside vacation with their young children was in order. The Johnson family duly motored to Narooma, about 150 miles southeast of Canberra, for what they expected to be a three-week holiday during the peak of the Australian summer. They chose the spot for its beauty—and because the children would be able to swim without worrying about sharks.[1] The Johnsons' holiday was cut short on January 8, when wire copy began circulating in Australia with unexpected and unwelcome news. Johnson was to be replaced as minister by a political confidant of President Franklin D. Roosevelt—Democratic National Committee Chairman Edward J. Flynn of New York. Not only would Flynn succeed Johnson in Canberra, he would be given an upgraded title—Ambassador Plenipotentiary—and expanded duties as a "roving Ambassador" in the South Pacific. He would also get nearly twice the salary Johnson was making. (Johnson was paid $10,000 a year; Flynn's salary would be $17,000.)

Contrary to protocol, the well-known Boss of the Bronx announced his own appointment prior to any formal news release from the White House.[2] Two days would pass before President Roosevelt's spokesman, Stephen Early, made it official: Johnson, Early said, had requested recall and put in retirement papers; Ed Flynn was the president's choice to succeed him in this important theater of the war.[3] The fact that Johnson had *not* asked to be replaced and had *not* intended to retire while the war was in progress was known only to the minister, his wife, and a few baffled State Department officials. The appointment had not gone through the regular channels, nor had the president's choice been vetted by the secretary of state.

In an instant Nelson Johnson's life was turned upside down. Little did Ed Flynn know it when he made his announcement, but his appointment was to bring him more grief than glory. Moreover, the president whom he had long served as a trusted political adviser would be seriously embarrassed by the headlines generated in course of the confirmation process and by its unlikely outcome.

As soon as news of Flynn's nomination reached him in Narooma, Nelson Johnson packed up his belongings and returned to Canberra to begin the process of closing out his affairs. He did not hide his disappointment from friends, nor from his associates in the diplomatic corps. As Johnson pointed out to a number of people, including Stanley Hornbeck, then assistant secretary of state for Asian affairs, he did not want to leave Australia while the war continued. He was annoyed that this was how the administration spun the issue. However, if retirement or reassignment was the president's wish, he would return to Washington as soon as his successor was confirmed by the Senate.[4]

No one in the Australian government knew what to make of the president's decision to replace the hard-working and popular minister. In private, reactions to the Flynn appointment among Australian officials ranged from resignation to anger. Notes of appreciation sent to Johnson by leading figures in the Australian government, among them Prime Minister John Curtin, former Prime Minister William ("Billy") Hughes, and Labor Party stalwart Arthur A. Calwell, made him feel he had accomplished something, but they also reminded him that his job was not yet fully done. Noting his "profound regret" that Johnson was going to leave Australia, Calwell observed that "in our hour of greatest danger from invasion you were Australia's first and one of its greatest friends." No stranger to hyperbole, Calwell went on to say that "but for you and General Macarthur [*sic*] we might easily today be a Japanese Colony—a fate too terrible almost to contemplate."[5] Prime Minister Curtin could barely restrain his irritation with the president's decision to name a political crony in Johnson's place. According to the editors of Curtin's backroom briefings, Curtin's comments to the Australian press about the replacement of a well-respected minister with a partisan wirepuller were "etched in incredulous contempt."[6]

Private expressions of support for Johnson from within government circles were one thing, but there would be no official protest from Canberra. Given the Australian government's dependence on American support in its hour of peril, there was no choice but to accept the president's decision. Curtin acknowledged this in his backroom press briefings.[7] As an American observer, John Holland, put it, "Australia . . . dare not say anything openly for in her desperate military plight she can not afford to question any act of [the] U.S.A., no matter how unprincipled."[8]

Trained to accept things beyond his control, Johnson intended to maintain a dignified silence on the controversy swirling about him. No public protest would emanate from his lips. As he told his friend Hornbeck, he would be a "good soldier" and "let nature take its course."[9] Nature's course, however, proved to be anything but smooth for Ed Flynn's ambassadorial ambitions. Commentators suggested that the nomination would not be cut and dried, owing to question marks about Flynn's qualifications for the position and recent charges, made by the Scripps-Howard newspapers that Flynn had ordered Bronx County public works crews to install 8,000 Belgian paving blocks in the driveway of his upstate New York vacation home. Seemingly a faux scandal that Flynn had brushed off successfully through two grand jury investigations, those paving blocks would prove to be the single most potent argument against Flynn,

and certainly the easiest for an interested public to grasp.[10] Why had FDR nominated Flynn in the first place? The question begs for an answer. Flynn's explanation was that Roosevelt wanted a person who got along well with others to manage an important diplomatic relationship. The fact that Flynn was friendly to organized labor—and that his ethnic heritage was Irish—would presumably help him in the work he was going to be doing in Canberra. Moreover, Flynn claimed, the president told him he "needed someone whom he could trust implicitly for this wartime post."[11]

The official explanation for the appointment was terse: this was the president's choice, Stephen Early had noted, and Flynn was qualified for the post. Privately, FDR told an old friend, the Rev. Anson Phelps Stokes, that he needed something other than a "very old and experienced" diplomat in Canberra. (Johnson was surely experienced, having been a member of the foreign service since 1907; but at age 56, he was hardly "very old." Indeed, he was five years younger than the president.) "What I need [is] a practical politician, thoroughly familiar with and acceptable to labor circles and, if possible, an Irishman because of the fact that nearly half of Australia is Irish in descent."[12]

There may have been some truth in that, but FDR's remark to Stokes seems more rationalization than rationale. Syndicated columnist Ernest Lindley may have come closer to the point when he observed that Flynn had stood by Roosevelt through "thick and thin" in the political wars. That was reason enough for his appointment, said Lindley. Another columnist, Gould Lincoln, offered a variation on this theme. He suggested that Roosevelt—ever the canny political operator—wanted someone he could trust to "keep an eye" on General Douglas MacArthur, a potential challenger for the presidency in 1944. David Lawrence of *U.S. News and World Report* said Roosevelt was simply paying off a political debt to Flynn, who had engineered FDR's third-term victory in 1940 and remained a key political adviser. His appointment, said Lawrence, was "an unfortunate mistake," given that Australia was "in the active theater of war" and relations with its leaders should not be put in the hands of "a politician."[13]

Other observers were more sardonic in their response to this evident political payoff. Syndicated columnist George Sokolsky asserted that Flynn's incompetence at the Democratic National Committee was the real reason for FDR's move. Scripps-Howard press syndicate chief Roy Howard, a burr in Flynn's saddle for more than a decade, suggested that the Bronx boss's qualifications for the Australian post were "about equal to my qualifications for being Pope or for fulfilling the functions of the Dalai Lama."[14]

It would have been difficult to sustain the argument that Flynn was an incompetent politician. He had done yeoman work for Roosevelt for nearly two decades, most especially in securing the president's third-term nomination against a backdrop of public ambivalence about breaking the two-term tradition. Flynn would exert himself usefully for the president in 1944 and for President Harry Truman in 1948. But being a canny politician cut two ways. All observers recognized that this appointment represented first and foremost the payment of a political debt the president owed to Flynn. As matters unfolded, it became more evident that Roosevelt was not the engine behind the appointment; Flynn was.

How can one draw that conclusion? By 1942 Flynn was increasingly the target of sniping from the media and fellow politicians, and he was tiring of the political game. He wanted to burnish his resume before returning to private law practice. Only months before the Australian appointment was announced Flynn had pressed Roosevelt for an appointment as ambassador to Mexico. That proved an impossible gift for Roosevelt to make. Australia seemed right, both to the ambitious boss and the grateful and increasingly weary president.[15] In this instance, Roosevelt's normally acute instincts proved fallible.

There may never have been a nomination that received worse press than Flynn's. Editorial writers for every New York newspaper, including the normally pro-Roosevelt *New York Times*, castigated the nomination of a native New Yorker.[16] The chorus was taken up across the country, with even reliably Democratic newspapers expressing their surprise, chagrin, or anger that the nomination had been made. An editorial writer in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, for example, suggested that FDR had appointed Flynn as a way to "get rid" of him as Democratic National Committee chairman. The *Nashville Banner* wrote that the appointment "offends Australia. It sickens America. Why, then make it."[17] One writer suggested that if Flynn were "eligible" for the Australian post, then "why not choose boss Eddie Kelly of Chicago as Envoy Extraordinary to China and issue to Boss Frankie Hague of Jersey City Plenipotentiary credentials to the Court of Saint James?" The nomination was "revolting to all decent citizens," Edith Harmon of Palo Alto, California, told the president. A disappointed Democrat chastised the president: "How could you do it? Why make it so hard for us who are doing all we can to back you up?" Helen Clymer wrote from New York City to ask, "Why victimize Australia?"[18]

Private correspondence addressed to the president, like Harmon's and Clymer's, was surprisingly negative and often caustic, with the most prominent metaphor relating to the "stink" of it. The "stink" motif featured prominently in editorial cartoons as well.[19] The upshot of the sour reaction to the nomination was readily apparent: the Flynn nomination provided an opening for Republicans—until the 1942 elections largely helpless to block New Deal measures—to attack the administration. With the Republican contingent substantially increased in Congress as it commenced business in January 1943, GOP leaders sensed an opportunity to bloody the president's nose. The Flynn nomination offered an ideal test case.

Three days after the president officially nominated Flynn, Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) said he would fight to block the nomination, which he called "an insult to Australia" and "the most despicable yet made by the President of the United States." He promised to testify against Flynn at Foreign Relations Committee hearings.[20] Bridges cited four grounds for his opposition: first, that Flynn had represented a New Yorker who had large "Jap" interests in the United States before Pearl Harbor; second, that Flynn as chancellor of New York City had invested and lost more than a million dollars in public funds in a firm that later employed him as general counsel; third, that he had appointed the "noted criminal and murderer" Dutch Schultz as an honorary deputy sheriff of Bronx County back in the 1920s; and finally, that the grand jury investigation of the use of city-owned material to pave Flynn's Lake Mahopac estate was "improperly handled."[21] As a symbol of the fight he planned to wage, Bridges kept on his desk a five-pound paving brick presented to him by a New York delegation as a "tombstone" for Flynn's career in public life. The delegation told Bridges it hoped the brick would serve as a warning to Australians "to nail down all public property when Flynn arrives [there] . . . as a fugitive from justice."[22]

While the national media saw the Flynn story as good fodder, few observers anticipated that the nomination would do more than generate interesting headlines and editorial commentary. Not since 1889 had the Senate rejected a diplomatic appointment.[23] All Flynn needed was a solid phalanx of Democratic support in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and then in the up-or-down Senate vote scheduled for the latter part of January. The Democratic Senate leader, Alben Barkley, said he was confident Flynn's nomination would sail through after a lot of what he called

"political noise."[24] Democratic senators, it seems, were prepared to carry FDR's water for him, meaning Flynn would win.[25] Back in Canberra the Australian government anticipated Flynn's easy confirmation, as did Nelson Johnson, who continued carrying out his duties, but also stepped up plans for his return to the United States and the enrollment of his children in private schools in Washington.

But the Flynn issue had legs. Although Australians remained anxious about a possible Japanese assault on the homeland, with the Japanese air attacks on Allied positions having for the moment ceased and the Japanese expelled from Guadalcanal, "there was little possibility of Australia being invaded, even had Japan the will to do so."[26] Hence the Flynn nomination fight, ballyhooed by the media, was not going to be crowded out by war news.

As a witness before the Democrat-dominated Foreign Relations Committee, Flynn was prepared to deal with the charges that Bridges had already announced he would make. He confidently brushed them off, pointing out that committees had investigated his official investments and found no wrongdoing and that the appointment of the gangster Dutch Schultz was under his real name—Arthur Flegenheimer. In addition, he asserted that the appointment was honorific only and was soon revoked. A Democratic senator, seeking to be helpful to Flynn, argued that the Schultz appointment was no more meaningful than being named a Kentucky Colonel. The fact that Schultz/Flegenheimer would be allowed to carry a concealed weapon was not mentioned in any defense of Flynn's unusual dispensation of honorifics.[27]

Addressing the much-hyped paving blocks issue, Flynn reminded senators that he had nothing to do with sending Bronx workmen to his home. He was unaware, he said, that work was being done until it was already completed; and once he learned about it, he reimbursed the city for the paving blocks. Flynn emphasized that two Bronx County grand juries had accepted his explanations.[28] For his part, Committee Chairman Tom Connolly of Texas attacked Bridges for implying that Flynn was somehow disloyal. When Connolly said he had not "heard of any objections to Mr. Flynn coming from Australia," Bridges retorted, "No, and you haven't heard them shouting with glee about his nomination, either. The Australian people probably feel that they aren't in a position to object to anything the President does concerning them, because American soldiers are defending their shores and they are getting lend-lease aid from us. But that does not mean that they are happy about having this war politician foisted on them."[29]

The problem with Flynn's explanations about the paving blocks was not that he was necessarily lying or even stretching the truth. There was no smoking gun proving he ordered the paving blocks installed in his vacation home driveway. Rather, the problem lay in the *perception* that something was fishy in the arrangement. For most Americans, it seemed obvious that even if Boss Ed Flynn didn't order anyone to do anything for him, underlings in the Bronx Public Works Department *did not need* any explicit go-ahead. They knew what Boss Flynn wanted, or they thought they did, and they acted accordingly; that's the way the boss system worked. Flynn, in short, was damned regardless of what he did or did not do. It did not help, either, that at various points in the confirmation hearings, Flynn claimed to have paid different sums for the labor of the men who placed the blocks in his driveway—$80, $88, and $750—while his law partner Monroe Goldwater referred to a repayment of $450.[30] The lack of consistency in this testimony hurt his case.

Worse, Senator Bridges laid a trap for him on another, more basic, matter: his qualifications for the Australian job. Bridges began by peppering Flynn with questions about his knowledge of Australia that the ambassador-designate found frustrating and at times impossible to answer. How many states are there in Australia? Bridges asked. "Four or five," Flynn responded. Name them, said Bridges. Flynn conceded he could not, adding that this was no different than being unable to name the counties of England. Asked to enumerate Australia's current population, Flynn replied, "approximately 10 million, I am told; I have never counted them." Bridges told him he was wrong on all counts and continued asking questions. Flynn was able to name the capital of Australia and when asked about parties, replied that they were "Conservative and Labor, with Labor in control." Bridges was unmoved. "You do not know a great deal about Australia," he told Flynn. "I know enough," Flynn replied.[31]

At this point Bridges, who was not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, but rather its guest, had tested the patience of several Democratic members. "Does the senator want him to give the whole history of Australia?" asked Senator James Tunnell of Delaware. Consequently, Bridges began pursuing the other issues he had said he would raise at the hearing. He elicited no new information about Dutch Schultz or the state investments Flynn had allegedly mishandled, but the damage was already done. The hearings were devastating to the nomination. As an observer quoted in the *New York Herald Tribune* put it, anyone who followed them would not know if the United States was "trying to export Mr. Flynn as a diplomat or deport him as an undesirable."[32]

Although the Foreign Relations Committee ultimately advanced the nomination by a 13–10 margin, three Democrats had voted against Flynn in committee, and several others—doubtless reading their mail and the newspapers—began expressing doubts. Publicly, the White House remained committed to the nomination and Flynn expressed confidence he would be confirmed.

But it was not to be. The critical wedge against the nomination was driven by Ed Flynn's old political enemy, Ed Crump, the Democratic boss of Memphis, Tennessee. Crump had long nursed a grudge against Flynn on several counts. His preferred vice- presidential nominee in 1940, Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, had been nixed by Flynn, a supporter of the more liberal Henry A. Wallace, who got the nod. Further, Crump's nominees for patronage positions in the Tennessee Valley Authority were usually ignored—a slight he blamed on Flynn, who may in fact have had nothing to do with the matter. Whatever the reality behind the Memphis boss's grievances, Crump passed the word to Tennessee's senior Democratic senator, Kenneth McKellar, that he wanted Flynn's nomination to fail. On January 28 McKellar announced he would oppose the nomination. It was the tipping point in the confirmation battle.[33] Although the Washington press suggested that Flynn might be confirmed with a margin of one or two votes, the fight had gone out of the boss.

As opposition to Flynn built, Roosevelt said not a word in public on behalf of his long-time associate. To an experienced politician like Flynn this was a sign that he needed to take the fall. And so he did. On February 1, Flynn announced that while he was confident he would have been confirmed in a full Senate vote, he was withdrawing his nomination and would seek to return to his life in politics. It was a stunning setback for the president. As Roy Howard vividly put the matter in a private letter, the Flynn nomination had "just exploded like a can of fermented tomatoes."[34]

Australians were delighted with the news, though at this stage they still anticipated Johnson's departure and remained wary about whom FDR might nominate next. Some observers suggested that the former U.S. minister to New Zealand, Patrick Hurley—a close associate of General MacArthur—was lobbying for the post. No one knew what the president would do. Johnson, on tenterhooks, went about his daily business as minister. For nearly two

months the president kept his counsel on the subject of a new minister for Australia. Perhaps Roosevelt felt it would be unseemly to have a second name at the ready so quickly; perhaps he was preoccupied with more pressing matters on the war front. During the period of watching and waiting, Johnson's friends, including Stanley Hornbeck in Foggy Bottom, reminded Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the present incumbent wanted to remain on the job and deserved to stay. Meanwhile, reporters—notably those working for Scripps-Howard papers—were pressing Hull on Johnson's status. Well aware of Johnson's attributes, Hull was not unsympathetic.[35] In the latter part of March, Hull was finally able to get Roosevelt's attention and on March 24 received the go-ahead to inform Johnson, by telegram, that he could continue in Canberra.[36] The news reached the pages of both American and Australian newspapers on March 25.[37] "Hearty congratulations," wrote Stanley Hornbeck to his old friend. "It's been nasty—but it ends well."[38]

Australians expressed themselves satisfied with the outcome, among them former Prime Minister Hughes and current Prime Minister Curtin. Curtin issued a statement: "I feel that I cannot exaggerate the value of Johnson's work in Australia. This country is deeply indebted to him." In a handwritten note the day he learned of FDR's decision to keep Johnson on, Curtin told Johnson that it was with "deep pleasure" that he received the announcement from Washington. "You know that it would be presumptuous for me to hold opinions regarding the appointments your country makes. But I can express my delight when they keep valued friends within my small orbit. And if, as I hope, the delight is mutual, then heaven be praised."[39] The delight was mutual. In responses that became formulaic in the telling, Johnson assured Curtin and his other correspondents that he was "content" with the outcome and looked forward to staying on the job until the war was won.[40]

What were the implications of the battle that FDR lost? At a minimum, it was an ill-thought-out appointment that inflamed Roosevelt's opponents and gave them a stick with which to attack the administration. It resulted in what *Time* called FDR's "worst political defeat" since the Supreme Court packing debacle of 1937.

Johnson's friends' reactions ranged from relieved to ecstatic. Former diplomat and Undersecretary of State W.R. Castle told Johnson that the Flynn "business" was "so disgusting that it really shocked the whole country, and it added to your popularity because, as you know, we Americans always like the fellow who has been unfairly treated." Keeping a low profile during the Flynn nomination, he added, had been the right way to handle the matter—making it possible for FDR to ask him to revoke his (bogus) retirement request and to assure him that he wanted him to remain on the job.[41]

Johnson remained in Canberra until 1945. He did not quite finish out the war in Australia, but by the time he departed, its outcome was not in doubt. He would subsequently serve as secretary general of the Far Eastern Commission, and upon concluding his labors there he retired from the Foreign Service. He spent his remaining years writing and lecturing about China and Australia, mentoring apprentice Foreign Service officers and enjoying life with his family in Washington, D.C. Johnson died of a heart attack in December 1954, while in the middle of an expansive oral history project conducted by Columbia University.[42]

Ed Flynn took the humiliation of his failed nomination without public recriminations. He soon reclaimed his role as head of the Bronx Democratic organization, though he was not offered a similar opportunity to regain the chairmanship of the national committee of the Democratic Party. Flynn remained in Roosevelt's inner circle and was part of the remarkable deliberation among Democratic bosses in the summer of 1944 that led to the replacement of Henry A. Wallace on Roosevelt's ticket by Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri.[43] Perhaps as a way of making amends for the embarrassment Flynn suffered in 1943, the president had Flynn invited to serve as a presidential aide at the Yalta Conference of 1945. But in the end he was probably better known as a whipping boy for Republican politicians in New York, including two-time presidential nominee Thomas E. Dewey.[44] By 1947 Flynn, having dictated his memoirs but still active in politics, was increasingly incapacitated by heart trouble and related ailments. He died in August 1953 while on a visit to Ireland.[45]

What were the implications of the battle that FDR lost? At a minimum, it was an ill-thought-out appointment that inflamed Roosevelt's opponents and gave them a stick with which to attack the administration. It resulted in what *Time* called FDR's "worst political defeat" since the Supreme Court packing debacle of 1937.[46] *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* editorial writer Irving Dilliard may have written the most perceptive account of the president's stumble. How was it, Dilliard asked, that the "power and influence" of the Roosevelt administration could not get Flynn confirmed, when six months before, the administration had no difficulty getting Jersey City Boss Frank Hague's man, Thomas F. Meaney, a lifetime appointment on the federal bench? The answer, he said, lay in the November election results. Thanks to a Republican resurgence in the midterm elections that brought nine new GOP senators into office, a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats was now able to stymie New Deal proposals it disliked. "The Flynn debacle," Dilliard wrote, was the "number one manifestation" of the new clout of this coalition. FDR's defeat on the Flynn nomination was, Dilliard noted, a serious strike at New Dealers, if not the New Deal itself.[47]

This was a sensible assessment. As historians have recently noted, by 1943 the New Deal was in effect blunted, first by the war, then by FDR's loss of leverage in the wake of the 1942 elections.[48] The Flynn nomination was a symptom, not a cause, of FDR's declining domestic clout. That it caused the president only some temporary heartburn was small solace to Ed Flynn. That the president made this nomination, and lost by it, was no one's fault but his own.

Notes:

1. See, among other documents, Nelson T. Johnson [hereafter NTJ] to Major Joseph S. Diasio, April 6, 1943, Box 41, NTJ Papers, Library of Congress [hereafter LC]; NTJ to the former U.S. minister to Australia, Christian Gauss, April 15, 1943, and NTJ to Hugh Gibson, March 11, 1943, both in Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC; NTJ to Stanley Hornbeck, January 12, 1943, Box 67, NTJ Papers, LC.
2. See James M. Minifie, "Diplomatic Surprise: Flynn Says He's Been Named Ambassador—Australia Bound," *Washington Post*, January 9, 1943, A1, A7; on the salary, see "Johnson Retiring Voluntarily: Flynn to Have Varied Duties," *Washington Star*, January 11, 1943. A copy of FDR's letter on January 8 to "Dear Eddie" announcing the nomination is in Box 1, The President's Official File 5224 (hereafter OF), Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY (hereafter FDR Library). On Johnson's "shock" at hearing the news, see his letter to William A. White, April 8, 1943, Box 43, NTJ Papers, LC.
3. On Flynn announcing his appointment before Early did, see Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Seventy-Eighth Congress, First Session, on the Nomination of Edward J. Flynn to be Minister to Australia (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 4; and Harold Callender, "President Names Flynn Minister; Senators to Fight," *New York Times*, January 12, 1943.
4. NTJ to Stanley Hornbeck, January 12, February 1, 1943, Box 66, NTJ Papers, LC. Johnson pointedly told White House Press Secretary Stephen Early that he did not want to retire, and

he objected to Early saying otherwise in announcing Flynn's appointment. NTJ to Early, January 14, 1943, Box 41, NTJ Papers, LC. Johnson told a foreign service friend, J.B. Hayden of the University of Michigan, that he would go wherever the State Department wanted to post him, but he wanted his friends all to know that contrary to the administration's public statements, he had no desire to retire. NTJ to J.B. Hayden, February 26, 1943, in Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC.

5. Arthur Calwell to NTJ, January 21, 1943, and William Hughes to NTJ, February 2, 1943, Box 41, NTJ Papers, LC. Hughes quipped that "you may properly claim to remain in a country until you have learned the language."

6. Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall, *Backroom Briefings: John Curtin's War* (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1997), 32. On the Australian press's perception that the Curtin government was unhappy with the appointment, see "Australia Cold on U.S. Nominee to Canberra," *Canberra Times*, January 12, 1943, copy in Box 63, NTJ Papers, LC.

7. An undated editorial in an Australian newspaper indicated that Australia was in no position to oppose the Flynn nomination. It is attached to Mrs. Frederick Hargee of Belmont, MA, to President Roosevelt, January 16, 1943, Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library. See also Ambassador Owen Dixon of Australia to Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles indicating that Australia would accept Flynn. That letter is dated Dec. 30, 1942, and is in Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library. For more on Curtin's reaction to the appointment of Flynn, see Lloyd and Hall, *Backroom Briefings*, 32, 122, 124. Curtin noted that apparently Johnson's politics were wrong for FDR. It is difficult to know if this had much to do with the decision to replace him. It is true that Johnson was a nominal Republican, as he acknowledged in his interview with Dean Albertson of the Columbia University Oral History project. Reminiscences of Nelson Trusler Johnson: Oral History, 1954 (New York, 1972), 673.

8. Typescript dated January 13, 1943, in Box 41, NTJ Papers, LC. This may have been a radio script. On the document Johnson wrote "destroy." Evidently he did not get around to doing that.

9. NTJ to Stanley Hornbeck, January 12, 1943, Box 66, NTJ Papers, LC.

10. For a summary of the controversy from Flynn's perspective, see his memoir, *You're the Boss: The Practice of American Politics* (1947; repr. New York: Collier Books, 1962), 185–93. For greater detail from a variety of angles, consult the hearings on Flynn's nomination.

11. Flynn, *You're the Boss,* 188.

12. FDR to Stokes, January 12, 1943, Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library.

13.See "Flynn Nomination: Why It Was Made," *Washington Post,* January 15, 1943. For a similar analysis, see Raymond Moley, "Flynn-Walker Duo Appraised," Los Angeles Times, January 12, 1943, copy in Box 9, Edward J. Flynn Papers, FDR Library. For columnists' remarks see David Lawrence, "Flynn Choice as Envoy is Blow to Unity," and Gould Lincoln, "Flynn's Appointment to Australian Post Attacked Along a Wide Front," both in *Washington Star,* January 12, 1943.

14. George Sokolsky, "These Days," no date, copy in Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library; Roy Howard to NTJ, January 11, 1943, Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC. It was Howard's *World Telegram and Sun* in New York that originally broke and highlighted the paving blocks story back in early 1942.

15. On the Mexican ambassador position, see Roy Howard to NTJ, January 11, 1943, Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC; Styles Bridges' reference to it is in *Hearings*, 9. Asked by Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg about Flynn's interest in the Mexican ambassadorship, Flynn denied that he had sought the nomination but conceded he had discussed it with FDR.

16. For the reference to "every" New York paper opposing Flynn's nomination, see the remarks of Senator Arthur Capper (R-Kansas) at the nomination hearings in Hearings, 20–21. *The New York Times* editorial, "Mr. Flynn in the Wrong Place," appeared on January 12, 1943. A January 20 editorial about the nomination in the *New York Times* called Flynn's appointment "extravagantly bad."

17. *San Francisco Chronicle* editorial dated January 12, 1943, copy in Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library; Nashville Banner, "Let's Reopen the Flynn Case," undated editorial in Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library.

18. All letters are from *San Francisco Chronicle,* Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library. The Harmon letter is undated; the letter from the disappointed Democrat, Irene P. Smith, is dated January 13, 1943; the Clymer letter to FDR is dated January 14, 1943.

19. See the correspondence in Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library. Insofar as there was any positive response to the nomination, it came from individuals in the Bronx who knew Flynn and Democrats across the country who were on the party payroll.

20. W.H. Lawrence, "Bridges Denounces Flynn; Falsehood Charged in Turn," *New York Times,* January 14, 1943; John M. Fisher, "Senators Vote Open Hearing in Flynn Row," *Washington Times-Herald,* January 16, 1943. For a copy of Bridges' remarks on the Senate floor, January 12, 1943, see File 69, Styles Bridges Papers, New Hampshire State Archives, Concord, NH. I am grateful to state archivist Frank Mevers for providing me with copies of this document and transcripts of subsequent speeches regarding Flynn dated January 14 and February 1, 1943.

21. See Robert St. John radio transcription for his NBC broadcast, January 14, 1943, Box 28, Flynn Papers, FDR Library; see also, "Paving Block Grand Juror to Fight Flynn Nomination," *Washington Daily News,* January 14, 1943, 12. Schultz/Flegenheimer held the honorary post of Deputy Sheriff in the Bronx from July 1925 until the winter of 1926, when he was picked up in a raid on Jack Diamond's Bronx club after a shooting there. According to one account, "that arrest made Schultz [Flegenheimer] an ex-Deputy Sheriff, but it did not inconvenience him in any other way." For this story see Paul Sann, *Kill the Dutchman! The Story of Dutch Schultz*, chap. 10 (New York, 1971).

22. Lawrence, "Bridges Denounces Flynn," *New York Times,* January 14, 1943.

23. See Raymond Clapper, "Intolerant Utterance," *Washington Daily News,* January 20, 1943, and "Exit Ed Flynn," Time, June 15, 1943, 15.

24. Robert St. John Radio Broadcast transcript, January 14, 1943, Box 28, Flynn Papers, FDR Library.

25. The hearings of January 20, 22, and 23, 1943, show that several Democrats on the Foreign Relations Committee asked softball questions of Flynn or simply disparaged witnesses' criticisms of him. See, among various examples, comments by Senator Elbert Thomas (D-UT) and Senator Tom Connolly (D-TX), the committee chair, in *Hearings*, 6–7.

26. David Day, *Claiming a Continent: A New History of Australia* (Sydney, AU, 2001), 229. See also Day, *Reluctant Nation: Australia and the Allied Defeat of Japan, 1942–1945* (Oxford, UK, 1992), chap. 7.

27. The reference to "Kentucky Colonel" was made by Senator Frederick Van Nuys (D-IN). See *Hearings*, 28–30. On the gun issue as it related to the honorary deputy sheriff position, see Sann, *Kill the Dutchman!*

28. *Hearings*, passim; Flynn, *You're the Boss*, 185–88.

29. Quoted in Drew Pearson's column, "Washington Merry-Go-Round," *Washington Post,* January 22, 1943. Given that the committee hearing was held in private, it appears that someone had leaked a transcript to Pearson.

30. *Hearings, 20, 21, 42, 54–55.*

31. For Australian coverage of this exchange, see "Envoy Can't Name States of Australia," *Sydney Sunday Telegraph,* January 24, 1943, copy in Box 63, NTJ Papers, LC.

32. For Bridges' interrogation, see *Hearings,* 38–44. The quote from the Herald Tribune made its way into the *Sydney Sunday Telegraph,* January 31, 1943, copy in Box 63, NTJ Papers, LC.

33. See, for example the Associated Press article, "[McKeller] to vote against Mr. Flynn," published in the *Sydney Morning Telegraph,* February 1, 1943. The article quoted the influential Senator Alben Barkley (D-KY) as calling McKellar's the "swing vote" on the nomination. Copy in Box 63, NTJ Papers, LC. For *Time* magazine on the Crump factor, see "Exit Ed Flynn" (February 8, 1943 issue) as reprinted in the February 7, 1943 *Sunday Telegraph* [Sydney], Box 63, NTJ Papers, LC. The *Time piece* said that McKeller's motives in opposing Flynn were unclear. In his memoirs, Flynn blamed Crump, not McKellar, for his troubles, saying it was pure payback for FDR having prohibited Crump's interference with TVA appointments. You're the Boss, 190. For a somewhat longer version of the "paving bricks" story from Flynn's point of view, see the 1946 draft of *You're the Boss* in folder 1, Box 27, Flynn Papers, FDR Library).

34. Howard to NTJ, March 27, 1943, Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC.

35. On Hull's attitude, see Roy Howard to NTJ, March 27, 1943, Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC. Howard inferred that Hull was unhappy with the Flynn affair and was sympathetic to Johnson's situation.

36. On the Hull telegram, see NTJ to Stanley Hornbeck, March 25, 1943, Box 66, NTJ Papers, LC. In a letter to William Allen White on April 8, 1943, Johnson says he received a message "from the President" on March 24 that "he would be gratified if I would continue here as Minister." Box 43, NTJ Papers, LC. Presumably this message was delivered through the offices of Secretary Hull.

37. For specific examples, see Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC.

38. Hornbeck to NTJ, March 27, 1943, Box 66, NTJ Papers, LC.

39. W.J. Hughes to NTJ, April 1, 1943, Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC; Curtin's statement is in United Press news service report, March 26, 1943, Box 41, NTJ Papers, LC; Curtin to NTJ, March 26, 1943, Box 41, NTJ Papers, LC.
40. Shortly before the reappointment, Johnson had told his friend Hugh Gibson that all he wanted to do was "see the war through with the Australians." NTJ to Gibson, March 11, 1943, Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC; for similar comments, along with the observation that in view of bad publicity Flynn would have had difficulties being taken seriously, see NTJ to Gibson, April 6, 1943, Box 42, NTJ Papers, LC. Johnson called the Flynn appointment "a meteor." On his "shock" at the original decision to relieve him, see NTJ to the American journalist William Allen White, April 8, 1943, Box 43, NTJ Papers, LC. January, Johnson told White, was a very difficult month for him. In his letter of March 25 to Stanley Hornbeck, Johnson referred to a difficult three months. Box 66, NTJ Papers, LC.
41.Castle to NTJ, November 20, 1943, Box 41, NTJ Papers, LC.
42. On Johnson's career as minister to Australia, see Michael J. Birkner, "Did He Matter? Nelson Johnson as Minister to Australia, 1941–1945," paper delivered at Australian and New Zealand Studies Association of North America, March 23, 2007. As a bouquet to Johnson, whom he had come to know and admire during a stint in Australia on behalf of the Office of War Information in 1943, historian Allan Nevins observed in the *New York Times Book Review* (July 23, 1944) that it was "positively outrageous that so wise and effective a diplomat" as Nelson Johnson should have potentially been ousted for Flynn. Nevins was reviewing Hugh Gibson's book, *The Road to Foreign Policy.*
43. On 1944, see especially Robert H. Ferrell, *Choosing Truman: The Democratic Convention of 1944* (Columbia, MO, 1994), passim; John Morton Blum, *V was For Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II* (New York, 1976), 288–92; and Flynn, *You're the Boss*, 193–99.
44. For jibes Dewey made about "Paving Block Flynn" while running for re-election as governor of New York in 1950, see transcription of Dewey's remarks for radio in Box 28, Flynn Papers, FDR Library. In speeches that fall, Dewey also repeatedly associated Flynn with New York gangster Frank Costello. For context on Dewey's repeated use of Flynn as a campaign whipping boy, see Richard Norton Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times* (New York, 1982), 568–70.
45. On Flynn and his memoirs, see his correspondence with *New York Times* columnist and Washington bureau chief Arthur Krock in Box 25, Krock Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. Apparently Flynn handed over his rough recollections to his old friend, the political columnist Raymond Moley, who shaped the memoir. Moley asked Krock for a pre-publication critique, which was duly provided. Interestingly, Krock suggested that Flynn should trim down the section on the failed nomination for the Australian ambassadorship, advice that Flynn evidently took.
46. "Exit Ed Flynn," *Time,* February 8, 1943, 15.
47. Dilliard's column was titled "Flynn's Dramatic Defeat Reveals How Congress is Coming Back into Its Own." Undated copy in Box 1, OF 5224, FDR Library.
48.Among other sources, see Brian Waddell, *The War Against the New Deal: World War II and American Democracy* (DeKalb, IL, 2001); Blum, *V Was for Victory*, 221–45; and Thomas Fleming, *The New Dealers' War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War Within World War II* (New York, 2001), 189–213.

In the next issue of *Passport*:

A roundtable on John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy*

The historiography of oil and U.S. foreign relations

A roundtable on Keisha Blain, *Set the World on Fire*

…and much more

Call for Proposals: Editor of *Diplomatic History*

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) is issuing a Call for Proposals to edit its flagship publication, *Diplomatic History*. The term of appointment will begin on July 1, 2019, and, as stipulated in SHAFR's by-laws, will extend for at least three but no more than five years.

DH is the leading journal in the fields of U.S. foreign relations and international history. In 2017, full text downloads of *DH* articles reached 108,000. SHAFR provides a substantial subvention to the Editorial Office doing the intellectual work of producing the journal. It has been the practice that the home institution of the Editorial Office also contributes financially and in-kind to the production of the journal. Presently, the journal is published by Oxford University Press. The current administrative set-up includes two co-editors, graduate student assistant editors, and a board of editors. While SHAFR's by-laws mandate a board of editors, they do not mandate the current division of labor. The editorial staff could be located at a single institution or distributed among more than one. In this digital age, SHAFR will welcome proposals from partners who are geographically separated by distance but who are committed to using technology to facilitate collaboration and teamwork.

In no more than five pages, applicants submitting a proposal should:

1. Specify the major individuals who would be involved and describe the role of each person.

2. Specify the support, both financial and in-kind, that the host-institution guarantees it will provide to the Editorial Office.

3. Assess the intellectual strength of *DH* as it now stands.

4. Offer a vision for the journal as it evolves. What do challenges and opportunities do you foresee for academic journals? Where would you like to take *DH*?

Review of applications will begin on May 1, 2018 and will continue until the position is filled.

The decision will be made by the President of SHAFR with the approval of Council. SHAFR Council established an advisory committee composed of Andrew Preston (chair), Mark Bradley, Gretchen Heefner, Lien-Hang Nguyen, and Daniel Sargent. Prospective applicants should feel free to consult with members of the committee.

Please submit applications to Andrew Preston at amp33@cam.ac.uk

The advisory committee expects to interview finalists in Spring 2018 and make its recommendation to the President and Council in June 2018.

A Roundtable on Gregg A. Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War*

James I. Matray, Meredith Oyen, Jeffrey Crean, Pierre Asselin, Mitchell Lerner, and Gregg Brazinsky

Introduction to Roundtable on Gregg A. Brazinsky. *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War*

James I. Matray

In 1980, Warren I. Cohen published the second edition of his *America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations*. In it, he labels the period from 1950 to March 1979, when the United States formally recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC), as "The Great Aberration." "Central to American desires in Asia in the half century that followed [John] Hay's Open Door notes," Cohen argues," was the existence of a strong, independent China." But with China's intervention in the Korean War, the Truman administration "committed the United States to a policy of containing Communism in Asia" that "became increasingly anti-Chinese, an unprecedented campaign of opposition to the development of a strong, modern China."[1] While not addressing whether it was an aberration, Gregg Brazinsky's new book, *Winning the Third World,* does describe in detail the intense rivalry between the United States and the PRC during these same years. Given the continuing friction between the two nations early in the twenty-first century, perhaps Sino-American competition in fact became the new normal in 1950.

Brazinsky examines in detail the competition between the United States and the PRC to win the hearts and minds of government leaders and the citizenry in the nations of South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa between 1950 and 1979. He presents a great deal of new information and insightful analysis. His main thesis holds that "status was the most important driving force behind this struggle" (1). For Chinese leaders, enhancing the PRC's status was "a means of ending China's history of humiliation and regaining the honor and glory that had been stolen from it" (6). For their part, American leaders consistently acted to "prevent Beijing from attaining the status it craved" because they feared "that if China succeeded it would threaten their ambitions to integrate newly independent countries into a U.S.-led international order."

By bringing Sino-American competition into focus, the author delivers on his promise to contribute "a more complex and multifaceted understanding to the Cold War" (3). He also documents how little progress the rivals made toward achieving their objectives. In fact, the Sino-American rivalry only inflicted additional hardship on target nations and, in the end, showed how "it is easier to seek status than to attain it" (8).

That all eight photographs in *Winning the Third World* display PRC officials or Chinese citizens meeting foreign leaders shows in a graphical way how China occupies center stage in this study. Throughout the book's ten chapters, Brazinsky's focus is on Beijing's efforts to use diplomacy, economic aid and advice, and revolutionary rhetoric to persuade the leaders and people of underdeveloped nations to align with the PRC in the Cold War. In the conclusion, he succinctly summarizes "three clear themes" that emerge from the book. First, "Communist China could effectively sell itself and its revolution to Asians and Africans because it had succeeded in creating a powerful new state that could mobilize its vast population." Second, "China's actions often did more to damage its prestige than did those of its rivals." Finally, the unpredictability of rapidly changing events in Africa and Asia, all of which were "beyond the PRC's control," meant that "the politics of the Third World frustrated the PRC just as much [as] they did its rivals." Brazinsky also presents abundant evidence of how Sino-American competition has continued into the twenty-first century.

Winning the Third World has received reviews ranging from good to almost excellent from the participants in this roundtable. Writing for the group, Pierre Asselin declares that the book presents "a superb exploration of the rivalry between Beijing and Washington that unfolded within the context of the Cold War." Even more complimentary, Meredith Oyen praises the study as a "beautifully written addition to the literature on the Cold War in Asia" that "will stand for some time as the best window we have into the world of Chinese foreign policymaking in Africa and Asia under Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai." Both these reviewers strongly recommend adopting the book for use in undergraduate and graduate seminars. Oyen makes it hard to ignore this advice when she lauds Brazinsky for providing an "example of how to write clear and cogent historical arguments without devolving into esoteric 'academese.' The jargon-free text offers clear introductions and conclusions to chapters and straightforward analyses of major events." All the reviewers agree that in addition to being very well written, the book is solidly structured and offers thoughtful analysis.

Mitchell Lerner's commentary is the most thorough, briefly summarizing and then elaborating on most of the main issues and events that receive coverage in what he labels a "brilliant" study. "*Winning the Third World*," he writes admiringly, "is a landmark work of international history, one that contributes not only to our understanding of Sino-American relations during the Cold War but also to

the literature on soft power diplomacy overall."

While Jeffrey Crean does not use the term "soft power," he also notes, as does Oyen, how the book "differs from its predecessors by apportioning its thematic emphasis across the full panoply of foreign policy tools, be they military, diplomatic, economic, or cultural." But Crean criticizes Brazinsky for not applying the same thematic approach to U.S. policy during the Kennedy administration, arguing that neither Kennedy nor his advisers ever "made a serious effort to connect means and ends in a manner which would even approximate a proper grand strategy." He also faults Brazinsky for ignoring Latin America in his discussion of Sino-American competition in the Third World. Similarly, Lerner and Oyen are disappointed that the author chose not to cover Korea after 1953 and did not deal with the Republic of China at all.

All the reviewers commend Brazinsky for his exhaustive research, several singling out his use of sources at the now-closed PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive. Crean, however, argues that "a laser-like focus" on these particular documents prevents him "from citing those of Mao's speeches and writings during the 1950s and 1960s in which he justifies his foreign policy to party members and the Chinese people." Lerner agrees, asserting that "the book's focus on international status as the driving force for Chinese actions sometimes comes at the expense of domestic factors," pointing specifically to China's decision to intervene militarily in the Korean War. Indirectly providing another example, he writes that "Brazinsky overstates the extent to which the decisions made at Versailles steered Mao towards the communist ranks," when "his intellectual development" and "political opportunism" were more influential factors.

Asselin discusses Brazinsky's treatment of Vietnam at length, applauding him for doing a "commendable job describing the rationale for Beijing's involvement in the Vietnam War," with the qualification that he "accords too much importance to the NLF as an independent actor." More important, Asselin identifies another motive behind the PRC's strategy in the Third World (apart from its contest with the United States). "Brazinsky fails," he contends, "to take into fuller account the Sino-Soviet dispute and its impact on . . . China's push into the Third World, [which] had . . . as much to do with asserting itself as the 'real' vanguard of the international communist movement as it did with other considerations." Similarly, Oyen sees Brazinsky's description of U.S. behavior as overly simplistic, disapproving of how "the actions and policy choices of the United States emerge almost exclusively as a response to the Chinese challenge." She attributes this failing to Brazinsky's overreliance on Chinese sources, which persists until the last chapter, where he rightly credits President Richard M. Nixon with initiating the rapprochement with the PRC.

Many readers will share the concerns about Brazinsky's main thesis that two of the reviewers raise. Did a desire for status fuel the postwar Sino-American competition in the Third World? Lerner believes the word "status" has a "somewhat elastic meaning" for Brazinsky; he "defines his term so broadly," Lerner writes, "that everything can fit into the framework of status-seeking." Asselin also challenges the author's identification of status as the prime motivator, perceptively asking whether status was "actually the 'primary objective,' or was it merely a means to narrower pragmatic ends?" If it was true, for example, that security was an important PRC goal, he wonders why the Chinese would compete aggressively with the Americans for status while feuding with the Soviets, when doing so made "China's national security even more precarious." However, Lerner and Asselin emphasize that imprecision on this important point does not diminish the enormous value of this study. Oyen and Crean join them in praising Brazinsky for demonstrating the central role that China played in postwar world affairs and adding a new dimension to the existing understanding of the global Cold War.

Brazinsky, in his response, expresses his satisfaction with "the reviews as being for the most part, positive." Before dealing with specifics, he judiciously explains that "the problem that I have with the points raised by these critiques is not so much that I disagree with them but that incorporating them would have forced me to make different choices about how the book was organized and written, ultimately weakening its focus." Brazinsky then emphasizes that because his main purpose was to examine how the PRC and the United States sought to "win" support in the Third World, "domestic politics (in both China and the United States) did not receive as much attention." But more to the point, reaching internationalist goals was more important to Beijing in its dealings with Afro-Asian nations, and weakening the PRC internally was not a priority for the United States. "I made choices about what to include and exclude," Brazinsky explains, "so that the book could highlight an important dimension of the Cold War that has not been given enough attention by other scholars despite its obvious relevance to the present."

Brazinsky insists that he does address the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on PRC policy, but he admits that he minimizes coverage of it, especially in Vietnam, in order to maximize his treatment of Sino-American rivalry, "which has been mostly ignored by other scholars." As for the NLF, rather than overstating its importance, his "handling of it" merely reflects "the importance accorded to it by Beijing and Washington." He does not respond directly to Oyen's criticism about his portrayal of U.S. policy as being consistently reactive to China's behavior. However, he minces no words in registering his surprise that Crean, "the promising young scholar of the group . . . seems to want to bring the field back to a more U.S.-centric perspective."

Finally, Brazinsky acknowledges that it is difficult to define "status precisely." But he asserts that "even if Beijing and Washington were in fact pursuing status as a means to achieve other goals, the actual competition between them was focused primarily on status itself." In concluding, Brazinsky labels his book "a starting point" for scholars wishing to establish "the full scope and many facets of Chinese influence" in the Cold War era." As he mentions, he had made this same point in the introduction to *Winning the Third World*, where he expressed the hope that future historians "researching in Indonesian, Swahili, Laotian, and other languages might one day shed light on other dimensions" and "the full impact of the foreign policy of Beijing and Washington in the region" (12). Here, in his response, Brazinsky calls on scholars to explore as well the worthy issues that the reviewers have raised in their commentaries.

Note:
1. Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1980), 220–21.

Review of Gregg Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War*

Meredith Oyen

Gregg Brazinsky's *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War* is an impressively researched and beautifully written addition to the literature on the Cold War in Asia. Because the volume makes such extensive use of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, which has severely curtailed access to its collections since 2013, Brazinsky's work will stand for some time as the best window we have

into the world of Chinese foreign policymaking in Africa and Asia under Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

Brazinsky's central argument is that "status was the most important driving force" in the Cold War-era rivalry between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) (1). Other common concerns, like increasing prestige or maintaining legitimacy, fall under the status umbrella. Over the course of the book, he explores the ways in which China sought status and the United States sought to deny it. In the process, he highlights the ways in which China used its own colonial past to reach out convincingly to emerging nations in Africa and Asia, and he examines the instances in which the PRC's policies created blowback that undermined its quest for prestige. He also recognizes the unpredictability inherent in the international system, where unanticipated and rapid changes can overthrow the finest diplomatic efforts.

In ten chapters plus an introduction and conclusion, *Winning the Third World* surveys Chinese foreign policy initiatives in Africa and Asia from the 1940s to the 1970s and the efforts made by the United States to counter them. The first three chapters deal with fairly well-known material, including the rise of the Chinese Communist Party and its revolutionary drive to power, the difficulties involved in supporting early Asian communist struggles in Korea and Indochina and challenging the United States' support of Taiwan, and the PRC's early emergence onto the world stage as a diplomatic power in important meetings at Geneva and Bandung. Though scholars well acquainted with these events and with some of the most recent work on them that also benefited from the all-too-brief window of opportunity to do research at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive will likely not find anything too unexpected in these chapters, they are useful for introducing the uninitiated reader to important context and for establishing the core arguments of the book.

Starting in the fourth chapter, the benefits of those hard-to-access archival sources really become clear, as Brazinsky takes his readers on a tour through Chinese outreach efforts in the "Third World," a term that in this case refers primarily to South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The contents and coverage of the book are clearly dictated by the availability of Chinese Foreign Ministry sources, and this leads to a sort of "impact-response" model in reverse. As historian Paul Cohen famously formulated it in *Discovering History in China*, a generation of American historians of China tended to interpret all Chinese actions as taking place in response to the challenge of the West. *Winning the Third World* seems to follow this pattern in reverse: the actions and policy choices of the United States emerge almost exclusively as a response to the Chinese challenge. This remains more or less the pattern until the final chapter, centered on President Richard Nixon's effort at achieving rapprochement with China. Not coincidentally, this chapter is also the only one that relies most heavily on U.S. sources, as the Foreign Ministry Archive never, even in the heyday of its openness, released documents from the period after 1965.

The body of the book takes readers on a tour through Chinese efforts to seek influence, recognition, and increased international status across two continents. It includes discussions of such disparate diplomatic tools as propaganda, state visits, economic aid, and military support for leftist insurgencies. Though the scope of the book is impressively expansive, Brazinsky effectively balances fascinating thematic discussions of different types of diplomatic overtures and necessary coverage of major events such as the Sino-Indian War and the Indonesian coup. The most well-known and well-studied events, such as the Vietnam War, receive coverage, but some of the most interesting parts of the book deal with Beijing's lesser-known attempts to make inroads into Africa, such as its participation in insurgent efforts in Zanzibar and the Congo.

Though *Winning the Third World* already has an impressive source base, one wonders what it would look like with the addition of the Republic of China's concurrent efforts to seek status in many of the same locations during the same era. PRC efforts to win international support, prestige, and legitimacy entailed in many cases winning recognition away from the ROC, and the American responses to PRC engagement in the world can often be tied to those of the government on Taiwan. After the first few chapters, the ROC falls out of the book (even in the short discussion of propaganda directed at the diasporic Chinese, where ROC efforts were extensive). The decision to leave the ROC out—a move likely also driven by sources, as Brazinski did not consult Taipei's own Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive—can no doubt be defended as extending the scope of an already expansive book beyond the breaking point. However, I hope that the next wave of research conducted in the era of less accessible mainland sources will amend this work by including that perspective.

Beyond the wide coverage, thoughtful analysis, and unique access to what are currently inaccessible sources, *Winning the Third World* is extremely well constructed. It could quite legitimately serve as a classroom example of how to write clear and cogent historical arguments without devolving into esoteric academese. The jargon-free text offers clear introductions and conclusions to chapters and straightforward analyses of major events. As a result, Brazinsky's work is a useful contribution not only to the shelves of Cold War historians, but to undergraduate and graduate seminars as well.

Review of Gregg A. Brazinsky's *Winning the Third World*

Jeffrey Crean

When John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency, Americans had been in the throes of a red scare for well over a decade. But in 1961, matters grew worse. An article that March in *Reader's Digest* attempted to raise the alarm about Chinese communist subversion not half a world away in Laos or South Vietnam, but in America's own backyard. According to the most widely circulated periodical in the United States at that time, the Chinese had "preempted the subversion lead in Latin America from their Russian partners." Latin America, with its predominately rural population and weak, corrupt, and unpopular central governments, bore "striking similarities to the China" the communists conquered in 1949. No doubt with Cuba's recent fate in mind, the article concluded with the call to arms "it is very late, and we must hurry."[1]

In *Winning the Third World*, Gregg Brazinsky mentions Latin America only briefly, when he notes the paltry resources the Chinese communists devoted to supporting the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. His work focuses on Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa, where the Chinese sent the vast majority of their money, advisors, and guns. Nonetheless, the very fact that Americans worried about Maoists in Peru and Venezuela in 1961 illustrates the strain of anti-Chinese hysteria which pervaded U.S. foreign policy circles, particularly in the early and mid-1960s.

Brazinsky's analytically sharp monograph makes clear, with its enviable trove of research material, makes it clear that during the height of Sino-American competition, from the late 1950s through the late 1960s, both sides were losers. Both saw their prestige weakened in various parts of Asia and Africa, usually in direct proportion to resources expended. The author argues that for both sides "status" was the primary motivator of this competition. While Mao's regime sought to increase its prestige in its own

neighborhood in particular and in the emerging Third World in general in order to buttress the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy to rule at home, various U.S. presidents and policy actors sought to diminish their communist rivals and deny them international respectability.

In the end, neither side won many lasting friends among post-colonial leaders or influenced foreign peoples in the developing world. Each eventually realized, at least partially, the self-destructive nature of their competition and decided upon cautious rapprochement and fitful collaboration as superior options.

This book is the latest to analyze Cold War competition in the Third World, following on the heels of Jeremy Friedman's 2015 *Shadow Cold War*, which provided the definitive take on Sino-Soviet competition. Both Friedman and Brazinsky agree with Odd Arne Westad's pathbreaking 2007 saga of U.S.-Soviet rivalry *The Cold War in the Third World*, which argues that these proxy battles left little in their wake besides piles of corpses, misguided White Elephant development projects, and human misery. The ironically titled *Winning the Third World* completes the triangle, adding to our understanding of the motivating factors behind Chinese and U.S. foreign policies as well as the effects of such policies on the ground from the Gulf of Guinea to the Strait of Malacca.

This book differs from its predecessors by apportioning its thematic emphasis across the full panoply of foreign policy tools, be they military, diplomatic, economic, or cultural. On the face of it, this competition should have been no competition at all. Yet the Chinese – at least at first – adroitly compensated for what they lacked in gold, guns, and butter with a potent advertising pitch emphasizing post-colonial self-reliance and non-white solidarity that resonated among the vast swathes of humanity who had spent the better part of the previous century on the wrong side of the imperial color line. Yankee arrogance and heavy-handedness provided an opening the Chinese could exploit with finesse and self-control. Of course, these were rarely Mao Zedong's strong suits.

As so often was the case for all powers during the Cold War, increasing effort brought declining – and eventually negative – marginal returns. Popular Chinese efforts at what Brazinsky calls "nation building" inevitably gave way to a penchant for supporting "revolutionary evangelism." In country after country, initially sympathetic leaders realized Zhou Enlai's velvet glove could not soften the blow of Mao's iron fist. Support for "Wars of National Liberation" undercut the pomp of diplomatic visits and the occasionally appealing propaganda of films and literature.

China achieved its greatest successes when it had no choice but to set its sights low, as with economic development. Chinese aid advisers put their U.S. counterparts to shame by living amongst the African people, sharing their hardships, and pragmatically providing quick and tangible economic benefits. Yet lack of resources, while preventing destructive overreach, limited the positive scope of these programs to a few localities.

The American side of the story is exceedingly strong in details but somewhat lacking in its overarching themes. Denying the Chinese Communists international status was undoubtedly the centerpiece of Dwight Eisenhower's policy, as enacted with such flamboyant heavy-handedness by his generally undiplomatic Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Thus, Brazinsky is on firm if well-trodden ground at the start. His recounting of Richard Nixon's piece-by-piece reversal of the policies enacted by the man he served as vice president is both sweeping and spare. Nixon turned Dulles on his head. He realized status need not be a zero-sum game, and that the U.S. could actually benefit by showing respect to rivals and adversaries.

The origin of this Nixonian insight is beyond the scope of the monograph, yet it perhaps had roots in the man's own longstanding insecurities, a lifetime of slights real and perceived and a subsequent personal yearning for respect and adulation. Well before he changed his mind on China, Nixon was one of the few U.S. foreign policy thinkers who called for treating the obstreperous French President Charles de Gaulle with respect. He argued that the best way to prevent the proud former leader of the Free French from being such a thorn in America's side was to accord him the symbolic grandeur he craved. One thus has no choice but to agree with the author that notions of status were paramount to the China policy of Republican presidents during the early Cold War.

However, Brazinsky fails to prove the same about Democratic presidents, particularly John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In my opinion, he cannot, because – in China as in so many other foreign policy areas – Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the presidents he served lacked a coherent grand strategy. Along with McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, and Walt Rostow, Kennedy, Johnson, and Rusk had goals, impulses, and beliefs, but never made a serious effort to connect means and ends in a manner which would even approximate a proper grand strategy.

Kennedy may have favored a brand of grandiosely idealistic foreign policy rhetoric which was anathema to Johnson, who devoted his visionary idealism solely to the domestic realm, but both adopted a muddle-through approach to containment. They careened from crisis to crisis and issue to issue, trying to suffer as little foreign and domestic embarrassment as possible, holding the line against communist expansion both real and perceived while avoiding Armageddon. This accidental pragmatism leaned on brushfire wars of counterinsurgency as opposed to nuclear brinksmanship, but that is a matter of tactics, not strategy.

The China policy of Kennedy and Johnson typified this purposeless drift. They maintained Eisenhower's containment and isolation while abandoning the underlying assumption that this approach would at most cause regime collapse and at the very least prevent a communist China from achieving great power status. Certain officials toyed with eliminating the counterproductive travel and trade bans. Yet, in keeping with their accidental pragmatism, they did so because such policies no longer made practical sense. They were not part of a larger strategy of wide-ranging outreach. Caught between the monolithic assumptions of Eisenhower and the trilateralist actions of Nixon, the most they could do was change the optics. In moves that were typical of their focus on the purely tactical level, both Kennedy and Johnson took steps to place the onus for the lack of a positive U.S.-China relationship firmly on Chinese shoulders.

The word "onus" appeared again and again in the writings of erstwhile reformers like Robert Komer, Chester Bowles, and James Thomson, moderate fence sitters such as Bundy, Rostow, and Alfred Jenkins, and was even eventually adopted by the hardliner Rusk, whose impulse on China was to be Dulles with a human face. This exercise in blame-shifting was not consonant with a concern for denying the Chinese communists status. From Kennedy's announcement in a 1963 press conference that the United States was "not wedded to a policy of hostility" toward "Red China" to Johnson's July 1966 speech making clear the U.S. was prepared to reach out to China if and when the Chinese were ready and willing, the overriding goal was letting the world know who was at fault.

One might say that this tactic subtly undermined Chinese status and was a pursuit of Eisenhower's goals through different means. But Brazinsky does not make this argument. Nor does he note this change in tactics which differentiated the U.S. China policy of the 1960s from that of the 1950s, such that there was a U.S. China policy in the 1960s beyond merely avoiding a repeat of the Truman-era

calamities which simultaneously scarred and scared a then-up-and-coming Dean Rusk.

On the Chinese side, Brazinsky is on far firmer footing, and I do not disagree that status had primacy in Mao's grand strategy. But by neglecting to look at how the chairman used his foreign policy for domestic purposes, the author fails to take this argument far enough by neglecting to look at how the Chairman used his foreign policy for domestic purposes. The inextricable connection between Mao's foreign and domestic policies was recognized in real time by analysts at the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency, confirmed by Chen Jian's early scholarship in the 1990s, and later on extended to the Sino-Soviet split by Lorenz Luthi. Brazinsky cites convincing evidence that Mao believed at least as far back as his time in Yenan in the early 1940s that the success of communist revolution in China was dependent upon the extension of that revolution to China's neighbors and, beyond that, upon China's involvement in ending imperialism in the "Intermediate Zone."

However, a laser-like focus on his great finds in the Foreign Ministry Archives prevents the author from citing those of Mao's speeches and writings during the 1950s and 1960s in which he justifies his foreign policy to party members and the Chinese people. Simply put, the reader is left to intuit that Mao's search of status abroad bolstered his legitimacy at home. This oversight could have been easily rectified, and is similar to Friedman's neglect of domestic factors in *Shadow Cold War*. International and transnational approaches need not be antithetical to considerations of the domestic-foreign policy nexus.

In terms of the specific subject matter, this is a story of failure. Neither China nor the United States won the Third World. Yet in grand strategic terms, it is a tale of success through failure. Today, the United States and the People's Republic of China are the world's sole great powers. The Soviet Union is no more, with its Russian successor state reduced to a malicious geopolitical version of a Puck who pretends he is a Prospero. China's loss of nearly all previous foreign policy gains during its *annus horribilus* of 1965 contributed to the domestic calamity of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which in turn led to Mao's and Zhou's outreach to Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who wanted to extricate themselves from a war in Vietnam that was motivated in large part by a desire to check the power of communist China. This gave the Chinese geopolitical breathing space at the moment their regime needed it most. The Chinese communists did the right thing after exhausting all other possible options, at least if their efforts are evaluated in terms of preserving their grip on power and maximizing China's global impact.

Brazinsky begins and ends this book by connecting his story to the current post-Cold War competition between the Chinese and the Americans. As during the Cold War, their rivalry is largely economic in Africa and is often dominated by military concerns in Asia. In fact, current Chinese leader Xi Jinping noted China's past aid to Africa in his first visit to that continent, establishing the contemporary relevance of the now-distant events of this book. Its detailing of past U.S. overreactions should be well heeded today.

Great powers often believe that they are like great white sharks: inaction will kill them. In fact, the opposite is more often the case. The works of Westad, Friedman, and Brazinsky, among other authors, portray the Cold War as a saga not unlike the legendary 1974 fight between Muhammad Ali and George Foreman in that tragic Cold War battleground of Zaire. Like Foreman, the Soviet Union was a fearsome and terrifying bruiser of a heavyweight that eventually punched itself to exhaustion. The eighth round in Kinshasa was a metaphorical preview of 1989. It was a shock that everyone should have seen coming. The only difference was that the United States simply had to stay on its feet to win, and never landed an actual knockout blow against an adversary staggered by its own aggressive nature. U.S. foreign policy decision makers would do well to consider such a lesson so as to avoid repeating the wasted efforts detailed in this outstanding book.

Note:
1. Lester Velie, "Chinese Red Star Over Latin America," *Reader's Digest*, March 1961, 97-102.

Review of Gregg Brazinsky's *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War*

Pierre Asselin

Gregg Brazinsky's *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War* is a superb exploration of the rivalry between Beijing and Washington that unfolded within the context of the Cold War—and in fact went a long way toward exacerbating and sustaining it. Starting in the 1950s, the Third World became the primary area of contestation among Cold War rivals. Although it had been created only recently, the People's Republic of China (PRC) assumed an extremely important role in the international system that emerged from the ashes of World War II. That role was especially consequential in the colonial and postcolonial world, namely the rest of Asia and Africa. China left an indelible mark on the Third World during the Cold War. How and why that came about is the central theme in Brazinsky's book.

Beijing's decision to insinuate itself aggressively into the competition for the Third World during the Cold War was not prompted by security, economic, or ideological factors, Brazinsky claims. It was instead the product of an ardent desire to reassert China's status as a great power and by extension to overcome and erase the national humiliation endured since the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century. In thus accounting for China's behavior in the Third World after 1949, Brazinsky effectively builds on the work of Chen Jian, which maintains that ideological considerations largely shaped the PRC's foreign policy during the Mao years. But whereas Chen considers the quest for status to have been but "a function of Mao's revolutionary nationalist ideology" (6), Brazinsky argues that it was actually central to the worldview and strategic thinking of Beijing leaders.

As part of the effort to reclaim its greatness, China also endeavored to serve as a revolutionary inspiration and model for embattled Third World nations. From 1949 onward, assisting other revolutionaries became China's "internationalist duty" (47). China, its leaders thought, had a "special role" (5) to play in supporting national liberation and other "progressive" movements in the Afro-Asian world. It was particularly important to assume that burden in Asia, where China could thus "credibly claim leadership of a wider Asian revolution" (47).

Chinese agency in the Cold War is clearly and convincingly shown throughout Brazinsky's book. Whether intentionally or not, the narrative strongly suggests that Beijing carried the tempo in the Third World and that Washington was more often than not reacting to circumstances set in motion there by the Chinese. The book thus offers a very important lesson about the Cold War: namely that the "superpowers," i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union, did not always control events. Preponderant as both their "hard" and "soft" power may have been, other states exercised tremendous leverage over international relations in the post-World War II period. The influence exerted by China was particularly meaningful, serving as it did to condition politics in the Third World to an immeasurable degree.

Arguably, the greatest strength of Brazinsky's book is that it effectively underscores the centrality of China in the global Cold War. Many in the West, including academics, consider the Cold War a competition between two main rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. The reality is that China may well have played a more important role than either of the superpowers in sustaining that competition. After all, the Soviet Union committed itself to "peaceful coexistence" with the Americans and the capitalist camp generally as early as 1956. Despite occasional, brief spikes in tensions between Moscow and Washington resulting from such events as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the two countries maintained a relatively healthy relationship well into the 1970s.

Throughout the 1960s and for much of the '70s, it was China that kept the momentum of the Cold War going. The radicalization of its domestic and foreign policy that started in the late 1950s contributed to that momentum to no insignificant degree, particularly in the Third World. As Brazinsky's book aptly demonstrates, China's adventurism elsewhere in Asia, including in the Middle East and in Africa, sounded alarm bells in Washington and prompted the continued mobilization of massive human and material resources to fight the Cold War. That, in turn, produced attendant bloody—or bloodier—crises across the Third World.

Nowhere was this more evident than on the Indochinese Peninsula. It was China that encouraged Hanoi to renew "big war" in 1964, with a view to bringing about Vietnamese reunification by force. Since the end of the war with France in 1954, Moscow had been urging North Vietnam's communist leaders to exercise caution in the South to avoid provoking a forceful American response and engulfing the country in another major war. The prospect of another "Caribbean crisis" in Southeast Asia was just too much for Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to bear. Over the latter's protestations, Hanoi, firmly under the control of Secretary Le Duan and other hardliners by early 1964, proceeded to dramatically escalate the insurgency begrudgingly sanctioned by Le Duan's predecessor, Ho Chi Minh, in 1959.

In the days after the so-called Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964, Hanoi's hawkish leadership made the fateful decision to deploy the first combat units of the North's regular armed forces, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), to the South. They were enthusiastically supported in that by Beijing. While Le Duan's regime jealously guarded its autonomy in decision making, there is no question that increased military assistance and offers of troop support from China's own People's Liberation Army (PLA) spurred the decision to authorize the dispatch of northern forces to participate in mass combat operations in the South. Hanoi made that decision knowing full well that the failure of its forces to achieve an expeditious victory over the armies of the "puppet" regime in Saigon would inevitably result in massive American intervention, including, Hanoi policymakers were convinced, an invasion of the North.

American intervention did not translate into an invasion of the North, but it did bring on a campaign of sustained bombing that targeted military, industrial, and other installations above the seventeenth parallel. It also produced Americanization and dramatic escalation of the war below that line. Through all this, Beijing remained steadfastly committed to its Vietnamese allies, as Brazinsky explains. That commitment, occurring as it did in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, significantly increased the pressure in Moscow to respond in kind and prove its mettle as leader of the socialist camp. In fact, that may well have been Moscow's primary motivation in deciding to render assistance to Hanoi.

The Soviets eventually provided Hanoi with the means to defend the North against American air raids. They did not, however, consent to supply the North and its surrogates in the South (the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Vietnam [NLF], also known as the Viet Cong) with the small arms and other hardware needed to fight U.S. troops and their allies. That was the purview of other socialist camp allies—Beijing in particular. In hindsight, had it not been for China's eagerness to support Le Duan's project to reunify Vietnam by force starting in 1964, one of the most consequential Cold War conflagrations may never have happened in the first place. At a minimum, its outcome would have been very different. China's role in Vietnam changed everything. And Vietnam, in turn, changed everything in the Cold War.

While Brazinsky does a commendable job of describing the rationale for Beijing's involvement in the Vietnam War, he accords too much importance to the NLF as an independent actor. The Front, as recent scholarship has demonstrated, answered to Hanoi, and was never an autonomous actor, especially when it came to its foreign relations and interactions with supporters such as the PRC. More fundamentally, there is some confusion as to the nature of Beijing's larger aim in aggressively engaging the Third World generally.

Brazinsky stresses repeatedly that status was the primary motive force in China's policy *vis-à-vis* the Third World during the Cold War. He writes that "in general, I view status as the larger objective sought by the PRC and gaining prestige, legitimacy and other attributes as important subcomponents of this goal" (5). But then he also notes that "in contending that Sino-American competition was driven by status," he does not mean to argue that "such other considerations as security and economic interests were irrelevant." Instead, he adds, China, much like Washington, actually "viewed status in the Third World as critical precisely because it could facilitate the achievement of other more tangible objectives" (8).

Was status actually the "primary objective," or was it merely a means to narrower pragmatic ends? What specific economic interests mattered to Beijing? And if security was an end, then why aggressively compete with Washington in the Third World even as the Sino-Soviet dispute kept getting worse? Did that not make China's national security even more precarious? These matters do not take away from what is otherwise a very persuasive account, but they should have been qualified with greater precision.

Lastly, Brazinsky fails, in my opinion, to take into fuller account the Sino-Soviet dispute and its impact on the formulation of Chinese foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the Third World in the 1960s and '70s. He recognizes that Beijing was deeply troubled by Soviet "revisionism," so much so that it was soon openly "lambasting the Soviet Union as an enemy of revolutionary forces in Asia and Africa" (182). But I do not think he goes far enough in relating the implications of their dispute for the Cold War generally and in the Third World specifically. As Beijing competed with Washington in the rest of Asia and Africa, it did the same with the Soviets. Starting in the early 1960s, deteriorating relations with Moscow figured increasingly prominently in the strategic calculations of Mao and other Chinese leaders.

Thus, China's push into the Third World and its struggle for influence there had, I believe, as much to do with asserting itself as the "real" vanguard of the international communist movement as it did with other considerations, including reclaiming its status as a world power at the expense of the United States. In fact, in the eyes of Chinese policymakers at the time, the quest for status may have had less to do with erasing past humiliation than it did with demonstrating the superiority of Chinese revolutionary prescriptions over Soviet ones. In retrospect, the ever-widening rift between Beijing and Moscow conditioned the Cold War in the Third World as much as, if not even more than, the Sino-American and Soviet-American competitions there.

To be sure, "Sino-American competition had an unquestionable impact on many guerrilla struggles" (32), but so, too, did the Sino-Soviet dispute. Brazinsky is absolutely correct in asserting that during the 1960s and 1970s South Vietnam became a "critical test case" for Beijing's and Washington's "starkly different visions for the future of Southeast Asia" (238). As Brazinsky points out, ensuring the triumph of wars of national liberation would "attest to the validity of Maoist doctrines, establish the PRC as a model for oppressed peoples waging wars of national liberation, and cement China's status as the world's leading revolutionary force" (231).

At the same time, however, South Vietnam became a critical test for the contrasting positions Beijing and Moscow adopted on resolving East-West/North-South conflict. For Mao, the war in South Vietnam became a laboratory of sorts to demonstrate the suitability and merits of militancy and revolutionary violence, of armed struggle. And that stood in stark contrast with the Soviet position, which called for the resolution of differences between Hanoi and the NLF, on the one hand, and the regime in Saigon and the United States, on the other, through negotiations. Until the disastrous Tet and "mini-Tet" campaigns of the first half of 1968, those were the metaphorical battle lines that Beijing and Moscow had drawn for themselves in Indochina.

Truth be told, much of my criticism of Brazinsky's book is unfair, narrowly focused as it is on the one issue I am most familiar and comfortable with, that is, the Vietnam War. His is a remarkably insightful study of a critically important yet oft-ignored dimension of the global Cold War. The book in fact epitomizes the academic study of the Cold War at its best. The scope, like the source material, is wide-ranging, the organization is sound, and the writing is lucid.

Winning the Third World is required reading in a graduate seminar on the United States and the global Cold War that I am currently (Fall 2017) teaching at San Diego State. It has proven absolutely invaluable in helping students understand the nature of the post-1945 international system, as well as the critical role played by China and other "lesser" actors in perpetuating and conditioning that system. I do not believe I am deluding myself when I say that my students have also thoroughly and genuinely enjoyed reading it. We have much to learn from the troubled history of Sino-American relations, and Brazinsky's account does justice to the importance of that history.

Note:
1. Lester Velie, "Chinese Red Star Over Latin America," *Reader's Digest*, March 1961, 97-102.

"Not Winning the Third World": A Review of Gregg Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World*

Mitchell Lerner

In 1961, Guinean President Sékou Touré expelled the Soviet ambassador from his newly independent nation, charging Moscow with plotting to overthrow his government. "Guinea will never surrender to puppets," Touré raged publicly. "The only course before them is a bloodbath."[1] Quickly, officials in Washington and Beijing scrambled to fill the void, hoping to spread their nations' influence within this emerging Cold War battleground. The Kennedy administration generally relied on private firms that, backed by government guarantees on their investments, sought to develop Guinea's economic resources and productive capacities as a way to lure the country into the American orbit. American companies worked to develop the nation's mines, increase farm production, and encourage trade with the outside world. Mao Zedong adopted a different tactic. Unable to match American financial resources, Chinese officials emphasized a more direct and hands-on approach that was focused on generating more immediate and obvious practical results at the expense of long-term investment. They also stressed the importance of recognizing indigenous values and traditions rather than trying to push Guinea in a new direction, and which required Chinese representatives to live and work alongside the local population to reinforce the sense of solidarity and understanding between the two peoples.

The Chinese approach, as Gregg Brazinsky's brilliant new book on Sino-American competition in the Third World demonstrates, was more successful. Guinean leaders had little patience for Washington's long-term approach, and they resented the distance maintained by many American officials. By late 1966, Touré announced that the United States was "welcome to reduce aid," and National Security Advisor Walt Rostow soon advised all American citizens, including Peace Corps and Agency for International Development personnel, to leave the country (281). But Beijing's victory proved ephemeral. Guinea's economy, for reasons that were primarily internal, remained stagnant. Chinese aid was welcomed, but any attempt to exert political influence was met warily by local officials. And the surrounding region was beset by political instability and rivalry that not only undermined the Chinese efforts in Guinea but also prevented its few successes from spreading beyond Guinean borders. In the end, the Sino-American fight over Guinea may have been more fruitful for the Chinese than the Americans, but neither side emerged with what it really sought. "The sad irony," concludes Brazinsky, "was that the United States and China both had much to offer the Third World, but their rivalry ultimately prevented them from delivering on their promises" (354).

Guinea, as *Winning the Third World* chronicles, was hardly an uncommon story. The book follows the struggle for influence between the two great powers throughout much of the twentieth century and finds more failure for both sides than it does success. But Brazinsky does more than simply trace these outreach efforts. He argues that this competition was less about military or economic gain or even about expanding the two nations' disparate ideological systems and more about status. Brazinsky depicts Chinese policy as being rooted in two related factors that drove the nation towards the pursuit of greater international standing. The first factor was China's deep resentment of the humiliations inflicted by the Great Powers on China earlier in the century, which laid the groundwork for the Communist Party's nationalist appeal at home. Increasing influence and standing in the Third World soon became a central part of this appeal and a defining component of the early years of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership. The second factor was Mao Zedong himself, whose role in the development of Chinese foreign policy was shaped by his desire to enhance his image as a great theoretician and revolutionary. That image was tied to increasing China's standing in the world and improving his own political standing at home. As a result, Beijing, especially in the decades immediately after the Korean War, sought to hold up its own revolutionary path as a model to those struggling to break the shackles of Western imperialism, and committed itself to a multifaceted effort to use economic, cultural, and diplomatic soft power to win the hearts and minds of the Third World. Alarmed by this growing Chinese effort, American officials in turn tried to meet these challenges with their own outreach campaigns, ones intended to win over converts in Asia and Africa while excluding the Chinese at the same time, although the American approaches were clearly more defensive and

reactive than those of its rival.

In its examination of this Sino-American competition, *Winning the Third World* leaves no stone unturned, taking readers across multiple twentieth-century soft power battlefields, with a focus on Asia and Africa. Brazinsky starts his story with the Chinese May Fourth Movement in 1919, positing that even at the outset, Chinese nationalists saw themselves as part of a community of exploited nations—nations that not only shared certain anti-Western values but also might become junior partners in a Chinese-led alliance. Although American leaders rarely took the CCP threat seriously in the early years, the dramatic growth of the party in the late 1930s and its emerging commitment to spread "Mao Zedong Thought" as an alternative model for developing states to emulate soon attracted American hostility, which was rooted in the fear that Mao would spread his ideological influence to other colonial nations. The Chinese entry into the Korean War––which Brazinsky attributes largely to Mao's desire to impress and hence win over other nations that might adopt the revolutionary line––convinced American policymakers of the need to take the threat of an expansionist China seriously and sparked the first steps of the conflict between the two over Chinese status on the international stage. The post-Korean War embargo on China, we learn, was thus supported by American policymakers less because it was effective and more because its resonance as a form of moral censure might lessen Beijing's standing with the international community (69). The Bandung Conference in 1955 cemented the Sino-American rivalry, as American officials were taken aback by Mao and Zhou Enlai's success in presenting China as a moderate and pragmatic alternative to the Western system. Over the next two decades, the two nations fought a quiet war to enhance their standing with emerging Afro-Asian nations.

The rest of the book focuses on the Cold War years and the many soft power battles that emerged. Although the specifics varied by country and region, the overarching picture is one of American money and industrial development efforts competing against Chinese manpower and rhetorical solidarity, supplemented on both sides by cultural and propaganda efforts. These were fights for influence that the United States usually lost, although its losses didn't necessarily translate into Chinese wins. The book is full of wonderful stories that trace the competition across the globe. Among them are tales of American officials meddling in Laotian politics as revenge for Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's visit to China in 1956; surprisingly successful Chinese cultural diplomacy efforts that included films, music, circus performers, and even Zhou Enlai's attempts at traditional dance in Mali; battles waged for loyalty in Pakistan, Cambodia, and Indonesia that indirectly led to the Games of the New Emerging Forces in 1963, a mid-level sporting competition for Third World athletes that the United States tried to undermine; the fierce economic development competition waged in Africa, where, rather than admit their mistakes, American officials often pointed to indigenous shortcomings and racial inadequacies as the cause of their own failures. Although he is critical of American failures, Brazinsky highlights Chinese shortcomings as well and, furthermore, points to the many indigenous and transnational factors that were beyond the control of either side. In the end, he concludes, neither country really won the Third World. The story of their struggle to try to do so, he notes, "demonstrated that it is far easier to seek status than to attain it" (8).

In the end, *Winning the Third World* is a landmark work of international history, one that contributes not only to our understanding of Sino-American relations during the Cold War but also to the literature on soft power diplomacy overall. Its breadth is enormous, and the research, in both American and Chinese sources, is equally impressive. There are, of course, a few small issues with which one might quibble. I think Brazinsky overstates the extent to which the decisions made at Versailles steered Mao towards the communist ranks (16). The chairman's disillusionment with the results of the conference was certainly significant, as Brazinsky shows, but his intellectual development seems to me to have been pushing him in that direction anyway, as was his own political opportunism.[2] I also think that the book's focus on international status as the driving force for Chinese actions sometimes comes at the expense of domestic factors. China's intervention into the Korean War, for example, is presented as the result of Chinese desires to boost their prestige in the region (47–8), without much discussion of the domestic political environment in which the decision was made, an environment that reflected growing doubts about CCP strength and legitimacy.[3] Mao's target audience, I would argue, thus seemed to be as much domestic as it was foreign, and that is an audience that Brazinsky largely overlooks here.

I am also surprised by the lack of coverage of Korea after 1953. If the Korean War, as Brazinsky shows, was seen by Chinese policymakers as a critical event in their campaign to establish China as a leading voice of anticolonial revolution, one would expect more coverage of the relationship after the war, particularly in the immediate postwar period when North Korea was struggling to rebuild, and during the periods when China and the USSR were competing for influence. I also admit to being a bit confused by Brazinsky's claim that "Beijing and Washington both . . . sacrificed far more blood and treasure in Korea [than Vietnam]" (58). Since the United States clearly lost more of both in Vietnam, I presume he means collectively, but it is still a confusing phraseology. These are admittedly very minor quibbles, however, and they do nothing to distract from the overall accomplishment of *Winning the Third World*.

The only larger concern I have reflects an issue that I think is inherent in the larger framework of the book: the somewhat elastic meaning of the term "status." China's quest for status is the organizing construct around which the book is wrapped, and yet by the author's own admission it is "a somewhat slippery concept . . . not easily measured or quantified" (4). Traditional notions of status seeking, as classically defined by such thinkers as Weber and Thorstein Veblen, fail to explain China's vision, since those notions assume that the status seeker desires acceptance and respect within an established order, while China instead sought status as the leader of a revolutionary vanguard committed to tearing down the existing structure. In Brazinsky's portrayal, China's quest thus emerges as a sort of inherent contradiction, a nation railing against top-down hierarchy while trying to establish itself atop a new order (which the author rather brilliantly describes as an effort to create an "anti-hierarchical hierarchy") (5). But while I agree that "status" was a central component of Chinese foreign policy, I am still not sure what it is or how we measure it. Increased economic partnerships sent Chinese goods abroad and no doubt enhanced China's standing overseas, but they also promoted economic gain at home and helped solidify the regime's political standing. In those cases, was status the endgame, or was it a steppingstone towards more tangible consequences related to military, economic, or political results? And I fear that the author defines his term so broadly that everything can fit into the framework of status seeking. We learn, for example, that China's efforts to receive foreign dignitaries were consciously planned in ways that would enhance the nation's status, but I admit that I didn't find the cheering crowds, lavish receptions, and ornate tours for distinguished guests that the book describes to be particularly different from the standard diplomatic protocol of almost every other nation. When

Italian Premier Fanfani visited the United States in 1963, for example, he was met by adoring crowds; feted at White House receptions; escorted by an honor guard of soldiers, sailors, marines; and, in Chicago, entertained by the 5th Army Band. I suppose one could argue that this fanfare was indeed an effort to enhance America's status with Italy, but surely it was not about seeking to increase America's standing on the international stage. Instead, it was about shoring up diplomatic alliances for strategic purposes and greasing the wheels of trade and investment. If everyone seeks status in the international arena, and if status is often just a means towards obtaining more tangible results in more practical arenas, and if status can be sought in even the most mundane tasks, how useful is it really as an explanatory construct?

None of these issues, however, should detract from what is a tremendous book overall. Thoughtful, well written, sophisticated, and truly international, *Winning the Third World* stands not only as the definitive work on this aspect of Sino-American relations and a wonderful examination of the superpower struggle for Third World loyalties, but as one of the best books about American-East Asian relations in recent years.

Notes:
1. Quoted in *Chicago Daily Defender*, December 28, 1961, 10.
2. See, for example, Alexander Pantsov, *Mao: The Real Story* (New York, 2013), chap. 5; and Jon Halliday and Jung Chang, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York, 2005), chap. 2.
3. On this point, see especially Masuda Hajimu, *Cold War Crucible* (Cambridge, MA, 2015), chap. 4.

Response to Reviewers

Gregg Brazinsky

I would like to thank Andrew Johns for organizing this round table and the four reviewers, whose work I greatly admire, for taking the time to review this book. I read the reviews as being, for the most part, positive. They praised *Winning the Third World* for its research, writing, and organization. The reviewers did raise some questions, however. They asked why I did not include some points or go into greater detail on some issues. And some of the reviewers do not find my argument about status—the core concept of the book—completely persuasive.

In many cases the problem that I have with the points raised by these critiques is not so much that I disagree with them but that incorporating them would have forced me to make different choices about how the book was organized and written, ultimately weakening its focus. I think it therefore might be most profitable to go over some of the choices that I made in writing the book and reflect on why I think more extended treatment of some of the issues brought up by the reviewers would not have strengthened it.

As the book's subtitle plainly states, I chose to focus my narrative on Sino-American rivalry in the Third World. In particular, I analyze how China strove to expand its status and influence in the Global South and how the United States sought to counter these efforts. As I explain in the introduction, Sino-American competition is one of many possible windows for looking at the Cold War in the Third World. While it brings some aspects of the conflict into sharp relief, it necessarily obscures others or pushes them to the background.

Focusing on how Beijing and Washington aimed to "win" the loyalties of Afro-Asian peoples meant that domestic politics (in both China and the United States) did not receive as much attention. Mitch Lerner and Jeffrey Crean both criticize the book on this point, arguing that Mao's efforts to expand Chinese influence abroad seemed as much geared at bolstering domestic legitimacy as enhancing new China's prestige at the international level. I do not disagree that Chinese diplomacy also had a domestic political function. But greater attention to this would not, in my view, have deepened our understanding of how the struggle between the United States and the PRC unfolded in the Third World, which is the story I wanted to tell in the book. Even if this was an important motive for the PRC, I saw little evidence in Chinese sources that it was more important to PRC policy toward Afro-Asian countries than Beijing's internationalist objectives. Moreover, Chinese domestic politics were not really an arena of Sino-American competition. While American policymakers did seek to weaken the Chinese Communist Party domestically where they could, by the 1950s they were realistic about that effort and recognized that Mao and his comrades would be in power for the foreseeable future.

Zeroing in on competition between Beijing and Washington also meant a heavier focus on some parts of the Third World and some time periods than others. I was not writing a Cold War history of Tanzania, Vietnam, Indonesia or any other Afro-Asian country so much as I was trying to demonstrate how the different countries in the region were impacted by Sino-American competition. This brings me to Pierre Asselin's critique of my handling of Vietnam in the book. Somewhat modestly, he does not bring up what I acknowledge is a flaw in the manuscript: my failure to cite his 2013 work on Vietnam, which, unfortunately, I did not become aware of until my book was in press. I suppose this speaks to the need of Cambridge University Press to increase its presence at SHAFR more than anything else.

Asselin makes two criticisms of my treatment of Vietnam: (1) that I overstate the importance of the NLF and (2) that I overemphasize Sino-American competition and downplay the impact of Sino-Soviet rivalry. On the first point, I would say that it is not so much that I overstate the importance of the NLF as that my handling of it in the book reflects the importance accorded to it by Beijing and Washington. As I argue, it was often the perceptions of Beijing and Washington—in this case that the NLF was answering to Hanoi—that shaped their policies more than the underlying realities. Thus, regardless of the underlying reality, Beijing's perception of the NLF as a revolutionary organization that was emulating the Maoist revolutionary model was a key part of what drove Chinese support for it and Chinese policy. It is for this reason that Chinese support for the NLF (militarily and diplomatically) receives so much attention in my chapter.

On the second point, I do acknowledge in the book that the Soviets would eventually gain influence in Vietnam and that, ironically, neither the United States nor China really benefited from their involvement in Vietnam. I also explain in the book (chapter 6) how Beijing was driven to support revolutionaries in the Third World in part by its competition with Moscow and how that had the ironic effect of intensifying Sino-American rivalry as well. At the same time, Asselin is right to say that most of my attention is focused on Sino-American rivalry and that I do not go into as much detail on Vietnam after 1966 (when Soviet involvement grew) as I do on the earlier period. While I believe that this story is relevant to Vietnamese history or the history of the Vietnam War, it is less relevant to a history of Sino-American competition in Vietnam, which petered out by the late 1960s. I can understand that the book might not be completely satisfying to regional or country specialists seeking a more complete account of how the Cold War played out in particular places. But if I had chosen that approach, the narrative of Sino-American rivalry, which has been mostly ignored by other scholars, would have

ended up getting subordinated to the numerous different national histories that the rivalry influenced.

In writing this history of Sino-American rivalry, I strove hard to create a balance between Chinese and American viewpoints and actions through the use of materials gathered in both countries. I do not know if I would go so far as Meredith Oyen does and say that I created a sort of "Western impact and Eastern response model" in reverse. But I do try to highlight that in many times and places, China was a critical actor and that the Cold War in the Third World was shaped not only by American policies but also by what the Chinese were doing. In this sense, the book is very much in keeping with the broader, ongoing effort in the field to encourage more multi-national, multi-archival research.

I must say it comes as something of a surprise that the promising young scholar of the group, Jeffrey Crean, seems to want to bring the field back to a more U.S.-centric perspective. He contends that I fail to demonstrate that blocking China's efforts to gain status in the Afro-Asian world was an important part of the Kennedy administration's grand strategy. The problem with this critique is that I never said that it was. Rather than taking American grand strategy as the starting point and organizing my work around it, I sought instead to view the history of Sino-American rivalry in the Third World as a more dialectical process in which America's China policy was sometimes completely reactive to what Beijing was doing and did not fit into any larger strategy. The book gives hundreds of pages of examples of how the Kennedy and Johnson administrations tried to diminish the influence of Chinese efforts to support insurgencies, implement aid projects, and spread the influence of Maoism. Vast amounts of time, resources, and energy were spent on these efforts. Whether or not they were related to a broader grand strategy is less relevant in my view than the fact that they were made throughout the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies.

Finally, the central argument of *Winning the Third World* is that status was the key driving force behind Sino-American competition in the Third World. I argue that China's craving for status motivated many of its policies while American officials were loath to see the PRC gain legitimacy or prestige anywhere in the world and did what they could to prevent it from doing so. As I explain in the book, defining status precisely is a difficult task because it cannot be measured objectively like territorial gains or economic wealth. I thought a great deal about exactly what to say about status in the introduction. If I defined it too narrowly I could not have applied it to many of the initiatives that Beijing pursued in Afro-Asian countries, while if I defined it too broadly, the term would lose its analytical utility.

Mitch Lerner and Pierre Asselin both think that I erred on the side of defining it too broadly. Lerner in particular wonders whether the efforts China made to lavish attention upon foreign dignitaries that I describe in the book were truly meant to enhance its status. He notes that receiving foreign dignitaries is a part of standard diplomatic protocol and gives the example of the American reception for the Italian premier, Amintore Fanfani, in 1963. To some degree, this is exactly my point. Much standard diplomatic protocol is geared—either explicitly or implicitly—at enhancing the status and prestige of the participating countries. State visits raise the visibility and legitimacy of the leaders and nations that are involved in them. Were diplomatic historians to pay more attention to status as an interpretive paradigm they would doubtless find that it inserts itself into the day-to-day practice of diplomacy in a myriad of ways.

In the introduction to *Winning the Third World*, I acknowledge that states often pursue status because it can be a means to more tangible ends. Picking up on this point, Lerner and Asselin both ask how we can know if status was the primary objective of Chinese and American policies or if the tangible objectives that came along with status were more important. I think, however, that this criticism ignores one nuance of my argument. I contend that status is the best framework for understanding Sino-American competition in the Third World. I do not argue, however, that it completely explains all Chinese (or American) policies toward the Global South. Thus, even if Beijing and Washington were in fact pursuing status as a means to achieve other goals, the actual competition between them was focused primarily on status itself. Since the primary purpose of the book was to describe the competition, it did not make sense to focus on all of the more tangible objectives that China and the United States hoped would go along with their enhanced status.

In conclusion, I would like to repeat one other point that I make in the introduction. *Winning the Third World* is, in many ways, a starting point. I made choices about what to include and exclude so that the book could highlight an important dimension of the Cold War that has not been given enough attention by other scholars despite its obvious relevance to the present. Many of the issues raised by the reviewers are indeed worthy of further exploration and I expect they will receive fuller treatment in different kinds of historical works. I do hope that my book (along with Jeremy Friedman's excellent recent work on Sino-Soviet competition) helps to establish the pivotal importance of China as an actor in the Afro-Asian world during the Cold War. Now it will be up to others to spend time in Africa, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere to explore the full scope and many facets of Chinese influence.

Close, but No Cigar!

Michael Schaller

Recently the Associated Press reported that retired Navy Admiral Bruce Loveless had been indicted for colluding in a scheme concocted by a notorious Malaysian defense contractor known as "Fat Leonard." The admiral along with more than two dozen other current and former officers were accused of bilking the Navy out of at least $35 million by steering contracts for ships' provisions and repairs to facilities in ports stretching from Vladivostok to Brisbane owned by "Fat Leonard" Glenn Francis, so named for his ample girth. In return for the padded services, the contractor plied his co-conspirators with cash and other kickbacks. Prosecutors reported that some of the defendants attempted to cover their tracks by referring to themselves using code names such as the "Lion King's Harem."

As of December 2017, 28 naval officers had been criminally charged in the case, of whom 18 pleaded guilty. Fat Leonard, lured to the United States in a sting operation in 2013, pled guilty in 2015 and agreed to testify against the accused. The investigation is ongoing, with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service probing the behavior of 60 (!) admirals and over 400 other officers. To date, five retired admirals have received letters of censure in what is likely the worst corruption case in the service's history.[1]

For over a decade, Fat Leonard's Singapore-based company, Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), employed a network of "moles" inside the Navy's 7th Fleet to direct ships to facilities controlled by GDMA. The company provided repairs to vessels, stocked ships with provisions, and off-loaded wastewater and garbage, among a variety of services. In a penetration scheme that would have been the envy of a foreign adversary, the moles forwarded details about where and when ships were headed, the scope of their missions, and other technical and highly classified information. This knowledge allowed GDMA to overcharge the Navy while its network of moles approved payments for the padded contracts.

In addition to outright bribery of individual officers, GDMA promoted goodwill by entertaining a large number of Navy personnel lavishly between 2000 and 2013, often at banquets during the fleet's port calls throughout the Asia-Pacific region. As part of his firm's enhanced customer service, Fat Leonard purchased an aging British warship which he refitted and renamed the *Glenn Braveheart.* Under its new management, the *Braveheart* became the world's largest party boat, sometimes mooring beside the U.S.S. Blue Ridge, the flagship of the 7th Fleet. Navy officers piped aboard were entertained by a troop of pole dancers (dubbed the "Elite Thai SEAL Team") and plied with liquor and prostitutes.

The complex indictment announced in mid-2017 described fancy meals, expensive wines, and $2,000 a box cigars presented to complicit Navy officers in the Philippines. An especially lurid passage explained that for entertainment "Fat Leonard" had "rented the MacArthur Suite atop the Manila Hotel, where memorabilia connected to Gen. Douglas MacArthur was used for sex acts with prostitutes." This assertion begs, no demands, elaboration.

The Manila Hotel, MacArthur's residence between 1935 and 1941, has been described by savvy travelers as perhaps the "only hotel with a foreign policy." In the late-1930s, while serving as military advisor to the Commonwealth Government and Field Marshal of its nascent army, MacArthur boasted that the handful of troops he commanded could easily repel a Japanese invasion. These reassurances were included in the hotel's advertising material, at least until the Japanese occupied Manila without resistance. Decades later, during the Marcos dictatorship, the now rebuilt hotel (the original had been badly damaged during the liberation of the city in 1944) turned MacArthur's refurbished penthouse apartment into a virtual shrine which the well-heeled or well-connected could rent. In the early 1980s, hotel banners proclaimed the solidarity of the Philippine people with the Reagan administration. This was one of numerous ways in which Ferdinand Marcos tried to enhance his own dubious wartime record by linking himself to the general and other powerful Americans. In Washington, occupants of the White House have been known to cultivate donors with the offer of a sleepover in the Lincoln Bedroom. In Manila, for the right price—perhaps along with a pair of designer shoes for Imelda Marcos?—revelers could party all night in MacArthur's penthouse.

The hotel's current website reports that the suite comes decorated with historic memorabilia linked to the general. These include items such as his battered campaign cap, sunglasses, and signature corn cob pipe. Legend to the contrary, however, MacArthur adopted the pipe as a prop only after he took command of Army forces in the Southwest Pacific, following his evacuation from the Philippines early in 1942. Before then he was strictly a cigar smoker. The recent indictment is somewhat vague or, perhaps, discreet, in its explanation of which historic items were utilized as props during the orgies. It could have been the pipe or, as with another powerful political miscreant, a cigar. Military history buffs can take some measure of solace in the fact that the corn cob pipe on display in Manila is a reproduction, not an original.

Note:
1. For detailed coverage of the scandal, see a pair of informative articles published in the *Washington Post*, "The Man Who Seduced the 7th Fleet," by Craig Whitlock, May 27, 2017, updated November 5, 2017. Also, Associated Press release, March 14, 2017.

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

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

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

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

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

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The Shit Quote

Jeffrey F. Taffet

"Son… I don't smoke and I don't drink. My only pleasure in life is kicking the shit out of the foreign aid program of the United States of America."

Otto Passman (D-LA), chair of the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations from 1955 to 1976

This is a shit quote, literally, and that is its appeal. It has been treated, more politely, quite badly by historians.

The quote is wonderful because it offers a simple way to explain that congressional leaders, most notably Passman, used their considerable power to cut executive branch budget requests for foreign aid appropriations during the Cold War. It can introduce Passman's fundamental view that the United States spent too much on aid. The quote is also colorful. It has the word "shit" in it, which allows an author to be transgressive in an effort to make their text more engaging. But did Passman actually say it?

I am in the early research stages of a project that explores opposition to foreign aid spending, and Otto Passman plays an important role in the narrative. I knew the quote, but I had forgotten where I had seen it, so I was excited to come across it as I read Robert David Johnson's *Congress and the Cold War* (New York, 2006). I looked at Johnson's footnote and saw that he had cited Chester J. Pach Jr. and Elmo Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence, KS, 1991), which I then picked up.

Pach and Richardson use the quote as well and cite William J. Burns, *Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1955–1981* (Albany, 1985) as their source. Burns, in his use of the quote, cites Dan Morgan, *Merchants of Grain* (New York, 1979).

I had discovered by following the footnotes that Johnson's was a fourth-generation use of the quote. I became curious about where else it might be located. I had a stack of unread books on my shelf about the history of foreign aid and checked their indexes. I found the quote again in George Guess's *The Politics of United States Foreign Aid* (London, 1987); Guess cites Burns. Now I got curious. Using Google, Google Books, JSTOR, and other databases, I tried finding it elsewhere, and I was a bit shocked to see how many scholars had used the quote.

The attached chart shows its spread. I ended up with 28 sources by 23 scholars, as some authors had used the quote more than once. The chart includes three MA theses and one dissertation. I discovered that there was actually a fifth-generation use of the quote, as four scholars cite Johnson, and four cite Joseph A. Fry's *Dixie Looks Abroad: The South and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1789–1973* (Baton Rouge, 2002). Fry also cites Pach and Richardson and is thus a fourth-generation user. I am confident that the chart is incomplete and that there are additional cases in print. The use of the quote has also exploded; I found 3 occurrences in the 1970s and 1980s, 4 in the 1990s, and 12 since 2010.

Dan Morgan's book about the international grain trade is the beginning of the line. All of the citation chains I found go through Burns and start with Morgan. But Morgan does not provide a citation for the quote. He explained his sourcing method by writing:

> Early attempts at footnoting and textual sourcing of every statement hindered the flow, seemed stilted, looked silly, and often as not accomplished nothing. So, at the possible risk of seeming to make unsubstantiated assertions, I have left the citation of sources for the back of the book. If my list of sources seems shorter than might be expected for such a vast subject, there are several reasons. One is that this is a book mainly about contemporary times, and living people, rather than documents, are the primary sources for all but a few chapters.

Then, at the end of his text, referring to the chapter in which the Passman quote is located, he writes, "This chapter relied heavily on documents in the public record: [a] voluminous, footlocker-size dossier of government reports and correspondence obtained under the Freedom of Information Act; and grand jury indictments and pleadings."

In short, all the scholars have used a quote that cannot be definitively proven to be accurate. But there are additional problems.

The Morgan text is, "'Son,' he once told a representative of the Agency for International Development, 'I don't smoke and I don't drink. My only pleasure in life is kicking the shit out of the foreign aid program of the United States of America.'" Burns changed "representative of the Agency for International Development" to "State Department official." He was writing about the 1950s when he used the quote, so for the most part authors place it in a 1950s context. Pach and Richardson strengthened the connection with the 1950s, as their oft-cited book is about Eisenhower. Sarah Babb in *Behind the Development Banks: Washington Politics, World Poverty, and the Wealth of Nations* (Chicago, 2009), a fifth-generation quote user via Johnson, writes that "Passman was once quoted as saying to an Eisenhower administration official . . ." Fry is even more specific; he writes that "In 1958 he informed a representative of the State Department . . ." Yet the Agency for International Development did not exist in the 1950s, so the quote, if true, has to be from sometime after its founding in 1961 (the quote is presented in the context of a discussion about foreign aid and rice sales to South Korea in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but it is not clear that it refers to that subject).

Morgan, of course, may be entirely accurate about Passman's words, but after spending a healthy amount of time studying him and reading his speeches, I wonder a bit about how much it reflects his sensibilities. His opponents did speak about him as somewhat maniacal in his opposition to aid, and year after year he did fight to cut foreign aid budgets. However, he did not oppose all aid. Much of his focus was on fighting waste and reducing spending. He highlighted the problem of unexpended funds and consistently asked why Congress should authorize more spending when there was still money in the aid pipeline. He pointed out, often with the facts on his side, that there was a great deal of waste, inefficiency, and corruption in aid programs.

Passman also had a sense of humor, and his deep knowledge about aid programs allowed him to use irony when homing in

on inconsistencies in budget requests and when pointing out instances in which aid administrators were asking for funding to continue obviously unsuccessful efforts. It is hard to know what he might have said in an unguarded moment off the record, but cutting aid did not appear to be a sport for him; it was a mission. Because the quote does not fully represent the complexity of Passman's approach, its use is problematic, especially when presented as the only piece of information about him.

That said, there certainly may be a document somewhere in which an Agency for International Development official reports this quote, but it also might be something that Morgan heard at a cocktail party third-hand. I have tried to contact Morgan but have not succeeded yet.

I am hesitant to be critical of Burns, Pach and Richardson, Johnson, Fry, Babb or the many other scholars who have used the quote, in part because I fear that I have similar mistakes in my own work. Further, I am impressed and inspired, generally, by much of this scholarship. Many authors, though not all, also cite multiple additional sources about Passman that demonstrate their effort to place the quote in context. In his essay "The United States, the World Bank, and the Challenges of International Development in the 1970s," Patrick Allan Sharma even cites some of my work that discusses Passman. Brenda Gayle Plummer's book *In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956–1974* has a complicated footnote that cites Fry, a fine essay about Passman that does not use the quote, and the Morgan book (though not the page with the Passman quote, but page 393 in a book with 387 pages). Stephen Jin-Woo Kim's book *Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul-Washington Alliance, 1953–1960* only uses the quote in a footnote, not in the actual text.

Burns should not have quoted Morgan uncritically, Morgan should have provided citation, and every other scholar in the chain should have been more careful about the quote. It should be standard practice to avoid quoting material from a secondary source unless that secondary source indicates a primary source. Authors should then indicate the secondary source in their text, not in a footnote. When practicable, scholars should also hunt down the primary sources to check for accuracy. That should be a minimum professional standard. When we cite, we should do it well.

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Editor's note: One of the things that I have noticed in recent years is that SHAFR's membership has undergone a significant amount of change due to retirements, new faculty and graduate students, and the expansion of what is considered to be related to the study of U.S. foreign relations. Thus, I thought that it might be useful (and fun) to spotlight several members of the organization in each issue of *Passport* to help everyone meet and get to know people that they might not otherwise interact with at the annual conference or encounter in their areas of interest. And I wanted to go beyond the usual scholarly biographies (focusing exclusively on publications and research interests) with a list of questions designed to make us all seem a bit more human and a little less the stereotype academic. In addition to a biographical statement, each of our spotlighted members is responding to the same set of questions If you would like to suggest someone (including yourself) to be featured in a future issue, please contact me directly at andrew_johns@byu.edu. ***AJ***

SHAFR SPOTLIGHT

Emily Conroy-Krutz

My research focuses on nineteenth-century religion and foreign relations, with a particular emphasis on the foreign mission movement. I first got into history in high school, when I discovered women's history and began thinking about the connections between history and the present. I came to diplomatic history accidentally when I was working on a seminar paper that I wanted to write on missionary wives, and found myself instead wondering what the first generation of American foreign missionaries thought they were doing, and why they thought it was a good idea to go to Asia in 1812 in the first place. My first book is *Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic* (Cornell, 2015), and I've published articles in *Diplomatic History*, the *Journal of the Early Republic, and Early American Studies*. I've been a SHAFR member for a few years now, and consider SHAFR and SHEAR to be my two academic homes (which makes for very busy summers of back-to-back conferences). I teach at Michigan State University and live in East Lansing with my husband, daughter, dog, and elderly cat. You might recognize me as one of the people knitting while listening to panels at the annual conference.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)

I really love television, so I don't know if I can come up with an all-time favorite tv list. It would definitely include Inspector Lewis and probably the very early seasons of Law and Order, which we used to watch during dinner when I was growing up. Lately, I've been loving: The Americans, The Good Place, Crazy Ex-Girlfriend, and The Crown. I will give just about anything on Masterpiece a try, and I've been getting my British crime-solving fix most recently from Vera.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I can't imagine anyone will want to answer this question honestly, but among my highlights was the time I was interviewing at AHA and managed to lose my voice over the course of the conference. By the time of my Saturday late-afternoon interview for a job I was really excited about, I was literally only able to communicate by squeaking out my words. Needless to say, I did not get the campus visit.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Angelina Grimké, to thank her and to come away with some of her energy. Catharine Beecher, to try to understand her better. And Julia Child, because that would be a delightful meal. Not all at the same time, obviously.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?

I would be pretty surprised that I'd actually bought a Powerball ticket! I'd spend it on the boring necessities (mortgage, college savings, retirement savings), and then plan some really fun travel without worrying about finding the perfect cheap-but-still-nice hotels.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?

I don't follow sports beyond the barest of bare minimums you need to make small talk in a Big 10 town. I am a runner, and have done a few half marathons.

What are five things on your bucket list?

I can't say that I have one. My goals are always to travel more, to read more, and to spend as much time by the water as possible.

When I was 8 years old, I met President Bill Clinton. My Dad was stationed at Camp David. Even then I showed signs of moving toward the SHAFR community. As I was walking past President Clinton on our way out of Thanksgiving church service, I couldn't help but tell him that I could name all 42 presidents…on the spot. I walked away, but a few moments later, the president tapped me on the shoulder and challenged me to come through on my promise. The White House photographer captured 3 priceless images of over conversation, which are among my most valuable possessions.

I am completing my doctoral studies at Vanderbilt, and my project looks at the effects of the war on drugs in Mexico. During this last stretch of doctoral study, I am serving as a Fellow at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at UC, San Diego. Mexico's upcoming presidential elections are never far from the daily conversation, and I believe my work is benefitting immensely from Vitamin D, fish tacos, and the Southern California mindset. I was born in Colon, Panama, located at the Atlantic entrance to the Panama Canal. I travelled the world as part of a military family growing up and served as a Marine Corps officer prior to starting graduate school. I have many and varied interests from fitness and travel to karaoke and spirituality.

Aileen Teague

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?
Movies - Beaches, Blood Diamond, Sicario, Forrest Gump
TV Shows - How I Met Your Mother, Homeland

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?
During my military days, I overslept when I was supposed to be leading a parade. There's no way to subtly arrive late in such a situation when hundreds of people are standing around waiting for you. I now set three alarms when I need to be somewhere early in the morning.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Frances Perkins, Frida Kahlo, and Jane Austen, ideally at the same table. It would be fascinating to speak with these women about the current state of women's rights and the #metoo movement.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
I would donate 25% to charity and then open my own gym and yoga studio near the beach in Southern California. I would also hire a private chef and own homes in all of the cities where my best friends live.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)…and did you ever compete at any level?
New England Patriots - I promise I'm not a frontrunner. I've been following them since attending college in Boston. I played basketball growing up and on club teams in high school and grad school. I also run and cycle though I'm less competitive about fitness activities now than I once was.

What are five things on your bucket list?
(a) Exchange my smartphone for a flip-phone - I've found that more technologically advanced does not always mean better, (b) See the Northern Lights, (c) Certify my dog so we can volunteer with the elderly together, (d) Complete my Spin Instructor Certification, (e) Write for a Women's Magazine (probably under a pseudonym!),

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
Without a doubt I would be some sort of fitness entrepreneur.

Cody J. Foster

Cody J. Foster is a PhD Candidate in History at the University of Kentucky where he studies contemporary U.S. History and America in the World under the supervision of Dr. Lien-Hang T. Nguyen (Columbia University). He is currently writing a dissertation titled, "'For the Conscience of Mankind': The International War Crimes Tribunal and the Creation of a Global Anti-Vietnam War Movement." He is also a project coordinator for an NEH Summer Institute for Teachers at the University of Kentucky. He has contributed articles to *The Journal of the Historical Society, Essays in History*, and *Passport*, has written think pieces for *The New York Times, The Huffington Post, Buzzfeed, History News Network, Counterpunch*, and *The Lexington-Herald Leader*, and has been featured in the *USA Today, The New York Times, The Courier-Journal,* and several international newspapers. He holds a B.A. in History and Political Science from Indiana University and an M.Phil. in Historical Studies from the University of Cambridge.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?
I'm not sure I would have made it this far without *The Office*. Michael Scott keeps me sane by showing me the true capacity for insanity. I'm also a big *Parks & Recreation* fan because I aspire to be a Ron Swanson but I know I'll always be a Chris Traeger. Of course, you can't study politics and international relations without following *The West Wing* and *The American President* – a film brought into my life by my wife, Hanna. Finally, I use the film *Something's Gotta Give* for both celebrations and defeats because it's one of my favorite movies. If Hanna comes home and sees that I'm watching *Something's Gotta Give,* she has to ask: "Good news or bad news?" The same applies if I'm listening to the *Les Miserables* soundtrack.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional movement?
It was the final week of being a master's student at the University of Cambridge. I rode my bike to the center of town, bound my dissertation, and submitted it to the Faculty of History. I then cycled to my final American History seminar where I expected to see my dissertation advisor. I caught his eye when I walked into the room, and, indeed, he stood up to congratulate me on completing the program. He rose his hand into the air for what I thought was a high five, but it turned out that he was just waving hello. I then proceeded to give him a high-five and a bro-hug. We then stood there in awkward silence for a moment before shaking hands again and parting ways. I all but pulled my robe up over my head and sulked to the back corner of the room. He's an amazing fellow and would certainly appreciate this story some five years later.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
I'd like to have dinner with Alexander Hamilton just so I can see his reaction when I tell him all about the best-selling Broadway play about his life. I'd like to have dinner with Herbert Hoover because I wrote my master's dissertation about his post-presidential life and I still have so many questions. Finally, I'd like to have dinner with Eleanor Roosevelt so that we can both gossip about Franklin while discussing her vision for human rights.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
I would invest heavily in bitcoin……..no I'm just joking. I'd first use $500 million to buy a beach compound in Captive, FL (reminiscent of Hyannisport) where all of my family could live. I'd invest heavily in my children's future so that they could travel, attend college, etc. I'd be very selfish and I'd purchase a kitchen with most advance gadgetry. I'd buy an Aston Martin so that I could feel like James Bond every now and then. Finally, I'd give a pretty penny to my Alma Mater, Indiana University (also known as The Promised Land), so that they could heavily recruit students to take classes in History, Political Science, and International Studies, and so that that they could support both faculty and graduate student research.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)…and did you ever compete at any level?
I couldn't have cared less about sports until I met my wife in 2007. I played baseball until I learned that I couldn't hit a ball. I participated in basketball until it became apparent that I'd never make a basket. I tried to learn karate, but refused to bow to the sensei and hated that I had to take my shoes and socks off to practice on such a cold floor (To be fair, I was 8). That being said, I did develop a love for both college basketball and football because of Hanna. Today I tend to yell louder than she does – even though she frequently has to correct my knowledge of the rules.

What are five things on your bucket list?

1. See *Hamilton*.
2. Run an ultra-marathon.
3. Write a book worthy of the Pulitzer.
4. Have dinner with Gordon Ramsay.
5. Walk the Camino de Santiago with my dad.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
Without question: I'd be a chef. I'm not willing to work the late evening hours because I want to spend time with my family. However, I'd be quite alright owning a bed and breakfast, a food truck, or a catering service. Life teaches you to have a hobby and a job: I do history as a job by day and I cook for my wife and friends as a hobby by night.

Laura Belmonte

I am currently Professor and Department Head at Oklahoma State University (and am clearly a freak of nature in that I actually love being Department Head). I am also Vice-Chair of the OSU Faculty Council and incoming Chair for 2018-2019. I have recently published a long piece on the history of U.S. propaganda and a shorter one on using popular culture in teaching about the Cold War. I am close to finishing a book manuscript called *Global Gay Rights: A History of the International LGBT Rights Movement* that will appear in Tom Zeiler's series "New Approaches to International History" published by Bloomsbury Press.

I got into history primarily so I could have gainful employment that permitted me to wear basketball shorts and a t-shirt most of the time, set my own schedule, and do something I truly love. 22 years into the gig, I remain confident it was a brilliant life choice. When I'm not doing history things, I love to run, golf, lift weights, travel, cook; and hang out with my wife Susie and our dogs William Howard Taft (a Westie) and James Madison (part Chihuahua, part Jack Russell Terrier, part Tasmanian Devil). I am a total news junkie and write a daily news summary on Facebook called The Full Belmonte. I detest goat cheese, people who abuse animals, and meetings that should have been emails. And conference calls that have more than three participants need to outlawed.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum often)?
The Royal Tenenbaums, Dr. Strangelove, Six Feet Under, The Fog of War, The Namesake, The Lives of Others, The Celluloid Closet, The Wire, Breaking Bad

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
Not too long ago, I was asked to give a keynote lecture at a workshop in Berlin. Stupidly, I decided that was the perfect occasion to deviate from my tried-and-true method of timing a paper (i.e. using an 18-point font and knowing it takes about 2 minutes to read) and tried a "word count clock" on the web. Suffice it to say, my 45-minute talk ballooned into an 80-minute talk (and it came at the end of a long day, not even starting until 6 p.m.) I'm surprised they didn't throw root vegetables, unplug my computer, and leave. Even I was sick of me by the time it ended. It was painful. So painful.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Elizabeth Cady Stanton – to witness her brilliance firsthand (and she loved a great meal); Magnus Hirschfeld – to ask him what it was like to be an international gay rights activist in the early 20th century; Martin Luther King, Jr. – to discuss the current state of American race relations. It would also be fun if Bullwinkle could be our server. No particular reason. I just love Bullwinkle.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
Start a foundation that promoted global human rights work; travel around the world; build my wife the house of her dreams; have the most stylin' wardrobe at SHAFR (because that would be a really high bar).

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?
The only professional sport I watch with any regularity is golf. I love college football though and often go to see OSU play and/or tailgate.

I played soccer for about 20 years.

What are five things on your bucket list?
Travel throughout Southeast Asia; go on a bike trip through the French wine country; perfect the art of making gnocci; make a hole-in-one; raise a Westie puppy who will undoubtedly have a presidential name.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
International public health or law. There was also a time when I seriously considered running for office. I aspired to be a doctor ("the kind that helps people" to use my wife's incomparable phrase) until I discovered I'm thick as two short planks when it comes to math and science.

It's kind of Andy Johns to ask about a slightly alternative biographical sketch. I'll diverge slightly from the suggested questions in pursuit of the general purpose of getting beyond the usual academic credentials. First, in the spirit of George W. Bush, brush-clearing: born and raised in Durham, North Carolina; boarding school in New Hampshire at Exeter; undergrad at Stanford; some outdoors and environmental work in the Sierra Nevada and Washington, D.C.; four years of high school teaching in Tacoma and Colorado Springs; grad school at Duke; 12 years teaching at Cornell and now 15 years at Nebraska; books on the United States and southern Africa, race and U.S. foreign relations, and the 1970s, with the next one on American thinking about non-Americans.

For most of the last three decades, the career has been a great blessing but also generally secondary to domestic priorities. Most households seem to need a home person, to one extent or another, and I've been fortunate to be a primary parent of two sons and enthusiastic supporter of my wife's career in the healthcare profession. To wit: I'm the cook. Also the travel planner for some slightly possessed cyclists and skiers. Domestic organizer may be the term.

Okay, a few answers: I did play college lacrosse. Best professional moment might have been an interview meal at Montana State where a failed attempt to cut of a rock-hard dessert sent it flying across the table. Three Kings is a hilarious teaching tool film (thanks, Jason Colby). I'd put the money into refugees, immigrants, and Planned Parenthood. Without the academic job, I'd still hope to teach—but not grade papers. For that proposed dinner, how about Jesus, Harriet Tubman, and John Woolman? I'd offer to cook.

Tim Borstelmann

Greetings! I am a PhD Candidate in Global History at Yale University and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Virginia. Currently, I am completing my dissertation, "The Asian Unity Project: Human Rights, Third World Solidarity, and the United Nations, 1945-1955." In the fall, I am joining the Department of History at the University of Toronto as an assistant professor of Contemporary International History. I will be teaching courses on the history of international relations, the Vietnam War, and U.S.-Asia relations. My forthcoming publications look at postcolonial constitutionalism in Asia, non-aligned diplomacy in the Cold War, and U.S. relations with the Third World.

Cindy Ewing

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time (minimum of three, maximum of ten)?
I may have been too young when I first saw *The English Patient*, because it planted an embarrassing, life-long love for weepie dramas. *Doctor Zhivago, Cinema Paradiso*, and *In the Mood for Love* are among my favorites, though I have to add *Old Boy* as a curveball. I would be remiss not to mention my admiration for Rithy Panh and how I learned about my heritage through his films. I am really behind on *The Americans*, but I am making my way through, usually while having dinner on the couch.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?
Where to begin? Not only have I spilled tea all over a seminar table, asked a professor what year of graduate school he was in, and broken my foot while moving furniture at a conference, but the most anxious and stressful minute of my professional life thus far was the silence in the room before I delivered my job talk.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?
Giving in to a flight of fancy, I would surround myself with poets like the nightingale of India Sarojini Naidu and the transcendentalist Margaret Fuller, maybe at Gertrude Stein's art-plastered salon in Paris. They were all beautiful writers, captivating conversationalists, and powerful voices of their time.

What would you do if you won the $500 million Powerball?
It is exceedingly hard for me to fathom that sum of money, but I would put it towards the endowment of De La Salle Academy, a very special, tiny private school in New York City for gifted, under-privileged children of color. I was lucky enough to get my start there as a sixth grader and I highly recommend checking out this wonderful school.

What are your favorite professional sports team(s)...and did you ever compete at any level?
I live in a Packers/Badgers home, but I'll just add that I am a Bronx baby. I will also never turn down an opportunity to go to a batting cage.

What are five things on your bucket list?
In spite of being someone who plans a lot, I don't have a bucket list of any kind. However, I have been trying to learn to play piano on my own. It's going very slowly, but the aspiration is to play well enough to have a bunch of friends over and do a sing-along!

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?
Without a doubt, I would be working at an international human rights organization dedicated to women's and children's rights, in particular supporting women candidates running for office in their countries, often at great risk to themselves and their families. Three of the women I had the honor to work under prior to graduate school are Massouda Jalal in Afghanistan, Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, and Mu Sochua in Cambodia. All three countries are in the midst of complex, ongoing crises, but their example has paved the way for scores of women to join the political process and speak up for their communities.

2018 SHAFR Awards Luncheon at the American Historical Association

From a crowded field of remarkable nominees, the **Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture Prize** committee (**Brian DeLay, Carol Chin**, and **Ara Keys**) has chosen **Professor Jay Sexton to deliver the 2019 Lecture**. He earned his Ph.D. at Oxford and then served on the faculty before becoming the Kinder Institute Chair at the University of Missouri in 2016. One of the profession's most prolific and distinguished young historians of 19th-century American foreign relations, Sexton has authored twenty articles and book chapters, edited two collections (with two more in the works), and is about to publish his third monograph. His important books on the foreign financing of the Civil War and on the Monroe Doctrine both powerfully reinterpret venerable topics, and his broader body of scholarship exemplifies the range, ambition, and quality of work that the Bernath Lecture Prize was meant to honor. The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize was established through the generosity of **Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath,** in memory of their late son to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field.

The **William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Grants** were established by SHAFR's Council to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D., who are working as professional historians, and who are working on the first research monograph. This year's committee (**Sarah Snyder, Keisha Blain**, and **Scott Laderman**) recognizes two outstanding projects for 2018:

Aaron Moulton receives his award from SHAFR President Peter Hahn

Uzma Quraishi's book manuscript, "Race to the Top: The Cold War, South Asia, and the Reshaping of American Immigration," focuses on Indian-Pakistani immigration to Houston in the 1960s. Her rich, creative, and multifaceted project wonderfully ties the history of U.S. public diplomacy together with histories of immigration and racial and class formation in the Cold War United States, up-ending not just traditional interpretations of South Asian immigration but also locating its origins in U.S. foreign policy.

Aaron Coy Moulton's book manuscript, "Caribbean Blood Pact: Dictators, Exiles, and the CIA in the Caribbean Basin, 1944-1955," is deeply researched and wonderfully international and transnational. His work will shed new light on the authoritarian networks that developed to counter threats to the military order in the Caribbean basin. The committee applauds his efforts to decenter (but not erase) the United States from the Central American story; his research will help to broaden our understanding of U.S.-Central Aaron Moulton receives his award from American relations in the early Cold War period.

SHAFR's **Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship** honors the long-time editor of *Diplomatic History* and is intended to promote research in foreign-language sources by graduate students. Chaired by Joy Schulz, this year's award committee (Arissa Oh and Karine Walther) was pleased to make this award to **Kate Tietzen,** a Ph.D. candidate at Kansas State University. Tietzen's dissertation, entitled "Iraq in the Cold War and Beyond the Fall of the Soviet Union, 1968-2003," examines the complex Cold War relationships existing between the United States and Iraq, Iraq and the Soviet Union, and Iraq and Syria. In Tietzen's terms, "there were multiple 'cold wars' within the Cold War...competing interests, rivalries, and claims to reckon with for both superpowers and non-superpowers."

The focus of Tietzen's research is the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party of Iraq collection housed at Stanford University. Amassed by Americans following the 2003 invasion and brought to Stanford in 2009, the archive houses eleven million documents, most of which are written in Arabic and remain largely unprocessed. Under the direction of her advisor Dr. Donald Mrozek, Tietzen will use the fellowship to continue her Arabic language courses in Oman during the summer of 2018.

The **Graduate Student Grants & Fellowships Committee**—consisting of **Jessica Chapman, Geoffrey Stewart, Sarah Miller-Davenport, Gregg Brazinsky**, and **Sam Lebovic**—made a number of awards:

Jonathan Ng has been awarded the **W. Stull Holt Fellowship** to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on his dissertation, "An Empire of Arms: The United States and the International Arms Trade, 1960-1985." He argues that during these years the arms trade was a major catalyst of globalization that was championed by political and corporate leaders as a means to address acute economic and energy crises. It helped spur and at times undermine the global human rights movement and was a major contributor to a debt crisis and militarization in the Third World. Ng is a doctoral student at Northwestern University.

Thomas Jamison has been awarded the **Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Fellowship,** established to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president; Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*; and Walter LaFeber, former president of SHAFR. Jamison's dissertation, "Gunboat Insurgency: Naval War in the Peripheral World and the Global Origins of Military Modernity, 1861-1895," contends that because semi-peripheral powers in the 19th century were unable to compete with the economic capacity of the United States and Great Britain, naval strategists across the Global South shifted emphasis, focusing instead on the acquisition of paradigm-shifting industrial weapons and their adaptation for asymmetric war. Jamison is a doctoral candidate at Harvard University.

Amna Qayyum receives her award from Gregg Brazinsky of the prize committee.

Amna Qayyum has been awarded the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant for her dissertation, "Standing Room Only: Population Control, Development, and Islamic Thought in Pakistan, c. 1951-1971." She explores the motivations of a variety of family planning groups in Pakistan during these years as a window into debates over modernization, foreign aid, the role of Islam, and state formation in a decolonizing society. Qayyum is a doctoral candidate at Princeton University.

Ten doctoral students received **Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants** to further their doctoral research projects:

Kyle Shybunko's dissertation, "Varieties of Liberalization: Western Political and Economic Foundations in Hungary since the 1970s," examines how Amna Qayyum receives her award from German and American non-governmental organizations Gregg Brazinsky of the prize committee. (NGOs) sought to shape Hungary's transition to capitalism both before and after 1989. It explores why Hungary became an object of liberal imagining in both Germany and the U.S., how their two visions differed, and why Hungary failed to develop strong democratic institutions after the fall of communism. This transnational, multi-archival project promises to expand our understanding of late-20th century capitalism, globalization, and the rise of populist nationalism. Shybunko is a Ph.D. candidate at New York University.

In her dissertation, "Modernization's Architects: United States International Development in Colombia, 1948-1971," **Amanda Waterhouse** deploys the lenses of spatial analysis and urban history to explore U.S. development and modernization in Cold War Latin America. Using Colombia as a case study, she looks at how U.S. ideas of security were embedded in the built environment of the urban centers of Bogotá and Cali, where American foreign policy would eventually clash with bottom-up demands for sovereignty. This is an exciting project that aims to make a number of interventions in the histories of development, cities, and U.S.-Latin American relations. Waterhouse is a Ph.D. student at Indiana University.

Sejoo Kim's project "American Soil, Asian Wage: The Struggle for 'Made-in-USA' in the American Pacific" examines the global history of American capitalism through the lens of the garment industry in the Northern Mariana Islands from the 1960s to the 2000s. Kim is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Notre Dame.

Brandon Kirk Williams' dissertation, "Globalizing Productivity, Globalizing Inequality: The ILO's Mission to Build Postcolonial Political Economy in India, Indonesia, and the World," explores the International Labor Organization's effort to spread an American-based vision of industrial productivity to postcolonial India and Indonesia. Williams is completing his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley.

John Perry's research project, "Threads of Empire: The United States, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinians, and the Syrian Kurds, 1945-1960," argues that these three non-state groups played a central role in shaping American strategies toward the Middle East and the global Cold War. Perry is a doctoral candidate at the University of Kentucky.

Koji Ito's dissertation, "Tug-of-War over Ocean Migratory Resources: America's Construction of New Maritime Legal Structures in the North Pacific, 1888-1952," explores the ways that the U.S., Canada, and Japan made competing jurisdictional claims over biological resources in the ocean and innovatively combines a study of inter-imperial relations with environmental history as well as the histories of law, diplomacy, and military power. Ito is a Ph.D. candidate in History at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Miles Culpepper's dissertation is a transnational history of Guatemalan exiles and refugees in the four decades after the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz. Emphasizing the political agency of this community, as well as their impact on the refugee and asylum policies of both Mexico and the U.S., the study offers new perspectives on the geopolitics of exile and migration in the Cold War. Culpepper is a doctoral candidate in History at the University of California, Berkeley.

Through new research in Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S., **Ruth Lawlor**'s dissertation, "Rape and American Soldiers: Europe, 1942-1946," places women's voices and experiences at the center of the history of American sexual violence in Europe during World War II and provides a new account of the ways that rape became politicized and racialized in different national contexts. Lawlor is a Ph.D. student at Trinity College, University of Cambridge.

Ruodi Duan, in her dissertation, "Resilient Dreams: Building an Afro-Asian Front after Bandung, 1964-1974," argues that socialist Tanzania, communist China, and the African-American left constituted three key nodes of the Afro-American imaginary as the Cold War developed into an increasingly multipolar conflict. For this project she is conducting research in China, Tanzania, and the United States. Duan is a Ph.D. Candidate at Harvard University.

Susmita Das examines twentieth-century foreign policy through the lenses of the soap-manufacturing and advertising industries in her dissertation, "Clean Body, Clean Home, Clean Nation: Consumer Culture and the Significance of Cleanliness in Neoliberal India." Her research sheds light on American cultural influences and postcolonial consumer culture in the Third World. Das is a doctoral student at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champagne.

Book Reviews

Review of John Pomfret, *The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: American and China, 1776 to the Present* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2016)

Catherine Forslund

This highly accessible, engagingly written, and remarkably detailed account of the long history of relations between the United States (Meiguo, the Beautiful Country) and China (long known as the Middle Kingdom) brings a deep range of sources to bear on a timely topic. John Pomfret argues that "no other two nations' mutual dependence is as vital to the fate of the world as the one between these two great powers" (7) and that China and the United States "are not quite friends, not yet enemies . . . pursuing parallel quests for power" (2). Since the world must live with the consequences of such quests, it goes without saying that understanding the motives behind their national actions is of paramount importance.

The author, an award-winning journalist who studied in China with the first group to do so after the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1979, brings to his study decades of experience as a foreign correspondent. He was expelled from China in 1989 after his coverage of the tumultuous Tiananmen Square events in June of that year, so he has no inherent love for the Chinese communist government. John Pomfret has the connections, experience, and perspective to understand this relationship from both sides, and he has successfully brought both points of view to his endeavor.

The study begins with the economic relationship initiated by the U.S. trade ship *Empress of China*, which sailed from New York to Canton (now Guangzhou) in 1784. Its return the following year with goods that brought a 30 percent profit fired the American imagination. As a result, over two hundred U.S. ships traversed the Pacific to follow the quest for trading riches in the next fifteen years (10).

The Americans sought to supplant the British in carrying Chinese goods to the West. Their efforts also inspired the American porcelain and drapery industries (11). But the U.S. silver supplies used to pay for the long list of desired Chinese goods soon created a trade deficit crisis when the supply of Western products the Chinese desired began to wane. Then the United States joined Great Britain in trading opium in China and reversed its trade imbalance in short order. By the mid-nineteenth century, some Chinese were already questioning their spot "at the apex of world civilization" and realized that their nation might need "to look outside itself for answers to its quest for wealth and power" (35). Such uncertainty foreshadowed the struggle between pro- and anti-Western sentiment that continues in China to this day.

Over time, the United States became a counterbalance to Great Britain in China and worked hard to convince the Chinese of its commitment to China's well-being. In the minds of some Chinese (and some Americans too), this commitment conflicted with the growth of American missionary activities in the later nineteenth century. While they peddled Christianity to the Chinese, the Americans were also hoping China would "embrace Western values" (44). Thus, two strong components of the American relationship with China were in place by the twentieth century: first, trade and economics; and second, the vision of Chinese society as free and open, like that of the United States.

Subsequently, Americans hoping to promote trade and change Chinese society developed competing ideologies on how to achieve such goals. One had a positive vision of China's potential and favored gently nudging the country to adopt constructive change. The other advocated a more forceful approach to push China into the modern family of nations. Pomfret argues that this tension between "forbearance and impatience" has defined U.S. policy since the nineteenth century (65).

While the bulk of his text is focused on events in China, Pomfret does not ignore the Chinese in America and the role they played in Sino-American relations. From the 1868 Burlingame Treaty, to the Chinese workers who labored at American railroad construction sites and mines in the West, to the generations of Chinese who studied in America, individual immigrants helped promote good relations between the countries. Early travelogues published in China by Chinese who visited the United States spoke about the greatness of American industry and helped advance the argument that "Western technology was the key to China's regaining its glory" (66). But at times immigrants also hindered good relations. The admiration of Western ideas, education, and technology was countered by a hostility to all things Western and the belief that adopting Western ways would hurt China. Pomfret's inclusion of so many of these immigrants' stories is one of the strengths of this work.

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At first, Americans welcomed Chinese immigrants. They filled important gaps in the nation's labor pool. That attitude swiveled 180 degrees when the post-Civil War economy entered a series of downturns and the Chinese became easy and obvious targets of American anger. Most Chinese women were accused of being prostitutes, while at the same time many of the white men who decried their presence patronized them or even ran bordellos filled with them. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was passed in response to growing anti-Chinese sentiment in the American West. It marked the first time the United States restricted the immigration of any specific ethnic group. But the Chinese fought back. Despite the hostility of the Beautiful Country, they continued to come to America, where, Pomfret argues, they were never as isolated as historians have maintained, and many of them achieved success despite strong hostility toward them (78).

Throughout much of this story, the group with the largest "American" sway in China was—and perhaps still is—Chinese students who studied in the United States and then returned home. (Pomfret also includes many examples of Chinese who chose to stay in America and exerted influence in both nations.) The first group of students arrived in 1872, and the pipeline never ran dry. Some of the students led charges for greater Westernization upon their return home (especially in business and education). Some were denounced and suffered terribly in various anti-Western purges. Some became disillusioned with the United States and the West generally, and some even went on to lead the nation and send their own children to American colleges and universities. Pomfret mentions so many of them across the decades that their impact is impossible to ignore as a key feature of his larger analysis. Their influence was wide, and it varied in its depth, but

whether in science, business, government, or the arts, their voices were a strong component of the ebb and flow of the U.S.-China relationship.

As the twentieth century advanced, the United States shifted from "working with other foreign powers" to intervening more directly to stabilize China. President Woodrow Wilson "believed the best way to secure China's future was not by convincing imperialist powers to be gentlemen but by spreading democratic and Christian ideals in the Middle Kingdom." His decision to focus on promoting change in China produced another strong feature of the relationship Pomfret establishes throughout the book, namely "a yawning gap between Chinese hopes and American action" (142–43).

The nature of the disappointment on both sides of that equation—and it can be flipped to cover Chinese actions and American hopes as well—constitutes perhaps the most common factor in the Sino-American relationship. Neither nation consistently lived up to the expectations of the other, and thwarted expectations resulted in resentment on both sides with serious consequences for both nations. As Pomfret's story gets closer to the present day, these frustrated expectations and broken promises became more significant. What happened to the assurances of support to the Guomindang in its war against the Japanese? Why did the United States give the Soviets privileges in Manchuria at war's end? What of the numerous prospects for engagement with the Chinese Communist Party? Even China's roles in today's global economy and in the post-Cold War circle of nuclear powers are points of contention. Pomfret accepts the "centuries-old American belief that China's stability [is] in the national interest of the United States" (515), and he argues that American hypocrisy over its own budget deficit, education and infrastructure funding, and "dark" military activities inhibits efforts to push China's government toward more political reform (635).

The recounting of late twentieth-century events includes a litany of misconceptions, bad behavior, manipulation, dishonesty, and misleading of citizens in both countries. Whether the issue was trade, economics, nuclear proliferation or some other matter of national interest, each country has used the other as a battering ram, a scapegoat, and a dupe for maximum domestic effect. This narrative helps explain the continued tensions and stress within the present-day Chinese-American relationship. It does not blame one side or the other; rather, it shows that both countries use similar tactics and share comparable goals and desires. Using myriad examples, Pomfret shows how each country "manages" the other, making accommodations as needed. This willingness to be flexible leads him to believe in a hopeful future.

A surprising aspect of Pomfret's study is his challenging of prevailing historical narratives regarding Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and their roles in China's history. He refutes the view of Chiang as "a closet Fascist [who] deserved to lose the civil war" to Mao's forces, instead viewing him as "an impassioned patriot, a die-hard foe of imperialism and, on the issue of economics . . . a socialist" (191). Pomfret says that the level of engagement between Mao's forces and the Japanese is "subject to debate," and he lists Zhou Enlai and a Russian correspondent for support of this argument (321–22).

That listing without actual citation leads to the general issue of documentation in Pomfret's work. For each of his forty-eight chapters, the author provides only a short paragraph in the "notes" section with basic information on some of that chapter's sources. In every case, what is listed is insufficient to clarify all that Pomfret describes in the text, which is a great disappointment. The more extensive bibliographic section includes periodicals, books, unpublished dissertations, newspaper articles, magazines, archives and databases, yet it does not include even all the archives mentioned in the text. This is where being a journalist rather than a historian is problematic. The level of detail in the book would have generated voluminous source notes, but instead, there is very limited referencing to specific materials for recreating, confirming, expanding ,or refuting Pomfret's arguments. Such a vacuum is particularly troubling for those passages that diverge from the standard narratives of U.S.-China history and relations.

Two final notes regarding the text's handling and printing. First, for a book as large as this one (669 pages), it is surprisingly comfortable to handle and read because of its solid but very flexible binding and lightweight paper stock. Readers can hold it open easily from beginning to end. On a less happy note, there are a large number of typographical errors throughout the book. Most are minor, but in some cases words are missing or totally wrong, and that detracts from the overall professional presentation of the book. One wonders about the level of scrutiny the author and editors applied to the completed work.

In the final analysis, John Pomfret has produced a prodigious chronicle of U.S.-Chinese relations, both great and small, and its value to scholarship on this topic is clear. Despite some flaws, there is no question that the book adds to the storied history of this relationship, helps illuminate how lessons of the past can inform the future direction of both nations, and shows those on both sides of the Pacific the value of looking beneath the surface of actions and words to seek out real motives. It demonstrates that the two nations were integral to each other's development in so many ways (through trade, as national foils, by giving aid, etc.) that the history of one cannot be accurately told without the inclusion of the other. If Pomfret has proven nothing else, his work has succeeded.

Review of Gregory F. Domber, *Empowering Revolution: America, Poland and the End of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014)

Jeffrey A. Engel

"I'm from the government, and I'm here to help." Ronald Reagan dubbed these the "most terrifying words in the English language."[1] Absent the descriptor "terrifying," they aptly describe the theme of Gregory F. Domber's insightful new work on Polish-American relations during the 1980s, though with a small twist. "I'm from the government . . . but how do I help?" might well have been Reagan's more apt response to one of the most tactically ambiguous and strategically volatile questions American policymakers under his direction faced during his two terms in office and after as well: how to help domestic opponents of Poland's long-standing communist regime in their struggle to reform and ultimately replace a government in power since World War II. How could the Reagan administration help draw together disparate Polish activists from the ranks of labor, the church, and the intelligentsia—groups that might have little in common save for their shared frustration with their country's debt and declining standard of living and their government's inept and at times draconian responses? How could the United States help without coordinating and thereby staining Poland's opposition with the one charge it could not withstand: that of being agents for a foreign power?

These are the parameters of the question that percolates repeatedly throughout Domber's thoughtful work, which offers a thorough and illuminating look at Polish-American relations during the tumultuous 1980s. It focuses on the ways U.S. policymakers struggled during that difficult decade to find the best means of helping their potential allies within Poland without inadvertently harming them. It is beyond a doubt the single best work on the subject

currently available in English, and it is among the best new studies of international politics behind the Iron Curtain to appear in years.

How to help without hurting is no small question, and Domber explores it in depth and with equal attention paid to Polish and American sources. The question itself is not new. American policymakers faced this dilemma whenever confronted with (or, in another light, presented with the opportunity of coordinating with) opposition groups behind the iron curtain. Help too much and pro-democracy forces might believe themselves entitled to a full-throated American response on their behalf (see Budapest, 1956). Help too little and hardline anticommunists at home (see détente, broadly) would fling political barbs at those in charge.

Ultimately, the predicament boiled down to this: give too little aid to the Soviet Bloc's reformers and watch them crumble for lack of resources and political recognition; give too much and risk emboldening communism's troglodytes to paint their foes as imperialist stooges. Such attacks could lead to the demise of potential Western allies. Even despondent citizens fed up with the hollowness of their own regimes can find room in their hearts to despise traitors more.

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This question of how much aid to give confronted the Reagan and the George H. W. Bush administrations as the 1980s came to a close, and on a larger stage than mere Poland. Mikhail Gorbachev promised a new revolution in international affairs based on equity, democracy, and ultimately, disarmament. Scholars have most often focused on questions of sincerity when analyzing this period, gauging and judging the speed and enthusiasm with which different global actors came to take Gorbachev's reforms seriously. What book on the period does not highlight Margaret Thatcher's recommendation of Gorbachev to her partner Reagan as a man "we can do business with"? James Mann explored the "rebellion of Ronald Reagan" in order to explain how the vicious anticommunist who once pledged to toss communism "on the ash heap of history" transformed himself in the White House into a willing partner for East-West reconciliation.[2] James Graham Wilson believes that reconciliation was the result of improvisation, for the most part, and triumphant improvisation at that.[3]

When did the pivotal mental change take place? For Reagan it occurred after the near-miraculous disarmament negotiations at Reykjavik and the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty the ensuing year. Bush's conversion moment can be pinned more precisely, even though it derived from an inaccurate premise. A skeptic upon entering office in early 1989, by year's end he had become convinced that, if nothing else, "this guy [Gorbachev] *is* perestroika."[4] Events changed his tune. "If they [Soviet officials, and Gorbachev especially) are going to let the Communists fall in East Germany," Bush exclaimed when watching scenes of the Berlin Wall's unexpected breach on his office television, "they've got to be really serious."[5]

Of course, we now know that Soviet officials, Gorbachev especially, knew nothing in advance about the climactic events in Berlin on November 9, 1989.[6] Neither did East Germany's own government. Crowds ultimately crossed the long-despised wall in large measure because of a misguided and ill-informed statement by a ruling party spokesman. Of such things history is made. Precisely when or even whether Gorbachev himself realized the full impact of the revolution he sparked remains an equally important and much-studied question.

What sets Domber's work apart from the literature focused on Soviet-American relations is his ability to drill deep into the Polish case, to make Warsaw less of a shuttlecock beaten back and forth by greater powers and more of a primary actor. His is international history, to be sure, but he is working from a side chamber of what Gorbachev once called their "common European home." That vantage point puts into sharp relief our understanding of precisely how, when, and why American officials came to trust Poland's opposition for its own sake and not dismiss it as merely the reaction of a geopolitical pawn; how they regulated and measured their material, financial, and political support for Poland's opposition; and how they weighed Polish domestic concerns against the needs of Washington's broader Cold War agenda. It also gives greater agency to the Poles themselves, and I shall return to that idea momentarily.

Domber's story begins in 1981, with Warsaw's imposition of martial law. Whether that was the idea of the Poles themselves or whether it was done at the behest of their masters in Moscow, the draconian move demanded a visible American response. But what? Visible need not mean vigorous. Cutting trade would hurt the regime but also further embitter the lives of the Polish citizens American policy aimed to support. Unilateral sanctions unsupported by allies would do little good; indeed, they might worsen a quite real transatlantic rift within NATO created by Reagan's bellicosity towards the Soviets, giving Moscow in effect an inadvertent reward for their cruelty.

It ultimately proved easier for Reagan to offer a clear-eyed moral condemnation than any clearly defined policy. Americans should place candles in their windows "as a beacon of our solidarity with the Polish people," the president suggested. "Let the light of millions of candles in American homes give notice that the light of freedom is not going to be extinguished."[7]

Candles would not fuel real tensions, at least not overtly. Reagan considered the fight in Poland "the last chance in our lifetime to see a change in the Soviet empire's colonial policy re Eastern Europe," since he was convinced that the structural and moral flaws inherent in communism would cause failure only if there was public scrutiny, not just in the West but behind the iron curtain as well.[8] That quote alone tells us all we need to know about Poland's place in the hierarchy of American priorities. Decisions on Poland could and would be titrated not only for the sake of Poles, but (as long as powerful Polish-American voting blocs were satisfied with the response) for broader Cold War goals.

Domber notes this dynamic, but does not accept it as the end of the tale. What followed over the ensuing decade, and what he traces in turn, were more American-led efforts to quietly educate, embolden, and ultimately undergird Poland's reformers without contributing to their arrest or demise. The broad strokes of the game might well have been Soviet-American in design, but by focusing on the movements of individual pieces, Domber shows the Poles were more than guided pawns: they were players with moves of their own.

Polish participation in determining their country's own fate will not surprise historians of Eastern Europe, who have typically shown as much disdain for tales denying their subject's agency as they do for the entire notion of an "Eastern Europe." Domber's approach does reveal much that is new for those interested in Poland's—and yes, the region's—relations with the wider world. Here he is at his best, exploring the backchannels of American financial

support for Poland's labor movement, funneled through America's sympathetic unions. On a more subtle and yet ultimately more profound level, Domber illuminates the ways in which American officials (Ambassador John Davis in Warsaw in particular) offered a convenient and politically tenable hub for reformers, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and even regime loyalists to congregate and exchange ideas and, one might think, a fair share of winks, nods, and symbols of mutual disdain for the decrepit regime. Ambassador Davis stressed that those conversations gave Poles a forum and a language for discerning their own best way forward. By 1989–90, American officials even provided tutorials for Polish political activists unfamiliar with democratic processes, having already made diplomatic approaches—and deals—on behalf of imprisoned or persecuted individuals.

Ultimately, Domber assigns a hierarchy to the triad of Polish, Soviet, and American influences on Poland's political evolution over the decade of his study. "In terms of ranking the importance of various factors," he writes, "developments in the PZPR [Polish United Worker's Party] were most closely tied to domestic concerns, followed then by Soviet policies, with American and Western influences falling to third place."[9]

There is no way to know if the first or even the first two of these would have succeeded absent the third, but from reading Domber's meticulous account we learn about the lengths Poles and Americans went to in order to work together for a peaceful evolution after Gorbachev's mid-decade launch of perestroika. Washington's representatives worked in various ways with both opposition and government figures in that quest. We also see how that policy evolved less out of grand design than to meet the exigencies of each particular moment.

"I'm from the government. . . . How can I help?" apparently has no one answer. Thankfully, even Reagan's dismissive rhetoric about the power of government to be a force for good did not keep his administration from doing some.

Notes:
1. John Wilson, *Talking with the President: The Pragmatics of Presidential Language* (Oxford, UK, 2015), 98.
2. James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York, 2010).
3. James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY, 2015).
4. V. Zubok, "Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Perspectives on History and Personality," *Cold War History* 2, no. 2 (2002): 61–100.
5. Douglas Little, *Us versus Them: The United States, Radical Islam, and the Rise of the Green Threat* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2016), 59.
6. Mary Sarotte, *The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall* (New York, 2014).
7. Gregory F. Domber, *Empowering Revolution: America, Poland and the End of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2014), 33.
8. Ibid., 30.
9. Ibid., 261.

Tony Smith, *Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017)

Andrew M. Johnston

Tony Smith's *Why Wilson Matters* is a something of a sequel to his 1994 *America's Mission: The United States and the Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. The story has been brought up to date since neoconservatives captured George W. Bush's imagination after 9/11 and plunged the United States into sixteen years of continuous warfare. Today, Smith wants the fable of America's essential goodness to reflect on the dark first decades of the twenty-first century, when Woodrow Wilson's original ideals were, in his view, perverted by the hubris of a cabal of political scientists and "neo-Wilsonian" hawks, who misunderstood Wilson's insight that democracy grows only from the soil of a carefully cultivated "national character" that cannot simply be imposed by force from without. Smith provides an argument for the origins, meaning, and definition of liberal internationalism that wants to prove that however much the world may change, there is only one policy consistent with America's revolutionary heritage. Although they too are Americans, realists, neo-conservatives, and isolationists don't speak in the vernacular of the nation's destiny.

The book is divided into two parts. The first explores the origins of Wilson's ideas about democracy and foreign policy; the second takes the discussion of those ideas into the rest of the twentieth century, showing where they worked (winning the fight against illiberal demons, bringing about an open global economy, establishing multilateral institutions for the amelioration of international friction) and where they didn't (just about everything after 9/11). The historical evaluation of Wilson is invaluable, though not without its curiosities. And while the angry attack on post-9/11 neo-imperialism will be contested by its targets, the book provides an important taxonomy of the intellectual failings of contemporary American policy and political science.

Smith begins with a detailed reading of Wilson's own scholarship, exploring its attention to English history, constitutionalism, and Calvinist covenant theology and scrutinizing Wilson's Burkean comparison of the American and French Revolutions. Professor Wilson believed that democracy grew organically from particular cultures, the Anglo-Saxon one foremost. Thus, while he prized democracy as the future of the world, he did not think seriously about how to make it the basis of a new world order. The War of 1898 started to shift his view toward believing that the United States had a national security duty to instantiate democracy overseas wherever possible. Wilson came to see "progressive imperialism" (in contrast to its European versions) as providing a prototype for propagating America's pluralism wherever local conditions were receptive, the rule of law could prevail, and the reach of U.S. power was measured.

The supporting evidence is a bit mixed. Wilson's interventionist hesitations (in Mexico and Russia) are creditable, but Smith glosses over the Philippines, the Caribbean and Central America generally. Wilson's euphemisms (colonial subjects need to be taught "obedience" and "discipline") masked a rule that was racist, exploitive, and cruel. In the case of Haiti, the two-decade U.S. occupation (in fairness not all under Wilson's watch) did more to destroy Haiti's economy, environment, and social order than any other period in its twentieth-century history. Wilson's interventions were—by his own admission—probably illegal.[1] So much for the rule of law.

While Smith concedes Wilson's frequent lack of a master plan and his racism (palpable but not, in Smith's view, constitutive), he insists that global order is only consistent with U.S. interests when it is founded on an open economy and a community of democratic governments. His proof of the effectiveness of this idea lies in everything from Bretton Woods to NATO, the democratization of Germany and Japan (which of course wasn't a genuine democracy until 1989), the Alliance for Progress, Jimmy Carter's discovery of human rights, and the end of the Cold War. By this point, a lot is being squeezed into Wilsonian garments, but then came the overexcited 1990s, and America lost its head.

Smith's chapters on the rise of "neo-Wilsonian" theory and practice after the triumphalism of the Cold War offer a

scathing indictment of what happened next. Three concepts emerged in the 1990s—all claiming some Wilsonian ancestry—and synthesized into a "high octane liberal internationalism." These were democratic peace theory (DPT), democratic transition theory (DTT), and a "just war" doctrine under the heading of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Smith provides a helpful if caustic guide to the U.S. political science literature of the 1990s and early 2000s, some of which, he concedes, is consistent with Wilsonianism. He is right, though, to mock the shallowness of much of this literature. When bound together, these three concepts drove U.S. policy toward ill-conceived interventions that were disastrous for the United States and the people being "liberated."

Smith's final chapter turns to the claims made by Robert Kagan, John Lewis Gaddis, and others that the Bush Doctrine was perfectly in step with U.S. foreign policy tradition. On the contrary, Smith insists, it was a perversion of the principles that had been so successful in the twentieth century; it produced a world if not hostile toward then certainly skeptical of U.S. power. Smith pins these failures on hubris, an exaggeration of U.S. power, and a refusal to admit that local resistance, affronted by U.S. arrogance (and, in the case of Iraq, theft), might be legitimate.

This carefully reasoned argument, however, rests on two related premises I found problematic. The first is Smith's (and Wilson's) ill-defined concept of "national character," which is employed here in ways that carry traces of an atavistic and openly racial civilizational hierarchy. The second one is an Orientalist belief that democracy comes only from a Western political line found nowhere else in the world. Smith doesn't offer any proof that democracy is *not* a widely shared value, even though recent scholarship has shown how many non-Western traditions of broad political deliberation, and even human rights, there are in history.[2]

The problem with the assumption is that it allows Americans to presume that the persistence of authoritarian regimes in the world is proof of the *absence* of Western power. Yet it's impossible to separate these regimes from the long history of imperial destabilization engendered by the West's liberal states. Is resistance to democracy in parts of the world a function of an atavistic cultural aversion, or the persistence of the piracy involved in an "open economy" and the "benevolent imperialism" that Wilson celebrated? The answer is assumed here, but it all gets especially awkward when Smith cites Gandhi and Mandela as examples of democratic leaders with the right "character" to form a national party without acknowledging that the greatest international obstacles to democracy and self-determination that these leaders faced were in London and Washington. Smith's refusal to see the Janus face of liberal internationalism weakens the thrust of his argument.

There are similarly jarring moments, such as the claim that early twentieth century democracies "were by their very character less likely to be either repressive at home or imperialist abroad" (99).[3] Even if we bracket America's racial caste system at the time, or Britain's entire history of grim violence toward Ireland, in Wilson's day the world's two largest overseas empires belonged to the British and the French, liberalism's ideological heroes. The difference between the empires of democratic Europe—along with their genocidal settler colonies—and those of autocratic states is negligible. When it comes to their empires, you simply cannot make the case that democracies contain "character" traits that promote "reasoned discussion and compromise" (97).

I read *Why Wilson Matters* a few weeks after picking up Jacques Rancière's *Hatred of Democracy* (2006), a distillation of his argument that the global fragility of democracy at our present juncture is a function of a deeply rooted oligarchic hatred of actual equality within those very democracies. Rancière argues that all government rests on either some theory of rights granted solely by birth (the theory of the *ancien régime*), or by the organization of productive activities in society that makes some people better at ruling than others. In principle, democracy levels all people—*anyone* can rule. That's its point. So, if it is the *organization of society* that determines who is best suited to rule, in practice democracy is always an oligarchy to the extent that any social order rests on economic, sexual, or racial hierarchies.

The American democracy of the 1780s was representative rule exclusively for white, Protestant, property-owning men: between 1 and 2 percent of the population voted in the first presidential election. The democratic exclusions in the United States (and everywhere else, of course) are being slowly overcome, but not because of any innate sense of deliberation and reasoning in the middle class, as Smith believes, but rather because of the struggles of the excluded. Most histories of the emergence of liberalism (as *the* ideology of the middle class) show the extent to which its great theorists feared and loathed the idea of political equality between classes, races, and sexes.[4]

I mention all this because I think any understanding of Wilson needs to be grounded in the political language of the turn of the century. It was the tension between licentious individualism—the driver of capitalist energy—and public order (the basis of the Calvinist covenant after all) that was at the heart of Progressive Era efforts to reformulate nineteenth-century liberalism. Greater democracy was called upon to bring corporate capitalism and labor to heel, but not *so much* democracy that the masses would make claims against the right of the meritorious to rule. The way to do this, according to Progressive liberals, was to cultivate a sense of "social control" by which individuals would internalize the demands of their social interdependence.

Lyman Abbott captured this idea perfectly in 1901: "The object of all government is to destroy the necessity of *any* government, by developing such a public conscience that no other force but that conscience will be needed to protect the rights of man."[3] This is why Wilson's models of democracy are also so inegalitarian and infused with racial assumptions: governance, national or international, is about instantiating the moral authority of the correct people. Going back to the Wilsonian well in the twenty-first century is disorienting when we consider just how different the world is now, and how wrong Wilson was about many other things (the Calvinist covenant and the color line being the most obvious). Why do Americans need to embed their understanding of the world today in the Presbyterian mindset of a nineteenth-century white supremacist?

Smith's decontextualization means that it's not always obvious where the line is between his analysis of Wilson and his own beliefs. He quotes Wilson with such approbation that it's unclear whether he is taking the president's Progressive Era fantasies about America's

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providential mission, peculiar duty, and selfless rescuing of dark-skinned island nations at face value. Take this classic: "The manifest destiny of America is not to rule the world by physical force . . . but its leadership and destiny are that she shall do the thinking of the world" (75). While we can thank Wilson for anticipating Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony, it's not a recipe for reconciling global pluralism with international order. As I read Smith's book, I tried to imagine that he was writing with neoconservative foes in mind, and in his determination to do so, he didn't have time to consider the *actual* meaning of Wilson's belief that the United States must bring order to the world and fill "unoccupied, unappropriated" lands for settlement and achievement.

As admirable a repost as this book is to the Bush Doctrine, it's not, to my mind, entirely clear whether it's better to seek our answers in these anachronistic imperial concepts or in the murky—and often highly improvised—responses of Wilson to the Great War. On the other hand, as I am writing these words on the day after the announcement of the Trump Doctrine, those who argue currently for enlightened American leadership in the world currently have, it would seem, an entirely different domestic dragon to slay.

Notes:
1. Alan McPherson, *A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Chichester, UK, 2016), 90-91.
1 See, for example, Benjamin Isakhan and Stephen Stockwell, eds., *The Secret History of Democracy* (New York, 2011); John Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy* (New York, 2009).
2. On the role played by Wilson's idea of character as a kind of racist code for global white supremacy, see John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge, 2012), 172–74.
3. Quoted in Eldon Eisenach, *The Lost Promise of Progressivism* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1994), 78.
4. Domenico Losurdo, *Liberalism: A Counter-History* (New York, 2006, 2011), chap. 5 especially; David Boucher, "Property and Propriety in International Relations: The Case of John Locke," in Beate Jahn, ed., *Classical Theory in International Relations* (New York, 2006), 156–77; Beate Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice* (Cambridge, 2013), 39–71.

Review of Louis Sell, *From Washington to Moscow: U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of the USSR* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016)

Henry R. Maar III

Louis Sell's *From Washington to Moscow* offers historians a hybrid account—part memoir, part history—of the final years of the Soviet Union. A veteran Foreign Service officer who specializes in Soviet and Balkan affairs, Sell draws in part on his own experiences and observations while utilizing a variety of sources in both English and Russian. He begins his narrative in 1967, when he visited the Soviet Union over his college spring break. His first trip to the other side of the Iron Curtain opened him up to the idea that not everything was as it seems: "the underlying reality of Soviet life kept breaking through the highly embellished official version" (8) the Soviets tried to create. This observation would stick with him in the decades to come.

Sell's work covers the major leaders and events of the late Cold War and largely focuses on the last twenty years of the Soviet Union, 1972–1991. While early chapters cover Soviet human rights dissidents, arms control, and prominent U.S. and Soviet leaders, nearly half the work follows the rise of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the consequences that attended his reforms. Sell does an excellent job of contrasting the "Gorbymania" that followed Gorbachev abroad with the "political chaos, economic decline, and ethnic violence" (166) that ravaged the Soviet Union at home. Although Gorbachev shared many traits with his political rival Boris Yeltsin, Sell describes the two as "oil and water" (280) and persuasively demonstrates how the rivalry between the two helped lead to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The chapters that truly stand out are those in which Sell talks about his personal role in events. In chapter 14, for example, Sell combines a survey of his time at the Office of U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Relations with a broader discussion of "the year of the spy" (1985). Here we are given insights into spy cases, including those of Vitaly Yurchenko and Nicholas Daniloff; the Soviets' use of "spy dust"; and the bugging of the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Sell offers his personal insights into what U.S.-Soviet wrangling over the bugged embassy looked like from the inside, as well as what the diplomatic process of securing the return of human rights dissidents and their families looked like before and after Mikhail Gorbachev. He argues persuasively that Gorbachev's perestroika initiatives and his ultimate desire for a breakthrough in nuclear arms reductions talks with President Reagan at Reykjavik "made it imperative to end the Daniloff affair" (225).

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For all the value of Sell's personal insights and research, however, he merely repeats many of the myths of the Reagan era. Whereas the Reagan administration (and its allies) claimed the United States was in a position of weakness during the early 1980s (the infamous "window of vulnerability"), when asked in congressional hearings whether they would agree to swap nuclear arsenals or military capabilities with the Soviets, none of America's military leaders (including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger) said yes. Sell further claims that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars, as it was widely known) was a byproduct of Reagan's abhorrence of nuclear war. This claim neglects the domestic political circumstances the administration faced over its arms control agenda and the influence of figures such as Edward Teller (then working on the Excalibur program) and Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham (founder of the High Frontier project).

Problems also arise in Sell's treatment of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the European antinuclear activists. While Sell correctly identifies the areas a nuclear freeze would cover—testing, production, and deployment—he leaves out a keyword: "bilateral" (148). Leaving this key phrase out allows Sell to paint freeze activists as seeking unilateral U.S. disarmament—a charge the Reagan administration and its allies regularly hurled at activists in an effort to discredit the movement in the eyes of the public.

Furthermore, Sell falsely calls Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth* the "centerpiece" of the nuclear freeze movement (149). While Schell's book may have helped rally people against the arms race, his work did not advocate for a nuclear weapons freeze, nor did it encourage what was at the time of its publication a movement just coming into the mainstream. Given Sell's treatment of the European peace movement and his apparent unawareness that the concept

for the Reagan administration's zero-zero proposal came from the banners of European antinuclear activists, it is quite clear that he does not take the peace movement and its influence on the Reagan administration's foreign policy seriously.

Sell's work, however, is not a rehash of the Reagan Victory School arguments. While Sell gives Reagan credit for playing "an important role in putting the Soviet Union on the defensive," he also observes that Reagan's policies "were not a major factor in the disintegration" of the Soviet Union, which "occurred through a combination of systemic weaknesses and mistakes by Gorbachev and his team" (335). The collapse of the Soviet economy cannot be ascribed to Reagan and SDI, Sell argues; responsibility for that fell squarely on the shoulders of Gorbachev and his team. Furthermore, Sell observes, Gorbachev's elimination of the "fear factor" through glasnost also eliminated the "grease that allowed an inherently inefficient system to function," thus undermining the Communist Party's authority (326). Gorbachev comes across as a deeply flawed figure who "never managed to devise, let alone actually implement, a lasting strategy for economic reform" (336). Sell also raises questions about Gorbachev's own role in the August 1991 coup that led to his resignation and the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Although *From Washington to Moscow* is not based on access to new documentation from presidential or Soviet archives, the book is nevertheless well researched. Sell makes ample use of sources in Russian (including memoirs, document collections, and a few secondary sources). He also draws on material from the Cold War International History Project, *FRUS*, the American Presidency Project, and other firsthand sources, collections, and interviews. His footnotes provide a useful guide to debates in the literature and provide additional anecdotes from his life.

Sell's work offers useful and sometimes tantalizing personal insights that Cold War historians and those interested in modern day U.S.-Russian relations would find interesting. The book is well written and makes a persuasive case that the modern-day Russia of Vladimir Putin is a direct result of the effect of the Cold War's end on the Soviet Union and, more particularly, of the West's failure to support Boris Yeltsin. That failure was, Sell argues, "the key Western mistake of the immediate post-Soviet era" (344). Nevertheless, the audience for Sell's work seems fairly limited. *From Washington to Moscow* is not an entry-level book on the late years of the Cold War, so it is unlikely to be assigned to undergraduate classes; furthermore, it would probably see only limited use in graduate seminars.

SHAFR Council Minutes
Friday, January 5, 2018
8:00 a.m. to 11:59 p.m.
Harding Room
Marriott Wardman Park
Washington, DC

Council members present:
Terry Anderson, Matthew Connelly, Mary Dudziak, David Engerman, Peter Hahn (presiding), Julia Irwin, Barbara Keys, Adriane Lentz-Smith, Brian McNamara, Amy Sayward (ex officio), Kathryn Statler

Others attending:
Mark Sanchez, Patricia Thomas, Anne Foster, Andrew Johns

Business Items:

Thanks to retiring Council members: Following introductions, Peter Hahn invited a resolution of thanks to retiring Council members Petra Goedde, Paul Kramer, Amanda Boczar, and Fred Logevall for their service. The motion was made by David Engerman, seconded by Matthew Connelly, and passed unanimously.

Recap of motions passed by correspondence: It was noted that the only Council action taken since the June 2017 meeting was approval of the minutes of that Council meeting. There was no further discussion.

SHAFR financials: Council reviewed the financial reports on Fiscal Year 2017 (1 November 2016 to 31 October 2017). Given that the Council's endowment spending rule (withdrawing no more than 3% of the endowment based on a three-year rolling average) takes effect during FY2018 and in light of uncertainty about future royalties, Council approved a number of recommendations from the Ways & Means Committee to balance the FY2018 budget. These resolutions included awarding only one Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship starting in 2018 (passed unanimously after discussion), trimming the budget for the Global Scholars and Diversity grants for the 2018 SHAFR Conference (passed unanimously after discussion), and ending financial support for the National History Center (passed unanimously after discussion). Additionally, Engerman moved (Terry Anderson seconded) that those responsible for organizing the social event at each year's conference organize the event and set the ticket costs in such a way that at least 50% of the cost of the event is recouped through ticket sales. This motion passed unanimously.

SHAFR publications: Engerman reported on behalf of the task force searching for a publisher once the Oxford University Press contract expires on 31 December 2019 (deadline to notify OUP of non-renewal is 31 December 2018). As a follow-up to sending a call for proposals to potential publishers, Engerman and Petra Goedde held informational meetings with several publishers during the AHA, preparatory to the February deadline for formal proposals. The task force plans to present a recommendation to Council in June 2018. Council members identified several features they would favor in a future contract.

Patricia Thomas of Oxford University Press reviewed some of the statistics on consortia agreements (referring to a pre-circulated written report), affirmed that revenue from *Diplomatic History* being available on JSTOR would be reflected in the next report, and stated that the working relationship between Oxford and the editorial team in Indiana was running very smoothly. Council members asked about social media strategies and the difficulties that SHAFR members currently face in becoming members or renewing their memberships through the OUP website.

Anne Foster, editor of *Diplomatic History*, referring to the editors' written report to Council, announced that new editorial board members had been appointed: Nicole Phelps, David Milne, and Emily Conroy-Krutz. Conversation then commenced on institutional support of the journal at Indiana University, which is scheduled to continue through June 2019.

Hahn asked Council to consider the written review of the editors of *Diplomatic History*, which called the publication "the jewel in SHAFR's crown" and offered strong endorsement of the current editorial team. Engerman proposed (Anderson seconded) a resolution, which passed unanimously, that expressed Council's enthusiastic endorsement of the work of the current editors and authorized Hahn to pursue negotiations with Indiana University about institutional support for a second five-year term.

Andrew Johns, editor of *Passport*, expressed his desire to maintain the current specifications for Passport under the new publisher contract but also expressed his understanding that Council would decide based on the best overall interests of the organization. The current arrangement has allowed *Passport* to publish a greater number and variety of pieces than might otherwise have been possible. Discussion followed about making individual articles searchable and tweetable as well as ending the delay between the paper and web publication of *Passport*, all of which could draw in a broader and more diverse audience of potential SHAFR members and authors. It was also suggested that increasing the diversity of authors of the books that are reviewed would be an asset.

Potential by-law amendments: Johns, in his role as outgoing chair of the Nominating Committee, discussed with Council the rationale of the committee's unanimous recommendations on by-law amendments that would shorten the election period (given the current electronic means of voting), eliminate the pairing of candidates on the ballot for each open position, and create eligibility prerequisites for candidates for election to Council and the Vice Presidency/Presidency.

Council discussed each of the Nominating Committee's recommendations. Mary Dudziak moved (Barbara Keys seconded) to decline the recommendation to replace the practice of pairing two candidates for each open Council seat with a practice of nominating a pool of candidates for all open seats and recognizing the top two overall vote-getters as the winners; the motion was approved by a majority vote (9-2-0). Dudziak moved (Keys seconded) to approve the recommendation to shorten the annual election cycle by ending balloting on September 30; Council passed that motion unanimously.

Regarding eligibility qualifications for election to the Nominating Committee, Council, or the Vice Presidency, Council members expressed concern about limiting the pool of candidates to only those persons who met the proposed prior service prerequisities. It was also pointed out that the membership had—in three of the last four years—elected Vice Presidents who had not met the proposed qualifications. Dudziak moved (Brian McNamara seconded) to decline the recommendation pertaining to eligibility requirements for nominees for Vice President; Council passed the motion unanimously. Dudziak moved (McNamara seconded) a motion to decline the recommendation pertaining to eligibility requirements for those standing for Council and the Nominating Committee; Council passed the motion by a majority vote (10-1-0).

Additionally, Keys pointed out an inconsistency in the by-laws regarding run-off elections. Specifically, she noted that the phrase (Article 5(a)) "When more than two nominees are slated for a particular office and no candidate receives a majority vote, a run-off election will be held between the candidates with the two highest vote totals" became obsolete when the membership previously ratified an amendment providing that ties would be resolved by Council vote (Section 5(e)). Dudziak moved (Anderson seconded) that Council approve the deletion of the obsolete text. Council approved that motion unanimously.

Council thus directed that two proposed by-laws amendments (shortening the election cycle and removing the obsolete text on tie-breaking) shall be submitted to the membership for ratification votes on the 2018 ballot.

Proposals to host the 2020 SHAFR Conference: Council discussed proposals to host the 2020 SHAFR Conference in New Orleans, LA; San Juan, PR; and College Station, TX. Concerns were expressed about the higher fares and limited number of daily flights into College Station and the limited number of SHAFR members currently in Puerto Rico. The institutional support specified in the New Orleans proposal made it particularly attractive to several Council members. After assessing the sense of Council, it was determined that Hahn and Amy Sayward will further investigate the proposals and make a recommendation to Council in June.

Survey of SHAFR membership:

Julia Irwin presented a follow-up report on the challenges facing a general survey of the membership, primarily the inability to link it to the current membership process, which would likely garner the most complete data. Rather than simply waiting for that development, Council brain-stormed other ideas for gathering input from the membership about the current state of SHAFR. Adriane Lentz-Smith moved (Connelly seconded) that the task force survey the membership as soon as it is feasible along the lines suggested by the task force. Council unanimously approved the motion.

Conference events: Sayward asked for advice about how best to manage the SHAFR luncheon at AHA conferences (where the Bernath Memorial Lecture is presented) given that AHA scheduling changes limit the luncheon time to 90 minutes and thereby forces a choice between either an on-site, 90-minute luncheon (at higher cost) or an off-site, longer luncheon that conflicts with one of the sessions (at lower cost). She will follow up on this—as well as the final costs associated with the one-drink ticket system implemented at this year's SHAFR reception at the AHA.

Mark Sanchez, SHAFR's Conference Coordinator, reported on preparations for the June 2018 conference, which prompted a discussion about how to best maximize accessibility for a diverse set of members and about how to minimize audio-visual expenses.

SHAFR Guide: Due to inclement weather, Jason Prevost of Brill was unable to attend the Council meeting in person. Sayward will meet with him later in the conference and report to Council on the proposed SHAFR member discount. The hope is that this can be implemented in the month of January.

Council adjourned at 11:59 a.m.

Editor's note: Due to a software glitch, the biographical statement for Barbara Keys on page 9 of the September 2017 issue of *Passport* contained two errors. Both of these have been rectified and a revised version of the statement appears in the online version of the issue on SHAFR.org. ***AJ***



Professional Notes

Amanda Demmer has accepted a position as Assistant Professor of History at Virginia Tech University beginning in Fall 2018.

Cindy Ewing has accepted a position as Assistant Professor of History at the University of Toronto beginning in Fall 2018.

Recent Books of Interest

Avlon, John. *Washington's Farewell: The Founding Father's Warning to Future Generations*, (Simon & Schuster, 2018).

Barton, Frederick D. *Peace Works: America's Unifying Role in a Turbulent World*, (Rowman, 2018).

Bayliss, John and Yoko Iwama, eds. *Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation, and the American Alliance*, (Routledge, 2018).

Bessner, Daniel. *Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual*, (Cornell, 2018).

Bew, John. *Realpolitik: A History*, (Oxford, 2018).

Bhardwaj, Atul, *US-India Relations*, (Routledge, 2018).

Brigham, Robert. *Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Vietnam War*, (PublicAffairs, 2018).

Burton, Guy. *Rising Powers and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1947*, (Rowman, 2018).

Chaudhuri, Jyotirmoy. *Whitehall and the Black Republic: A Study of Colonial Britain's Attitudes toward Liberia, 1914-1939*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Cohen, Warren I. *A Nation Like All Others: A Brief History of American Foreign Relations*, (Columbia, 2018).

Cooper, James. *The Politics of Diplomacy: U.S. Presidents and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1963-1998*, (Edinburgh, 2018).

DeRoche, Andy. *Kenneth Kaunda, the United States, and Southern Africa*, (Bloomsbury, 2016).

Eicher, Peter. *Raising the Flag: America's First Envoys in Faraway Lands*, (Potomac, 2018).

Elgindy, Khaled. *Blind Spot: America and the Palestinians, from Balfour to Obama*, (Brookings, 2018).

Elliott, Oliver. *The American Press and the Cold War: The Rise of Authoritarianism in South Korea, 1945-1954*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Erken, Ali. *America and the Making of Modern Turkey: Education Culture and Nation-Building*, (IB Tauris, 2018).

Field, Thomas C. *From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era*, (Cornell, 2018).

Fowler, Randall. *More Than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East*, (Potomac, 2018).

Gelfand, Lawrence, and John Day Tully. *The United States and the Rise of Tyrants: Diplomatic Relations with Nationalist Dictators Between the World Wars*, (McFarland, 2018).

Gibler, Douglas M. *International Conflicts, 1816-2010: Militarize Interstate Dispute Narratives*, (Rowman, 2018).

Gresh, Geoffrey and Tugrul Keskin, eds. *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From American Missionaries to the Islamic State*, (Routledge, 2018).

Grieve, Victoria. *Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood in the 1950s*, (Oxford, 2018).

Harvey, Mark. *Celebrity Influence: Politics, Persuasion, and Issue-Based Advocacy*, (Kansas, 2018).

Heer, Paul J. *Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia*, (Cornell, 2018).

Homolar, Alexander. *US Security Policy: Origins, Politics and Contemporary Challenges*, (Routledge, 2018).

Honeck, Misha. *Our Frontier is the World: The Boy Scouts in the Age of American Ascendancy*, (Cornell, 2018).

Jackson, Simon and Alanna O'Malley. *The Institution of International Order: From the League of Nations to the United Nations*, (Routledge, 2018).

Jelly-Shapiro, Eli. *Security and Terror: American Culture and the Long History of Colonial Modernity*, (California, 2018).

Jentleson, Bruce. *The Peacemakers: Leadership Lessons from Twentieth-Century Statesmanship*, (W.W. Norton, 2018).

Johns, Andrew L. and Mitchell B. Lerner, eds. *The Cold War at Home and Abroad: Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945*, (Kentucky, 2018).

Jones, Matthew. *The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, Volume I: From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945-1964*, (Routledge, 2017).

Jones, Matthew. *The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, Volume II: The Labour Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964-1970*, (Routledge, 2017).

Kami, Hideaki. *Diplomacy Means Migration: US Relations with Cuba during the Cold War*, (Cambridge, 2018).

Kanda, Yutaka. *Japan's Cold War Policy Toward China: Two Perceptions of Order*, (Routledge, 2018).

Karakatsanis, Neovi M. and Jonathan Swarts. *American Foreign Policy towards the Colonels' Greece: Uncertain Allies and the 1967 Coup d'État*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Khan, Sulman Wasif. *Haunted by Chaos: China's Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping*, (Harvard, 2018).

Kurlantzick, Joshua. *A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth of a Military CIA*, (Simon & Schuster, 2018).

Leebaert, Derek. *Grand Improvisation: America Confronts the British Superpower, 1945-1957*, (Farrar, 2018).

Lindsay-Poland, John. *Plan Colombia: U.S. Ally Atrocities and Community Activism*, (Duke, 2018).

Magu, Stephen. *Peace Corps and Citizen Diplomacy: Soft Power Strategies in U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Rowman, 2018).

Martin, James W. *Banana Cowboys: The United Fruit Company and the Culture of Corporate Colonialism*, (New Mexico, 2018).

Mason, Mike. *Turbulent Empires: A History of Global Capitalism since 1945*, (McGill-Queens, 2018).

Mitelpunkt, Shaun. *Israel in the American Mind: The Cultural Politics of US-Israeli Relations, 1958-1988*, (Cambridge, 2018).

Oliva, Mara. *Eisenhower and American Public Opinion on China*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Payne, John. *State-Sponsored Terrorism and the USA: Diplomacy, Terror, and US Foreign Policy in the Late Twentieth Century*, (IB Tauris, 2018).

Poast, Paul and Johannes Urpelainen. *Organizing Democracy: How International Organizations Assist New Democracies*, (Chicago, 2018).

Ratti, Luca. *A Not-So-Special Relationship: The US, UK and German Reunification, 1945-1990*, (Edinburgh, 2018).

Reel, Monte. *A Brotherhood of Spies: The U-2 and the CIA's Secret War*, (Doubleday, 2018).

Reinhardt, Bob. *The End of a Global Pox: America and the Eradication of Smallpox in the Cold War Era*, (UNC, 2018).

Ryan, David. *Collective Memory, Intervention, and Vietnam: The Cultural Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy since 1969*, (Routledge, 2018).

Scott, Catherine. *Neoliberalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: From Carter to Trump*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Shipoli, Erdoan. *Islam, Securitization, and US Foreign Policy*, (Palgrave 2018).

Siracusa, Joseph and Hang Thi Thuy Nguyen. *Richard Nixon and European Integration: A Reappraisal*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Smolnikov, Sergey. *Great Power Conduct and Credibility in World Politics*, (Palgrave, 2018).

Snyder, Sarah. *From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Columbia, 2018).

Thompson, Jenny and Sherry Thompson. *The Kremlinologist: Llewellyn E. Thompson, America's Man in Cold War Moscow*, (Johns Hopkins, 2018).

Thompson, Sue. *The United States and Southeast Asian Regionalism: Collaborative Defence and Economic Security, 1945-75*, (Routledge, 2018).

Verdery, Katherine. *My Life as a Spy: Investigations in a Secret Police File*, (Duke, 2018).

Voeneky, Silja, and Gerald Neuman, eds. *Human Rights, Democracy, and Legitimacy in a World of Disorder*, (Cambridge, 2018).

Wiesner-Hanks, Merry, and Urmi Engineer Willoughby. *A Primer for Teaching Women, Gender, and Sexuality in World History: Ten Design Principles*, (Duke, 2018).

Wind, Marlene. *International Courts and Domestic Politics*, (Cambridge, 2018).

Yarhi-Milo, Keren, *Who Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Reputation*, (Princeton, 2018).

Zhang, Xiaoming. *Deng Xiaoping's Long War: The Military Conflict Between China and Vietnam, 1979-1991*, (UNC, 2018).

Fumi Inoue

Report for the 2017 Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant

I am delighted to report to the 2017 Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant Committee about my research undertaken thanks to the grant I received. I conducted research at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park and Princeton University in August 2017 for my dissertation project "American Military Justice in Postwar Japan, 1952-Present." My dissertation examines the power, function, and impact of American foreign criminal jurisdiction (FCJ) policy in post-Occupation Japan (including U.S.-occupied Okinawa, 1952-1972). I study the United States' governmental policy of maximizing legal immunity over criminal cases involving its military personnel stationed abroad and the reaction of Japanese authorities and civil society to this policy.

At NARA, I was able to collect numerous files of declassified documents that collectively reveal a trajectory of U.S. FCJ policy on Japan, which appears to have evolved in *constant* reflections on legislative and public debates on the extraterritorial military justice. Postwar American policymakers constrained and extended the legal status and rights of mainland Japanese and Okinawans not only based upon internal discussions but also in consideration of political pressure imposed by non-state actors: legislators, lawyers, journalists, GIs' families, and NGOs. Furthermore, I obtained newly declassified documents on the 1970 Koza Riot in Okinawa. Against the backdrop of the Vietnam War and persistent criminal acts committed by U.S. military personnel, Okinawans and African-American soldiers formed new solidarity networks. This new transnational activism forced occupation authorities to redefine "the enemy," strengthen surveillance against dissidents within, and grant further rights to the Okinawan local police.

At Princeton University, I gathered sources from John Foster Dulles State Papers and the records of Roger N. Baldwin, who founded the American Civil Liberties Union. Above all, Dulles's copy of a State memorandum distributed in 1957 is revealing. According to this memorandum, the State Department requested Prime Minister Kishi to declassify a 1953 Japan-U.S. confidential agreement which committed Japan to waive primary jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel related cases except for those considered "material importance to Japan." Yet Kishi declined this request during his stay in Washington in June 1957. The State Department reported that "the declassification of this arrangement at this time would subject his Government to severe attack by the Socialists and Communists, and would be extremely embarrassing to his administration." Further, due to this research trip, I enriched my understanding of the ACLU's ambivalent position in the triangular Japan-Okinawa-U.S. relationship. Although Baldwin legitimized U.S. basing in post-Occupation Japan and the Okinawa Island at least until the mid-1960s, he consistently supported their local jurisdiction from the 1950s onward. Princeton's collections reveal both Baldwin's sympathy toward postwar America's fight for the "free world" and his dissatisfaction with the extraterritorial nature attached to FCJ policy.

All in all, my research funded by the 2017 Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant was tremendously helpful. Thank you very much again for your generous support.

In Memoriam: Sally Marks

Dr. Sally Marks, who died peacefully on January 13, 2018 after a brief illness, was many things. She is perhaps best known in the profession as the author of two landmark general studies of international history: *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe* (1976) and *The Ebbing of European Ascendency: An International History of the World, 1914-1945* (2002). She also devoted her formidable scholarly energies to a much more specialized topic: *Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (1981), a masterpiece of archival digging and lucid narrative that was awarded the AHA's George Louis Beer Prize in International History in 1981.

But for those scholars who have labored in the vineyards of the peace settlement of 1919, her most enduring legacy is her articles and book chapters that upended the standard historiographical assessment of the topic of German reparations after the Great War. The harsh verdict of the British economist John Maynard Keynes, delivered only a few months after the treaty was signed, had won almost universal acceptance among scholars and the general public for the next half-century: the voracious, vindictive Allied powers, particularly France, had imposed on defeated Germany a "Carthaginian" reparation burden that led directly to the rise of Hitler, the collapse of the 1919 peace settlement, the Second World War, and the Holocaust.

It is difficult to imagine a more forbidding task than sorting out the complex set of technical issues related to the requirement in the Versailles Treaty that defeated Germany pay the costs of repairing the extensive material damage to neighboring countries caused by its military forces during the war. But Sally waded into the weeds, plumbing archives in numerous countries, and, in the company of other scholars such as Marc Trachtenberg and Stephen A. Schuker, conclusively demonstrated that Keynes had it wrong. From her article "The Myth of Reparations"[1] to "Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918-1921,"[2] Marks precipitated what might be called the post-Keynesian version of the economic portion of the peace settlement of 1919—an interpretation that has won widespread acceptance in the profession.

Sally was also a valuable participant in several conferences treating the Versailles settlement, including an international gathering at the University of California at the University of California, Berkeley in 1994, which produced a volume to which she contributed a lucid chapter summarizing her findings about her favorite subject.[3]

She was one of a small group of women scholars who entered the field of diplomatic history/history of international relations in the 1970s. When I hosted a conference at Boston University in March 2007 titled "From the Great War to the Paris Peace Settlement, 1918-1919," I recall the pleasure I and others felt in seeing three distinguished women historians on the dais during the opening session: Sally, Margaret Macmillan, and Carole Fink. Since then, many more women have entered the sub-discipline. Sally was one of the pioneers.

She accomplished much of her scholarly work in spite of two handicaps. First, she felt that her academic institution, Rhode Island College, did not appreciate her sufficiently, so she took early retirement in 1988 and became an independent scholar, with the financial challenges that such a status entails. Second, late in her career she was afflicted with a painful physical ailment that hampered her ability to travel to conferences. But she continued to research, write, and publish.

She was very generous with her time when asked by colleagues to comment on their work. She gave me excellent advice about many scholarly matters and was a penetrating reader of my drafts. She never hesitated to express her opinion about an argument, even if it was negative, but she always conveyed her constructive criticism with tact and respect.

I cannot close without mentioning her valuable service to the Board of Editors of H-Diplo. When the occasional controversial issue was brought to the attention of the Board, we all profited from her calm, sensible advice about how to reach a sensible resolution. She also chaired the Editorial Board's search for new members, and ensured that female scholars were fairly represented.

Sally Marks will be greatly missed by her colleagues, friends, and admirers.

—William R. Keylor

Notes:
1. *Central European History,* Vol.11, No. 3 (September 1978), 231-255.
2. *Journal of Modern History,* Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 2013), 632-659.
3. Sally Marks, "Smoke and Mirrors: In Smoke-Filled Rooms and the Galerie des Glaces," in Manfred Boemeke, et al., *The Treaty of Versaiiles: A Reassessment after 75 Years* (Cambridge, 1998), 337-390.

The Last Word: Goodbye to All That

Francis J. Gavin

No one likes moving. Unpacking, however, can provide a chance revisit your past. While emptying my boxes in my new office at School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, I found the program for the first academic meeting I ever attended. The Bradley conference on diplomatic and international history, sponsored by Yale's International Security Studies Program (IIS), was held almost 25 years ago. I was halfway through my second year of a Ph.D. program in the department of history at the University of Pennsylvania, studying under wonderful mentors—Marc Trachtenberg, Walter McDougall, and Bruce Kuklick. During the conference, I ended up losing (then miraculously re-finding) the only nice suit jacket I owned at the time, an unnatural blue-ish blend of cotton and man-made fibers purchased by my grandmother as a present at *Today's Man*. I still have it.

Spirited communities like journalists, international relations scholars, students, diplomats, and policymakers are hungry for historical insight about the questions surrounding American foreign policy in an uncertain world. Philanthropists, think-tanks, university leaders, the larger public—all cheering on our mission of teaching and researching historically informed statecraft and strategy. Then I look at another world—academic history departments—and the picture appears much different.

I had no idea what to expect when I got off the Northeast Regional at New Haven's dilapidated Union Station, the first of what would be many such trips in the years to come. Yale can be both magical and ridiculous all at once: gleaming spires and gothic buildings, the Whiffenpoofs and Mory's, all nestled uncomfortably within a gritty and resentful urban setting. ISS were wonderful hosts; Paul Kennedy was constructing an intellectual empire which, in retrospect, did much to revive if not save diplomatic and military history during the 1990s. I was awe-struck walking amongst the legendary scholars that I had studied during my seminars: Volker Berghan, Akira Iriye, William McNeil, Geoffrey Parker, Stephen Schuker, Gaddis Smith. Exciting panels on new approaches to international history, the state of field, aspects of imperial Russia, and "national" security in early modern Europe fed my hopes that diplomatic history would be an inspiring and welcoming intellectual home. Most exciting, however, were the graduate students I met from institutions up and down the Amtrak corridor. In the early 1990s, Yale, Georgetown, Rutgers, Harvard, Columbia, University of Virginia, and Temple University each had thriving programs with multiple Ph.D. candidates working on diplomatic and military history. It was at this conference that I first met scholars who I greatly admired and would become life-long friends—Mary Sarotte, Will Hitchcock, Ted Brommund, Drew Erdmann, and Matt Connelly (the latter with whom I spent a legendary evening being overserved adult beverages, resulting in hijinks which are embellished with each retelling).

For all the intellectual firepower and comradery gathered by ISS, there was an underlying sense of unease during the meeting. Many of the historians in the room complained they felt unappreciated and at times besieged by departmental colleagues whose work came from cultural and social perspectives and who were suspicious of their efforts to study the thoughts and actions of immoral states run by powerful men. The recent end to the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union had generated naïve hopes that the relevance of war and peace as a historical force in the world had receded. Prominent diplomatic and military historians were retiring and not being replaced, and the number of assistant professor positions was continuing its steep decline.

Twenty-five years on, I've been reflecting upon that Yale meeting quite a bit, especially as I think about how to implement the mission of the new Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs: "to generate and apply rigorous historical thinking to the most vexing global challenges." As a diplomatic historian on think tank row, I often confront two worlds. On the one hand, spirited communities like journalists, international relations scholars, students, diplomats, and policymakers are hungry for historical insight about the questions surrounding American foreign policy in an uncertain world. Philanthropists, think-tanks, university leaders, the larger public—all cheering on our mission of teaching and researching historically informed statecraft and strategy. Then I look at another world—academic history departments—and the picture appears much different.

I recently attended a workshop sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Tobin Project on new scholarship on politics and international history, with panels on the politics of authoritarian regimes, leaders and the use of force, and new historical perspectives on U.S. national security policy, which overlapped with the annual American Historical Association meeting. Joining four excellent diplomatic historians on the last panel, I bluntly pointed out that while the subjects my colleagues from Brookings had selected were obviously important and worthy of rigorous scholarly treatment, I could not in good conscience advise a Ph.D. student in history—unlike those in political science or public policy—to purse them. To do so would be asking a young person to commit what would amount to career suicide, in the unlikely event they could even find a department willing to entertain the notion. Policy relevance is not the most important goal of historical study, obviously, and contemporary history presents great challenges. But I had to point out, to the surprise of the non-historians in the room, that the discipline of academic history has done little to encourage work on the kind of broader concerns in which the organizers of the workshop were interested, such as world order, international politics, and American national security policy.

Not everyone shares this view, obviously. Mary Dudziak—a great historian and wonderful leader of

SHAFR—countered with a narrative I've heard elsewhere, that the last few decades has witnessed a renaissance and resurgence in diplomatic history, with a broadening of the subjects, perspectives, and methods employed by the sub-field to understand the past. I responded with two points.

First, while I was all in favor of new approaches, there were important questions of war and peace, strategy, diplomacy, and statecraft where there appeared to be little serious work being done by Ph.D. students in history departments. What had taken place in diplomatic history was not an *expansion* of subjects and perspectives, but a *substitution*. To give just one of many possible examples: in one of the areas I am interested in, nuclear history, there has been fascinating work on a range of issues from the portrayal of nuclear anxiety in comic books to what the design of nuclear reactors tells us about political culture. Despite massive declassification of archival materials around the world, however, there has far less support on critical questions such as why states do or do not pursue nuclear weapons, or how nuclear weapons influences international behavior. When these documents are used, it is usually by political scientists or researchers from outside of the United States, not Ph.D. students in top U.S. history departments. In a town where debates over Iran and North Korea's nuclear ambitions, renewed geopolitical competition with nuclear powers China and Russia, and a multi-decade, $1.2 trillion plan to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons are fiercely debated, when many of the basic historical and analytical questions are unanswered and prevailing assumptions remain unchallenged, this lack of intellectual engagement by the history profession both surprises and disappoints those outside of the ivory tower.

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Second, I pointed out that many of the historians under the age of sixty who still did this kind of work were as likely to be employed by policy schools, international relations programs, or political science departments as history departments. I asked the audience, which included many Ph.D.s in other fields and experienced policymakers, to make a mental list of their favorite historians of international affairs and foreign policy and check to see whether they were tenured full time in a history department. Some are independent scholars, like Walter Russell Mead and Robert Kagan, while others such as Arne Westad, Mary Sarotte, Will Inboden, Marc Trachtenberg, Sarah Snyder, John Bew, and Hal Brands, amongst others, were employed by policy schools, international relations programs, and political science departments. Professor Dudziak herself is employed by a law school, with a courtesy appointment in political science. Some of the largest, most prestigious history departments in the country employ dozens of tenured faculty, without any of them teaching courses or conducting research on questions of war, peace, and diplomacy, to say nothing of mentoring the next generation of international affairs scholars in their Ph.D. programs. This exposes the two worlds problem I face: while marginalized within academic history departments, important historical scholarship and teaching on war and peace was embraced and supported by others institutions like think tanks, foundations, international affairs programs, and policy schools.

I don't enjoy being the skunk at a garden party—I actually think it an exciting time to teach and research international relations.[1] Nor is my point is not to engage in yet another argument about the state of the field, or calls for inclusiveness, or debate whether SHAFR should change its name, though I would highly recommend my colleague Hal Brands' excellent piece that deals with some of these issues.[2] The fact is, though I think of myself as a historian, judged by the normal metrics of a profession, including where I am published and cited, who invites me to conferences and talks, and where I work, I've never really been a member of the guild.

Perhaps my story is anomalous: someone trained to research and study the past, who loves history and believes it possesses extraordinary power to help us understand and explain important questions in the world,[3] but who in his career has found far greater acceptance, encouragement, intellectual stimulation, and perhaps most tellingly, employment in policy schools, international relations programs, and political science departments. I've never felt defensive explaining to my colleagues in economics, sociology, political science, policy, or law, for example, why I was working on international monetary relations or nuclear statecraft; they immediately grasped why someone would think these subjects worthy of deep, rigorous historical treatment. It is a far more welcoming response than the blank stare or worse I've often received from historians when discussing my scholarship.

While I have been quite happy with how things have worked out for me, for a long time I worried quite a bit about what has happened, both in the history discipline and the sub-field of diplomatic history. To be clear, I never yearned for a return to the so-called world where diplomatic historians studied "clerk to clerk" exchanges or simply "marked time," though it is not obvious to me that the best work in international or diplomatic history was ever so dry or unsophisticated as its critics claimed. Nor is it to deny the political or ideological challenges that come with this kind of work; like every other historian, I wrestle with the challenges posed by ideology, perspective and position in that elusive search for "objectivity." Honest debates can be had over the "so what?" question, though given our privileged position as scholars and teachers, I believe we have a moral obligation to at least ask the question. I laid out my views on the scope and range of questions that might engage diplomatic and international history in the mission statement I crafted in my role as chairman of the board of editors for an exciting new interdisciplinary journal, the *Texas National Security Review*:

> "International conflict, competition, and cooperation shape the world we live in. War has been both a great scourge on humanity as well as a driver of historical change, for both ill and good. The profound consequences of war unfold along a wide spectrum, from heart-wrenching individual tragedies to the very structure and shape of the modern state and global economy. The study of war and peace goes far beyond assessing the tactics of the battlefield or understanding the diplomacy between capitals: it would be impossible, for example, to comprehend a variety of crucial issues, from modern medicine and public health, technology, finance, accounting, taxation, literacy, mass education, race and gender relations,

to say nothing of how humans move about, what they eat and wear, and how they communicate with each other, without reference to war. Most national cultures, literature, music, visual art, and even language is suffused with reference to or inspiration from conflict. War and peace challenge and shape our core beliefs, our ethics, our sense of identity. Still, despite great intellectual effort, we know far less about the causes, conduct, and consequences of war and peace than we'd like."[1]

This statement also describes the type of courses and research we hope to undertake at the Kissinger Center for Global Affairs. It is not dissimilar from the themes and sentiments that so inspired me during that conference at Yale a quarter of a century ago, and which has inspired my teaching and research ever since. Whether it parallels what academic departments of history are interested in today is no longer my concern. It is what will animate our new center at SAIS, and we welcome all those who think of themselves as historians, even when the academic field of history does not.

Notes:
1. Francis J. Gavin, "It's Never Been a Better Time to Study IR," *Foreign Policy*, February 20, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/20/its-never-been-a-better-time-to-study-international-relations-trump-foreign-policy/
2. Hal Brands, "The Triumph & Tragedy of Diplomatic History," *Texas National Security Review*, December 2017, vol. 1, no. 1 pp., 132-143. For two other, excellent reflections on the promise and problems of diplomatic history, see William R. Keylor, "The Problems and Prospects of Diplomatic/International History," April 10, 2015, *H-Diplo*, https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/66930/h-diplo-state-field-essay-"-problems-and-prospects Marc Trachtenberg, "The State of International History," *E-International Relations*, March 9, 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/03/09/the-state-of-international-history/
3. Francis J. Gavin, "Thinking Historically: A Guide to Strategy and Statecraft," *War on the Rocks*, November 16, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/thinking-historically-a-guide-for-strategy-and-statecraft/ Originally presented as the 12th annual Alvin H. Bernstein Lecture, The Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, November 10, 2016.

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