

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 40, Issue 2, September 2009



Inside...

The Fight Over Vice-President Cheney's Records
Happy Anniversary to William Appleman Williams's
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy
The View From Overseas: Turkish-American Relations
Research at the Herbert Hoover Library and Museum

..and much more!

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Editorial Office:

Mershon Center for International Security Studies
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus OH 43201
passport@osu.edu
614-292-1681 (phone)
614-292-2407 (fax)

Executive Director

Peter L. Hahn, The Ohio State University

Editor

Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University-Newark

Production Editor

Julie Rojewski

Editorial Assistant

Matt Yates, The Ohio State University

Cover Photo

“Vice President Dick Cheney delivers remarks to American troops at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Thursday, Feb. 22, 2007.” White House Photo by David Bohrer, White House Archives, reprinted at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/photoessays/2007/Feb/24.html>.

Editorial Advisory Board and Terms of Appointment:

Andrew Preston, University of Cambridge (2007-2009)
W. Taylor Fain, University of North Carolina—Wilmington (2008-2010)
Elizabeth Kelly Gray, Towson University (2009-2011)

Passport is published three times per year (April, September, January), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and are acceptable in all formats, although electronic copy by email to passport@osu.edu is preferred. Submissions should follow the guidelines articulated in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited to conform to *Passport* style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find relevant information on the web at: <http://www.shafir.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm>, or can contact the editor. The opinions expressed in *Passport* do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR or of The Ohio State University.

The editors of *Passport* wish to acknowledge the generous support of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University—Newark, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

© 2009 SHAFR

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 40, Number 2, September 2009

In This Issue

- 4 The Elusive Vice-Presidential Records of Richard B. Cheney
 Anne L. Weismann
- 8 Fifty Years of William Appleman Williams' Tragedy of America
 Diplomacy: An Anniversary, a Discussion, and a Celebration
 H.W. Brands, Robert Buzzanco, Jerald A. Combs, Christopher Fisher,
 Lloyd Gardner, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, Ryan Irwin, Walter
 LaFeber, Thomas McCormick, Anna K. Nelson, Nicole Phelps, Emily
 S. Rosenberg, Robert D. Schulzinger, William Stueck, Jeremi Suri,
 Dustin Walcher, & Vanessa Walker
- 36 "Evet We Can": President Barack Obama's Visit to Turkey and the State of
 Turkish-American Relations
 Edward P. Kohn
- 40 SHAFR At Play: Highlights from the 2009 SHAFR Conference in
 Falls Church, VA
- 43 Historical Resources on Foreign Policy at the Herbert Hoover
 Presidential Library-Museum
 Spencer Howard
- 45 In Memoriam: John E. Taylor
- 47 In Memoriam: Richard H. Zeitlan
- 48 SHAFR Council Minutes
- 55 The Diplomatic Pouch
- 68 The Last Word

The Elusive Vice-Presidential Records of Richard B. Cheney

Anne L. Weismann

In the last years of the Bush administration, Vice President Richard Cheney became increasingly vocal about the status of his office, which he claimed occupied a curious position neither executive nor legislative. When pressed, the vice president conceded that his office belonged with the legislative branch, if anywhere, but was really neither fish nor fowl.¹ Not simply a matter of semantics, the vice president's formulation was used to justify his unilateral decision to opt out of classification requirements imposed on executive branch entities, to refuse the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) permission to conduct an on-site inspection of the procedures and facilities that the Office of the Vice President (OVP) used to safeguard classified national security information, and to ignore certain reporting requirements imposed by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. This pattern of conduct also cast serious doubt on Mr. Cheney's full compliance with the Presidential Records Act (PRA).

Congress enacted the PRA in 1978 to "promote the creation of the fullest possible documentary record" of a presidency and ensure its preservation for "scholars, journalists, researchers and citizens for our own and future generations."² Toward that end, the PRA confirms the nation's ownership and control of presidential records (44 U.S.C. § 2202) and imposes preservation obligations on the president and vice president (*id.* at §§ 2203[a], 2207). Expansive in its scope, the PRA excludes from its reach only "purely personal" records³ that have "no relationship or direct effect on the President's official activities."⁴

An early signal of Vice President Cheney's limited view of his PRA obligations can be found in Section 11(a) of Executive Order 13233, issued by President Bush on November 1, 2001. This little-noticed provision states that the PRA "applies to the executive records of the Vice President" (emphasis added).⁵ The PRA itself, however, uses much broader language to define vice-presidential records as encompassing

all documentary materials the vice president creates or receives "in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the [vice president's] constitutional, statutory, or other official ceremonial duties."⁶ Under the statutory definition, the vice president's legislative duties of presiding over the Senate and breaking a tie in Senate votes, imposed by Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution, clearly would be covered by the PRA, while the executive order would exclude them as non-executive branch activities.

The Bush administration's treatment of vice presidential records under the PRA formed part of a larger leitmotif of secrecy that Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) and other public interest groups have been battling for years. From the millions of disappearing White House emails⁷ to abrupt changes in the agency status of the Office of Administration (OA), a component of the Executive Office of the President (EOP),⁸ the Bush White House imposed numerous barriers to public access, blocking not only its own records but also those of Ronald Reagan's presidency and the presidency and vice-presidency of George H. W. Bush. In response to Vice President Cheney's truncated approach to his PRA obligations, CREW and a consortium of historians and groups of historians and archivists sued the vice president, the OVP, the EOP, NARA, and the archivist of the United States.⁹ Under the caption *CREW v. Cheney*, Civil No. 08-1548 (CKK) (D.D.C.), the plaintiffs challenged as contrary to law the White House defendants' limitations on the scope of vice-presidential records subject to the PRA and the NARA defendants' exclusion of the vice president's legislative records from the mandatory scope of the PRA. The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction that would impose preservation obligations on the defendants pending the outcome of the litigation.

The plaintiffs secured an early victory when Judge Colleen Kollar-

Kotelly of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the preliminary injunction and required the defendants to preserve through the pendency of the litigation all vice-presidential records, broadly defined as those related to or having an effect upon the carrying out of the vice president's constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties, and without regard to any limiting definitions defendants deemed appropriate. The court entered this relief in the face of the defendants' argument that by preserving documents concerning the vice president's functions as president of the Senate and those functions "specially assigned" to him by the president "in the discharge of executive duties and responsibilities," the vice president and OVP were complying fully with the PRA. Facially under-inclusive, these two categories omitted responsibilities assigned to the vice president by statute as well as responsibilities the vice president takes on at his own initiative.¹⁰ The vice president's limited definition of vice-presidential records subject to the PRA appeared also to exclude records generated by the performance of legislative responsibilities as defined by the vice president.

To fill in the gaps in the record before it, gaps that made it impossible for the court to determine whether the vice president engaged only in activities within the two categories encompassed by defendants' narrow definition, the court authorized plaintiffs to take the depositions of NARA official Nancy Smith and Vice-Presidential Chief of Staff David Addington. On the eve of the first scheduled deposition, the vice president filed a petition for mandamus with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing that the authorized depositions would intrude impermissibly into the conduct and opinions of the vice president and his closest advisors. The district court had further compounded its error, the vice president argued, by refusing to first consider whether the plaintiffs had viable causes of action against all

defendants. The D.C. Circuit denied the petition in large part, although it concluded the record before it did not justify the deposition of such a high-ranking official as Mr. Addington. As a result, the district court authorized the plaintiffs to take the deposition of Vice-Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff Claire M. O'Donnell in lieu of Mr. Addington.

Despite her title, Ms. O'Donnell had no personal knowledge about the vice president's actual recordkeeping practices and policies. Instead, she served essentially as an office manager in an administrative office of the OVP with responsibility for securing office space, passes, and parking for OVP staff. Nor could she explain the origin of the "specially assigned" language she had used in declarations submitted to the court; as she admitted during her deposition, the language was formulated by counsel. Ms. O'Donnell had personal responsibility for only a small subset of OVP records such as trip files for the vice president and budget files related to how the vice president spent his authorized budget. But with no opportunity for additional discovery,¹¹ the plaintiffs were unable to adduce further evidence of the vice president's interpretation of his recordkeeping responsibilities under the PRA.

On January 19, 2009, one day before the change in administrations, Judge Kollar-Kotelly entered judgment for the defendants and vacated the preliminary injunction, which lifted from the defendants the continuing obligation to preserve vice-presidential records broadly defined. Although at first glance the court's decision appeared to be a victory for the defendants, the plaintiffs also secured important victories on critical threshold legal issues that will have a long-lasting impact beyond the specifics of this case. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly initially observed in her opinion, "[t]his case concerns matters of significance extending beyond its individual parties, requiring a discussion of how the three branches of government interact to preserve documents that form part of our nation's history." Confronting the court were claims rooted in the PRA, a statute that limits the scope of the court's review and provides little oversight over how the president and vice president meet their recordkeeping and preservation obligations. Based on a congressional assumption that presidents (and vice presidents) would comply with the act in good faith, the PRA contains no express role for the archivist or NARA

until after a president leaves office. Relying on these limitations in the PRA as interpreted by the D.C. Circuit Court in a series of cases, the defendants argued judicial review of all of the plaintiffs' claims was precluded in its entirety. In support, the defendants cited the D.C. Circuit Court's conclusion in *Armstrong v. Bush*, 924 F. 3d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (hereafter *Armstrong I*), that judicial review of the president's "recordkeeping practices and decisions" was foreclosed because such review "would upset the intricate statutory scheme Congress carefully drafted to keep in equipoise important competing political and constitutional concerns" (*Id.* at 290-91). As the *Cheney* court concluded, however, the defendants turned a blind eye to a subsequent decision wherein the D.C. Circuit Court explained that *Armstrong I* did "not stand for the unequivocal proposition that all decisions made pursuant to the PRA are immune from judicial review" (*Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President*, 1 F.3d 1274, 1293 [D.C. Cir. 1993], hereafter *Armstrong II*). *Armstrong II* clarified that while courts are not authorized to review a president's "creation, management, and disposal decisions," they have the power to review guidelines outlining what is and is not a presidential (and vice-presidential) record in the first place under the PRA (*Id.* at 1294). Based on the holding in *Armstrong II*, the district court in *Cheney* concluded that judicial review was available to prevent the vice president from using a different definition of vice-presidential records than the definition contained in the PRA, an action that falls squarely within guidelines as to what is and is not a vice-presidential record.

Had the court instead accepted the defendants' argument, the president and vice president would have been able to circumvent the act altogether by rewriting its terms, without being subject to any judicial oversight or censure. The obligations of the president and vice president under the PRA flow from their creation and receipt of "presidential (and vice presidential) records." By redefining the meaning and scope of that term, the president and vice president would have been able to alter those obligations fundamentally. The court's ruling in *Cheney* prevents this result. As the court reasoned, "it 'borders on the absurd' to believe that Congress statutorily defined Vice-Presidential records and required the Vice President to implement steps to preserve them, but denied any judicial review to prevent the

Vice President from using a different definition for Vice-Presidential records."

Prior to the *Cheney* decision, there was considerable doubt and confusion, based on the fairly sweeping language in *Armstrong I*, about whether and to what extent judicial review remained available under the PRA. *Armstrong II* clarified that issue to some extent, recognizing that at least some PRA issues were subject to review, but the exact parameters of that review remained in question. Indeed, even after *Armstrong II* the conventional wisdom suggested very few challenges to a president's compliance with the PRA were likely to get past the threshold issue of whether judicial review was available. Judge Kollar-Kotelly's decision in *Cheney* adds to a growing body of case law recognizing the ability of plaintiffs like CREW and others to challenge a president's (and vice president's) attempt to rewrite central terms of the PRA.¹²

The plaintiffs in *Cheney* secured another important victory when the court held they had viable causes of action for mandamus relief—that is, that they could seek judicial review of their claims in hopes of securing a writ ordering the defendants to perform the duties they were required to perform by law. The court's conclusion that judicial review is available under the PRA did not address whether the plaintiffs had viable claims upon which relief could be granted. Because the PRA does not itself directly allow suits by private plaintiffs, the *Cheney* plaintiffs needed another statute to supply their cause of action. They used the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, to require the White House defendants to comply with their statutory duty to treat as subject to the PRA all of the vice president's records relating to the exercise of his constitutional, statutory, official or ceremonial duties. In opposition, the defendants argued that the duties the PRA imposes on them are not sufficiently ministerial (i.e., nondiscretionary) to be subject to mandamus relief. Judge Kollar-Kotelly disagreed, pointing to the statutorily imposed definition of vice-presidential records contained in the PRA, which leaves the vice president no discretion to change this definition, and the act's requirement to preserve such records.

From a legal perspective, this ruling is especially significant because it gives some definition to the kinds of claims a plaintiff can bring against the president and vice president related to their compliance with the PRA.¹³ By recognizing that

at least some of the obligations the PRA imposes on the president and vice president are non-discretionary and therefore ministerial, the *Cheney* court paved the way for further actions seeking mandamus relief.

The plaintiffs also prevailed on a third threshold issue: whether they had standing to pursue their claims. Rooted in Article III of the Constitution, the standing requirement prevents courts from resolving abstract legal questions unrelated to an actual dispute and unlikely to be redressed by a favorable opinion. The defendants challenged the plaintiffs' standing, arguing they had only a speculative or hypothetical interest in seeking future access to vice-presidential records. The court disagreed, finding that because at least one of the plaintiffs, Stanley Kutler, had established his past and continuing interest in seeking PRA records and that interest would be impaired if vice presidential records were destroyed, all of the plaintiffs had standing.

Had the *Cheney* plaintiffs not survived the standing inquiry, virtually no plaintiff could have sued to prevent the destruction of presidential and vice-presidential records. The *Cheney* defendants advanced an aggressively narrow view of standing that essentially would have required a plaintiff to wait to file suit until a former president's records were available for public review, years after the end of an administration. As a practical matter, at that late date any effort to seek records a president or vice president had failed to preserve while in office could not succeed.

The *Cheney* plaintiffs' claims against NARA and the archivist did not fare as well. Judge Kollar-Kotelly concluded that because the archivist and NARA have only a very limited role under the PRA during a president's and vice president's term in office and have no authority to implement classification guidelines, there is no relief available to the plaintiffs for their claims that NARA guidelines are contrary to law. The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding its recognition that NARA "may have provided the Vice President with document preservation guidance that conflicts with the requirements in the PRA." Judge Kollar-Kotelly concluded that the plaintiffs' only remedy for their claims against the archivist and NARA lies with Congress, not the courts.

The plaintiffs also failed on the ultimate factual question of whether the vice president had

adopted guidelines excluding vice-presidential records from the scope of the PRA. Relying on Ms. O'Donnell's "understanding" that all of the vice president's functions fall within his duties as president of the Senate and his "specially assigned" functions, the court entered judgment for the defendants. Although the court pointed to the absence of any contrary evidence and the plaintiffs' failure to adduce their own evidence as justifying this conclusion, the court never acknowledged that the plaintiffs' inability to produce such proof was the direct consequence of the severely restricted scope of discovery the court had authorized.

The mixed results of the *Cheney* litigation present several challenges for historians, archivists, and the public at large. On the one hand, the *Cheney* decision confirms a plaintiff's ability to challenge presidential or vice-presidential guidelines that conflict with their statutory obligations under the PRA, a question about which there was considerable doubt prior to this decision. On the other hand, the *Cheney* decision confirms NARA's long-held view that it has virtually no role to play with respect to an incumbent's handling of his presidential or vice-presidential papers. And the judicially imposed prohibition on challenging a president's day-to-day compliance with the PRA creates huge evidentiary hurdles for a plaintiff seeking confirmatory facts about an unlawful PRA policy. Judge Kollar-Kotelly has argued that the answer lies with Congress and its ability to rewrite the law. As she pointed out, "Congress limited the scope of judicial review and provided little oversight authority for the President and Vice President's document preservation decisions."

The *Cheney* lawsuit exposed some of the major loopholes in the PRA. Wary of intruding unconstitutionally into the daily recordkeeping decisions that a president and vice president make, Congress left all such decisions entirely up to them. Congress went even further in its deference to the president, however, and carved out only the most limited roles for NARA and the archivist; under the statute their only role while a president is in office is to provide their views, upon request of the president or vice president, on the proposed disposal of presidential or vice-presidential records (See 44 U.S.C. § 2203[c]). Accordingly, it falls to Congress to fix these deficiencies through legislative changes.

Specifically, Congress should amend the PRA to provide the

archivist and NARA with the authority to issue regulations further clarifying the meaning of the act's provisions and the obligations it imposes on the president and vice president. Doing so would ensure that where those guidelines run astray, as in *Cheney*, courts will have the authority to provide relief. Congress should also require the archivist to notify Congress upon learning of a planned disposition of presidential or vice-presidential records that is inconsistent with the PRA's requirements, regardless of whether the archivist's knowledge stems from direct communications from the president or vice president. Further, Congress should make it absolutely clear that outside individuals and entities have standing to file lawsuits based on the president's and vice president's non-compliance with their mandatory duties under the PRA.¹⁴

Beyond legislative fixes, NARA and the archivist need to rethink their role in this statutory scheme and affirm their obligations to the American public. The *Cheney* litigation revealed the degree to which the archivist has taken a passive role in ensuring the president's and vice president's fullest compliance with the PRA. Acceding to the Bush White House's interpretation of their PRA obligations, the archivist and NARA did not even attempt to defend the lawfulness of their own regulations. NARA clearly sees the agency merely as a caretaker of a president's papers after a president leaves office. With the archivist and NARA refusing to lead the charge, it falls to historians, archivists, and good-government groups like CREW to press Congress, the courts, and the executive branch for greater protections to ensure full and adequate preservation of our nation's history.

As for Mr. Cheney's vice-presidential records, historians can take some comfort in the broad preservation obligation in place until the last hours of the Bush administration, which should have acted as a brake on any further document destruction. Moreover, the full legacy of the Bush presidency will be revealed not only through the president's and vice president's records, but those of their staff, particularly staff emails. This leaves the remaining litigation over the millions of missing White House emails critical to bringing transparency and accountability to the Bush administration. Yet in that case too, historians, archivists, and the public will have to depend on the efficacy of the archivist who now has

custody over all of the PRA materials from President Bush's administration.

Anne L. Weismann is Chief Counsel for Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW).

Notes:

1. The 2008 edition of the *United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions* (commonly known as the "Plum Book") describes the vice presidency as "a unique office that is neither a part of the executive branch nor a part of the legislative branch, but is attached by the Constitution to the latter."

2. 124 Cong. Rec. H34894 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978) (Statement of Rep. Brademas).

The Supreme Court confirmed the legitimacy of these interests in *Nixon v. Administrator*, 433 U.S. 425, 452 (1977), when it upheld the constitutionality of the predecessor law to the PRA.

3. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(3).

4. 124 Cong. Rec. H34896 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978) (Statement of Rep. Preyer); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-1487, at 11 (1978), reprinted in *U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News* (St. Paul, MN), 1978, at 5742.

5. On January 21, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an executive order establishing policies and procedures governing the assertion of executive privilege over presidential records and revoking Executive Order 13233.

6. 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2), defining presidential records (emphasis added). Although the PRA does not separately define vice presidential records, it requires records of a vice president to be treated--in the same manner as Presidential records--and directs the vice president to assume the same duties and responsibilities with respect to vice presidential records as the president must assume for presidential records. 44 U.S.C. § 2207.

7. In the spring of 2007, CREW broke the story of many millions of emails mysteriously missing from White House servers over a two-and-one-half-year period. See *Without a Trace: The Missing White House E-mails and the Violation of the Presidential Records Act*, April 12, 2007, available at <http://www.citizensforethics.org/files/041207WithoutATraceFullReport.pdf>. CREW and the National Security Archive subsequently brought lawsuits challenging the Bush administration's failure to take any action to restore the missing emails or to implement an effective electronic recordkeeping system, which contravened the requirements of the Federal Records Act. *CREW v. Executive Office of the President*, Civil No. 07-1707 (HHK) (D.D.C.).

8. After CREW sued the OA for its failure to respond to CREW's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for documentation of the missing emails in



Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement

Lawrence S. Wittner

(an abbreviated version of the classic, award-winning scholarly trilogy, *The Struggle Against the Bomb*)

From reviews of *The Struggle Against the Bomb*

"Wittner's impressively researched, clearly written, and balanced assessment of the antinuclear-weapons movement belongs on the shelf not only of every serious student of the nuclear arms race but also of everyone who is concerned about the safety of humanity."

— *American Historical Review*

"Wittner's outstanding book employs massive research . . . to show how concerned citizens . . . have altered the course of history. . . . Monumental."

— *Journal of American History*

"[A] substantial, meticulously researched and sympathetic history of the disarmament movement."

— *Foreign Affairs*

"Groundbreaking. . . . An encyclopedic account of a diverse . . . transnational movement at work. . . . Deserves a wide audience."

— *Diplomatic History*

CREW v. Office of Administration, Civil No. 07-0964 (CKK) (D.D.C.), the OA claimed it was no longer an agency subject to the FOIA even though it had functioned as a FOIA agency since its inception in 1974, adopting a comprehensive FOIA regulatory scheme and processing hundreds of FOIA requests.

9. In addition to CREW, the plaintiffs included historian and law professor Stanley I. Kutler, history professor Martin J. Sherwin, the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Society of American Archivists, and the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

10. For example, Congress assigned to the vice president the responsibility to sit on the National Security Council through the National Security Act of 1947.

11. The district court denied CREW's renewed request to depose David Addington, concluding that additional

deposition testimony was unnecessary. 12. As a decision of a district court, the Cheney opinion is not binding precedent. Nevertheless, it is a persuasive opinion that other judges are likely to heed.

13. Prior to Cheney, plaintiffs had brought claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See *Armstrong I* and *Armstrong II*. While the APA provides an avenue to challenge agency action or inaction, it does not apply to either the president or vice president. See, for example, *Franklin v. Massachusetts*, 505 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1992) (president not an agency for purposes of the APA); and *Banks v. Lappin*, 539 F.Supp.2d 228, 234 (D.D.C. 2008) (vice president not an agency under the FOIA, which uses the same agency definition as the APA).

14. Although the court in Cheney that found this authority already exists, legislative clarification would eliminate the potential for further litigation on this issue.

Fifty Years of William Appleman Williams' *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*: An Anniversary, a Discussion, and a Celebration

H.W. Brands, Robert Buzzanco, Jerald A. Combs, Christopher Fisher, Lloyd Gardner, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, Ryan Irwin, Walter LaFeber, Thomas McCormick, Anna K. Nelson, Nicole Phelps, Emily S. Rosenberg, Robert D. Schulzinger, William Stueck, Jeremi Suri, Dustin Walcher, & Vanessa Walker

Williams, Beard, Kennan—and Me

H. W. Brands

The *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* rescued me from believing I was an utter idiot. As an undergraduate at Stanford in the early 1970s I found myself in classes where everyone knew a lot more about history than I did—or did a better job of faking it. My instructors assigned books that assumed far more background in history and greater sophistication than I possessed. Reading Christopher Lasch's *New Radicalism in America*, I was expected to know who Mabel Dodge Luhan and Randolph Bourne were; *The Education of Henry Adams* demanded that I catch the insider ironies of its gloomy author.

Tragedy, which I read in Barton Bernstein's class on American foreign policy, was something quite different. It was a hot property at the most divisive moment of the Vietnam War, and it was quite comprehensible. Williams wasn't trying to impress me, although he was trying to convert me. His book had the thumping straightforwardness of a good manifesto. I had heard of the open door, but I had no idea how pervasive that policy was and how much it influenced American foreign policy for most of the twentieth century. I read the 1962 edition, in which Williams was able to cite the Bay of Pigs as the I-told-you-so confirmation of his 1959 version. Yet it was Vietnam that made him a guru of the left, and as the quagmire deepened, his reputation as the prophet of anti-imperialism rose.

What appealed to me, however, was not the accuracy of Williams's forecast but the tone of his voice. Among all the leftists of the era—I

read Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy at about that same time, along with Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko, Harry Magdoff and Noam Chomsky—Williams was the only one who seemed to care that American policy had run off the rails. The Marxists and their near-kin took American malfeasance as a given, the inevitable consequence of American capitalism. Williams paid attention to capitalism, but he cared more about American democracy than the hard left did, and it pained him that democracy had been so perverted. The Marxists sneered at Williams' naivete, but I was moved when he pleaded with Americans to rethink open door imperialism:

Isn't it time to stop defining trade as the control of markets for our surplus products and control of raw materials for our factories? Isn't it time to stop depending so narrowly—in our thinking as well as in our practice—upon an informal empire for our well-being and welfare? Isn't it time to ask ourselves if we are really so unimaginative that we have to have a frontier in the form of an informal empire in order to have democracy and prosperity at home? Isn't it time to say that we can make American society function even better on the basis of equitable relationships with other people?¹

Before encountering Williams I hadn't paid much attention to the titles of the books I read, but I came to appreciate the care with which he had chosen his. To the other radicals, American diplomacy was a plot, a conspiracy, a crime; to Williams it was a *tragedy*—an error all the more heartbreaking for having been avoidable. And I realized that he

wasn't a radical at all, but a jilted liberal.

Williams reintroduced me to Charles Beard, with whom I already had a passing acquaintance. My grandfather was a sucker for door-to-door book salesmen (apparently such a breed once existed), and alongside the complete works of Sir Walter Scott sat Beard's two-volume *Rise of American Civilization* (written with Mary Beard). I had thumbed through it, unaware that Beard was the best-selling American historian ever but intrigued by his ability to wrap the minutiae of American life into a grand drama. My reading of Williams, who acknowledged his debt to Beard, reminded me of browsing Beard, and it sent me back to that fat set, as well as to Beard's other works, including *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* and eventually *The Open Door at Home*. The latter made Williams seem a little less original to me, but I was willing to forgive him for that.

By this time I was out of college and on the road as a traveling salesman. Beard and other historians accompanied me across the Great Basin, where the hardware stores—my customers—closed at five in the afternoon and television reception was spotty. I didn't yet conceive of myself as a historian, but the germ of my original plan for a dissertation took root somewhere between Winnemucca, Nevada, and Salt Lake City. As it turned out, Robert Divine at the University of Texas thought an intellectual history of American foreign policy was a bit ambitious for a thesis, so I set it aside.

But eventually I got back to it, and the basic concept came straight from Williams and Beard. I called the book that resulted *What America Owes the World*, and it took as its starting point the essential moralism

of Williams and Beard. Williams wouldn't have been so pained by American diplomacy if he hadn't believed that America could do better. Beard became an isolationist, but his isolationism was informed by a conviction that America owed the world not military salvation but the example of a prosperous democracy living within its means and mostly within its borders. Beard and Williams anchored one side of the long debate over America's responsibilities to the world, the side I labeled "exemplarists." The other side—the "vindicators"—were those who advocated the international activism against which Williams and Beard contended.

Perhaps it is not surprising that Williams and Beard got sympathetic treatment in my book, which was published in 1998, safely after the end of the Cold War and before the terrorist attacks of September 2001. I didn't buy the Reaganist argument that American pressure had broken the Soviet model; instead I sided with the aging George Kennan, who pointed out that his original "X" article had suggested that the Soviet system included the seeds of its own destruction. Kennan also complained that his concept of containment had been hijacked by the militarists, and he sounded a lot like Williams and Beard when he asserted, in an opinion piece in the *New York Times* in 1994, that "it is primarily by example, never by precept, that a country such as ours exerts the most useful influence beyond its borders" and that "unless we preserve the quality, the vigor and the morale of our own society, we will be of little use to anyone at all."²

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 this modest approach appeared shortsighted, but after George W. Bush involved the United States in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have come to look soberingly like Vietnam, and as the country faces an economic crisis that grimly echoes the Great Depression, Williams and Beard again appear pertinent. Beard underestimated Hitler, and neither he nor Williams foresaw what the globalization of economics and finance would accomplish, for better and for worse. But each clung to a vision of an America that lived up to its own democratic promise; and that vision never goes out of style.

I don't assign *Tragedy* to my undergraduate students. Like all effective manifestos, it is too rooted in its time and place to transpose well. But they get the message nonetheless.

H. W. Brands is Dickson, Allen,

Anderson Centennial Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin.

Notes:

1. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1962), 5.
2. *New York Times*, March 14, 1994.

"We Always Did Feel the Same, We Just Saw It From a Different Point of View"

Robert Buzzanco

Writing about *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* is like trying to discuss Eric Hobsbawm, Frank Sinatra, or Miles Davis. It is much easier writing about a book that had no real significance and was quickly forgotten, as most books that historians write are. What can I say that hasn't been said before, and who am I to critique these people? Here goes anyway.

I suspect most people participating in this symposium have been influenced by William Appleman Williams, just as I have. He shaped the study of U.S. foreign policy like no one else, and whether we accept his analysis or not, we have learned much from him. Isaiah Berlin said that Marx's intellectual power was evident in the countless, continuing efforts to attack him, and the same can be said of *Tragedy*. To steal from Dylan again: most people "read books, repeat quotations . . . draw conclusions on the wall."¹ Williams's work requires thought. Love it or hate it, it can't be ignored, and producing work of that caliber is a laudable achievement and a worthwhile goal. (I can't speak for the postmodernists and culturalists here. I suspect their emphasis on "tropes," "discourses," and "representations" doesn't owe a whole lot to William Appleman Williams [maybe to Raymond] and I also suspect that he would have been bemused by it at best.)

As one of a dwindling number of leftist, materialist historians, Williams was a guru. *Tragedy* was really the first book I read in graduate school (along with Gabriel Kolko's *The Politics of War*), and it affected me powerfully. It was cerebral, angry, raw, nuanced, and powerful. I knew then that I would study U.S. diplomatic history and give primacy

Williams's work requires thought. Love it or hate it, it can't be ignored, and producing work of that caliber is a laudable achievement and a worthwhile goal.

to the systemic issue of economics, as a material consideration and as *weltanschauung*. And for over a quarter-century now, I have framed foreign policy issues in my work as an American attempt to expand commercial interests. Instead of asking whether the motive is economic, I ask, how it could not be economic?

The beauty of *Tragedy* is, in the most positive way, its simplicity. Williams introduced us to the open door and explained American expansion, intervention, overthrows, wars, and empire via that doctrine. And *Tragedy* is not a contortionistic history that makes weird twists and turns and tumbles so that ideas will fit into a methodological framework. The open door concept applies to discussions of the market revolution, the 1890s, the World Wars, the Cold War, Vietnam, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was right in 1959 and it is right today. Seeking security and democracy, the United States (and by "United States" and "America" I mean the nation's ruling-class government officials, bankers, corporate titans, global collaborators, and the media and intellectual myrmidons that promote them) conducted its affairs abroad with an eye to finding markets, investment opportunities, cheap or slave labor, resources, and political influence.

Still, as important as *Tragedy* is to the study of all U.S. history, I have, guiltily, some real quibbles with some of Williams's main points. So, to be contrarian, I would like to talk about those a bit. But even with these disagreements, *Tragedy* remains essential reading on any short list of the most important history books.

The primary issue I have with Williams is his belief in the existence of a fundamental system of American values. Two outstanding books published recently, Joan Hoff's *A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush* and William Walker's *National Security and Core Values*, argue that America's interventionist and often brutal experiences abroad were a contravention of national values. Hoff believes that the United States made a "pact with the devil" to gain enormous power, and Walker claims that "core values" were violated in the pursuit of "national security," i.e., in interventions and wars. These books evoke Williams's work, but I think their analyses recreate the main flaw of *Tragedy*.

Tragedy, my English professors drilled into me, is not simply the story of an action that had gone bad. It involves a protagonist pursuing a noble purpose, seeing it go wrong, but inexorably continuing on his quest despite the inevitable, ignoble end that awaits. Tragedies, in that sense, are redemptive, and those to whom the story is told are penitent and wiser for knowing the plight of the protagonist. Using those criteria, it is hard to see America's experience abroad as tragic. It was too intentional and successful, made too much profit, eliminated enemies too effectively, established global hegemony, and was done without much introspection or guilt. Pursuing open doors globally, the ruling class overwhelmed weaker peoples, people of color, peasants and farmers; it denied self-determination and national sovereignty and diminished and crushed movements for broader or participatory forms of democracy. There was nothing noble about their purposes or tragic in the consequences of their actions. They set out to rule the world and did so quite effectively, at least through the fall of 2008.

Williams understood those consequences. He wrote that America's reformist and expansionist program "provoked trouble," the reaction to which "ultimately took the form of terror." Notice that he invoked terrorism as the response to U.S. empire, not as the tactic used by Americans to impose reform and expansion on other peoples. So Williams, with all his insight and critical analysis, still accepted the idea of American exceptionalism; he would lament dreams unfulfilled and values betrayed rather than admit that the American elite had a coherent worldview that saw state violence as the means for growing its own influence.

In their moving biography of Williams, Paul Buhle and Edward Rice-Maximin, his associates from Madison, explain his worldview. Among his political icons were John Quincy Adams and Herbert Hoover, while he was critical of Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Liberalism, a "suffocating ideology," preempted "solid radicalism" and "thoughtful conservatism," so Williams held to a "judicious paternalism" and was a "Christian socialist and an undoubted patriot." These ideals would guide Williams as he wrote *Tragedy*, even though the men he studied were more similar to the Corleones than to the Waltons.

Williams began by seeing Cuba in the 1890s as prologue to Cuba in

the 1960s. That linkage is perceptive, but as he numbered the flaws in the American approach to Havana, he criticized U.S. intransigence toward Cuban reformists as "creating a fourth truth and contributing to the tragedy" because it pushed the Cubans "further to the left" and "strengthened the radicals." For Williams, the correct path would have been nonintervention. But why is nonintervention (not, presumably, revolution?) the alternative to empire, and why was it a tragedy that the radical left was strengthened? Although it took sixty years, Fidel Castro's revolution finally brought Cuba national liberation and economic reform, which most

So Williams, with all his insight and critical analysis, still accepted the idea of American exceptionalism; he would lament dreams unfulfilled and values betrayed rather than admit that the American elite had a coherent worldview that saw state violence as the means for growing its own influence.

Cubans and many outside observers would see as a huge improvement. Yet Williams saw it as tragic. He was also troubled by the elitism reflected in U.S. policy toward Cuba; yet one might ask whether arguing that the United States "pushed" Cuban radicals to the left isn't itself elitist, since it denigrates the Cubans' role in their own liberation.

Williams then jumped to Harry Truman (to be snarky, the chronological to-and-fro in *Tragedy* and the lack of an index are annoyances). He wrote that at the outset of the Cold War and during the Korean War, Truman "refined the technique of announcing and defining issues in such a way as to place critics on the defensive as men and women who seemed to be challenging traditional American values and objectives." Williams presupposed, then, that "traditional American values and objectives" existed and that Truman's militarism violated them. Given his paternalism, theology, and patriotism, that presupposition should not surprise; but given the invective heaped upon Williams for his alleged radicalism, his belief in traditional values and objectives seems unfounded. So either Williams's critics had him wrong all along (which I think is obvious), or Williams himself did not have as radical a critique of American policies as these critics alleged (which, although true, would be

rejected by those critics). Or perhaps both those claims are correct. In a similar vein, Williams asserted that "America's humanitarian urge to assist other peoples is undercut—even subverted—by the way it goes about helping them." Again, he presupposed a set of positive values, a legitimate humanitarian quest to assist others.

But let's consider for a moment that the critics Truman was trying to place on the defensive—and all the critics of the war on Cuba, the Korean War, the Cold War, Vietnam, of Iraq today—were (and are) the ones challenging traditional American values and objectives. That is to say, let's take Truman at his word.

The United States, as Williams knew and explained powerfully, was built upon mass genocide and enslavement, indentured servitude and disenfranchisement, subordination of women, conquest of other, especially non-white, lands, a brutal civil war to defend industrial capitalism, violent crushing of labor and farmer groups. And that's just before 1900. Perhaps those were the traditional values Truman was invoking.

But like Hoff and Walker, Williams offered an alternative coda—that republicanism, free labor, liberty, civic duty, civil rights, and at least the pursuit of happiness and equality are our "core values," to use Walker's term but to adopt an idea that Williams would surely have accepted. Maybe it wasn't America making a "pact with the devil" by committing atrocities abroad, but the elites in those other countries making a contract with Old Scratch in Washington, D.C., to allow the dark forces of capital to enter their dominion and plague their people. And as for those ideals Williams held dear from his Iowa boyhood, perhaps our values really are intervention, warfare, denial of self-determination, and torture.

Running throughout *Tragedy* is the idea, sometimes voiced, often implied, that the United States could have acted differently, humanely, democratically, and that failing to do so was the tragedy. But given Williams's own understanding of the economic imperatives driving policy, how could he assume that different tactics, strategies, or outcomes were possible?

Williams's treatment of Woodrow Wilson emphasized the gap between "values" and empire. Clearly Williams was no fan of Wilson (neither am I). Wilson could not remain neutral once hostilities began in Europe, Williams asserts, because a British victory was essential for a

“peaceful, prosperous, and moral” world. Wilson “had either to abandon [his] determination and destiny to lead the world or go to war.” Williams also suggested that the “basic dilemma” of foreign policy was framed by the time Wilson was president: America’s “generous humanitarianism” prompted it to help the less fortunate, but it defined that humanitarianism as making others more “like us.” That interpretation subverted self-determination while leading the United States to expand overseas in search of material benefits.

Finally, Williams concluded that intervention in the Great War, counterrevolutionary activities in Mexico, and continued pursuit of the open door meant that “Wilson’s liberal practice was not in keeping with his liberal principles.” Williams, as Buhle and Rice-Maximin put it, saw Wilson’s interventions as the “act of a reckless empire-builder.”

But what if Wilson actually had a precise and accurate understanding of liberal democracy? Indeed, I would argue that his understanding of liberal political economy was near-brilliant. Turn-of-the-century liberalism was an economic ideology based on the idea of free trade, free investments, free markets, and so forth, with correlative reform in order to create more progressive communities of producers and consumers abroad, provide “democracy” by creating competing elite parties, and provide political stability for commerce. Today, more than a few business schools teach that democracy, which Williams and others saw as embodying the values mentioned above, is in essence “commercial liberty,” and that is the equation Wilson was making. In other words, although Wilson might have framed the issue of “free seas” as one of international law, the real point was that submarines were sinking ships laden with manufactures and specie.

Claims of recklessness aside, Wilson was much vindicated by the events of the 1920s, when Nazism and global depression resulted from the failure to reach a reasonable settlement at Versailles. Yet Williams didn’t effectively engage these postwar consequences and didn’t mention the question of German reparations at all. Perhaps Wilson was “reckless,” but he also made America a creditor nation and a world power through his intervention in the war. As a leftist, I am not happy with the consequences of that “recklessness,” but I suspect that the ruling class was more than pleased with the outcome of the war,

as the new corporate state and the economic expansion of the 1920s might have confirmed.

Williams treats the origins of the Cold War in much the same way—framing it in a conventional narrative of the United States v. the Soviet Union, though of course pointing out, correctly, how the American pursuit of the Open Door made conflict likely if not inevitable. Again, there were alternative narratives, such as contending that the real point of the Cold War was not to contain the USSR—for Stalin was never adventurous to begin with and was basically beaten after the failure of the Berlin blockade [on Stalin, see Geoffrey Robert’s fantastic *Stalin’s Wars*, New Haven, 2008]—but to contain forces of nationalism, and democracy at home, like the Soviet Union was doing in Eastern Europe. Surely, as a victim of McCarthyism himself, Williams understood this alternative, and perhaps it should be more central to the narrative. Once it became clear that “rollback” would not occur and that the resources and markets of the Soviet bloc would stay off limits, Third World nationalism and neutralism and broad democracy at home (what I call in my classes “the Paul Robeson version”) became targets of American power.

I am also more than a bit surprised that Williams made nary a mention of Bretton Woods. More than a globalization of the open door, the Bretton Woods system created a world order based not just on free trade but on a commercial-cum-monetary regime that would regulate all economic and financial policies. That regime far exceeded anything Hay, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, or Hoover could have created.

William Appleman Williams surely had doubts about the values he held. But to have such doubts means that you hold particular ideals about what America should be. It is more than surprising that, given his intellectual capacity, Williams repeatedly called episodes that contravened those values tragic. Tragedies evoke empathy, not just for the victim but often for the perpetrator too. I see little that was tragic in the development of the American empire, from the slaughter of natives, to the arrival of slaves and indentures, to the massacres on the plains, the Civil War, the attacks at Homestead, Ludlow and so many other industrial locales, the battlefields of Europe, the fields of Guatemala, the sands of Iraq. They lack the pathos or redemption to be tragedy, so they become “war stories” which, as Tim O’Brien tells us, hold an “absolute and uncompromising allegiance to

obscenity and evil.”

The “men of property,” as the folk song “The World Turned Upside Down” called them, “sent out the hired men and troopers” to wipe out the claims of the Diggers, Englishmen using the land for sustenance. Not much has changed since the Diggers and Levellers fought the ruling class in 1649 at St. George’s Hill. Perhaps William Appleman Williams knew that but didn’t want to lose the romantic values of his youth, the values that lay behind his service to his country. Even so, the truths he uncovered remain too important to be spoiled by intellectual disputes of this type. As I think of *Tragedy*, fifty years after its publication and twenty-five years after I read it first, I feel the same about it, even if we have a different point of view.

Robert Buzzanco is Professor of History at the University of Houston.

The Influence of William Appleman Williams on a Nonbeliever

Jerald A. Combs

At a recent AHA/Pacific Coast Branch panel on the state of our field, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman put to us the question of whether sweeping interpretations of the history of American foreign relations like Williams’s *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* were polemics that were of less value than books based more closely on archival research. That heretical thought has no doubt occurred to many of us, especially when reading interpretations with which we disagree. At the same time, however, I recall how valuable and exciting my first encounter with Williams’s work was. He raised questions for my own research that I would never even have thought to ask.

When I was researching my dissertation on the Jay Treaty in the mid-1960s, I was moseying through my analysis of Alexander Hamilton’s thought and diplomacy when I came across “The Age of Mercantilism,” an article Williams published in the *William and Mary Quarterly*, and *Contours of American History*, in which he applied the open door imperialist thesis of *Tragedy* to specific aspects of early U.S. history and foreign policy.¹ In those elaborations, Williams challenged the common notion that Hamilton’s *Report on Manufactures* demonstrated his preference for an independent, balanced economy over foreign trade that tied the United States to British manufactures. Williams asserted instead that

Hamilton's opposition to the punitive tariffs Jefferson and Madison wished to impose on Great Britain showed that he favored a permanent alliance with Great Britain, "never pushed manufacturing as an integral part of the economy, and in fact opposed the efforts of others to accelerate its development."² In the end, I concluded that Williams was wrong, that Hamilton had wanted a balanced economy and ultimate independence from any British alliance but had not wanted to risk a trade war with Great Britain or the loss of critical federal income from moderate tariffs on British trade by a premature challenge to Britain's economy and power.

Similarly, Williams challenged my sense of James Madison's foreign policy. I had assumed that Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10, that republicanism could survive in a large area because a multiplicity of interests would balance one another to prevent one interest securing a permanent majority, was aimed at the anti-federalists, who insisted that sovereignty should reside in the states because only small areas could maintain a republican form of government. Williams, on the other hand, saw Federalist No. 10 as an argument for imperialism aimed at soothing American fears that territorial expansion would destroy republicanism. I still concluded that in the context of the debate over the Constitution, Madison's intent was to prove that the United States could govern what it already had rather than what it might acquire in an expansionist crusade. But clearly Williams had a point in that Federalist No. 10 could be used to encourage expansion when the opportunity arose.

My dissertation supervisors, Page Smith and Keith Berwick, who had generously taken over that duty when Bradford Perkins left UCLA for Michigan, advised me to drop the references to Williams because they thought I was setting up a straw man. I am glad that I left them in. Although I did not yet appreciate the significance that the concept of open door imperialism would have in the field of diplomatic history, I never again assessed an issue in the history of American foreign relations without considering the role that U.S. expansionism might have played in it. As time went on, the conflict within the field generated by the revisionist insistence that expansionism was the dominant theme throughout all of America's dealings with the world was the primary inspiration behind my interest in the historiography of

American foreign relations. And in the end, while my own analyses have never gone as far as the revisionists' have, the last edition of my textbook certainly emphasizes the aggressive and expansionist aspects of the history of American foreign relations more than the first edition.

I am not alone among non-revisionists in absorbing and reflecting the influence of Williams and other revisionists. George Herring's new general narrative of the history of American foreign relations, *From Colony to Superpower*, while written from a non-revisionist perspective, certainly emphasizes American aggressiveness and expansionism to a far greater degree than non-revisionist histories written in earlier decades.³ Even a history written from a very conservative viewpoint, Robert Kagan's *Dangerous Nation*, accepts the centrality of American expansionism.⁴

While the emphasis of Williams and the Wisconsin School on aggressive expansionism in American history has had enormous influence, their idea that American expansionism was due almost entirely to economic causes has not fared so well. Their concept of open door imperialism—the idea that U.S. expansionism was the product of the American elites' need to expand their markets in order to stave off demands for economic redistribution from the lower classes—was very close to Lenin's theory of imperialism. Williams accepted that kinship to some extent, but he and the Wisconsin School always said that their ideas owed more to indigenous American sources, especially Charles Beard.⁵ And they had a point. They did not take the next step in the Leninist logic: they never adopted the idea that ending American imperialism required a domestic socialist revolution and the forcible redistribution of resources so that a growing internal economic demand would obviate the need for overseas expansion. They obviously detested the market economy and the aggression, selfishness, and injustice that it bred, but they implied that the necessary changes could come about by peaceful democratic reform. It seemed to me that they regarded the market economy and the resultant imperialism as an intellectual construct that could be changed by persuasion rather than the inevitable outcome of an economic and social class structure that could only be changed by force.

If open door imperialism was an intellectual construct, then it was open to supplementary cultural and ideological components beyond the

economics of class and the market, such as race and gender. Thus, revisionist historians influenced by the cultural and ideological turn in historiography have not rejected Williams and the Wisconsin School but have added cultural influences to the economic ideas of the open door in explaining the history of U.S. foreign relations.⁶ If such revisionism is not now the majority opinion in the field of the history of U.S. foreign relations, it is very close to it. And no one is more responsible for that than William Appleman Williams.

Jerald A. Combs is Professor of History, Emeritus at San Francisco State University.

1. William Appleman Williams, "The Age of Mercantilism: An Interpretation of the American Political Economy, 1763-1828," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, XV (1958): 419-437; Williams, *The Contours of American History* (Cleveland, 1961).
2. Williams, *Contours of American History*, 163.
3. George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (New York, 2008).
4. Robert Kagan, *Dangerous Nation* (New York, 2006).
5. William Appleman Williams, *The Great Evasion: An Essay on the Contemporary Relevance of Karl Marx and on the Wisdom of Admitting the Heretic into the Dialogue about America's Future* (Chicago, 1964).
6. The textbooks of Thomas Paterson are a good example of this fusion.

Williams and the Intellectual Legacies of Tragedy

Christopher Fisher

I came to *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* through a side door, you might say. In the mid-1990s I studied with Lloyd Gardner, a close friend, understudy, and confidante of William Appleman Williams, and that experience gave me a unique window into *Tragedy*. Like his contemporaries from Madison, Lloyd never strayed too far from the original intent of Williamsonian revisionism, uncovering the sources of power in the United States and the contradictions of deploying that power abroad in response to pressures at home. Certain themes bracketed our study of America's global dominance: that economic forces were instrumental in determining America's interests abroad; that U.S. hegemony reflected an enduring vision passed from generation to generation by a ruling elite; that ideologies structured

and sustained American behavior in the international realm; and that the grasp at empire, informal or otherwise, manifested ironic consequences.

Given the obvious and discernible revisionist *weltanschauung*—to quote Williams—of our intellectual community, you may wonder why I came to *Tragedy* through a side door. Although I worked with Lloyd for nearly two years and our friendship predated graduate school, he never suggested I read it. In fact, it was noticeably absent from my graduate training: it wasn't required reading in our courses; we didn't discuss it in debates; there were no colloquiums

on *Tragedy* or Williams or the revisionist debate; it didn't even come up in Lloyd's anecdotal information about Williams, of which he had an abundance. It was as if Lloyd wanted each of us to find our own way to *Tragedy*. I assume reticence was his way of impressing upon us that *Tragedy* and Williams were still relevant for deciphering the trends in U.S. history.

Indeed, if this was the case, Lloyd was right; when I finally had the chance to fully digest *Tragedy* it was a revelatory moment. Subconsciously, I had been moving in its direction throughout my academic career—a predilection that was reflected in my

fascination with the power dynamic in the United States and in protests against unfair tuition and CIA recruitment on college campuses. With a line of inquiry that rested on the interplay between domestic concerns and foreign practices; the significance of ideas, both as matters of interpretive analysis and experiential history; the conflicted nature of principles in the United States due to inconsistencies between the past and present; the belief that markets were the mechanism for expressing American power and an understanding that markets were more than money, commerce, or goods; and the certainty scholars

Congratulations! 2009 SHAFR Award Winners

Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize:

George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford UP)

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize:

Jason Parker, *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962* (Oxford UP)

Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize:

Brian C. Etheridge, "The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War America," *Diplomatic History*, April 2008.

Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize:

Elizabeth Borgwardt, Washington University in St. Louis

Myrna Bernath Fellowship:

Jessica Johnson, Brown University

Michael J. Hogan Fellowship:

Nicholas Molnar, Rutgers University

W. Stull Holt Fellowship:

Christopher Dietrich, University of Texas at Austin

Betty Unterberger Dissertation Prize:

Gregory Domber, George Washington University

SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowships:

Mara Drogan, State University of New York, Albany
Ryan Irwin, Ohio State University

could fit “empire” into their discourse without abdicating their patriotism, *Tragedy* reflected a natural rhythm in my thinking. I came to diplomatic history from the study of race relations and social movements in the United States, and Williams served as a conduit for my interests in those silenced by power and larger forces bending history to their own ends. As I sought my path as a scholar, motivated by the belief that ideas and ideologies mattered in U.S. policies abroad, Williams became a fixed star in my interpretive universe, and tragedy, in the most Burkean sense, was an unshakable complication at every analytical turn.

My experience wasn't unusual. Diplomatic history was changing as well, no doubt in reaction to Williams's passing and years of post-revisionist uproar. Rather than abandon the lessons of *Tragedy*—its activism, economic determinism, structural critique, and literary sense—scholars incorporated them into advances taking place in cultural, intellectual, and social history. The benefit was mutual, but it also kept *Tragedy's* organizing belief—the inherent and irreconcilable conflict between U.S. ideals and its national interest—a useful and relevant part of historical study. The subfield as a whole still shows *Tragedy's* influence, but there are two places where it is particularly acute: in the recent work on the influence of post-World War II development theories, where I cut my professional teeth, and in the surge in scholarship on the United States in the world since the *La Pietra* conference of 1997.

In many ways, the effort to decode America's cold war development policies was conceived in one of *Tragedy's* basic tensions, that “America's humanitarian urge to assist other people is undercut—even subverted—by the way it goes about helping them.”¹ True to Williams, my own work contains ideas that move fluidly across time, place, and context. It takes a long view of U.S. history and is sensitive to how Americans mythologized themes that predated the republic as the justification for projecting their power abroad. The dichotomies of home-abroad, past-present, history-mythology, and national identity-national interest propelled my research. Yet unlike Williams, whose Marxist outlook privileged economics in the interpretative process and made “tragedy” the most viable conclusion, I was bound by no intellectual or discursive shackles. Instead, I placed Marx, Hegel, and Gramsci side by side in my interpretation and found

relativism, if not ambiguity itself, more useful than the zero-sum allusions of “tragedy.” The relativist position is captured appropriately, I think, by Walter McDougall's waggish claim that “the United States has always been good, bad, and ugly—idealistic, hypocritical, and just realistic, often at the same time.”² McDougall's assertion that U.S. history is fraught with doubt and ambiguity, has added meaning because of *Tragedy*.

Far from shutting down analysis because of the absence of moral judgments that assign blame, such indeterminacy has proven useful in my examination of the many sides of U.S. development. Here the open door thesis is very much a factor in America's desire, conscious or not, to create a world order premised upon progress and stability. However, the means of accomplishing this—open access to goods, opportunities, and places—turned the United States, obsessed with its own perfectibility, into a global crusader that casually trampled over others to reach its destiny. These contradictions rest at the center of my early work on modernization and pacification in South Vietnam; they are reflected, for example, in the way steely rationalists considered brutal repression a reasonable precondition for community development and social progress. The backlash created by these contradictions happened simultaneously and on multiple levels: within the command structure in South Vietnam, among pacification program operatives and village leaders in the Vietnamese hinterland, among intellectuals in America's development community, and in how the United States understood modernization as an idea. Whereas the dominant narratives of postwar development rely upon a fixed and immutable grand design, presented almost uniformly as modernization theory, my study suggests ambivalence on both the question of policy direction and the underlying morality.

Although I didn't envision myself shifting the historical paradigm on the order of *Tragedy* in this work, I did see the drama playing out at the end of Johnson's presidency, particularly the uncertainty in the face of a competing narrative of development, as an exposé on the limitations of the historiography. To date, the

As I sought my path as a scholar, motivated by the belief that ideas and ideologies mattered in U.S. policies abroad, Williams became a fixed star in my interpretive universe, and tragedy, in the most Burkean sense, was an unshakable complication at every analytical turn.

literature has focused primarily on modernization theory, a distinct species of development thought, as the archetype of U.S. development programs, because of its direct links to certain branches of the federal

government, private industry, and the nation's top research institutions. And while such scholarship has created a better understanding of where race and modernity intersect, the shared ownership and influence in the social construction of modernity, and the difficulties of converting theory to praxis, it has also mythologized the modernization theory paradigm. Recent scholarship speaks to this tension in the literature and in doing so corroborates my contention that the development scene was much more complex, differentiated, and unsettled than we thought. Again, the critical dialogue generated in the aftermath of *Tragedy* and the 1960s explains this shift in the historiography.

Part of the innovation in recent scholarship has come from uncovering counternarratives to the U.S. model of social advancement and progress and the different ways those approaches construct modernity. David Engerman's *Modernization from the Other Shore* is one illustration of the fluid and variegated character of development ideology. His study explores the curious admiration U.S. theorists and intellectuals had for Soviet-style modernization, especially how that model employed repressive tactics to create a stable environment for experimentation. With this approach, Engerman does more than disabuse us of liberal assumptions about the modernization theory community; he also joins other studies in demystifying those suppositions altogether by contradicting the transmission of American modernity. Rob Kroes and Kristin Hoganson offer similar critiques of the modernization process through their interrogation of how the tools of modernity move from place to place. For Kroes, the symbols of modernity, delivered in American goods, acquired different meaning once in the hands of a foreign other. Such transformation brings the notion of U.S. hegemony into question. Hoganson highlights the unacknowledged truth of America's empire: that U.S. identity is defined by what it consumes from the

broader world. It is an argument that complicates how we perceive the effects of hegemony through where it locates US dependence. These studies suggest that indigenous cultures undergo a rebirth according to their own needs due to western goods, and that foreign symbols of modernity are projected back into the United States. As such, they stand the dominant construction of postwar modernization on its head. When read back to back, this literature provides a dialectic of modernity that runs like an endless loop, connecting all *ad infinitum* and troubling even *Tragedy's* notion of *weltanschauung*.

Despite these differences, and the twists and turns in the historiography, the study of postwar development is a legacy of *Tragedy*. And it is a rich heritage that looks especially bright when considered alongside the newest vogue in the study of American history—the United States in the world approach. Although Thomas Bender makes no mention of Williams or *Tragedy* in his description of its origins, this approach is very much an extension of the debate that began in 1959. Two aims shape the “US in the World” vogue that are tied to the intellectual fallout from *Tragedy*: the attempt to move beyond U.S. exceptionalism by reconnecting American history to world history and the desire to soften, if not erase, the boundary between foreign and domestic by contesting the idea of the nation-state. I don't mean to suggest that the United States in the world approach is synonymous with diplomatic history (though some see it as such), but I do believe it is entering the conversation with the benefit of learning from *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy's* troubled past. And judging by its ambition to uncover and interrogate the structures of power, privilege, and dominance in America, I would say that, like all scholarship that sees history as the basis for social awareness and change, the United States in the world approach is better off for it.

Christopher Fisher is Assistant Professor of History at The College of New Jersey.

Notes:

1. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1988), 15.
2. Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston, 1997), 3.

The Big Shock

Lloyd Gardner

When I entered graduate school in the fall of 1956 I was a confirmed realist in my approach to the history of American foreign policy. George Kennan was for all intents and purposes the best critic of our Wilsonian past and the soundest guide to the future. Graduate seminar with Fred Harvey Harrington was a bit different from what I had expected, but it was easy to adapt to his interest-group approach almost without realizing that it raised some pertinent questions about the adequacy of the realist outlook. When I took my nearly finished master's thesis into Harrington, he looked it over and commented, “Where's the economics?”

I left his office wondering exactly what I needed to do to “find” the economics, because clearly what I had produced in this first draft of a study of FDR and colonialism was not going to cut it. My senior thesis at Ohio Wesleyan had been on Wilson and Mexico. It stressed the folly of trying to personalize relations between nations and pointed out that doing so had only encouraged Wilson's opponents to condemn his policy and urge military intervention. There was no discussion of the Constitution of 1917 and what that portended for American investments because the paper halted with the crisis that might have led to war if the Latin American states had not come to Wilson's rescue and provided a reasonable exit agenda for Huerta. If the paper had gone on to consider the aftermath of the crisis and the Constitution of 1917 it would have been impossible, of course, not to “find” the economics.

But in that spring of 1957 I had to find the economics or Professor Harrington would not think very highly of my research abilities. Going back to my notes I discovered some material about Lend-Lease and American interests in persuading the British to give up imperial preference after the war. It was enough for the master's degree. I had a feeling, nevertheless, that FHH had something a little bit bigger in mind. During that first year I did manage to get the full gist of the “Turner Thesis.” One could hardly be a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin in the twentieth century without learning about the Turner thesis and its critics.

Like many other graduate students of the day, I planned to make the

master's a chapter in my doctoral thesis, although how I would expand it was not yet clear in my mind. Bill Williams came to Madison that fall, and along with Walt LaFaber and Tom McCormick, I was a TA in one of his classes. Bill always broke things down into points I, II, and III, with subpoints A, B, and C (or more) under each major heading. Sometimes the bell rang and he did not finish—actually, more than sometimes. Students came rushing to us in the back of the room to ask what the unfinished point was. We had no idea. What we did know was that what Williams was saying was shocking, in the sense that it jolted us out of assumptions that went unquestioned even when editorials and columnists in papers such as the *New York Times* were questioning specific policies. Williams's ideas were different. He was taking us to a whole new place.

His first book, *American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947*, had already made him something of a notorious figure in academic circles, particularly as it concluded with a very harsh critique of Kennan as the author of the current containment policy. One of the main points of the book, however, was that containment had been an ongoing policy, not simply an invention of the Foreign Service officer serving in Moscow when the Cold War began. And that made his book even more heretical.

Much of what he explored in that class soon appeared in *Tragedy*, but even before its appearance he had already become a well-known speaker at student events on campus. We had, as it were, a ringside seat as Williams worked through his ideas, and we could watch the intellectual process as the book took shape. Other students and history faculty were impressed as well, if not stunned. Harrington, I learned later, had actually urged him not to publish *Tragedy*, not because he disapproved of the way Williams developed the open door theme, but because he worried about such a promising young historian rushing in where angels feared to tread. For his part, Bill always felt that Fred had all the building blocks for the open door interpretation but fought shy of attempting to put them together. He did not criticize him for not doing so, and, while there was always some father-son tension in that relationship, each was always the other's greatest supporter.

Harrington had reason to be concerned about *Tragedy's* reception, as critics—most of them liberals, it seemed—savaged Williams; apparently they feared guilt by

association. An interesting exception was the old New Dealer Adolf Berle, whose review in the *New York Times Book Review* hailed Williams as scholar not afraid to advance a thesis, parts of which he found convincing, if not the whole. Williams was even called at one point to appear before the House Un-American Affairs Committee, although the subpoena was rescinded before his scheduled appearance. The IRS paid him attention whenever things got a little dull, and he could count on the Post Office to open correspondence every now and then, leaving little clues to show they had been there.

At this point it should be obvious that I “found” the economics. With teachers so focused on the part that economics played in American foreign policy I could hardly do otherwise. But it would be a great mistake to conclude that Bill Williams was an economic determinist or an orthodox leftist. Indeed, one of the reasons he eventually left Wisconsin was his dismay at the behavior of the student left. He once wrote in the student newspaper that he wondered what they would do next: swallow goldfish? This reference to the flaming youth of the 1920s did not endear him to many student leaders of the day. He found it quieter on the Oregon coast, where he felt spiritually at home. He always associated the East Coast with New York provincialism. He urged me many times to get away from the baleful influence of the metropolis, and could never understand why I did not flee from the Schlesingeresque atmosphere of Cold War liberalism.

Now that the Cold War fur has stopped flying, the impact of *Tragedy* is evident wherever one looks. It was followed by even bigger enterprises, because, of course, *Tragedy* was essentially an essay meant to provoke discussion, both in its original form and in all of its later incarnations. Succeeding books, *The Contours of American History* and *The Roots of the American Empire*, also upset audiences. The former left liberals aghast, as many of the “heroes” in the book turn out to be conservatives, particularly John Quincy Adams and Herbert Hoover. *Roots* puzzled orthodox leftist thinkers because it turned Lenin upside down to argue that the main proponents of American foreign expansion in the late nineteenth century were not industrialists but farmers, who demanded an expansion of the marketplace and forced their view on political leaders. One wonders if Turner might not have been more

than a little pleased at Williams’s radical reworking of his thesis.

Roots had another distinction. It was Williams’s longest and most fully documented book since *American-Russian* relations. By today’s standards it is a bit unwieldy and is thus not easily adopted for classroom use. Perhaps its size is the reason it is neglected compared to his other books. Some critics complained that it was pedantic—a different take entirely from that of the critics who had complained of *Tragedy* that it was all speculation and was not supported by careful research.

Despite these critics and those who argued that *Tragedy* was destined for oblivion as soon as the Vietnam War and the crazy 1960s came to an end, its impact remains as strong as ever. The open door thesis is firmly implanted in the literature in myriad variations developed by a second and third generation of scholars. And with the end of the Cold War, the arguments *Tragedy* began are considerably less vehement than was originally the case. The questions are different as well. We no longer ask “Who started the Cold War?” as often as we ask “What were the fears and concerns of policymakers?”

Over the years my own work has focused on the three “I’s” at their meeting points: Individuals, Ideas and Institutions. There is a lot of Bill Williams there, but there is also a lot of Fred Harrington and Arno Mayer and a lot of Walt and Tom.

Similarly, it would be hard to trace all the ripples emanating from *Tragedy* since its publication fifty years ago. The latest edition, Norton editors inform me, sells around two thousand copies a year. A new edition is due out in April, with my introduction and an afterword by Andrew Bacevich. If Bill were still here he would raise his eyebrows when I told him that news. Then he would laugh and shrug it off, as he always did when he heard something that touched upon him personally, and turn to the next subject, with its more promising intellectual give-and-take.

Lloyd Gardner is Professor Emeritus of History at Rutgers University.

The Tragedy of William Appleman Williams

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman

William Appleman Williams was easily the most influential scholar of the second half of the twentieth century. His books traveled the world, and his

critique set the parameters of debate for fifty years, both at home and abroad. Williams was the first major historian to describe the United States as an exploitative empire that hid its economic avarice behind a liberal façade—a thesis that has been bolstered and amplified by scholars, pundits, and critics ever since. When I taught at University College Dublin on a Fulbright a few years ago, I found more copies of the *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* on the library shelf than any other monograph in the field. Writing in the shadow of McCarthyism, Williams was both brilliant and brave. He was also tragically wrong.

Williams’s initial popularity sprang from the congruence of his vision with that of the emerging sixties generation. Although he was somewhat older than the radicals who became his students, he shared their shock, anger, and disillusionment that the United States was not an exemplar of the democratic values for which it supposedly stood. It tolerated racial segregation at home and dictatorships abroad. He called the disjuncture between U.S. ideology and actions “tragic” because he accepted America’s “humanitarian impulse” as real, even though he saw it as irremediably compromised by the nation’s baser, acquisitive instincts.

The organizing principle of Williams’s work was the concept of open door empire. Although he offered no economic data to substantiate his claim, he posited that every expression of the desire for global trade was evidence that American business had sought and achieved worldwide dominance, to the detriment of others. Other countries were encouraged to develop economically but were then arrested at “a point favorable to American interests.”¹ Again and again in his seminal work, Williams cited businessmen and government officials who proclaimed, like Herbert Hoover, that America must ensure domestic prosperity by finding “a profitable market for our surpluses.”² This vaunted expansion into overseas markets was, by definition, a form of imperialism to Williams. (Today we call it globalization.) And any government policy that reduced trade barriers or impediments to the free-flow of foreign investment betokened exploitation.

Williams particularly targeted the Open Door Notes issued by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 and 1900 as prima facie evidence of economic expansionism. Hay’s notes endorsed two basic principles. The first

principle, previously championed by Britain, was free trade: all foreign merchants had rights equal to *one another* in trade with China (none being able to create a monopoly or closed trading sphere). The second principle was respect for China's territorial sovereignty and opposition to its being colonized by foreign governments. In effect, Hay tried to extend to Asia the non-colonization principle first articulated with regard to Latin America by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

But Williams believed that the Open Door Notes had an effect that was the polar opposite of what they implied on paper and were thus evidence for America's underlying duplicity. Free trade between two countries inherently diminished the sovereignty of whichever was less industrially developed, making it into a virtual colony. "Leaving aside the question-begging approach which evades the issue by defining empire solely and narrowly in terms of seventeenth- or nineteenth-century colonialism," Williams wrote, "when an industrial nation plays . . . a controlling and one-sided role in the development of a weaker economy, then the policy of the more powerful country can with accuracy and candor only be described as imperial."³

Williams's bold but unsubstantiated assertion assumed that any relationship that is unequal is also exploitative. However, the historical experience of both the United States and China shows that this assumption is completely false. In the nineteenth century, the United States was a developing country that depended heavily on foreign investors to underwrite its development and buy its goods. As Walter Russell Mead shows in *Providential Nation*, Americans felt their subservience to outsiders keenly: they resented the power of foreign bankers whose money dug canals and built railroads and the foreign markets upon which farmers depended at their peril for a livelihood. In the late nineteenth century, twelve states restricted foreign ownership of land, and in 1884 *Banker's Magazine* of New York foretold a day "when the United States shall cease to be an exploiting ground for European bankers and money lenders."⁴ That day was a long

time coming. When Europe went to war in 1914, the American stock exchange closed for eight months, like a shadow puppet that the light of the world economy had ceased to illuminate.

Yet we do not define the nineteenth century United States as a colony of Britain, which for more than a hundred years was the dominant partner in their economic relationship. The United States, like much of Europe, benefited from the quietude of the Pax Britannica, but it was not part of the British Empire.

China, similarly, was not a part of any twentieth century American empire. In per capita income, it remains one of the world's poorer countries, but its economy has grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades—in the absence of any multinational land war between industrialized states since 1945 (the current pax). This occurred largely

One of the many problems with Williams's model of imperialism is that it requires only that a scholar prove significant disparity between two countries, and resentment of the stronger by the weaker, to show that one is abusively colonizing the other.

because the communist government of China reversed its earlier isolationism and reopened the door to trade as the most expedient route to prosperity. In 1978, Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping opened four special economic zones where foreign goods and investment were made welcome and thus set the stage for a boom that transformed the country in three decades. Deng Xiaoping resurrected what he called the open door policy not because any other nation forced him to accept what Williams unfaillingly called "the American system," but because he saw the spectacular economic progress of the other Asian tigers.⁵ In fact, China's experience showed that a country could benefit from freer trade from a position of relative weakness, not just strength.

One of the many problems with Williams's model of imperialism is that it requires only that a scholar prove significant disparity between two countries, and resentment of the stronger by the weaker, to show that one is abusively colonizing the other. Yet by these criteria, we would have to call even the nineteenth-century United States a colony of Britain, and today's communist China a colony of the United States, even though such definitions flout common sense.

Williams further compounded his error by failing to look at exactly how investment operates on the ground. Michael Hunt, for example, who closely examined the open door

policy, found that far from being captive to American capitalists, Chinese consumers exerted a lot of control. Most American businessmen passed up open door opportunities because prospects for investment at home were so good and the opportunities in China were so poor, and the few who did invest found that to succeed they had to solicit Chinese opinion, use Chinese merchants, cater to Chinese tastes, and play by Chinese rules.⁶

I found similar evidence a number of years ago when studying American investments in Brazil, another lesser-developed country where Williams's thesis led me to expect pushy businessmen itching to promote America's "overseas economic expansion." Coincidentally, Williams cited by name the two businessmen who became the focus of my study: Nelson Rockefeller and Henry Kaiser. In 1959 Williams noted that the history of open door empire provided "illuminating perspectives" on then-current newspaper stories about the activities of the Rockefeller and Kaiser corporations.⁷

But my research showed their activities to be the exact opposite of what Williams's thesis predicted. The story was much more about "pull" than "push." The Brazilians felt they had to "knock on this door until it opens," soliciting U.S. loans and investment that could hardly flow south fast enough to meet local hopes and needs.⁸ They passed laws that defined the terms under which outsiders could participate in the Brazilian marketplace and at the same time assiduously wooed foreign involvement. American corporations, I found, were sometimes far more solicitous of local sensitivities and concerns than the U.S. government. Brazil's story made me wonder: if the very examples that Williams plucked out of the air to prove his point were in fact quite inapt, what did that say about the rest of his evidence?

When I first read William Appleman Williams as an undergraduate in the 1970s, I resided in a radical feminist collective founded upon socialist principles of equal income and shared work, and I was subsequently fortunate to live there for more than twenty years. His book was inspiring and reassuring since it showed that even within academia there were individuals willing to challenge received wisdom and speak the truth about America's oppressive, hypocritical relationship to the Third World. I also found it a bit tame, however, since Williams stopped short of a Marxist analysis of capitalism, saying that Americans "thought" they needed to expand

economically, not that the capitalist system *required* such expansion, as Lenin argued.⁹

Today, Williams still seems tame, but for a different reason: his thesis has become received wisdom. As such, it should be challenged. In the years following the 1959 publication of *Tragedy*, numerous historians elaborated upon Williams's thesis, to the point where it has become more controversial (and professionally riskier) to praise America than to disparage it. The evidence for good works is often held to a higher standard than allegations of wrongdoing, and even then such evidence is sometimes received as the exception that proves the rule. ("I must admit I'm disappointed," a colleague once commented when I told him I had found that the Rockefeller and Kaiser enterprises, despite mixed results, overall proved very useful to Brazilian development).¹⁰

But these are mere scholarly squabbles. Much more important is that bastardized versions of Williams's sweeping generalizations have burrowed deep into the popular psyche. It is essential that we recognize historical mistakes, but students are sometimes surprised to discover that not all (or even most) of what goes wrong can be laid at America's doorstep. (Unless one believes that the United States somehow "runs" the 192 countries of the world, how could it be?) These students are not the complacent true believers in American righteousness whom Williams sought to awaken in the 1950s, but rather a generation raised on movies in which CIA officials have replaced Nazis and black-hat gunslings as the prototypical bad guys.

Williams' Manichean mythology does not affect only American students. As Mark Bowden's book on the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis showed, the chief interrogator of the imprisoned diplomats studied at U.C. Berkeley, where he first encountered the homegrown rhetoric that denounced the United States as racist, tyrannical, and "world-devouring."¹¹ Historical arguments meant to rouse social consciousness at home can have dire consequences abroad. Businessmen, medical personnel, soldiers, diplomats, tourists, and journalists have been imprisoned, held hostage, tortured, shot, and even beheaded because irate foreign citizens believed these Americans were part of an imperialist vanguard. The work of the ivory tower can have tragic repercussions in the street.

In the 1970s, psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky

proved that people at all educational levels tend to remember dramatic information about danger and risk much better than mundane information. Most people then over-rely upon this information regardless of whether it is representative of reality.¹² Sensational, thinly documented accusations of American imperialism are thus likely to be remembered and relied upon. When a word is both memorable and inaccurate, it is doubly dangerous.

Williams made an effort to balance his denunciations of American foreign policy with the recognition that some of its actions, particularly the Marshall Plan and other foreign aid efforts, "literally made the difference between life and death to hundreds of thousands of people throughout the world."¹³ But the positive achievements of U.S. foreign policy are not what Williams emphasized, and these are not the words for which he is remembered. Like much of the literature of the late 1950 and the 1960s, *Tragedy* crystallized the growing sentiment that, as John F. Kennedy said, "we can do better." It spurred Americans to think more deeply and critically about their effect upon the world. But Williams's book is as useful a barometer of present reality as *The Feminine Mystique* or the *Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test*. Its day has come and gone.

Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman is the Dwight E. Stanford Chair in U.S. Foreign Relations at San Diego State University.

Notes:

1. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1962), 61.
2. Williams, 123.
3. Williams, 47, 60.
4. Quoted in Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (London, 2002), 16.
5. "Open Door Policy," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/key_people_events/html/8.stm, accessed 24 January 2009.
6. Michael Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914* (New York, 1983), 284-285. I found evidence of a similar nature in my earlier research on U.S. businesses in Latin America. See Elizabeth A. Cobbs, "U.S. Business: Self-Interest and Neutrality," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America* (Baltimore, 1991).
7. Williams, 60.
8. Elizabeth A. Cobbs, *The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil* (New Haven, 1992), 65.

9. Williams, 21.

10. Victoria DeGrazia's recent research on the activities of the Rockefeller-owned International Basic Economy Corporation in Italy shows similarly that the Rockefeller affiliate there decreased food costs for all Italians and eventually became Italian-owned. DeGrazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA, 2005), 376-415.

11. Mark Bowden, *Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America's War with Islam* (New York, 2006), 69, 159-160, 173, 183.

12. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," *Science* 185, no. 4157: 1127. The authors note, rather wryly, that "it is a common experience that the subjective probability of traffic accidents rises temporarily when one sees a car overturned by the side of the road."

13. Williams, 292.

Tragedy, Revisited . . . Again

Ryan Irwin

Just as there can be no explanation in history without a story, so too there can be no story without a plot by which to make of it a story of a particular kind.

—Hayden White¹

As a historian, Williams wished for an America whose ideals, as he understood them, were never compromised by the behavior of the leadership. He never seems to have sensed that if he were cogent in his exploration of the motivating forces in the history of the republic, there was something foolish or perverse in his exhortations for Americans to take a different path.

—Bruce Kuklick²

Being asked to say something original about an academic icon is never easy, especially when you're the scholarly equivalent of a peon. To be honest, I have a hard time even imagining what a conversation between William Appleman Williams and me would look like. I would probably begin with some painfully awkward self-introduction, like "Hello, Professor Williams, my name is Ryan. I'm, umm, I'm an historian too." It would be one of those halting exchanges that demand long, embarrassing pauses, and a follow-up like "Can I call you Bill?" In all candor, I have no idea what Professor Williams was like in real life, but I can visualize only one response. He would look at me dead in the eyes with a pipe in his teeth or a cigarette dangling from his lips—I don't know if he actually smoked,

but he would do this for several, very dramatic moments—before responding finally, “No, no you may not. And Ryan . . . You’re not as good as you think you are.”

Perhaps my introduction would get better with practice, but I’d like to think the response would remain the same. The words just jump out whenever I hear his name. William Appleman Williams—this towering, semi-mythical intellectual with a singular message: “America, you may think that you’re a big deal, that you’re a beneficent and noble superpower, but in real life, the place where economics matter and politics are nasty, your leaders are just like everybody else—and by everybody else I’m talking about Europe.” Admittedly, the thesis doesn’t pack as much raw emotional power as it probably did in the early sixties, but it still works. It taps into some underlying, semi-universal truth about life—the idea that the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves just aren’t true. And what makes Williams’s version of this argument all the more powerful, in my opinion, is that he then couples it with a rejoinder that suggests, in essence, that if we wanted to, if we just tried hard enough, we could in fact be our imagined versions of ourselves. The only thing stopping us is the ridiculous, unfounded notion that market expansion will solve all our problems. It’s just plain tragic.

This essay is supposed to provide a “graduate student perspective” on *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, celebrating the book’s fiftieth anniversary while commenting on its relevance to the contemporary field. In other words, I should try to say something that can pass for semi-intelligent, generationally aware commentary on this very famous thesis. I will take two swings and pass the bat feebly to my neighbor. First, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* is unusual by today’s standards. The book reads more like a philosophical statement on America than a traditional monograph of U.S. foreign relations history. On the one hand, it is confident in a way that historians aren’t really allowed to be anymore. Just look at the chapter titles: “Imperial Anticolonialism,” “The Imperialism of Idealism” and “The Impotence of Nuclear Supremacy.” I won’t throw anyone in particular under the bus here, but I will say that I certainly don’t have that type of rhetorical creativity. Then there is the prose. “If it could be done, [Wilson] was confident that American economic power could take care of the United States—and the world” (91). If I tried to say something

so unequivocal in a seminar paper today I would probably get a big fat question mark in the margins, followed by an exclamation like “evidence!” or “historiography!”

The profession has changed. People make this observation all the time, but Williams was a Richard Hofstadter-type historian; he talked not just to the historical profession but to America as a whole. His ideas were big and clean and provocative, and they were meant both to persuade us to change our views about our past and adjust our attitudes about our present. They hearken, ultimately, back to a time when historians could call their country “her” and have their peers—who happened to all be white Anglo-Saxon Protestant men—say something other than “Man, that guy’s a misogynistic meta-jerk.”

On the other hand—or maybe on the flip side of the same hand—it’s hard to miss the fact that *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* has no footnotes. It is probably not a mistake that people—and here I am admittedly thinking of myself—typically reference Walter LaFeber, Lloyd Gardner, and Thomas McCormick when they want to discuss revisionism as a school of thought. Would William Appleman Williams be William Appleman Williams without the scholars who came after him (and provided the evidence-based case studies that gave his argument such lasting interpretive power)? I have no idea, but I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that much of the work since *Tragedy*—or at least during that period between the sixties and early nineties—was a fight over Williams’s footnotes. And the opposition admittedly landed some solid punches. For instance, can you really put *Tragedy* next to Melvyn Leffler’s *A Preponderance of Power* and walk away thinking that Williams nailed the “origins” debate? Many of the arguments of the post-*Tragedy* era—call them post-revisionist or liberal realist or neo-strategicalist or whatever you want—resound because they capture something about the archival materials historians find when they visit College Park and other government archives. Even if we are ultimately talking about interpretive apples and

oranges—you look at government elites, I look at Mexican farmers—historiography is a fruit basket. The oranges don’t technically have more intrinsic value than the apples.

Anyway, that’s swing numero uno. My second argument, I suppose, takes this point into the deep end of the pool. Stated plainly, and a little bit tentatively, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* is wrong. I would love to pitch this as some sort of generationally hip post-9/11 statement, but when I explained my thinking

to my friends they all said I was wrong. So maybe I’ll step back from the statement a little (wrong, after all, turns out to be the rhetorical equivalent of a slap in the face), and say instead that if you take sociologist Karl Mannheim even a little bit seriously—accepting his notion that modern societies can be ideologically grouped in terms of anarchism, conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism—then Williams’s work fits too cleanly into one category. He’s a semi-romantic radical’s radical (using Mannheim’s epistemological definitions, of course). Therefore, if you argue that Williams’s diagnosis was an accurate reflection of the historical record, that America was, in fact, driven by economic impulses that prevented it from being “good,” then you have essentially elevated one particular ideological roadmap to an objective reality. Use whatever terminology you prefer—lumping, directional theorizing, mechanical plotting, synthetic thinking, or just plain old-fashioned storytelling—but, like the work of most of the great philosopher-historians, Williams’s analysis doesn’t jibe well with the teachings of our postmodern era. I don’t mean to deny the argumentative beauty of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* or conflate a term like “wrong” with “bad.” But the book has ideological blinders. It wants to change the world—it wants a better America.

So what’s wrong with that? Depending on your age and/or political proclivities, nothing and everything, I suppose. What would happen if the United States did isolate itself from the world and repent for the sins of the open door philosophy? Would the world be a

William Appleman Williams—this towering, semi-mythical intellectual with a singular message: “America, you may think that you’re a big deal, that you’re a beneficent and noble superpower, but in real life, the place where economics matter and politics are nasty, your leaders are just like everybody else—and by everybody else I’m talking about Europe.”

better place? Would America be a better place? I imagine half of us would say “Heck, yeah!” and the other half “Hell no!” and the point here isn’t so much that there is a right or wrong answer but that the answer itself says as much about you and me—where we grew up, what we believe, and how we think about our country—as it does America. You could ground this statement in all sorts of different scholarships, but it will always come back to the same point. The world is interconnected in strange, multi-directional, and unexpected ways, with nation-states functioning as merely one entity in a sea of overlapping, conflicting interests, and elite behavior, along with the imperatives that shape that behavior, looks a lot different when you are in the White House than when you are on the sidelines of a pleasant academic town like Madison, Wisconsin. It would be so easy, for instance, if we could say, with a straight face, that the current global financial meltdown is the result of the dynamics unveiled in Williams’s *Tragedy*. But on some level we all know better. I sat through a lecture recently where the speaker—Paul Solman from PBS’s “NewsHour”—started asking the audience to recall their mindsets as their home values skyrocketed in the early 2000s, and this little old lady, an archetypal grandmother, raised her hand right at the most dramatic moment of the discussion and stated with the matter-of-fact sincerity that stays with you late at night, “I wanted more.” My point is this: there are no grandmothers in Williams’s America. Only tragic leaders who make tragic decisions.

Which takes this story back to my initial, imagined exchange with Professor Williams. For I suppose if I were a bolder version of myself—someone more ensconced in the particularities of my millennial generation—the conversation wouldn’t end with me sulking over my own inadequacies. I would wait, like some academic version of John Cusack’s character in the movie *High Fidelity*, until my version of Professor Williams turned to walk away, and I would mutter just loud enough for him to actually hear me and with that Jon Stewartesque intonation that manages to be ironical, self-deprecating, and self-aware all at the same time, “Well, Professor, maybe you’re right, but you’re not as good as you think you are either. None of us are.” And I’ll mean it, not in a snarky, mean-spirited sort of way but in the philosophically honest way. Because all tragedies, ultimately, lie in the eye

of the beholder. Then I suppose I’d snap back to reality. Because the next part—where I would run as fast as I could out of the room, watching my tenureless career crash down on my heels—wouldn’t be pretty.

Ryan Irwin is a Ph.D. candidate at Ohio State University. He is currently a pre-doctoral fellow at Yale University.

Notes:

1. Bruce Kuklick, “William Appleman Williams and His Interpreters,” *Diplomatic History* 21 (4): 666.
2. I say this, of course, knowing full well that William Appleman Williams was responsible for the authorship of more than just *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* and that many of these other works had copious footnotes and abundant archival evidence. Think of this observation as more a metaphorical rumination than a literal statement.

The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Then and Now

Walter LaFeber

Carl Becker’s declaration that it is the responsibility of the historian “to think otherwise” anticipated the debate, indeed the furor, detonated by Williams Appleman Williams in 1959 and still exploding today. When Williams published *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* 50 years ago, the intellectual consensus was clustered around “the vital center,” as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. had defined (and embodied) it. The supposed right, whether Eisenhower conservatives or McCarthyite witch-hunters, was declining, while left-of-center critiques were beginning to emerge in scholarship exemplified by the works of C. Wright Mills. Williams’s book galvanized and shaped those critiques as the Vietnam War era took hold.

Tragedy provided that most important ingredient for any understanding of and possible prescription for the foreign policy tragedies that shaped the generation and more after the book’s publication. Unlike many other intellectuals and politicians of the time, Williams provided this understanding not by hotly favoring, then—when finally comprehending

the war’s full meaning for Americans as well as Vietnamese—turning coldly against the conflict. Nor was he searching for any vital center when in later editions he dissected the American involvement with the Vietnam struggle and the 1959 Cuban Revolution.

These two U.S. defeats, and the American response to them, began a long series of setbacks that marked the beginning of the end of Henry Luce’s short-lived American Century: Chile, Iran, the Central American revolutions and their extended aftereffects, Somalia, Haiti, the failure of Latin American democratic experiments, Iraq, Central Asia, Georgia, the Ukraine, and a U.S.-shaped and dominated international economy whose downturn in 2009 was compared to that of the 1929 crash in both the global extent of the devastation and the effects on Americans themselves. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had marked a high point of U.S. policy. But it was a high point that soon turned into something quite different than the victors had initially assumed, just as the supposed “end of history” in 1989 turned into disasters which were in reality deeply rooted in a history that inexorably continued to work its way through the final stages of the so-called American Century.

Tragedy spoke to these dilemmas because its approach diametrically opposed the believers in the “end of history” or Charles Krauthammer’s unipolar world model. For Williams, the tragedy had deep roots in a history that had never ended because Americans refused to examine critically the major historical assumptions of their foreign policies. To carry out that examination, they first needed to know their own history and how to critique it. In the

1950s, as in 2001-2004, most Americans, especially newspaper and academic pundits, proved to be singularly unequipped to carry out such criticism. Williams helped prepare others in the generations of the 1960s, 1970s, and beyond to do so.

For Williams, the tragedy had deep roots in a history that had never ended because Americans refused to examine critically the major historical assumptions of their foreign policies. To carry out that examination, they first needed to know their own history and how to critique it.

The tragedy, he argued, had begun in the 1890s, if not before. (In later work, such as *The Contours of American History*, Williams located origins of the tragedy several centuries earlier.) Directly

challenging Samuel Flagg Bemis's popular thesis that the American imperialism of the 1898 to 1913 era was an "aberration" in the nation's expansionism, Williams demonstrated that the era was instead a seedbed from which emerged the full-blown policies of Woodrow Wilson and Cold War officials.

Tragedy thus radically turned the prism through which twentieth-century U.S. power was viewed by demonstrating that American entry into the 1898 war was caused not by yellow journalism, or some deluded public opinion peculiar to the era, but by top officials, skillfully led by President William McKinley, whose foreign policies were part of an ongoing historical continuum; that the pro-revolutionary position of 1776 for which Americans long after applauded themselves had turned by 1898 into a direct attack on Cuban revolutionaries and thus set the precedent for the anti-revolutionary policies that propelled U.S. policies through the next century; and that these driving forces behind Washington's policies could be identified by an open door policy rubric that indeed opened the possibility of justifying nothing less than global expansionism of American-style capitalism and democracy (or self-determination, as it was often termed in *Tragedy*). Such justification continued even if, as frequently occurred, it became necessary to use military force to advance the open door doctrine that was not supposed to require force—indeed, Secretaries of State John Hay and Henry Stimson, among others, argued that the doctrine should obviate the need for military force.

Williams's use of post-1890s history prepared us to understand globalization, that post-1960s updating of the open door policy which was defined and led by the United States. Frederick Jackson Turner's highly influential frontier thesis of 1893 provided the worldview that was pivotal to *Tragedy's* argument in this regard. Globalization resembled Turner's frontier in that it became both an opportunity and an escape—an opportunity for fresh, cheaper land or labor and an escape from market gluts and labor/wage pressures. Just as Washington officials had trouble, even wars, with Native Americans, Mexicans, and Chinese within the framework of Turner's frontier of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they encountered similar problems with, among others, Chinese, Indians, and Southeast Asians a century later, although the

economic power relationship had become quite different.

Williams's open door idea, resembling the globalization process, linked continents. *Tragedy* was one of the earliest accounts that understood that the United States could undertake its first major military intervention in Asia (landing U.S. troops in China in 1900), because McKinley had earlier used events on the other side of the world in Cuba to rationalize and make possible this historic intervention. These and other policies justified by the open door doctrine, Williams believed, had indeed been expressly—and quite mistakenly—conceived in order to win commercial prizes without having to fight wars. Such a policy, again resembling globalization, aimed in *Tragedy's* view to rework the political economics of the poorer third-world nations into policies that fit the worldview of Americans.

Some leading neoconservatives in the post-9/11 era had read Williams. They believed that the central problem in U.S. foreign policy was not open door/globalization tactics; these had simply become internalized in an American consensus which either understood little history or believed it could escape from—or, better yet, reshape—its own history. By definition, this consensus did not lack journalists or historians who happily reshaped the history to justify the Bush policies of 2003, just as many historians of the so-called age of consensus in the 1950s wrote history to justify Eisenhower-Dulles-Kennedy policies. The problem, as the neoconservatives saw it in 2001 and after, was that Americans did not sufficiently understand that military commitments (often unilateral U.S. military commitments) were necessary to carry out the consensus's objectives because there were communities—whether for economic, religious, or other historical reasons—that bitterly opposed U.S.-style globalization and hegemony. By examining Washington's interventions in Latin America from the 1890s to the 1930s on behalf of a Monroe Doctrine that had shifted with rapidly growing American commercial and financial exports from an anti-intervention policy in 1823 to an interventionist tool by 1905, and especially by noting in detail how Woodrow Wilson became the most important formulator and advocate of a refined open door policy that became the American version of informal empire, Williams drew up essential historical background for understanding the opposition to U.S.-style globalization. When in the first decades of the

twentieth century, armed opposition, even revolution, erupted in Mexico, Russia, and China to oppose both the existing order and the American economic and military quest for that stable, informal empire, Wilson and many of his successors followed McKinley's example in 1898-1900 of responding with even greater military force. Neoconservatives read the history, but they never understood the *Tragedy*.

Williams's use of global open door economic expansion destroyed the long-held consensus, summarized neatly in leading classroom texts, that the 1920s were instructive primarily because the decade illustrated the many dead ends of "isolationism." His analysis of America's global economic involvement, and the accompanying political challenges, made it impossible for any serious observer to identify such policy as isolationist. In reframing the years during and after World War I, *Tragedy* raised fundamental questions about the contradictions in American economic expansion that led to the post-1929 crisis, a crisis that forced Herbert Hoover, Stimson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt to come to terms with a conclusion that later U.S. observers, including the neoconservatives, gladly embraced: open door globalization can lead to the necessity of protecting it with a globalized military force. Williams's fresh approach to the 1920s was followed, and sometimes challenged, in the 1980s by a group of historians that included Frank Costigliola, Melvyn Leffler, Joan Hoff, and Michael Hogan. They further solidified our understanding of a key decade that now linked, not temporarily severed, fundamental policies running from McKinley and Wilson to the Cold War—and beyond.

Summarizing in *Tragedy* how this historical legacy played out in the 1940s and 1950s, Williams eerily anticipated post-1989 U.S. policies and problems: "From the very beginning . . . many American leaders stressed the desirability and possibility of making the countries of eastern Europe 'independent of Soviet control'. . . . Hardly any American leader failed to contribute his insights to the 'cheerful discussion of how America ought, and ought not, to try to remake Russia'. . . . All agreed on the morality and practicality of the objective."

The Tragedy of American Diplomacy recast the writing of post-1890s U.S. foreign policy history. It did so because the book defined and issued warnings about the central ideas, the unexamined, parochial assumptions,

that haunted and undermined American diplomacy not only between the 1890s and the 1960s, but long after Williams published his own final edition of the book in 1972.

Walter LaFeber is the Andrew and James Tisch University Professor Emeritus at Cornell University, and, when in graduate school at the University of Wisconsin, was a teaching assistant in William Appleman Williams's U.S. foreign policy lecture course.

Fifty Years On: A Paradigm Shift?

Thomas McCormick

Three years after William A. Williams published *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Thomas Kuhn's classic study, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, introduced the term "paradigm shift," a three-stage process by which conventional wisdom is altered and replaced. First, individual scholars identify so many errors or anomalies in orthodox analysis that the exceptions no longer prove the rule. Second, the ensuing crisis provokes an outpouring of new interpretations that engage in intellectual warfare, battling with staunch defenders of the old order. Third, after a protracted period characterized by back-and-forth shifts in the balance of power, a consensus on a new explanatory model solidifies. *Voilà!* A paradigm shift! While truly applicable only to the natural sciences, Kuhn's three-stage process is, in a rough-hewn way, a fair description of Williams's impact on the profession: 1) exposed anomalies and exceptions; 2) presented an alternative overview; and 3) engaged in a long struggle to establish a new paradigm—one that was to enjoy initial gains, later losses and now a renewed chance at paradigmatic dominance.

Stage One: During the seven-year run-up to *Tragedy's* appearance in 1959, Williams had established himself as the *enfant terrible* of the profession-- "a kind of Socrates as socialist who habitually got up on the wrong side of the bed." He had already published his dissertation on Russian-American relations, followed by twenty-four articles and a half-dozen book review essays. Some were in radical publications like *The Nation*, *Science and Society* and *Monthly Review*; others were in peer-reviewed journals like the *American Historical Review*, the *Pacific Historical Review*, the *New England Quarterly* and the *William and Mary Quarterly*. In these articles he highlighted the

anti-revolutionary imperialism at the core of Wilsonian internationalism; stood conventional treatment on its head with "The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s"; presaged his later work on liberal corporatism by stressing the continuities between Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt; challenged the usefulness of the idealism-realism typology in attacks on the "Mr. X" article" (which he dubbed "The Sophistry of Super-Realism"); paid his intellectual debts to Charles A. Beard, whom he characterized affectionately as a "Tory-Radical"; and offered a preview of his open door paradigm in "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy." Almost every piece was provocative or even combative, and often butted heads with heavyweights like Arthur S. Schlesinger, Jr., and George F. Kennan.

Stage Two: Williams articulated a full-blown alternative paradigm in *Tragedy* in 1959 and in *The Contours of American History* two years later. Its main thesis bears repeating-- that American leaders had always viewed expanding (and thus diffusing) political space as the best way to preserve democracy; had looked at expanding economic space as the best way to grow and develop a sustainable economy; and had seen expanding geographic space as the best way to blunt internal conflicts like sectionalism. In that last sense, expansion and territorial acquisition had always been a way to "export the social question." In the late nineteenth century, however, radical circumstances changed the process of expansion. First, the nature of the social question itself mutated with the emergence of a new, industrial America that fueled agrarian and working-class upheaval. Second, America's closing frontier could no longer serve its historic purpose of providing *lebensraum* for democracy, free enterprise and nationalism. As a consequence, expansion and (if need be) overseas empire became a logical means of providing a new frontier to meet those needs—to sustain American democracy by

Central to this open door paradigm was the notion that continuity and consensus in American foreign policy were, over time, more important and more revealing than oscillating shifts in opinion and tactics. Williams challenged the field's tendency to organize its explanatory typologies around polar-opposite dyads, engaged in an endless, pendulum-shifting struggle to shape the character of U.S. foreign policy: isolationism and internationalism, unilateralism and multilateralism, realism and idealism, dogmatism and pragmatism, Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism.

universalizing it and making the world safe for it; to provide the markets and profits for American surplus capital and goods and thus prevent free market capitalism from devolving into more statist or even socialist forms; and to provide the sense of national pride and power that would subsume domestic differences of class and region. For Williams, expansionism often became synonymous with empire. While the old paradigm defined empire narrowly as formal colonialism, Williams broadened it in his notion of

open door imperialism--what British scholars called "the imperialism of free trade" or "imperialism on the cheap." Limited and short-lived by orthodox standards, America's empire was large and long-lived by Williams's since it also included an informal empire of economic dominion (e.g., pre-revolutionary Mexico) and a semiformal empire of military-financial protectorates (e.g., Cuba under the Platt Amendment). Informal empire (the open door) was always the preferred model, but more formal means of control would be used when circumstances dictated.

Also central to this open door paradigm was the notion that continuity and consensus in American foreign policy were, over time, more important and more revealing than oscillating shifts in opinion and tactics. Williams challenged the field's tendency to organize its explanatory typologies around polar-opposite dyads, engaged in an endless, pendulum-shifting struggle to shape the character of U.S. foreign policy: isolationism and internationalism, unilateralism and multilateralism, realism and idealism, dogmatism and pragmatism, Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism. He saw these concepts as too vague and vacuous to have any real utility for sophisticated analysis; instead, they were merely rhetorical pegs, many political science imports, on which to hang our stories. They over-emphasized shifts in tactics while fudging the continuity of strategy and ends. Moreover, they exaggerated the differences

generated by changes in presidential personalities and political parties.

And finally, the open door thesis stopped well short of economic determinism. While Williams saw human thought as largely the result of its social and economic context, he believed that the consequent worldviews (*Weltanschauungs*) could be transcended by reason and free will and altered by rational dialogue, by dint of ideas rubbing up against contrary ideas. While empire might have been “a way of life” for Americans, they could be persuaded to make a quite different choice; and the essence of America’s “tragedy” was that they had not done so

Stage Three, a protracted period of competing paradigms, has waxed and waned for the half century since *Tragedy’s* publication. It remains to be seen if an end game is at hand. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Williams paradigm was an idea before its time. To be sure, *Tragedy* was a cult book for antiwar protestors in the Vietnam War era; many of Williams’s students enjoyed academic success; and the Wisconsin School of Diplomatic History was a frequent focus of professional discourse. And

even as late as 1980, Williams himself acquired a measure of legitimacy with his election as president of the OAH. Well before then, however, a concerted, critical reaction had commenced. While a few polemical critics questioned Williams’s accuracy, if not his honesty, the more substantive, on both the right and the left, offered serious, intellectual challenges. On one hand, the Thermidorian reaction reaffirmed the validity of the orthodox paradigm with great vigor and success. To be sure, it did re-brand itself (e.g., post-revisionism) and it did make economic factors part of its narrative, though a rather perfunctory, marginalized part. At heart, however, it was a reworking of an older paradigm. On the other hand, Williams’s standing may have suffered less from orthodox counterattack than it did from relative neglect in the post-Vietnam decades by the academic left. That distancing reflected two related concerns, both reflecting the left’s drift into identity politics and its attraction to the new social and

cultural histories. First, Williams’s work appeared to lack a proper radical emphasis on class and class consciousness or a sufficient acknowledgement of agency by non-elites both in America and in the Third World. Second, like the whole field of diplomatic history, it seemed top-down, elitist history of white men with power, making its relevance ideologically suspect.

If Williams’s paradigm of open door imperialism and long-term continuity was ahead of its time in the 1960s, there are some reasons to suspect that its time is now at hand. First, the paradigm has addressed some of its own shortcomings. It has been leavened and deepened by cultural and social historians who, in making their own research focus far more international in scope, have often discovered compatibility

Tragedy certainly has the power to sweep up the reader in a powerful tide of indignation over the mistakes that were made in American foreign policy since the 1890s. But, as I read it, I was also swept up in a fit of methodological and linguistic indignation because Williams tells us that mistakes were made, but he doesn’t really tell us who made them or what, if any, steps an individual reader might take toward correcting them.

between their work and Williams’s constructs. Likewise, its partial integration with world systems theory has tended to broaden its American-centered focus to encompass a wider and more comparative range. It has taken some of the edge off the sense of American

exceptionalism; it has refined the use of the term “empire” by distinguishing between it and hegemony; and it has augmented the stress on leadership worldviews with more attention to systems and structures.

Second, orthodoxy has lost much of its own coherence by being forced to concede too much rhetorical real estate to the Williams paradigm. For example, it has accepted “empire” as a legitimate description of U.S. foreign policy—moreover, an empire by unilateral choice rather than “by invitation.” Similarly, it has acknowledged considerable continuity and consensus in that policy—coupling even the likes of John Quincy Adams and George W. Bush. To be sure, the concessions are only skin-deep! The structural imperatives of empire that flow from the U.S. political economy are still not appreciated and thus grossly understudied—even as the global financial architecture reels in disarray. And discussion of continuity is largely limited to issues of tactics like unilateralism,

preemptive war and presidential doctrines rather than the continuity of open door goals. Nonetheless, these rhetorical concessions tend to highlight some of the weaknesses inherent in the older paradigm.

Finally, the Williams paradigm has been able to offer a more plausible narrative than others for post-Cold War developments. In particular, it was able to answer two questions rarely answered well by other interpretations. First, why did policy after the Cold War change so little, if at all, from policy during the Cold War? By any measure, there seemed to be little difference between the two in military spending and the use of force, in NATO’s expansion and employment “out of theater,” in the rigid rules of the international economic game (“the Washington Consensus”), and in hostility to the emergence of even regional powers, much less global ones. None of that would have surprised Williams, because he always viewed the Cold War as a subset of a larger project: that of using American hegemony to promote what has come to be called globalization; to rescue the world from the economic and political nationalism that had produced the Great Depression and World War II; and to reprise Britain’s role from the mid-nineteenth century during the world’s first round of globalization. Ironically, the Cold War was a godsend to that hegemonic project, since providing security against an external enemy was a crucial lever in maintaining allies’ deference to it, especially that of Europe and Japan. But when the Cold War ended, America’s project remained ever constant; and so did the policies that served it.

Second, why did that hegemonic project fall apart when America seemed at the height of its power? Why did the “unipolar moment” turn out to be little more than that in historical time—a moment only? One could infer three answers from Williams’s paradigm. In the short term, hegemony itself was far harder to sustain after the Cold War than during it. No longer needing American protection against the communist threat, America’s allies and its client-states were far freer to follow their own national interests and to resist American initiatives when the two were at odds. In the medium term, the Williams school had seen Pax Americana in slow, halting decline since the 1970s era of détente, stagflation and Bretton Woods collapse. And while military Keynesianism and business deregulation had re-energized it in the 1980s and 1990s, its material

underpinnings were hollowed out by deindustrialization, increased income inequality and stagnant public investment in infrastructure. Reaganomics-Rubinomics was itself a kind of bubble, sustainable only by a succession of bubbles in emerging markets, technology and housing.

Finally, Williams always believed that in the long term “the chickens would come home to roost” for America’s open door imperium when it reached its planetary limits—the final Last Frontier. Much influenced by Karl Polanyi’s *The Great Transformation*, he had already learned two lessons from the first wave of globalization under the aegis of the British. First, globalization always reaches limits and has to retrench. It produces a backlash from cultures and religions undermined by secular modernization. It produces anger at the free movement of capital, characteristic of late globalization, because it is always more volatile than free trade, forever moving hither and yon, in and out, in search of profit maximization. It ultimately produces a structural problem of global glut as worldwide income redistribution upward places limits on consumption and forces capital away from production and into exotic speculation to sustain profits.

Second, globalization’s retrenchment is both the cause and consequence of the hegemon’s decline. No longer able to enforce the rules of the global game, it increasingly breaks its own rules in an effort to hang onto its primacy. And the costs of that heterodoxy are not merely material, but moral and psychic as well. For example, Britain’s inability to sustain its global order prompted it to move away from the open door back to colonialism and more formal forms of empire; to spend an increasing amount of state funds on its military; to resort to regional wars that were both preemptive and perhaps unnecessary (e.g., the Boer War); and to conduct both its empire and its wars in ways sometimes inconsistent with the nation’s supposed moral codes. So it would not have surprised Williams to discover that a similar fate awaited the United States, knowing as he did that once the status quo no longer met its needs, it would try to fashion a new status quo more to its liking through more unilateral, aggressive means. Likewise, he would not have been surprised by the growing obstacles encountered—old allies melting away, new power centers emerging to challenge, and the loss of moral legitimacy that accompanies the abuse of power.

Thomas McCormick is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

The Fiftieth Anniversary of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*

Anna K. Nelson

It is hard to remember the level of controversy that followed the publication of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* and the number of diplomatic historians who rejected it out of hand. My major professor in graduate school was a Bemis man. To him, William’s views were apostasy. Eleven years after *Tragedy* was published, I carefully avoided reading it, even though it was on my book shelf and I knew the gist of its contents. It was important that no residue from Williams enter my graduate exams. When I completed the exams, I sat down to read *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*.

Williams continued to be controversial, of course. At least one eminent Ivy League historian resigned from the Organization of American Historians when Williams became president. Another currently tends to use Williams as a foil to prove his own arguments. Most critics, however, content themselves with challenging his views in their books, essays and lectures. If nothing else, Williams has enlivened debates for fifty years.

Meanwhile, *Tragedy* has stood the test of time. Even those who refute its thesis acknowledge Williams’s impact upon our discipline. Except for a few hold-outs, it is required reading for graduate students, part of the “canon,” and a continuing subject for discussion and critique. My informal and unscientific poll of a few graduate students indicates that *Tragedy* is still relevant to this generation.¹ Only one student was reading Williams for the first time this academic year. Others noted that they had read it several times for different classes. Students also shared my view that because so much of the book had drifted into the work of others, it was not as shocking to read about American imperialism as it was in 1959.

For purposes of this discussion, I went to my bookshelves to find *Tragedy* and reread the book. To my surprise, I found two copies: a very yellowed copy of the original edition, published in 1959, and the third edition, published in 1972 with an extensive new introduction by the author. Also tucked into my copy of the 1972 edition were some notes I had made questioning the author’s

generalizations.

Two quite different introductions appeared in the two editions on my shelf. In 1959 Williams’s introduction reflected the Soviet-American relationship and the launching of the first Russian satellite. He justified his re-examination of American foreign policy by quoting mainstream figures such as Arthur Krock, Senator J. William Fulbright, and Walter Lippmann, all of whom urged such a review, and he noted that to make such a re-examination required a fresh look at the history of the United States. *Tragedy* was the result.

On page three of the 1959 introduction, Williams set forth his thesis. Americans, he wrote, are guided by “three conceptions.” First, they have a “warm, generous, humanitarian” impulse to help other people solve their problems. Second, they support the “principle of self-determination” that gives societies the right to their own goals. However, the third component of the American vision is a belief that other societies can only improve their lives if they follow the American way. There is an obvious conflict among these components, he continued, and therein lies the tragedy of American diplomacy.²

The 1972 edition did not discuss these “three conceptions” until page thirteen. Instead, his 16 pages of introduction focused on U.S. relations with Cuba., His words had a sharper edge. He still mentioned Krock, Lippman and other moderates, but he had traveled far from their moderate world, and he no longer had to quote others as he argued for a change in foreign policy. American relations with Cuba confirmed his views of American policy. First, he noted, the United States fought for Cuban independence from Spain in 1898 for presumably “humanitarian” reasons: to give the Cubans independence and “to initiate and sustain [Cuba’s] development toward political democracy and economic welfare.”³ After the War of 1898, the United States built roads, water systems and other infrastructure but it did not “sustain” the development of either democracy or economic welfare. Instead, it repeatedly interfered in Cuba’s political and economic life, dominating the country through its economic policies for sixty years. Americans controlled the sugar industry, set limits to political independence and managed to squelch opposition. What began as a humanitarian gesture ended with a degree of American economic control that prevented any real self-determination. Here was the tragedy

of U.S. diplomacy writ large. Finally, the Cubans staged their revolution in 1959-61.

The new introduction also contained some of Williams's favorite themes. He points to American elitism, the American view that democracy is connected to "individualism, private property, and a capitalist marketplace economy"; economic expansionism that turned to overseas markets after the land frontier had closed; and the support of farmers, who are often erroneously described as isolationist, for foreign policy that promotes trade.⁴

Williams was revising *Tragedy* during the worst years of the Vietnam War, and he pointed to that war as the logical end of the policies the United States pursued throughout the preceding century. He made passing reference to it in the text but left a lengthier discussion of the war to the revised conclusion. The absence of any discussion of the war in the body of the book is not surprising, for *Tragedy's* ideas and examples come from the first fifty years of twentieth-century history. Williams did not formulate his major contribution to U.S. foreign policy from the events around him. His frame of reference and his examples come from decades dominated by Wilson, Hoover and both Roosevelts.

Williams formulated his major contribution to U. S foreign policy from events of the last years of the 19th century. He took John Hay's Open Door Notes to keep the ports of China open and turned them into a symbol of American policy and its imperialistic goals. The open door policy, Williams argued, was designed "to win the victories without the wars." The United States devised the policy because its "overwhelming economic power" could "cast the economy and the politics of the poorer, weaker, underdeveloped countries in a pro-American mold." He predicted that if it were not modified, "the policy was certain to produce foreign policy crises that would become increasingly severe." The ultimate failures of the Open Door Policy, he wrote, are the failures "generated by its success in guiding Americans in the creation of an empire."⁵ Permeating policy was the need for markets, an open door to every country and region of the world. Without those markets, policy makers did not think the United States could survive as a democracy. It was this need for markets which led inexorably to the promotion of the Open Door. Behind every policy, Williams saw the hidden hand of the open door.

Tragedy was almost ignored when it was first published. Under other circumstances it might have remained at best on the periphery of scholarship. But many who read it saw the events of the 1960s as acting out *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Seeming to add validity to his analysis were the economic punishment of Cuba, which closed the door on the United States; interference in Africa, where there were rich lodes of minerals; the actions of the U.S. Marines in the Dominican Republic, which typified American arrogance and elitism; and the continuing escalation of the war in Vietnam. Humanitarian instincts sent the Marines to Santo Domingo, for example, to protect the Americans and their embassy. But President Johnson, who had little respect for Dominican political leaders, was concerned primarily with preventing the restoration of a democratically elected government under a political party that included communists. Humanitarian motives gave way to political and economic interests. Similarly, the United States entered Vietnam to help the South Vietnamese preserve their freedom. But as war progressed, Americans ended up destroying the country they went to save.

It is easy to grow impatient with Williams, since his arguments can appear so one-dimensional. Never mind the geopolitical or strategic factor: it was the open door policy that influenced every diplomatic move and negotiation. His discussion of pre-World War II policy, for example, left out Hitler, the brutal occupation of conquered countries and the concentration camps for Jews and dissidents. For the most part he also ignored the interaction between politics and cultural traditions and the influence of culture on policy. His approach to issues could be misleading. The United States was not responsible for Mexico's poverty, as Williams intimated, dismissing the powerful elites who controlled the country. Sometimes he was simply wrong. Dulles was not an "adviser and assistant" to Acheson.⁶

Never mind these details, William Appleton Williams gave us a new conceptual framework for the study of American foreign policy. Few historians, if any, regard *Tragedy* as the last word on twentieth-century foreign policy. Historians have moved ahead to a more complex view of that policy, but Williams brought to front and center important factors that cannot now be ignored. As one historian noted, "*Tragedy* was the first fundamental assault on the merits of American objectives."⁶ There are now

more assaults and greater complexity. William Appleton Williams marked the path; others have either enlarged or abandoned it. But although it must be used with care, the path is still there and still usable.

Anna K. Nelson is the Distinguished Historian in Residence at American University.

Notes:

1. It also revealed that students were uniformly troubled by the lack of notes on sources, a testament to our research seminars.
2. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1959), 3-4.
3. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1972), 1.
3. *Ibid.*, 6-9. The quote is from p. 9.
4. *Ibid.*, 57.
5. *Ibid.*, 274.
6. Bradford Perkins, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty-Five Years After," *Reviews in American History* 12: 1-18.

Agency and Nation in Williams's *Tragedy*

Nicole Phelps

My re-reading of William Appleman Williams's 1972 version of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* in preparation for writing this reflection coincided with an outbreak of debate on H-Diplo about the definitions of international, diplomatic, and transnational history. As a recent Ph.D., negotiating among these labels—and helping to give them meaning—is quite important to me, and it struck me as I was reading *Tragedy* that the book could be helpful for articulating different approaches to scholarship on the international system.

I should note at the outset of what is going to be a sharp critique of *Tragedy* that I have tremendous respect for both the book and Williams himself, although I have no personal stake in the reputation of either. When the book celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary, I was in kindergarten. I understand *Tragedy* as being important because it expanded the scope of studies of U.S. foreign relations beyond military-based balance-of-power politics to include economic factors, and because it called into question both the efficacy and the morality of U.S. foreign policy. These ideas are invaluable contributions, and they seem to me to be alive and well among historians in a variety of subfields and among scholars in a number of other

disciplines.

Tragedy certainly has the power to sweep up the reader in a powerful tide of indignation over the mistakes that were made in American foreign policy since the 1890s. But, as I read it, I was also swept up in a fit of methodological and linguistic indignation because Williams tells us that *mistakes were made*, but he doesn't really tell us who made them or what, if any, steps an individual reader might take toward correcting them. Williams's sense of agency is painfully vague, and he draws haphazardly and inconsistently from what have become several distinct theoretical approaches. Yet reading *Tragedy* can help us identify the differences between theories of foreign policies and theories of international relations and recognize what transnational history can contribute to our understanding of how the world works.

Williams most often sticks to the realm of foreign policy: the actors he talks about—notably presidents, secretaries of state, their closest executive-branch advisors, and American business interests—are all located within “the United States,” and the “American diplomacy,” or foreign policy, they devise is thrust upon the world in the name of a unitary, sovereign United States. This is, I think, how many U.S.-trained diplomatic historians have approached their own accounts; it's about picking a vantage point within the U.S. government and looking out on private Americans and the rest of the world, and it can be done by consulting strictly American sources.

Williams ventures occasionally into the realm of international history when he attempts to explain the Soviet perspective in addition to that of the United States. To do so, he shifts his attention from internal U.S. processes to the international arena, and his actors are unitary sovereign states. He quickly cuts himself off from this approach, however, and re-grounds himself in US foreign policy, noting that “this essay is about American diplomacy, and ... has to concentrate on America's actions and the ideas behind them” (217).

In *Tragedy*, Williams is inconsistent when it comes to treating states and nations as unitary. He makes an important point when he stresses that all Marxists are not the same, thus rendering it inaccurate and unhelpful to treat communism as a monolith. His approach to Marxism suggests that he's willing to differentiate among different groups within—and perhaps even across—the boundaries of the nation-state. However, he retreats from differentiation when

he employs a national character argument: “The Russian's search for self and emphasis on community in the face of poverty and power led him to conclude that man's essential goodness emerges as a phoenix from the pyre of degradation. Hence in his mind he is best qualified to lead a similar reconstruction of all humanity. For his part, the American concluded that his achievement of prosperity and military might elected him as trustee for the same responsibility” (283). In this construction, there is only one Russian and only one American—idealized individuals standing in for their national collectives. To me, that suggests that Williams is really saying that race is more fundamental than economics, since all Russians are the same at the core but the Marxist ideologies they adopt are different.

That passage, along with numerous others in the book, also paints “Americans” with the same brush, rendering them homogeneous—and complicit in the tragedy of American diplomacy. This doesn't seem fair, especially since Williams repeatedly stresses the elite nature of American diplomacy. When Williams actually names names, he's talking about presidents, secretaries of state, and their advisors; the business interests that they're responsive to remain an un-individuated collective. I think Williams means to blame those few elite men for the tragedy of American diplomacy, but that's really unclear, since he drops into the passive voice at some very crucial moments. Most notably, when he lists the four factors that produced the tragedy of American diplomacy in Vietnam—factors that are contributors to the longer-running tragedy, too—point three is “the loss of the capacity to think critically about reality, and about individual action” (303). He doesn't tell us who it is who lost that capacity. He may very well mean that the elite policy makers have lost that capability, but he may also mean a broader American public.

It is not really clear who the intended audience is for Williams's book. If it is aimed at elites, then there are certainly ways in which they can take action to remedy the tragedy of American diplomacy; Williams provides them with a definite place in the policy making process. If the book is aimed at individuals outside those elite ranks, however, identifying a course of action is much more difficult, since Williams does not articulate a role for non-elites in the international system. In theories of foreign policy that apply to democratic countries, there

is a common assumption that public opinion is collected via elections, and Williams does suggest that voting might be an avenue for reform. He's quite pessimistic about it, though, asserting that “votes have mattered increasingly less in recent decades” (312).

Williams—and myriad other scholars who take the unitary state, nation, or nation-state as an ontological given—appears to assume a congruence between American voters, members of the American nation, U.S. citizens, and residents of the United States. In the past several decades, scholars working in a number of historical subfields and in disciplines outside history have chipped away at this assumption. They have disconnected the nation from the state, loosed the nation from its moorings in nineteenth-century biology and rendered it a social construction, illuminated disparities in citizenship rights and obligations based on gender, race, class, and sexuality, and demonstrated the permeability of state borders. This is the stuff of “transnational history.” These developments raise serious questions about an account like *Tragedy*, in which power, ideas, and goods appear to flow out of a monolithic United States while no one resists and very, very little flows in the other direction.

If we think of power, ideas, goods—and people—constantly crossing borders, opportunities for individual action in the international system become clearer. Non-electoral actions such as lobbying and protesting are a possibility, and their importance can be intensified when those taking action can claim identities that cut across boundaries of nation and citizenship or when their physical location renders their actions legal or beyond state control. In addition, individuals have a meaningful role to play as consumers. Economics drive the action in Williams's account, but he talks about capitalism in terms of production, focusing on capital and labor; his consumers are vaguely defined foreigners. Americans were and are consumers, too, and their demand for foreign products is a crucial part of the story of the global economy. I am willing to concede to Williams that the organization of the economy can strip individuals of much of their power because they are dependent on particular goods for their survival, but I am unwilling to write those individuals out of the story completely. Many consumers contributed to the construction of the capitalist economy, and they

could reshape it by changing what they buy; individuals who are more thoroughly dependent on the system can still opt to resist, even if their efforts are ultimately unsuccessful.

The scholarly developments that have formed the basis of transnational history demand methodological and linguistic precision, especially on the question of agency. Collective nouns like *nation* and *state* hide more than they illuminate, including human agency and responsibility. In *Tragedy*, Williams's imprecision shuts down paths of much-needed change. He gets the reader riled up—and justifiably so—but he really doesn't seem to offer a way out. By not giving the individual reader a role in his story of how the world works, Williams also hinders the reader's ability to see herself as part of a wider community that demands her empathy or any re-definition of her self-interest. Even for most "Americans," the tragedy of American diplomacy is apparently someone else's problem.

Nicole Phelps is assistant professor at the University of Vermont.

The Tragedy Updated: Considering Consumerism and Sustainability

Emily S. Rosenberg

In his classic interpretative work, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, William A. Williams advanced a critique of open door expansionism, arguing that it drove U.S. international policy and warning that it could bring about the "destruction of democracy" rather than its spread. In the half century since the publication of *Tragedy*, however, the open door world that Williams examined has undergone seismic shifts. This commentary seeks to build on Williams's interpretation by asking how the open door has contributed to new global economic patterns and spawned threats to democratic forms that the *Tragedy* hardly anticipated. Read in the context of the global crises that currently beset the United States and the world, Williams's 1959 book seems almost like the historiographical equivalent of *Happy Days*. The threats of global economic implosion and onrushing climate change suggest a tragedy that looks a bit different from the one that Williams envisioned.

Tragedy appeared at a time when the economic engine of American power revolved largely around

production and exports rather than consumption and imports. Moreover, national economies in 1959 still seemed relatively coterminous with political boundaries, and threats from environmental damage were invisible or seemed relatively benign. Grounded in its historical era, Williams's analysis elided two trends—consumerism and sustainability—that now loom as central to national and global predicaments. To examine how an open door world contributed to these trends, it will help to understand the central role that mass consumerism came to play in American life during the twentieth century.

Mass consumerism in America plays no role in Williams's *Tragedy*. Consumerism may have seemed, in the 1950s and early 1960s, to lie mostly in the "domestic" sphere. Cold War "kitchen debates" about which system could offer more personal goods to its citizens may have appeared to be essentially trivial footnotes to the nuclear/military standoffs of the day. But as more and more Americans embraced what Charles McGovern has called "material nationalism" and came to equate Americanism with ever-growing consumer choice, the American economy morphed from what Charles Maier has called an "empire of production" to an "empire of consumption." The open door, which Williams saw as a portal primarily for an outflow of American products and investment capital, became a reverse gateway for a growing cascade of imports, most of which supported increasingly entrenched consumer lifestyles in the United States. The persistent demand for lower-priced goods from a transnationalized and mobile manufacturing base abroad in effect eroded America's productive capacities and the heavily unionized, high-wage system that had been in place since the New Deal.

Mass consumerism in America became both an economic and a social/cultural system. As an economic system, it rested on an intensive use and commoditization of the continent's seemingly inexhaustible natural resources and on innovative technologies that spurred revolutions in transportation, communication, and productive techniques. Confronted with bounty and innovation, the European "dismal science" of scarcity did a summersault in America. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Williams argued, politicians and business people pursued policies aimed at addressing overproduction and abundance.

Williams, of course, concentrated on attempts to expand markets and a market-based productive system abroad. But stimulating domestic consumer demand at home became even more central to the growth of American capitalism. Over time, business and governmental efforts to create and maintain a robust domestic consumerism would dramatically influence foreign policy.

As a social/cultural system that emphasized desire and the construction of identities through purchasing, consumerism thrived in part because of the unique characteristics of America's immigrant-based society. Entrepreneurs in media, entertainment, and advertising industries, often drawing on and targeting America's immigrant-based subcultures, developed consumer imaginaries that projected acts of purchase as acts of self-fashioning. Consumer goods took on aspirational qualities, seeming to confer glamour, leisure, and respect. Smoothing over the diversity in languages and customs, the advertising industry that drove the mass production/consumption system presented commodities as cultural markers of national identity as well as of personal upward mobility. Consumer-based habits could provide the comforts of "consumption communities" even as they became powerful Americanizing agents. McGovern's *Sold American* charts the ways in which the acts and rituals of shopping took on nationalistic overtones and consumer citizenship came to rival older definitions of civic participation.¹ Consumerism, his book suggests, played a key role in expanding the definition of the "nation," as ethnic and racial groups that were once outsiders learned to view their citizenship in terms of access to goods. To be able to exercise "choice" as part of a consuming market was to join the national imaginary of "America."

By the late 1950s, when Williams wrote, mass consumerism had begun to emerge as an economic, social, psychological, and nationalistic system that was integral to American life. It was, however, still too early to discern how dramatically the ethos of "consumer citizenship" would transform America's international position. It was only after *Tragedy* was published in 1959 that American trade balances began their long deterioration and the open door became less and less a creature of America's once prodigious productive capacities and more and more a creature of its apparently

insatiable appetite for consumer goods.

Robert Reich's *Supercapitalism* has recently traced in detail the process by which Americans' desire to consume things at lower and lower prices and therefore to manufacture goods at lower and lower costs became the central logic of U.S. international trade and financial policies. Reich also points out that as retirement plans shifted from defined benefits to individual portfolios, a growing number of American worker-investors had a stake in enlarging corporate profits. Businesses, government, and consumer-citizens, for a variety of different reasons, found it easier to respond to (and promote) consumer desires by gravitating toward policies that encouraged lower prices with higher profits (gained from moving offshore) rather than toward those that might have encouraged higher wages at home and abroad. "The last several decades have involved a shift of power away from us in our capacities as citizens and toward us as consumers and investors," Reich writes.²

Open door policies that emphasized lowering prices for consumer goods but did little to maintain wage levels became part of a historic shift in America's relationship to the world economy. During the era in which Williams wrote, the United States was an "empire of production"; the nation ran trade surpluses and was a capital lender in the world economy. As an "empire of consumption," by contrast, the United States increasingly ran trade deficits and, to fund its appetite for cheaper imports, became the world's greatest debtor. Meanwhile, the largest transnational firms, most of which in Williams's day were still anchored within the United States, became globalized enterprises and spread their sites of production, and even management, into widely scattered and often highly mobile locations. This globalization of production and the onset of all kinds of flexible manufacturing techniques accelerated during and after the 1970s, as businesses used open door mechanisms, in effect, to export production and jobs and to turn America into a great import emporium. Meanwhile, lower-priced goods helped enable the conservative political turn that kept consumer lifestyles affordable to many even as income and wealth were distributed upwards.

Any reversal of open-door/low-cost consumption policies became politically difficult. Robust

consumerism so thoroughly intertwined with discourses of American nationalism that it seemed nearly impossible to break the cycle of pursuing cheaper and cheaper imports with lower and lower prices—even when such a cycle meant fewer well-paid jobs with guaranteed benefits at home. Nationalist themes, which emphasized the ability of Americans to consume (and to borrow even against their own homes and retirement funds in order to consume) and to share (though unequally) in higher profits, prompted businesses, politicians, and most citizen-consumers to ignore the deficits in national and personal savings that accompanied the sharply deteriorating terms of trade.

Borrowing made up for imbalances, especially during the past decade, as the gap between rich and poor widened to historic proportions. Borrowing from abroad funded America's deteriorating trade balances. Borrowing eased the gap between the wages most people could earn and their desires for consumer products. And to paper over both the international imbalances and the widening gap in the distribution of wealth and income at home, finance capitalists operated on a global scale to create new credit instruments that became more and more abstract and less and less transparent. The pressures to lower consumer costs and to advance credit to facilitate consumer purchasing thrived, especially within the highly nationalistic discourses advanced during the Republican ascendancy of the early twenty-first century—even as the nation's productive capacities withered.

Economic "globalization," a word that became prominent in the early 1980s, brought about a disjuncture between bounded national states composed of *citizens* and an unbounded and globally networked economy catering to *consumers*, especially in America. This was a disjuncture that Williams's work on the open door presaged but did not thoroughly anticipate.

Like consumerism, the mounting "tragedy" associated with environmental sustainability also

lay outside of Williams's purview. Mass consumerism, of course, arose partly from America's abundance of cheap resources and technological innovation. American-style production and consumerist imaginaries, entering through open doors, then spread into the world. But are the assumptions of abundance appropriate in a resource-scarce world now threatened with climate change and facing burgeoning populations that live at the margins of regular employment? The American system of force-feeding consumer desire to solve the "problem" of overproduction and abundance seems increasingly anachronistic.

Environmental tragedies are emerging from the U.S.-led global system that helped stimulate ever-growing demand through lower prices in a world in which many governments (especially the U.S. government) seem unable to factor environmental costs into the price of goods without incurring severe political backlash from their consumer citizens. The environmental impact of practices that emphasized the commodification and sale of nature's goods at an ever-accelerating pace has created tragedies beyond Williams's worst nightmares. And these tragedies may not be ameliorated by Williams's suggestion of allowing an "Open Door for revolution." That

Viewed in relation to the economic crisis of 2009, Williams's work may have renewed relevance, as it reminds us that foreign policy claims and practices have actually undermined their own presumed goals (the definition of tragedy). Moreover, his insistence that U.S. international policies emerge from economic relationships at home remains as relevant (and as frequently overlooked) as it was in 1959.

"revolution," after all, might well be an expression of consumer-citizen desires for greater abundance of inexpensive consumer goods, for low prices achieved by keeping resources cheap. Williams did not advocate slamming

shut the open doors as a solution to the problem of democracy-in-peril. I do not believe he embraced protectionism or rejected people's desires for material satisfactions. Certainly, I advocate neither protectionism nor anti-consumerism as a solution to global dilemmas. Rather, these dilemmas, if they are to be solved, will necessitate new forms of international and transnational regimes that can enforce norms and standards for sustainable labor and environmental policies. Viewed in relation to the economic crisis of 2009, Williams's work may have renewed

relevance, as it reminds us that foreign policy claims and practices have actually undermined their own presumed goals (the definition of tragedy). Moreover, his insistence that U.S. international policies emerge from economic relationships at home remains as relevant (and as frequently overlooked) as it was in 1959.

“Capitalism has become more responsive to what we want as individual purchasers of goods, but democracy has grown less responsive to what we want together as citizens,” writes Robert Reich.³ Williams’s call not to close doors but to open *more* doors—to dissenting ideas, critical analysis, and a broader sphere of public discussion—supports a revival of democratic citizenship over the consumer citizenship that rested on low-cost goods and on unsustainable resource use.

Emily S. Rosenberg is Professor of History at the University of California, Irvine.

Notes:

1. Charles McGovern, *Sold American: Consumption and Citizenship, 1890-1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
2. Robert B. Reich, *Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life* (New York, 2007), 5.
3. Ibid.

Reading *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy in Hard Times*

Robert D. Schulzinger

I reread William Appleman Williams’s *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* in the midst of an economic slump. Many people called it the worst since the Great Depression; some predicted it might be another Great Depression. The United States was also engaged in two wars. One of them was in Afghanistan, a place so remote that a few decades ago the word “Afghanistan” was code among news editors for a place so remote that few knew and no one cared what happened there.

My reading took place two months into the presidency of Barack Obama, whose election called to mind some of the hopes of 1960 and some of the turmoil of 1968. A few weeks before Obama took office, he mentioned that he was reading one of the several recent books on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Hundred Days. As bad news came from big financial firms every week and the stock market continued to fall in early 2009, there

were continual comparisons between him and FDR and calls for another New Deal.

Williams wrote about economic hard times, foreign wars, and presidential leadership in *Tragedy*. He saw connections among them. Many of those connections apply today; some are dated or irrelevant. What is most surprising is how fresh and accessible the language of *Tragedy* is. Most fifty-year-old books are past their shelf life. This one is not.

Williams’s baseline for hard times was the Panic of 1893. It changed leaders’ minds about the sustainability of domestic economic growth. They thought the United States would have to keep finding new markets for a growing surplus of consumer goods. Like the leaders of the other imperial powers, they thought that empires paid, and the United States had to have one or wither. Hence a war with Spain for Cuba and the Philippines.

Williams’s views were not entirely new in the 1950s, but they have gained more currency among historians since. They are pretty much the standard version of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Philippine War.

We have not heard much in the last thirty years about the need to dump America’s surplus production; if anything, the United States worries now about absorbing too much of other countries’ goods. But involvement in the world’s movement of goods, ideas, and people remains central to the creation of foreign policy, as does, more specifically, trade. What is most relevant about Williams’s views today is his emphasis on what elites thought. Now, as then, there is group-think, suspicion of Americans without special knowledge, emphasis on control and secrecy, and concern about the way other rich, educated nations conduct their affairs. *Tragedy* does not explore the themes of the new cultural turn in the history of American foreign relations. There is nothing in it that is explicitly about race, gender, or culture. But its emphasis on elites, how they think, and their fears of what others may think set the stage for the recent work on the psychology of foreign affairs.

Fifty years ago the freshest part of *Tragedy* was the chapter on the legend of isolationism in the 1920s. Williams wrote about the elite’s

continuing belief in the convergence of commercial expansion and a harmonious and peaceful world. This theme runs through elite opinion from Norman Angell’s *The Great Illusion* (1910) to any session of the Davos World Economic Forum before the crash of 2008. Williams wrote of the institutionalization of international business as a way of promoting American values. The only item of contemporary interest missing from his catalogue of the government’s efforts to promote business abroad is the role of finance. There is nothing about central bankers and little about foreign lending.

Half of *Tragedy* deals with World War II and the Cold War. In that way too, the book showed what historians wanted to study. At least half of the writing on U.S. foreign relations is about World War II or the Cold War. We know so much about these

Williams wrote about economic hard times, foreign wars, and presidential leadership in *Tragedy*. He saw connections among them. Many of those connections apply today; some are dated or irrelevant. What is most surprising is how fresh and accessible the language of *Tragedy* is. Most fifty-year-old books are past their shelf life. This one is not.

complex events that Williams’s account of them seems lacking. He emphasized trade expansion consistently and said little about nationalism, ideology, and technology as causes and drivers of war. He focused so exclusively on the confrontation

between the rich, self-confident United States and the rest of the world that it appeared as if nothing that happened elsewhere mattered. Such self-centeredness is always dangerous. Certainly Americans came to realize how dangerous it can be when the administration of President George W. Bush sought to impose its locally generated views about democratic government on other nations. But Williams was writing about American diplomacy, so *Tragedy* was necessarily Yankee-centric.

Unlike his account of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Philippine war, his explanation of the origins of World War II or the Cold War has not been accepted as the standard version. Few historians see World War II as a war to expand U.S. trade. A greater number of them, but hardly a majority, explain the early Cold War as an American attempt to encircle a poor and suspicious Soviet Union.

What has proved to be of continuing value in Williams’s account of World War II and the Cold War is his discussion of elites. He wrote that the New Deal “steadily

drew more and more of its leadership from the community of large, established corporation executives, their counsels, and their economic advisers" (177). The reliance on an established elite may be good or it may be bad. Williams clearly thought it was bad. It is also a timely topic. As the government faces the financial problems of 2009, liberals, generally supportive of Barack Obama, now voice their frustration with his appointment of people with experience as investment bankers to important positions overseeing private finance.

Williams was fascinated and frustrated by the elusive character of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was not alone. Williams was no realist of the Hans Morgenthau or George F. Kennan school of foreign relations; if anything, he was a romantic and occasionally a revolutionary. But he praised FDR for his recognition of reality. Roosevelt accepted "limits upon American expectations and actions, and for the working out of a concert of power with other major nations" (204-05). Here again, the contrast with George W. Bush is stark. But Roosevelt disappointed Williams because he was not as revolutionary or visionary a figure as Williams wanted him to be. He wrote of Roosevelt, in sorrow rather than in anger, that he "offered a few very general ideas about the kind of things that could be done to adapt American thinking and policy to the new conditions. . . . But he never worked out, initiated, or carried through a fresh approach. . . . At the time of his death, he was turning back toward the inadequate domestic programs of the New Deal era, and was in foreign affairs reasserting the traditional strategy of the Open Door Policy" (205). For Williams, Roosevelt's problem was that he was a reformer, and Williams wanted more than reform. There are echoes of the same concerns expressed by some liberals in early 2009 that Obama is too much a reformer and not a completely transformative figure. But this is distinctly a minority point of view, because there aren't many revolutionaries now. There were more in the 1960s, although they were hardly a majority.

Throughout *Tragedy*, Williams reverts to an idea that runs counter to open door economic expansion: he wanted Americans to be more understanding and accommodating of revolutions. This sentiment certainly made sense at the height of the Cold War, when Americans feared revolutions and considered most nationalism archaic, but it has

almost no resonance today. Whatever counter-arguments there are to the triumphant global capitalism of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s, they are not revolutionary, at least not in the Marxist mode of the twentieth century. But Williams's plea that Americans should leave the rest of the world alone to develop as it pleases has resonance.

There are many details in *Tragedy* to quarrel with. Williams's account of the early Cold War doesn't stand the test of time. His leaders focus almost exclusively on economic motives. But there is also a skeptical approach to the leadership of the past that is especially relevant. Williams consistently criticized the leaders of the twentieth century for their narrow ideological blinders. They talked mostly to one another and rarely saw merit in any alternative point of view. It is that critique that had the most appeal when the book appeared in 1959, and it is what keeps it alive today.

Robert D. Schulzinger is College Professor of Distinction of History and International Affairs at the University of Colorado.

Reflections on *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Its Publication

William Stueck

Originally I intended to focus my comments here on a comparison of the four editions of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959, 1962, 1972, and 1988), as I remembered the first as relatively moderate in tone and content compared to the later ones. In examining them, however, I discovered that the last was identical to the third, except for its inclusion of an essay by Bradford Perkins, originally published in *Reviews in American History*, which did an excellent job of tracing the book's evolution and influence. Perkins attributed the increasingly strident tone of the second and third editions to Williams's "growing alienation" in the face of America's reaction to the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions. By the time of the third edition Williams had a good deal of company in that disaffected state, including several younger scholars whom he had helped train at the University of Wisconsin. Indeed, some of those scholars took Williams's critique of U.S. foreign policy to new extremes, especially in their claims for the inherently expansionist qualities of

American capitalism, and they were joined by others such as Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. Since Perkins's fine essay obviates the need to analyze the evolution of *Tragedy*, I decided to provide some recollections of how the book affected both my own scholarship and trends in our field from the time I entered graduate school to the present.

I first read *Tragedy* in what was probably the 1962 edition sometime between the spring of 1968, when I was finishing my first year in the master's program at Queens College, and the spring of 1972, as I completed my first year in the Ph.D. program at Brown University. The first three years of that period saw the height of the anti-Vietnam War movement, with which I was peripherally involved, and the last two years brought publication of two major works on the early Cold War, Herbert Feis's *From Trust to Terror* and Joyce and Gabriel Kolko's *The Limits of Power*. In a seminar offered at Brown during the spring semester of 1972 by a visiting professor, Allen Weinstein, then in the early stages of his work on Alger Hiss, both books generated considerable discussion. I recall Weinstein being impressed by how much of the revisionist argument Feis had adopted. Feis was a former employee of the State Department and was generally considered a moderate proponent of conventional wisdom. On the other hand, the Kolkos' book had a distinctly hard edge and made *Tragedy* seem rather mild by comparison. The response to *Limits* by reviewers in mass publications was generally favorable, but I had reservations about the Kolkos' use of sources in their treatment of the origins of the Korean War, on which I had written a master's thesis at Queens. A closer examination of their citations led me to write what would be my first publication, a critique of the Kolkos' methodology.

Although my own views on many broad issues of American foreign policy remained fluid, my inclinations were toward a conventional interpretation of the U.S. course in Europe after World War II and a moderate revisionist one on the U.S. course in the Third World. The Kolko interpretation seemed overly deterministic and, while I understood that Williams's framework was more flexible, admired his less polemical tone, subscribed to his passionate belief in using the past to help us understand the present, and recognized the value of his insights regarding America's trials and tribulations in

the Third World, *Tragedy* struck me as naïve about the Soviets' postwar aims and intentions. By that time I had been exposed to the postwar writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, which I found overlapped with Williams's in warning against national hubris while recognizing the need to confront Soviet expansion. The appeal of that outlook remains strong to the present day, even though its prescriptive significance is not always obvious in specific circumstances. It is no surprise to me that one prominent present-day critic of U.S. foreign relations, Andrew Bacevitch, a self-described conservative, borrowed heavily from Williams in his first major book and from Niebuhr in his most recent.

Bacevitch's invocation of Williams in his admonitions against American empire strike me as a welcome rekindling of Williams's memory after a generation of scholars who either found the postrevisionist model of complexity and ambiguity attractive, as I did, and tended to move toward international history, or were influenced by French theorists and moved toward the emergent "holy trinity" of race, class, and gender (with emphasis on the first and third) advanced by social and cultural historians. To be sure, Williams's student Thomas McCormick helped keep the open door thesis in the mix with his logically rigorous if thinly documented synthesis of 1989, *America's Half-Century*, which drew heavily on Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems model. And Michael J. Hogan and others developed a "corporatist synthesis" that integrated economic and ideological factors with institutional developments in the public and private sectors. Yet proponents of international history tended to focus on the interactions of states and peoples, sometimes at the expense of the internal variables that drove both, while proponents of the cultural turn frequently emphasized attitudes toward race and gender in ways that submerged material considerations as driving forces behind America's outward thrust.

Yet there are risks as well (dare I suggest hubris?) in focusing primarily on our domestic institutions and habits of thought in addressing our relationship with the world. For one thing, such an approach encourages us to believe that we can resolve the problems we face largely by ourselves alone. For another, it discourages us from recognizing the compelling need to learn about others. The most dramatic omission in *Tragedy* is any

sense of the importance of geopolitics as an influence on U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century. Without such a sense it is impossible to comprehend a good deal about what drove American decisionmakers in the Cold War. I can agree with Bacevitch on points that Williams surely would endorse were he still with us: namely, that "our appetites and expectations have grown exponentially" in the post-Cold War era, that we "expect the world to accommodate the American way of life," and that these attitudes are extremely unhealthy and increasingly unrealistic. However, I disagree that we can resolve our problems at home or abroad by reversing the growth of our appetites and modifying our expectations of the world, however important it might be to do so. It is essential to keep reminding ourselves of our own limits and failings, both individual and systemic, and Williams's work served—and, in our remembrance of it, continues to serve—that purpose. But *Tragedy* never offered a comprehensive vision for how to confront our problems. For that, I will continue to look to the Christian realism of Niebuhr.

William Stueck is Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Georgia.

Williams, the Wisconsin School, and Midwestern Progressivism

Jeremi Suri

Teaching a joint seminar with William Appleman Williams at the University of Wisconsin in the early 1960s, George Mosse, the great historian of European radicalism, once told him that if he was right he would be "as famous as Beard or Turner." If he was wrong, he would "simply be written off as another sign of the times." Williams's writing, especially his *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, was both enduring and presentist—famous and a sign of his times.¹

Mosse anticipated this verdict: "I was never able to persuade Williams that historical concepts specific to one period could not just be applied to a different period. . . . The isolationism of this Wisconsin school of history played a role here, the combination of regionalism and intense patriotism which fed their suspicion of the Eastern Seaboard (which sometimes extended to students from New York). This patriotism also made them highly critical of the United States' role in the world. I believe that a feeling of a lost utopia—

disappointment with the lack of effectiveness of their Midwestern vision of America—determined to a large extent their outlook upon the past."²

The power of Williams's *Tragedy* comes from exactly what Mosse observed: the author's intense belief in the promise of America and his deep suspicion of the eastern elites who often distorted promise through practice. "American leaders were not evil men. They did not conceive and excuse some dreadful conspiracy. Nor were they treacherous hypocrites," Williams wrote. "They believed deeply in the ideals they proclaimed."³ *Tragedy* opens with a reflection on the "warm, generous, humanitarian impulse" among Americans to "help other people solve their problems." The fundamental American flaw, Williams explained, was not one of intentions, but self-centeredness—the conviction that "other people cannot really solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it the same way as the United States. . . . This insistence that other people ought to copy America contradicts the humanitarian urge to help them and the idea that they have the right to make such key decisions for themselves."⁴

This argument resonates with students attending university in the shadow of the Iraq War, just as it grabbed the attention of protesters against the Vietnam War and critics of Ronald Reagan's "New Cold War." Williams's dissection of self-serving American moralism echoes through the decades. In this sense, he agreed with his frequent nemesis, George F. Kennan, about the destructive tendency of Americans to overstate their power ("the vision of omnipotence") and their purchase upon solutions to far-away problems ("the imperialism of idealism").

Williams's famous argument about the ideology of the open door came out of this context. Beginning with the Panic of 1893 and the first American invasion of Cuba, continuing through the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Vietnam War, Williams described a consistent American urge to preserve prosperity by enhancing access to foreign societies. From John Hay to John F. Kennedy, elite policymakers in Williams's narrative manipulated foreign economic influence, combined with political pressure and military force, to make other societies more capitalist on American terms. Market access, private property protections, and expanded trade supported consumption in the United States and created a perception of peace

by Americanizing—or seeming to Americanize—the far reaches of the globe.

When this vision came under attack from diverse sources, U.S. leaders condoned and sometimes instigated brutal acts of repression to restore a functioning economic order. In the Philippines, Nicaragua, South Korea, Iran, Guatemala, Cambodia, Chile, and countless other places the United States targeted nationalist figures who wanted to protect local practices and deny American solutions. East Coast elites and the good citizens indoctrinated by them “defined every opponent of the United States as being misadvised about the nature of the world. . . . Americans became very prone to define their rivals as unnatural men. They were thus beyond the pale and almost, if not wholly, beyond redemption.”⁵

For Williams it was not “pocketbook” economics that drove American expansion, but instead a worldview (*Weltanschauung*) that emphasized the possibilities of opening other societies and the dangers of caution and restraint.⁶ It

was what Williams called in another book a “way of life” that encouraged the bigness of empire rather than the smaller-scale life of nation and community. Dazzled, frightened, coerced, and frequently confused, Americans accepted the centralizing and interventionist impulses of their leaders, according to Williams, transforming republican democracy into corporate society: “All major segments of the economy came to be dominated by a tiny number of giant firms which shared an interest in controlling any new rivals, and establishing rules and procedures to control their part of the marketplace . . . the history of that dynamic interaction, and particularly the story of how the citizens were increasingly limited to choosing between policies formulated by the corporations or the government (or the two in collaboration), makes it apparent that all those protagonists accepted an imperial way of life.”⁷

It did not have to be this way. Elites made decisions in 1898 and subsequent decades that contributed to this descent. Citizens accepted and followed. The serious humanitarian impulses of American society made

it difficult—nearly impossible—for Americans to see the dark shadows lingering behind their bright-eyed intentions. Most of all, in what Williams called the “diplomacy of the vicious circle,” foreign resistance to U.S. influence inspired redoubled American efforts overseas.⁸

How could insurgent groups in Cuba, the Philippines, and Vietnam act with such seeming disregard for humanity? How could communists (and religious extremists) preach harm to the United States? Williams argued that America’s opponents across the last century were quite often brought into being by the very country that intervened to eliminate them. George Kennan and the doctrine of containment that he initially authored came under sharp attack from Williams in this context: “By creating in fact a real, avowed, and all-encompassing outside threat,

action based upon such analysis and analogy lent substance to what Kennan originally defined as a hallucination in the minds of Soviet leaders. Having argued that they [the Soviets] had to create imaginary foreign dangers

in order to stay in power,” Kennan and other American Cold War policy-makers conjured a self-fulfilling conflict.⁹

This analysis is precisely what inspired students (especially during the Vietnam and Iraq Wars), and it is precisely what George Mosse found so incomplete. For all its words about the economy and politics, Williams’s *Tragedy* was driven by a small set of elite decision-makers. They made policies that sacrificed inner American strengths and values for their self-defined purposes. Americans and non-Americans alike were forced to react, often in ways that barely slowed the tide of the open door. For a book that condemned assumptions about American power, *Tragedy* presumed inordinate international agency for Washington and New York bigwigs. Beyond resisting or collaborating, foreign countries barely acted in Williams’s narrative.

For a European émigré like Mosse, this was passionate but also provincial history, replicating the very self-centeredness that Williams sought to attack. “One could not,” Mosse remarked, “analyze American

imperialism without being familiar with the history of nations like Russia or China against which it was presumably directed.”¹⁰ For the great American historians who surrounded Williams in Madison—William Hesseltine, Merle Curti, Howard K. Beale, Merrill Jensen, and Fred Harvey Harrington—provincialism was not an active issue of debate. They shared, as Mosse recounted, a critique of twentieth-century American expansion that grew from a deep commitment to a more modest past and a virtuous, reform-minded nation that they believed had been under siege since the Spanish-American War. The Wisconsin School in all its glory was rooted in midwestern progressivism. Williams’s work was more about that than foreign policy.

Williams’s *Tragedy* speaks across generations because it brilliantly articulated a critique of American society and its outward manifestations from the perspective of an idealistic and patriotic young man. Students easily identify with Williams’s arguments, his passions, even his sarcasm. *Tragedy* offered a window into another time and recovered a still-vital vision of the nation and its flaws. That is perhaps the finest accomplishment for a historian. Like many of Williams’s readers, Mosse might have had serious differences with *Tragedy*’s arguments, but he accurately anticipated that its author would soon become as famous as Beard or Turner. Williams was so successful that he became the patron saint of the “Wisconsin School,” the Society for Historians of Foreign Relations, and the field in general. His progressive anti-elite writings have become an integral part of a politically moderate scholarly establishment. I think he would relish that irony.

Jeremi Suri is E. Gordon Fox Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin.

Notes:

1. George L. Mosse, *Confronting History: A Memoir* (Madison, 2000), 158.
2. *Ibid.*, 156-57.
3. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1972), 2.
4. *Ibid.*, 13-14. Emphasis in original.
5. *Ibid.*, 94.
6. *Ibid.*, 38.
7. William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Present Predicament Along With a Few Thoughts About an Alternative* (New York, 1980), 12-13.
8. Williams, *Tragedy*, 258.

The Ongoing Tragedy of American Diplomacy

Dustin Walcher

“Do people still read *him*?” That pointed question, delivered in a dismissive tone, greeted me in December 2001 as I gathered my things in the History Department mailroom. It was the middle of the final week of my first quarter as a graduate student, and a senior faculty member was asking—or rather was commenting—on the subject of a paper that I was preparing to hand in to complete Ohio State’s required course on historiography. The culminating assignment prompted us to write an essay on a scholar of great significance. I wrote on William Appleman Williams.

Very few books possess a similar capacity to raise the hackles of detractors nearly a half-century after their date of first publication; however, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* excited critics from the start. When it first appeared in 1959 it was, as Bradford Perkins explained twenty-five years ago, “[a]n iconoclastic attack upon conventional wisdom.”¹

Working within the larger Beardian tradition by positing that ideas about the domestic political economy served as the driving influence upon the makers of U.S. foreign policy, *Tragedy* revolutionized the field of U.S. diplomatic history, then dominated by scholarship in the realist tradition. Consequently, over the years detractors have dismissed Williams as a Marxist and Stalinist apologist. They have alleged that he ignored evidence that failed to conform to his conclusions and that he was sloppy in his research. They have argued that whatever popularity and influence Williams achieved came as the result of disenchantment with the U.S. war in Vietnam. Yet despite such concerted efforts to dismiss Williams, and especially his most famous book, both have been remarkably resilient. As Perkins again pointed out, “[t]hat so much labor had gone into this reaction is proof of *Tragedy*’s influence.”²

Tragedy’s historiographical significance, then, has been clearly established. In whatever new directions the field moves, graduate students will continue to cite it on their comprehensive exams. However, *Tragedy*’s ability to

resonate with new generations of practitioners in the field—that is to say, with my generation and those that follow—remains a more open question. After all, in the past fifty years the historical profession has changed considerably, and despite the perceptions of some within it, U.S. diplomatic history has as well. For one thing, according to my entirely unscientific observations over the past eight years, most younger scholars identify themselves as historians of U.S. foreign relations and/or international historians instead of diplomatic historians. The cultural turn has caught on with a significant segment of foreign relations historians, and they have integrated categories of race and gender fruitfully into the tapestry of our collective work. As a result, the sustained analysis of political economy that once seemed radical, and for which *Tragedy* became famous, now appears traditional. Moreover, an increasing proportion of younger SHAFR members have wisely heeded the call to re-internationalize the field. While the presidential library circuit remains on their research itineraries, they are as likely to be found overseas, and not only in Europe, as was the case with Samuel Flagg Bemis’s generation of multi-archival practitioners of diplomatic history. Williams by contrast was unapologetically Americentric in his analytic focus, defining himself first and foremost as a historian of the United States. (Analyzing wartime diplomacy with the Soviet Union, Williams wrote, “since this essay is about American diplomacy . . . [it] has to concentrate on American actions and the ideas behind them.”³) Having expanded the available universe of sources and methodologies, historians are analyzing a more complicated architecture of political, economic, cultural, and social power across national borders than did Williams. Rarely have I heard SHAFR members of my generation invoke *Tragedy* outside of conversations about where the field has been. To do so would seem to carry with it the air of refighting the scholarly disputes of the sixties, seventies and eighties rather than of advancing a cutting-edge research agenda.

In this light, *Tragedy* remains as an imperfect synthesis. Its arguments do not fully address all significant questions asked by practitioners in the field, and its analysis of the causes and consequences of U.S. foreign policy are ultimately incomplete. It is therefore possible to conclude that Williams and his most noted book have been

relegated exclusively to discussions of historiography and not of history. Worse for an author who defined history “as a way of learning” would be the prospect that, absent the fundamental change in the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy that he called for, *Tragedy* offers no insights into the tumultuous global events of our time.⁴ Despite all of its limitations, however, I hope that my contemporaries will not dismiss *Tragedy* as irrelevant. Fifty years after it was first published, it remains the best starting point for serious study of the history of U.S. foreign relations. As scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the U.S. interaction with the Third World, embraced a multi-archival approach, and developed more multi-faceted interpretations of agency and causation, they have too often confirmed that the history of U.S. diplomacy has had tragic results both at home and abroad in the broad sense that Williams intended, even as they have transformed significant aspects of his original thesis.

Much of the discussion related to *Tragedy* has centered upon two of its key arguments: the formulation of the open door interpretation of U.S. expansionism and Cold War revisionism. Indeed, Williams played a central part in developing each of those related historical interpretations, and they merit the protracted attention they have received. As important as those ideas are, however, the essence of *Tragedy* lies embedded in its title. Williams concluded that “[t]he tragedy of American diplomacy is not that it is evil, but that it denies and subverts American ideas and ideals.”⁵ As Melvyn Leffler reminds us, Williams began to develop this theme on the book’s second page, where he described how the United States tolerated “torture and terror” in Cuba and intervened to support the “economic and political restrictions” it had established there:

That sad result was not caused by purposeful malice, callous indifference, or ruthless and predatory exploitation. American leaders were not evil men. They did not conceive and ex[ecute] some dreadful conspiracy. Nor were they treacherous hypocrites. They believed deeply in the ideals they proclaimed, and they were sincere in arguing that their policies and actions would ultimately create a Cuba that would be responsibly self-governed, economically prosperous, and socially stable and happy. All, of course, in the

image of America.

Precisely for those reasons, however, American diplomacy contained the fundamental elements of tragedy.⁶

The tragedy, then, has been that although Americans most often proceeded into the world with the best of intentions, too often the effects of their actions were disastrous. For all of the discussions of Williams's alleged economic determination, supposed lack of patriotism, and real commitment to understanding, refining, and utilizing the work of Karl Marx, *Tragedy* remains first and foremost an idealist's plea that his country honor its stated principles. The United States, Williams argued, should not merely talk about self-determination but instead must permit other countries to choose their own leaders and their own political and economic systems. The United States ought not to obstruct those movements around the world that seek social justice for dominated populations; instead it should embrace them. Implicit in *Tragedy's* pages is the idea that Americans should concentrate on perfecting liberty and democracy at home rather than spreading a particular version of those concepts (which Williams would have argued includes market capitalism) abroad.

Far from limited to the Vietnam generation, *Tragedy's* themes resonate across time. To take examples from the past two decades, the Clinton administration supported the North American Free Trade Agreement, called for a Free Trade Area of the Americas, and ultimately backed most favored nation status for China. Each decision offered continuities with the open door principles expressed a century before. From embracing torture in the name of national security to prosecuting the war in Iraq with the eventual explanation that it would serve to spread democracy and American values, it is almost too easy to recount the ways that the George W. Bush administration pursued policies that fit into *Tragedy's* framework. It seems unlikely that Williams would have been surprised, but I find it hard to imagine that he would not have been severely disappointed.

Unlike many of the contributors to this roundtable, I never knew Williams; indeed, I was born a full decade after he left Madison for the Oregon coast. *Tragedy* nevertheless became central to my professional development in ways that I did not understand while it was happening. As I contemplated attending graduate school to study the history of U.S.

foreign relations, nearly all the professors I spoke with warned me against what would almost certainly be a monumental mistake. It was a dying field, they said. I would never find a job. If I was determined to continue on to graduate school (they were well aware of the difficult state of the academic job market even for freshly minted Ph.D.s in fields widely considered more cutting-edge), they suggested that I study social or cultural history instead. However, their very pragmatic and well-founded arguments could not convince me. I had enjoyed my coursework on the history of U.S. foreign relations and was particularly drawn to the work of Walter LaFeber and Emily Rosenberg. I wanted to gain a better understanding of the construction and use of power on a national and international scale. I wanted to understand more fully the role of the United States in opposing Third World social revolution. Without knowing it, because I did not read *Tragedy* until I started graduate school, I had set out on a path that Williams had blazed. While subsequent historians refined the ideas pursued in *Tragedy*, Williams wrote intelligently about many of the core questions that we confront: the causes of U.S. expansionism; the U.S. response to global social revolution; the role of ideas (especially ideas about the economy) in the construction of U.S. foreign policy; structural constraints on policymakers; and the consequences of U.S. policy abroad. The questions that Williams asked are still essential to the advancement of historical and policy analysis. *Tragedy* remains not only relevant, but also essential.

I have been unusually fortunate. Over the long odds that my undergraduate professors quoted, I found tenure-track employment as a historian of U.S. foreign relations with a research agenda that includes, among others, the themes listed above. In the process I have accrued a tremendous intellectual debt to Williams. So, to answer the question that began this essay: yes, at least some of us still read Williams, and if we are wise we will persist in reading him for at least the next fifty years.

Dustin Walcher is Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Political Science at Southern Oregon University.

Notes:

1. Bradford Perkins, "'The Tragedy of American Diplomacy': Twenty-Five Years After," reprinted in William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American*

Diplomacy, 4th ed. (New York, 1988), 313-334. The quotation is from p. 313.

2. See especially John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," *Diplomatic History* 17: 1-16; and Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1971). For early criticism, see Ruhl Bartlett, "Review of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* by William Appleman Williams," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46: 342-343. Perkins, "'The Tragedy of American Diplomacy': Twenty-Five Years After," 321.

3. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 4th ed. (New York, 1988), 217.

4. *Ibid.*, 13.

5. *Ibid.*, 291.

6. Melvyn P. Leffler, "Reflections on SHAFR at Forty," *Diplomatic History* 31: 413-417. Williams made minor alterations in the text between the second and third editions. Although Leffler uses the 1962 edition, the above quotation reflects Williams' 1972 edits. See Williams, *Tragedy*, 4th ed., 2.

Critically Relevant and Genuinely Critical

Vanessa Walker

As a biology major at a small liberal arts school, I wandered unsuspectingly into my first history class my junior year of college to fulfill a humanities requirement for my degree. While I came for four humanities credits, what I received was a whole new way to think about the world around me and, eventually, a new career path. That history course—the United States in Vietnam—opened up new horizons, and I began to explore U.S. history and political affairs with the zeal of a convert. After a discussion about contemporary foreign policy, my professor, David F. Schmitz, handed me a copy of William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, hinting, as the book's introduction did, that "at the end of such a review of the past, we return to the present better informed."¹

The cover of my 1972 edition touted Williams as "America's leading radical historian," so I was a bit surprised to find that Williams did not present the United States as inherently evil or portray its aspirations and foundational principles as fatally flawed. The "tragedy" for Williams was not the absence of ideals or simple greed and power-lust on the part of U.S. policymakers, but rather the hell of good intentions, where admirable ideals, distorted in their application, subverted the ends. What resonated with me was not an argument about

open door imperialism, free markets, or economic determinism, but rather, Williams's lack of cynicism about and indeed championing of the principles at the core of U.S. foreign policy. Williams was not dismissive of the value of American ideals of democracy and self-determination, nor was the book skeptical about the sincerity of U.S. leaders in espousing those ideals. What he lamented was the narrowness of vision that imprisoned these ideals in counterproductive policies.

Williams argued that to transcend tragedy, one has to grapple with the nation's mistakes and engage the ideas of those with whom one disagrees. It is easy to decry corporate greed and power-hungry leaders. It is harder to see that your adversaries share your own best, most sincerely held ideals, and that it is precisely those ideals that lead to the policies that you so adamantly disagree with. It is indeed the shared territory of these ideals that makes the recent debates about the Iraq War, torture as an interrogation technique, and post-9/11 foreign policy so contentious, so personal, and so painful. When considered within the framework of a Williams-style tragedy, it is clear that the problem is not, nor has it ever been, simply the presence or absence of ideals. These debates are not about those who believe in democracy and those who do not, those who want to protect freedom and those who want to destroy it, those who want to strengthen the United States, and those who want to weaken it. Rather, the devil is in the details of translating principles into actions. No nation can be without higher national ideals, shared values, and good intentions. Yet the ways in which nations apply these values must be closely examined so that they do not obscure the means used to achieve them, so that ideals do not become zealotry, justifying any exploit in their name.

Works like *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* are an essential part of a process of national self-examination. In the introduction to *Tragedy* Williams declared that "history is a mirror in which, if we are honest enough, we can see ourselves as we are as well as the way we would like to be," and he clearly intended his book to call attention to the

Ultimately, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* is a reminder that ideas matter but that ideas without reflection or history are as dangerous as they are vital. We need historians to help place these ideas in a broader context so that we remain aware of their importance, their larger meaning, and their corruptibility.

discrepancies between the two images.² It is precisely the historian's quest for objectivity and perspective that gives the profession a unique position from which to evaluate and critique these discrepancies. Historians like Williams are thus necessary to break through the walls between academia and policymaking, between scholarly pursuits and civic discourse, to facilitate new, productive debates. The

history of U.S. foreign relations should not simply be reduced to a proxy discussion of current conflicts and policy issues. However, historians should not shy away from allowing the present to pose new questions about the past, challenging previous assumptions, and in turn, offering new light on contemporary problems and addressing the gap between intent and outcome.

The Tragedy of American Diplomacy helped give my undergraduate studies meaning beyond the classroom; it did not ask me to give up my ideals, but encouraged me to ask how those ideals could be better served. Thus, as my like-minded friends applied to law school, the Foreign Service, government internships, Teach for America, and non-profit organizations, I applied to graduate school in history. My dog-eared copy of Williams has become a touchstone for me, not for its content and analysis, but as a reminder that history's importance transcends academia. A gift from an inspired and dedicated professor, my copy also reminds me that excitement and eagerness to learn come, in large part, from relevance and a teacher's ability to help students find those connections between their studies and their world. The vast majority of our students will not become historians. Raising questions pertinent to both historical topics and current issues, however, can encourage them to think in fresh ways about the issues they face, to debate important ideas, and challenge their own assumptions.

Ultimately, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* is a reminder that ideas matter but that ideas without reflection or history are as dangerous as they are vital. We need historians to help place these ideas in a broader context so that we remain aware of their importance, their larger meaning, and their corruptibility.

Quoting Oliver Cromwell, Williams admonishes policymakers and fellow historians alike: "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, consider that ye may be mistaken."³ Williams's legacy lies in the boldness of his quest, his engagement with the contemporary issues of his time, in his willingness to take the ideas he critiques seriously and, perhaps most important, in his reminder that we too may be mistaken.

Vanessa Walker is a Ph.D Candidate in U.S. History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a 2009-2010 Fellow at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs.

Notes:

1. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1972), 13.
2. *Ibid.*, 16.
3. *Ibid.*

Announcement Re: *Diplomatic History*

SHAFR Council directed immediate publication of the following motion on *Diplomatic History* that it approved at its meeting on June 25, 2009:

- 1) Council approves reappointment of Robert Schulzinger and Thomas Zeiler as Editor-in-Chief and Executive Editor, respectively, for the 2009-2013 term.
- 2) A notice will be posted immediately in *Passport* that the SHAFR will appoint a committee in 2012 to consider applications for the editorship, for a term beginning in August 2013.
- 3) The current editors will be eligible (and cordially invited) to submit an application to that committee for reappointment.
- 4) The editor will serve ex officio on the committee to renegotiate the *Diplomatic History* contract.

“Evet We Can”: President Barack Obama’s Visit to Turkey and the State of Turkish-American Relations

Edward P. Kohn

The following essay is part of the View From Overseas, which is an occasional series that consists of short pieces written by someone outside of the United States, examining the views held by the people and government in their country about the United States. SHAFR members who are living abroad, even temporarily, or who have contacts abroad that might be well-positioned to write such pieces are encouraged to contact the editor, Mitch Lerner, at passport@osu.edu.

On the eve of President Barack Obama’s April visit to Turkey, the *Hurriyet*, a nationally circulated newspaper, summed up the country’s feelings about the United States in a front-page address to the American president. “You come to a country that is a friend of the U.S.,” the paper said. “However, our hearts have been broken in the last eight years. Now is the time to make repairs.” Indeed, in recent years it has been easy to forget that the United States and Turkey are allies and that each country would consider an attack on the other the same as an attack on itself. In fact, in 2001, in response to September 11, Turkey voted with its NATO allies to invoke Article V of the alliance, stating “an attack on one is an attack on all.” In all likelihood the two countries had never been closer.

Soon after that, however, relations between the United States and Turkey began to go downhill. In 2003 the Turkish Parliament refused the United States permission (by a margin of only twelve votes) to use Turkey as a jumping-off point for the invasion of neighboring Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld later asserted that Turkey’s move had made American occupation of Iraq more difficult, implying that the Turkish vote had cost American lives. Shortly after the Iraq invasion, on July 4, 2003, the infamous “hood event,” took place, when American troops captured Turkish military personnel operating in northern Iraq and led them away in hoods. Although most Americans remain unaware of this incident, it instantly became notorious among Turks. It inspired a best-selling Turkish book, *Metal Storm*, which describes a war between Turkey and the United States and ends with a Turkish agent exploding a nuclear bomb in Washington, D.C. The “hood event” also formed the basis of a popular Turkish film, the 2006 “Valley of the Wolves: Iraq.” Both the book and the film were widely seen as reflecting a spike in Turkish anti-Americanism, a perception that appeared to be confirmed by the results of a 2007 poll by the Pew Center. According to this survey of anti-Americanism in forty-seven countries, Turkey topped the list, with only nine percent of Turks holding

a favorable opinion of the United States. Even Pakistanis and Palestinians viewed America more favorably.

Americans and Turks alike wondered what was going on. The United States and Turkey were supposed to be allies. They were partners in NATO, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and G-20; they cooperated on the Joint Strike Fighter program; and the United States was the most vocal supporter of Turkey’s membership in the EU. Certainly Turkey was not happy with the Iraq War and America’s occupation of a neighboring country. The occupation complicated Turkey’s long-standing conflict with the Kurdish paramilitary group, the PKK, as Kurdish fighters operating out of northern Iraq launched attacks on Turkish troops. The October 2007 PKK ambush that left seventeen Turkish soldiers dead was widely blamed on the United States. That same year Turkey withdrew its ambassador to Washington following the introduction of a House resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide of World War I.

It is significant that when Turks were asked in 2007 what exactly they disliked most about the United States, many of them said President George Bush. In other words, Turkish anti-Americanism focused specifically on the administration and its foreign policy rather than on America or Americans in general. Indeed, Turkish anti-Americanism in those years was largely confined to the press, politicians, and popular culture. There were no demonstrations in front of the American embassy in Ankara and no protests against Americans in Turkey. The atmosphere in Turkey was in stark contrast to the Vietnam era, when students at Ankara’s Middle East Technical University set fire to the American ambassador’s car.

Aside from formal treaties and agreements between Turkey and the United States, there is much that binds the two countries together. As in much of the rest of the world, American culture, including its consumer culture, has taken deep root in Turkey. Turks drink coffee at Starbucks while talking on iPhones onto which they have downloaded the newest Justin Timberlake/Ciara music video. They watch American television with Turkish subtitles, and read American bestsellers translated into Turkish. The Fulbright exchange program regularly brings guest lecturers from American universities, and it affords opportunities for Turkish students to study and conduct research in the United States. Ankara boasts a Turkish-American Association, an American Studies Association, and an American Research Institute.

Aside from the obvious differences between a largely Muslim country and one that is largely Judeo-Christian, there is much to draw the United States and Turkey together, even where religion is concerned. Turks and Americans share a level of religiosity that sets them apart from the countries of Western Europe. Over ninety percent of Turks and Americans say they believe in God, while a 2006 *Science* magazine poll showed that of thirty-four European countries (plus the United States and Japan), Turkey and the United States ranked lowest in the number of citizens who believe in evolution. Such rejection of scientific theory underscores the conflict between traditionalism and modernism that both countries have experienced. In the United States, there is a persistent struggle between advocates of constitutional separation of church and state and those who want to institute school prayer and the teaching of creationism in public schools. Since the 1970s Christian fundamentalism has increasingly asserted itself over the life, politics, and culture of the United States. A similar tension exists within Turkey. In 1923 the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, established the principle of secularism for this overwhelmingly Muslim nation. Women's headscarves have been banned from classrooms and from the Turkish Parliament. At the same time, Turkey has a Department of Religious Affairs that authorizes the building of new mosques and actually employs every imam. In other words, every Muslim cleric in Turkey is a civil servant. The state is not separate from the "church" in Turkey; instead, the state has co-opted it.

In such religious countries, religion inevitably slips into the public discourse. In the United States it is hard to imagine an avowed atheist ever being elected to the presidency, as candidates openly discuss their faith. In Turkey, the wall that divides Islam from society is a fragile one indeed. The recently re-elected governing party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), has its roots in a previously outlawed Islamic political party. The wives of the Turkish prime minister and president both wear headscarves at all state and public functions. And the government has been inching toward an expansion of the public and educational role of Islam. For about a week in 2008, many female students could be seen wearing headscarves in university classrooms as the Parliament briefly enacted a law allowing this display of faith before the Supreme Court finally declared it unconstitutional. The government also sought to accredit private religious schools that teach the Koran, thus allowing these schools to be a stepping-stone to a university education. For the first time in the Republic's history, banknotes were issued with portraits of famous Turks other than Ataturk. For those Turks who see secularism as a founding pillar of the Turkish Republic, these measures were a disturbing attack on Ataturk's legacy. They led to a great schism within Turkey and prompted many prominent Turks to rally against the government. The government responded by arresting scores of military personnel and civilians for allegedly plotting a coup.

Such was the situation in Turkey and in Turkish-American relations when Barack Obama arrived in Ankara on April 5. Not since President Bill Clinton visited in 1999 was an American's visit to Turkey so warmly anticipated. Many Turks, especially the young, had closely followed the U.S. elections, had watched the Will.i.am "Yes, We Can" video on YouTube, and had noted Obama's familiarity with Islam and his middle name, Hussein. They had heard the line from Obama's inaugural address: "To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect." While much of the rest of the world interpreted Obama's Turkey visit as simply about sending a message to the greater Muslim world, Turks saw the visit as being about them and their

country and waited to see how the new president would deal with sensitive issues in Turkish-American relations.

For a *yabancı* (foreigner) in Turkey, negotiating Turkish society and history can be like walking through a minefield. Some issues are just too explosive to touch: the situation of the Turkish Kurds, the treatment of minorities, and particularly the mass killings of Armenians. And certain events and figures of Turkish history, especially the Republic's founder, Ataturk, must be acknowledged with the greatest respect. No wonder, then, that Turkish students who watched the speech to Parliament with me felt that it resembled "a history lesson." Obama touched on all the expected topics: Ataturk, the Truman Doctrine, and the NATO alliance. The gravity of his speech was unfortunately marred by a rather lame reference to Turkish NBA players Hedo Turkoglu and Mehmet Okur, which drew only lukewarm applause from an audience made up largely of soccer fans. Obama went on to speak of economic cooperation and America's support for Turkish EU membership. The president then congratulated Turkey on recent political and civil rights reforms before touching on the "terrible events of 1915," a reference to the mass killings of Armenians. Cyprus, Palestine and Israel, the threat of a nuclear Iran, support for Turkish efforts against PKK "terror," and Turkish support for America's war in Afghanistan all received a prominent place in the president's address.

These are the references that Turks took most note of, while American observers underscored the next part of the speech as the true reason for the president's visit to a Muslim country. "So let me say this as clearly as I can," President Obama said. "The United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam." This statement was followed by a lengthy assertion of respect for and a deep appreciation of the Islamic faith and a call for building bridges between Christians and Muslims. Then Obama played his Muslim trump card: "The United States has been enriched by Muslim Americans," he declared. "Many other Americans have Muslims in their families or have lived in a Muslim-majority country. I know, because I am one of them." This statement received warm applause.

With this affirmation of America's respect for Islam, the president had achieved the central goal of his trip to Turkey. The trip and the speech to Turkey's Parliament were a precursor to the president's June trip to the Middle East and his address to the Egyptian Parliament. There Obama made a direct reference to his Ankara remark—"The United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam"—and thereby underscored once again the common American view that America's road to the Middle East goes through Turkey.

In Turkey, however, the media searched for signs of Obama's stand on Turkish secularism. President Bush liked to call Turkey a "moderate Islamic state," a term Turkish secularists found insulting. Lumping Turkey together with the rest of the Muslim world seemed implicitly to link Turkey with the Arab states and even with the kind of Islamic extremism behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It did not reflect a true understanding of Turkey's Ottoman and democratic roots. Obama's April 6 speech to the Turkish Parliament showed that the new American president understood Turkish history and Turkey's unique place in the world, as a secular, non-Arab Muslim society.

Yet only weeks after Obama's visit, events showed how difficult the path would be for Turks and Americans seeking a new way forward. On April 24, the White House released the president's statement on Armenian Remembrance Day. While Obama assiduously avoided using the term "genocide," he did not mince words in describing "the 1.5 million Armenians who were subsequently massacred or marched to their death in

1933, after he was out of office, and by that time Europe and Japan had begun vigorously rearming. The bulk of Hoover's papers concerning disarmament can be found in the Disarmament sub-series of the Foreign Affairs series.

For the United States, the Manchurian Crisis posed the greatest threat of war during Hoover's administration. The Japanese policy of expansionism in China accelerated in the late 1920s and early 1930s and became a major concern of the U.S. government. After Japan seized control of Manchuria in late 1931, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson sent notes to both China and Japan declaring that the U.S. government would not recognize any territorial or administrative changes the Japanese might impose upon China. In March 1932 the Assembly of the League of Nations unanimously adopted an anti-Japanese resolution incorporating virtually verbatim the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition. The Hoover administration's response to the crisis is documented in the Manchurian Crisis sub-series of the Foreign Affairs series.

The Hoover administration also faced an ongoing problem involving the World War I debts that European nations owed to American banks and the U.S. government. In April 1931 the economies of several European nations collapsed in rapid succession as a result of the Depression and staggering war debt or reparations payments. U.S. trade with Europe virtually ceased, and European banks and governments began to default on American loans. Hoover issued a public statement in June proposing a one-year moratorium on World War I reparations payments and war debts. He hoped the moratorium would give the United States time to restructure the crushing payments that were crippling many of Europe's economies and aggravating the Depression throughout the world. However, Congress pointedly ignored his request to review the war debts dilemma because there was strong public sentiment that debtor nations should keep their promises to pay. Congress later issued a declaration opposing any restructuring of obligations owed to the United States. The Financial sub-series of the Foreign Affairs series deals with the moratorium agreement and war debts and reparations. Related documents may be found in the State and Treasury Departments sub-series of the Cabinet Offices series and under "Business," "Chronology of Important Economic and Financial Events," and "Financial Matters" in the Subject File.

Many of the more than 300 collections at the Hoover Library contain significant documentation on U.S. foreign relations. Finding aids for all of the smaller collections can be found at <http://www.ecommcode2.com/hover/research/historicalmaterials/hmother.html>.

There are five collections that are extraordinarily rich resources for foreign affairs research. William R. Castle, Jr., was ambassador to Japan, undersecretary of state, and (briefly) acting secretary of state during the Hoover administration, having previously served as a division chief and assistant secretary of state. In his papers there are fourteen containers of diplomatic correspondence, which Castle arranged in bound volumes by country, then chronologically. A complete index of this correspondence has not yet been created, so it is very difficult to access this material in any meaningful way without visiting the research room. The bound volumes, as well as the remainder of the collection, are described in detail in the online finding aid. Researchers should also note that Castle's detailed diary is in the collection of Harvard University; a microfilm copy and index are available at the Hoover Library.

The papers of Irwin B. Laughlin are arranged in one large alphabetic file and consist almost entirely of diplomatic correspondence. At first glance, much of Laughlin's correspondence with fellow diplomats appears to be no more than routine diplomatic business. However, students of the State Department in the period between 1905 and 1933 and biographers of diplomatic figures will be interested in the insights these men's comments furnish into the operation of the department, their working conditions, and their colleagues. Three periods in Laughlin's diplomatic career supply the bulk of this collection: 1912-19, when he was secretary and councilor of the embassy in London; 1924-26, when he was minister to Greece; and 1929-33, when he was ambassador to monarchist and republican Spain. The collection contains only a small number of documents pertaining to his earlier service in the Far East, Paris, and Berlin (1903-12).

The papers of Truman Smith document his service as American military attaché in Berlin from 1935 to 1939. From this unique vantage point he observed and reported on the rearmament of the German army and air forces and the transformation of the German economy. In a brilliant stroke, Smith arranged to have Col. Charles A.

Lindbergh inspect the German aircraft industry and the reorganized Luftwaffe in May of 1936. As a result of his observations, Lindbergh returned to the United States in 1939 determined to campaign for greater military preparations and American neutrality. Students of the interwar years will be delighted to find that this collection contains not one but three eyewitness accounts of life in Germany in the 1930s, including his air intelligence reports and an autobiography, "Facts of Life," that contains additional comments on his service in Berlin and the aftermath of the Lindbergh-Smith reports. The third account is that of Mrs. Smith, which she compiled from her diaries.

The papers of Hugh R. Wilson are a very small collection, just four containers, consisting primarily of carbon copies of diplomatic correspondence filed alphabetically by correspondent. Wilson was a career diplomat who had a knack for being in exciting places at exciting times. He served in Berlin during World War I, Tokyo during the 1923 earthquake, and Geneva during the many peace conferences of the 1920s and 30s. He was also ambassador to Germany in 1938 and 1939. In addition to relaying details of his adventures, Wilson's correspondence illustrates in colorful detail the inner workings of the Foreign Service "family."

The papers of Francis White are particularly strong on Latin America. After serving in Peking, Tehran and Havana, White became chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs in 1923 and assistant secretary of state in 1927. White's profound interest and expertise in Latin American affairs are documented by materials accumulated during his service as councilor of the American delegation to the Sixth International Conference of American States at Havana in 1928 and its direct offshoot—the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration at Washington, 1928-29. He was also a delegate to the Fourth Pan American Commercial Conference at Washington in 1931 and served as chairman of the Commission of Neutrals for the Bolivia/Paraguay dispute in the Chaco from 1929 to 1933. White's files also contain materials documenting his involvement in the Peru-Colombia question over Leticia, the Guatemala-Honduras boundary dispute, Panama, the Platt Amendment with Cuba, and the Tacna-Arica Boundary Commission.

Other collections with substantial foreign affairs components include the papers of Elmer Bougerie, a

the final days of the Ottoman Empire." Armenians were unhappy that Obama did not fulfill previous pledges to call the catastrophe a "genocide." The president's efforts to avoid using the word were probably what prompted Turkish President Gul to issue a relatively mild protest. He said only that he "didn't agree with some things" in Obama's statement. In turn, Turkish nationalists slammed the government for not protesting the Armenian Remembrance Day statement more strongly.

The days following Obama's visit to Turkey also witnessed a new round of arrests. Exactly one week after Obama stood in Parliament and congratulated Turkey on liberalizing reforms, police arrested thirty-nine people, including several current and former rectors of Turkish universities, for allegedly plotting a coup against the government. This so-called "academic wave" of arrests had apparently been planned for some time; the government delayed them just long enough so that they did not correspond too closely to Obama's visit. Such events showed that long-standing irritations in Turkish-American relations had not simply vanished because of Obama's visit to Turkey and would constitute serious obstacles to a truly warm understanding between the two nations.

If nothing else, President Obama helped change the tone and rhetoric of Turkish-American relations. By acknowledging Turkey's secular nature and expressing

his sincere respect for the Muslim world, Obama moved the United States away from the dark days when President George W. Bush referred to America's war in Afghanistan as a "crusade." Just as they responded enthusiastically to Bill Clinton's charisma, Turks embraced Obama as young, fresh, and different. The American president's Muslim middle name and African heritage challenged Turks' long-held view of the United States as a predominantly racist country controlled by Jews and Christian fundamentalists. Because so many aspects of Turkish-American relations are institutionalized through treaties and economic agreements, no profound alteration of the status quo is on the immediate horizon. Yet by choosing to visit Turkey within his first ninety days in office, by showing his sensitivity to Turkish concerns over secularism and the Armenian question, and by reaching out to the Muslim world, Obama may have done more for Turkish-American relations in a single speech than anyone since Harry Truman in 1947.

Edward P. Kohn is Assistant Professor of History at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey.

Congratulations to the Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grant Winners!

Graduate Students

- Dina Fainberg**, Rutgers University. *Advisor: David Fogelson* (\$4,000)
Thomas D. Westerman, University of Connecticut. *Advisor: Frank Costigliola* (\$4,000)
Jacob Eder, University of Pennsylvania. *Advisor: Ronald Granieri* (\$3,000)
Kelly J. Shannon, Temple University. *Advisor: Richard Immerman* (\$3,000)
Mara Drogan, State University of New York, Albany. *Advisor: Lawrence Wittner* (\$2,000)
Jennifer Miller, University of Wisconsin. *Advisor: Jeremi Suri* (\$2,000)
Sudina Paungpetch, Texas A&M University. *Advisor: Terry H. Anderson* (\$2,000)
Thomas Field, London School of Economics & Political Science. *Advisor: Odd Arne Westad* (\$2,000)
James Wilson, University of Virginia. *Advisor: Melvyn P. Leffler* (\$2,000)
Patrick Sharma, UCLA. *Advisor: Ellen Carol DuBois* (\$2,000)
Jamie Sedgwick, University of British Columbia. *Advisor: George Egerton* (\$2,000)

Faculty

- Sarah E. Cornell**, University of New Mexico (\$2,000)
Megan Threlkeld, Denison University (\$2,000)



SHAFR at Play: Highlights from the 2009





SHAFR Conference in Falls Church, VA



2009 SHAFR Award Winners

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

Jason C. Parker

Jason C. Parker, *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)

In *Brother's Keeper*, Jason C. Parker of Texas A&M University has produced an outstanding work of multiarchival diplomatic history. Parker's greatest achievement is his success in weaving a coherent and compelling narrative out of so many different actors in so many places. From Washington to Harlem, and from London to Kingston, he illuminates a complicated story of imperial rivalry and cooperation from the late 1930s through World War II and into the Cold War. His analysis weaves together wartime alliances, postwar national security, decolonization, and Caribbean economic development. Parker traveled to twenty-two archives in seven countries to tell the story of the United States' role in the British Caribbean. Moving outside the halls of state power, Parker also sheds light on what he calls the "Harlem nexus," a network of activists, intellectuals, and immigrants who represented another force shaping U.S. policy toward independence efforts in the West Indies. The result of Parker's ambitious research is a book that contributes to multiple fields. His skillful analysis of U.S. preference for a moderate "federation" framework unifying Jamaica, Trinidad, and the rest of the British Caribbean offers insight for all historians of decolonization. Parker's account of U.S. concerns with military bases and strategic bauxite reserves underscores the 1940s rise of U.S. security policy. In addition, his attention to the influence of Caribbean political leaders and their diasporic allies in the United States, especially in Harlem, provides a political framework on which cultural historians and historians of immigration can ground their studies. In sum, *Brother's Keeper* embodies both classic multinational diplomatic history and an expanded "big tent" approach to U.S. foreign relations history. We are pleased to award the Bernath Prize to this worthy book.

--Christopher Endy
California State, Los Angeles

Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

Elizabeth Borgwardt

The Bernath Lecture Committee takes great pleasure in selecting Elizabeth Borgwardt as the winner of this year's prize. Elizabeth Borgwardt is one of the brightest, most accomplished individuals in our profession today. She received her bachelor's and master's degrees at Cambridge University in Great Britain, her juris doctorate at Harvard Law School, and her Ph.D. at Stanford University. She has won four book prizes, including the Stuart Bernath Prize for her first book, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights*. Students praise her book for its accessibility, vividness, and wit; scholars for its erudition, breadth, and originality. Borgwardt's research shows how the experiences of economic havoc and war inspired not only Americans, but also peoples worldwide to embrace a new vision of the responsibility of humans to one another. *A New Deal for the World* is especially timely today in the face of similar challenges. Elizabeth Borgwardt has been a visiting scholar at the University of Heidelberg and the Charles Warren Center at Harvard, and is the winner of two awards for teaching. She is currently associate professor of history at Washington University in Saint Louis. Her work and dedication do honor to the memory of Stuart Bernath.

--Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman
San Diego State University

Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

Brian Etheridge

The Selection Committee for the Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize is pleased to announce that the 2009 recipient is Dr. Brian Etheridge (Louisiana Tech University). His article, "The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War America," appeared in the April 2008 edition of *Diplomatic History*. Committee members praised the article as being well-written, analytically sophisticated, and making a significant contribution to the historiography of U.S. cultural diplomacy.

--Michael L. Krenn
Appalachian State

Robert Ferrell Prize

George C. Herring

SHAFR's Robert Ferrell Prize Committee, consisting of Nancy Tucker of Georgetown University, Bill Miscamble of Notre Dame University, and myself (as chair) has unanimously agreed to award this year's Ferrell Prize to George C. Herring for his magisterial book, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, published by Oxford University Press.

A contribution to the multi-volume series, *The Oxford History of the United States*, George Herring's book offers a masterful interpretive synthesis of America's interaction with the wider world, from the era of the Founding Fathers to the Iraq War. In the only thematic volume in that distinguished series, he deftly interweaves the story of American foreign relations and expansion with the broader story of American history writ large. In so doing, Herring demonstrates the centrality of foreign affairs to the overall history of the United States, from the late 18th century to the early 21st.

Our committee was extremely impressed with the book's sweep and breadth, the clarity of its prose, and the balance and sophistication of its interpretive judgments. Despite its nearly 1,000-page length, *From Colony to Superpower* remains a remarkably fast-paced, accessible narrative that should prove as appealing to general readers as it will be invaluable to specialists. Drawing from his own mature and judicious reading of an exhaustive range of primary and secondary sources, and informed throughout by recent scholarly literature that has emphasized the cultural, ideological, and racial dimensions of U.S. interactions with other states and peoples, Herring has provided an authoritative, up-to-date, and broadly conceived account of American diplomatic history. His study speaks to all of the critical themes and covers all of the major episodes in the history of American foreign relations; and it does so in an incisive, measured, and oftentimes provocative manner.

Our committee salutes George Herring for what it considers a monumental achievement. We expect that *From Colony to Superpower* will long remain the standard interpretive overview of the history of American foreign relations. This is a book that will be indispensable not just to specialists in U.S. diplomatic history—but to all historians of the United States.

--Robert J. McMahon
Ohio State University

Historical Resources on Foreign Policy at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library-Museum

Spencer Howard

The Herbert Hoover Presidential Library-Museum is located in West Branch, Iowa, just a few hundred yards from Hoover's birthplace and final resting place. As part of the presidential library system administered by the National Archives and Records Administration, the Hoover Library contains approximately 2,500 linear feet of the papers of Herbert Hoover as well as copies of selected record groups from the National Archives documenting the activities of federal agencies connected to Hoover. The library also houses the papers of Mrs. Lou Henry Hoover and over 300 other collections from individuals who worked with Herbert Hoover or were associated with him. Along with Hoover's life and presidency, other areas of research interest covered by the manuscript collections include atomic energy, aviation, international relief work, agricultural economics, the isolationist movement prior to World War II, and conservative political thought in the mid-twentieth century. Audiovisual holdings at the Hoover Library include almost 40,000 still photos, 153,000 feet of motion picture film, 420 hours of audio tape, 19 hours of video tape, 79 audio discs, and transcripts of 443 oral history interviews.

The Herbert Hoover Papers span Hoover's lifetime from his birth in West Branch in 1874 to his death in New York City in 1964. To facilitate research, the library has divided the collection chronologically into five subgroups, each pertaining to a distinct period in Hoover's long career of public service: Pre-Commerce (1874-1921), Commerce (1921-1928), Campaign & Transition (1928-1929), Presidential Period (1929-1933) and Post-Presidential Period (1933-1964). Guides to the Hoover Papers can be found online at <http://www.ecommcode2.com/hoover/research/hooverpapers/index.html>.

Before his entry onto the American political stage in the 1920s, Hoover made a name for himself on the international scene, first in his early

career as an international mining engineer and consultant and more famously through his humanitarian efforts during and after World War I. Limited documentation of Hoover's mining career, early humanitarian work, and involvement with the Wilson administration and relief activities in post-war Europe can be found in the Pre-Commerce subgroup. More detailed records can be found at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, <http://www.hoover.org/>. Hoover's Commerce papers reveal his involvement with many foreign policy initiatives during the Harding and Coolidge administrations, including the World Foreign Debt Commission, the early phases of the St. Lawrence Seaway project, and the rapid expansion of the Commerce Department's Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.

The Presidential Period papers are broken down into a number of series, four of which are most useful for researchers interested in foreign policy. The Foreign Affairs series, which is the most relevant, is divided into seven sub-series by topic. The Cabinet Offices series contains correspondence between the White House and the State Department. Most of the correspondence is purely administrative, but researchers should not overlook the series, because it does contain some hidden gems. The Subject File series is a large topical file, arranged alphabetically. Finally, the Secretary's File series, the largest series in the presidential subgroup, contains some correspondence, numerous cross-references, and abstracts of letters referred to various governmental departments and agencies for attention. The cross-references in the Secretary's File are very helpful in developing leads to information within other series.

Hoover had hoped to make foreign relations a centerpiece of his administration, but his administration's accomplishments in foreign affairs were largely

overshadowed by the beginning of the Great Depression at home. Between the election and the inauguration, he traveled to Central and South America, visited with leaders, and began formulating what would be known as the Good Neighbor Policy. He promised to improve diplomatic relations and to remove troops that had been sent to "keep the peace" in several Latin American countries. The records of Hoover's pre-inaugural trip to Latin America can be found in the Campaign and Transition subgroup; documents concerning Latin American relations after the inauguration can be found in the Presidential Period subgroup primarily within the Foreign Affairs series and the Subject File series.

Hoover was an ardent advocate of world peace and cooperation between nations. He had been a vocal proponent of the League of Nations after World War I, and as president he supported the establishment of a World Court and encouraged legislation, defeated in the Senate, to make the United States a member. Documents concerning the World Court can be found in the Judicial sub-series of the Foreign Affairs series. Hoover also took a strong interest in disarmament, a goal he pursued with even greater urgency as the Depression began. He believed that if all nations would cooperate to reduce expenditures on armaments, the money saved could be put to use fighting the Depression through public works projects and programs to increase employment. He proposed cutting the number of submarines and battleships in all navies by one third and sought unsuccessfully to persuade the international community to eliminate all bombers, tanks, and chemical warfare. The London Naval Conference of 1930 successfully reduced the rate of growth of the navies of the Big Five (the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy), but the World Disarmament Conference Hoover called for did not convene until

Foreign Service officer who served in Africa, Mexico and West Germany in the 1940s and 1950s; Kenneth Colegrove, a political scientist at Northwestern University who served in Japan as a consultant to the OSS and General MacArthur at the end of World War II; Roy Tasco Davis, who served as envoy to Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Panama and was later named ambassador to Haiti; Edward Durand, an economist who served in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and later served on the U.S. Tariff Commission; Hugh Gibson, a Foreign Service officer who served in Honduras, Cuba, Belgium, Poland and Switzerland and was involved with several disarmament conferences; Henry Holthusen, a Foreign Service officer who served in Japan, Turkey, and Egypt; Joseph E. Johnson, a history professor who served in a variety of roles with the State Department, was a special envoy to the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine in 1961 and was involved with the creation of the United Nations; Nathan William MacChesney, who served as U. S. minister to Canada (unconfirmed) from 1932 to 1933 and consul general to Thailand from 1924 to 1954; Hanford MacNider, a businessman and founder of the American Legion who served as minister to Canada from 1930 to 1932; Ferdinand Mayer, a Foreign Service officer who served in Canada, Peru, Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany, and Haiti; and Henry J. Taylor, a journalist and author who served as ambassador to Switzerland from 1957 to 1961.

The research room at the Hoover Library is open weekdays from 8:45 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and 12:30 p.m. to 4:45 p.m., and is closed on weekends and federal holidays. Researchers should bring some form of photo identification with them for registration. Appointments are not necessary, but researchers are strongly encouraged to contact the research room in advance of their arrival. The archives staff can be contacted by email at hoover.library@nara.gov, telephone (319) 643-5301, or FAX (319) 643-6045.

Spencer Howard is Archives Technician at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library-Museum.

Call for Contributors

The Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations is looking for contributors to a new series of lesson plans for secondary teachers. Our first set of topics is below.

If you would like to be considered as a contributing editor for one or more of the topics, please submit a one paragraph summary of how you would approach the topic and a brief C.V. to the SHAFR Director of Secondary Education, John Tully, at tullyj@ccsu.edu.

We especially welcome joint submissions from SHAFR members and secondary teachers, so please share this announcement with local teachers in your area.

We have a limited number of stipends available for those selected. We would like to have the first draft of the lesson plans completed in the fall semester.

The typical lesson plan will have clear, measurable objectives of what the students will learn, a variety of primary sources for students to explore, strategies for opening and closing the lesson, and suggestions for further reading for both teachers and students.

Additional information is available at the SHAFR web site www.shafrr.org, under the teaching-secondary education tab.

- The Jay Treaty
- The Louisiana Purchase
- War of 1812: Another War for Independence?
- The United States and the Republic of Texas
- Slavery and Civil War Diplomacy
- The Philadelphia World's Fair, 1876
- The Philippines after the Spanish-American War
- Wilson's Vision of the Postwar World
- FDR and Great Britain in the 1930s
- The Yalta Conference
- The Marshall Plan
- How "Cold" was the Cold War?
- The United States and Iran: Troubled Past
- Was the Space Race about Space?
- The United States and the Middle East: 1945-1967
- Nixon Goes to China
- Ronald Reagan and the End of the Cold War
- The Bush Doctrine: Old or New Strategy?

In Memoriam: John E. Taylor

Few archivists can have had as much influence on as many historians as John E. Taylor of the National Archives and Records Administration. Taylor, who died at the age of 87 at his Washington home on September 20, 2008, worked at the archives for more than sixty years and probably dealt with more researchers than any other staff member. He joined the archives in the first week of September 1945 and specialized first in World War II documents and later in the records of the OSS (Office of Special Services), the CIA, and the NSA. Because books on those subjects sell well, and because the authors often thanked him for his help, Taylor became one of the world's best-known archivists. The more those authors published, the more his fame grew.

Many researchers revered him for his knowledge of the files—their sources. But they liked him because of his avuncular kindness. He would reassure young researchers, far from home and daunted by the hundreds of files they faced, that they could make a contribution to knowledge. He could sense when a researcher seemed adrift, and he would suggest looking at some other source. His kindness and sensitivity were the reason former researchers would telephone him years later from around the world—many of them from Japan—to tell him of their latest project, to ask for his advice, or simply to report a marriage or the birth of a child.

Many groups honored him. The OSS Society gave him its Distinguished Service Award for his decades of work with OSS files. The National Archives, the National Intelligence Study Center, the Embassy of Japan, and the American Jewish Historical Society gave him awards. The archive's John E. Taylor Collection of almost 1,000 books on espionage and intelligence, many of whose authors he helped, stands as a monument to his contributions to scholarship.

Taylor's legacy also lies in the many historians he helped. His longevity ensured that he would deal with many young historians and writers who had to discover on their first visit that an archive is not a library and that they had to learn different ways of research. From his long-time aerie in Room 13W in the National Archives building on Pennsylvania Avenue, Taylor graciously led them through the mazes of record groups and finding aids. He continued to do so when Archives II opened in College Park and he met his visitors at a cluttered desk in a cubicle off the main reading room.

Taylor said he had a poor memory for names but remembered faces and could connect each face with a research project and its problems. Naturally he kept up with new acquisitions, and sometimes he would call researchers when documents that might be of interest to them arrived. If he knew of a researcher who was working on a project similar to one another person was starting, he would sometimes call the first researcher to ask whether he would talk with the second. He never broke a confidence, however, if the first scholar did not want his project discussed.

An Arkansan and a graduate of the University of Arkansas, Taylor became an archivist almost by accident, though he had always enjoyed history. In the summer of 1945, he took the Civil Service examination and gave as a reference the name of a teacher he had liked at Arkansas, Fred Harrington, who was head of the history department. Harrington had done research at the archives, and someone there called him. He recommended Taylor, and the archives hired him and assigned him to the War



Photo Courtesy of National Archives II, John Taylor Collection

Records Office, which had been created only a few months before.

In an interview on February 3, 2006, with Dr. Tim Nenninger, the head of the modern military and civil records branch at the archives who was for many years Taylor's chief, Taylor said that he had worked part-time as a librarian in school but had never been in an archive.¹ When on his first day he walked through the stacks to the office in room 8W, he was struck by the smell of the documents. He later claimed that that it was the smell of history rendering judgment. After a few days or weeks, he started to open document boxes to see what was inside. "I was fascinated, and I have been fascinated ever since," he said.

Although his bosses wanted him to start by taking the course on archival administration given by a refugee German archivist, Dr. Ernst Posner, Taylor declined. He wanted to get some experience first. He would take the course later, after working for seven months. His first assignment was to call up agencies that had borrowed documents from the National Archives and get them back. They would say that they still needed them. Taylor would say, "That's OK. Just send them back to me and I'll recharge them." Presumably he got a lot of papers back that way.

He often wondered why more people didn't know about the National Archives. He heard radio programs about the Library of Congress, about the Smithsonian, but never about the archives. He soon learned that many of his superiors did not want the public to know about them. "Their attitude, almost, was, 'We have these records, but by God, we don't want anyone to know about it.' I encountered that many, many times," he said.

The main emphasis of the archives was reference—answering questions from both the public and government agencies. But in the years immediately after World War II, many wartime records were flooding into the National Archives. They had to be recorded, cleaned, arranged, listed, boxed, security-cleared, shelved, and given to requestors. Among the first records that Taylor worked on were those of the Office of Civilian Defense. Then came the War Production Board records in 1947 and the Nuremberg Trial records in 1948 and 1949. Taylor got a reputation as the lead archivist for those groups of records.

He was also the savior of the unit records of the American Expeditionary Forces of World War I. His supervisor, Dr. Dallas Irvine, thought that the records of the units could be discarded because the personnel records sufficed. Taylor disagreed. For a year and a half he kept making up figures when his bosses asked him what percentage of the unit records he had eliminated that quarter. In the end, he saved them all. And many people were glad he did, because a fire in the St. Louis records center destroyed many personnel records and made the unit records he had saved all the more valuable.

Taylor began his work with intelligence records in 1946. President Harry S. Truman had abolished the OSS abruptly at the end of the war, and many of its records—some 800 linear feet of documents—came to the archives soon afterward. The State Department, which had received other OSS records but did not want them, subsequently sent 900,000 index cards and many reports to the archives. Taylor found these records fascinating. They soon led to an expansion of his responsibilities. State, which controlled the records of the OSS's Research and Analysis Branch even though they were physically at the

National Archives, allowed users to take notes on the records but required that those notes be cleared. Taylor dealt with State's authorizers and later dealt with authorizers from the FBI and the CIA in the same way. He thus became the archivist to whom researchers went when they wanted records from those agencies or from the Military Intelligence Division files.

Archivists have to prepare records for use by researchers. They refer to this work as "projects." Some archivists enjoy it: they like being in the stacks, working with the documents, and not being interrupted by people. Taylor never cared for it. He did his share of it, as with the AEF records, and he had a desk in the stacks. But he preferred working with people and concentrated more on dealing with researchers.

Of the celebrities he dealt with perhaps the most famous was William Casey. Casey had been in the OSS. He would visit Taylor fairly often in 13W. "He would come in, and talk to me about these records and look at some of the card indexes, maybe look at a few documents. Then he'd jump up, look at his watch: 'Brother Taylor, I have to be in London tomorrow morning. I've got to go.'" Casey was still a private-sector lawyer at the time. He later became Ronald Reagan's campaign manager, and after Reagan was elected he was appointed director of central intelligence. But even after he became CIA director he stayed in touch with Taylor. "Casey would call me up from time to time. Once or twice in the 1980s I went out to Langley and talked to CIA people about new records coming in here. And the next day I would talk to Casey on the phone and say, 'I was in your building,' and he'd boom, 'Why didn't you come to see me?'"

One day Casey asked Taylor to meet him at his house after work. "I grabbed a cab, went up to Northwest Washington. He came in, a bit late; I got there before he did. He gave me a drink or two, then he turned to me and tossed a manuscript in my lap. He said, 'I want you to help me edit this manuscript.' I said, 'No way! I am blind in one eye, and by five o'clock my good eye is shot. But I have the person who may be ideal for you.' I gave him the name of a friend of mine who had done research in the records at Archives when she was a student. And they hit it off, and they both came to Archives a number of times to do research. Casey even came in on Saturdays. But after he died—I also knew Mrs. Casey; I met her a couple of times, we had talked on the phone many times—I called her up and urged her to have the publisher hire this young lady, who had aided her husband in the editing of his book. The manuscript he had was in very bad shape, but they got the book out."

Among the other CIA directors he worked with was Bill Colby, whom he liked "very much." Colby was "very low key. I would see him many times outside of the Archives, outside of the government; each time he'd come up to me and say, 'John, I'm Bill Colby.'" He also knew Admiral Stansfield Turner. Turner "called me up one day and said that he hoped to swing by to see me, but he never came. Admiral Turner had a young guy come in to do the research for him."

Asked how he saw his role in helping a researcher, Taylor said that whether the researcher was "a student from Georgetown, or a student from Oxford, or a famous writer who has published a half-a-dozen books," he would tell them the same thing: "'The more I know about your project, the better I can help you.' Many, many researchers, not the sort of people you're talking about now [senior authors and researchers], but for many researchers who come here, it's like pulling teeth to find out exactly what are they looking for. They are sometimes reluctant to reveal everything, or think that two or three lines are all we need, but I often tell researchers that the more we know about your project, the better we can provide assistance."

When asked about his career, Taylor often said that he "liked it from Day One." He worked for years in 13W, and as Nenninger told him, "Everybody just sort of reorganized around you and you just sat in the same place! And I know when I first came to the Archives in 1967 to do research I think you were sitting in pretty much the same spot where you were in the early 90s before we all moved out here!" When asked when he might retire, Taylor's standard answer was, "Not this week!" Taylor

was also a fixture in the Archives Café. He lunched there each day, usually having a salad, a cherry coke, and frozen yogurt. It was easy to spot him: he was the man surrounded by good-looking young women.

Everyone seemed to have a story about him. His office mate and superior, Bob Wolfe, revealed a mischievous side of Taylor. "He took great delight in startling me into momentary belief in bogus, but plausible, newly discovered records, and chortled with tongue-in-cheek each time he conned me that way." Richard Immerman, now at Temple University, felt that what made Taylor unique was less his expertise, less his eagerness to help, than his commitment and dedication. "The archives were his life. I recall doing work at the Modern Military Branch years ago. It was November, and it snowed. Washington of course mostly shut down. But the Archives remained open, and I showed up. I was young. So did Taylor. He was not. I had a one-on-one with him that day. I won't ever forget it."

David and Helen Anderson, now of California State University at Monterey, found Taylor very "creative" in helping with Freedom of Information requests. He was also generous and trusting with those he knew were honest. One day Anderson showed him a note from the son-in-law of General J. Lawton Collins giving him permission to see his father-in-law's papers. Taylor led Anderson to a small room crowded with library trucks stacked full of archives boxes and with a copy machine in the next room. He told Anderson to give him a page count when he finished. He then closed the door and left him with what Anderson calls "the trove of archival treasure. He was a gem."

Katie Sibley of St. Joseph's University called him "a dear and kind man, always solicitous and helpful, and what an amazing fount of information. I remember he told me about materials in Record Group 319 [army staff], personnel records, which I had no idea about, and which connected me to some great material for my Red Spies book." When Mark Stoler began his dissertation research in 1969, he was working in diplomatic and modern military records. Someone suggested he speak with Taylor about OSS records. Stoler did, and he received invaluable advice on material that he used in his dissertation, later published as *The Politics of the Second Front*.

Stanley Cohen, a Manhattan lawyer, was the force behind the American Jewish Historical Society's awards to those unsung heroes of the historical profession, the archivists. One award went to Jacquie Kavanagh, keeper of the written archives of the BBC, and last year's went to Dr. Saad Eskander, head of the Baghdad library and archives. But the first went to John Taylor. "John could obtain documents that we were told never existed," Cohen said. "Once when I had a problem obtaining a 1940 document from the CIA, John called his counterpart there. I received a copy a few days later."

And if I may add my own recollection: I met John in 1963 or '64, after Barbara Tuchman's *The Zimmermann Telegram* cited the National Archives as the location of an important version of the telegram. I was a newspaperman and had never thought about archives as a source of information. Tuchman's citation woke me up. I visited the archives and found the telegram (in RG 59, State Department). But the archives had much more information on codes. With John's help, I found tons of material that I never would have thought of and that I used in *The Codebreakers*. We became friends, and our friendship lasted more than 40 years.

All men and women depend on other human beings in their labors. Those of us who write history are no different. We use the documents to tell it as it really was, and we need the specialists who can lead us through the mountains of papers, find what we need, and so help us enrich the world's knowledge. To that high endeavor John Taylor devoted his life. For that we thank him, and for that we remember him.

—David Kahn
Independent Historian and Author

Notes:

1. Nenninger's interview provided most of the information and all of the quotes from Taylor in this article.

In Memoriam: Richard H. Zeitlin

Dr. Richard H. Zeitlin, historian and director of the Wisconsin Veterans Museum, died on December 3 after a short but courageous battle with cancer. He was 63 years old.

A native of New York City, Zeitlin earned his B.A. degree from Queens College of the City University of New York in 1966 and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1969 and 1973. In Madison he studied with Professors Allan Bogue, Edward M. Coffman and Thomas McCormick, among others. He worked for the State Historical Society of Wisconsin and operated an historical consulting firm before joining the Wisconsin Veterans Museum as curator in 1980. In 1982 he became its director.

When Zeitlin joined the Wisconsin Veterans Museum it consisted of a room in the State Capitol building dedicated to Civil War relics. Under his direction a new state-of-the-art museum was constructed between 1989 and 1993. Zeitlin supervised this major redevelopment, working closely with designers and historical experts to create an internationally-known military history institution. He continued to direct the museum and presided over its continued success until his death. At that time it contained over 20,000 objects, hosted a major annual lecture series by internationally-known diplomatic as well as military historians, attracted an average of 11,000 visitors each month, and provided a moving educational experience for veterans and non-veterans alike. Zeitlin also remained active with the Wisconsin State Historical Society and was a frequent consultant for as well as guest on local and statewide media. Wisconsin Secretary of Veterans Affairs John A. Scocos referred to him as a "state treasure."

Zeitlin also published a series of books and articles, primarily but not exclusively on Wisconsin history, military history and the Civil War. These included *Germans in Wisconsin* (1977, 1985, 1991, 2000), *All for the Union: Wisconsin in the Civil War* (1998), *The Flags of the Iron Brigade* (1997), *U.S.S. Wisconsin: A History of Two Battleships* (1988), and *Old Abe the War Eagle* (1986). He also taught U.S. military history at both Edgewood College and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He served



Photo Courtesy of Wisconsin Veterans Museum

on the Wisconsin State Historic Preservation Review Board and the Dane County Cultural Affairs Commission, both of which he chaired, and was a member of the Board of Presidential Advisers for the National World War II Museum in New Orleans. He worked frequently with SHAFR members and invited many of them to lecture at the Veterans Museum. He was also an active member of the Society for Military History and organized two memorable SMH conferences in Madison: a special 1998 regional conference in honor of Edward M. Coffman and the highly successful 2002 annual conference.

Richard Zeitlin's knowledge of and interest in history were legendary. So were his warmth, kindness and gentleness, as well as his incredible smile. These attributes, together with his impressive managerial skills, helped make the Wisconsin Veterans Museum the outstanding institution that it is today. They also gave many of us a friend and colleague whom we treasured and will never forget.

Zeitlin is survived by his children Samuel and Eleanor Zeitlin, who are presently students in Munich and New York; his mother Mildred Zeitlin of New York City; his brother and sister-in-law Dr. Alan and Sherri Zeitlin; his niece Brigitte Zeitlin; and his significant other Jackie Johnson of Madison, Wisconsin. He was buried in New York on December 7, and a memorial service was held at the Veterans Museum on March 21—which would have been his 64th birthday. A room dedication and historical conference in his honor are being planned for the fall at the Veterans Museum, with details to follow. A special fund has also been established in his honor. Donations can be sent to the Wisconsin Veterans Museum Foundation, Attn: Richard Zeitlin Memorial Fund, PO Box 2657, Madison, WI 53701-2657, or by visiting the Foundation's website at www.wvmfoundation.com.

—Mark A. Stoler
University of Vermont

SHAFR Council Minutes

Thursday, June 25, 2009

8:30am – 12:00 noon

Presidential Boardroom

Fairview Park Marriott

Falls Church, Virginia

Present: Frank Costigliola (presiding), Jeffrey Engel, Brian Etheridge, Catherine Forslund, Peter Hahn, Richard Immerman, Paul Kramer, Mitch Lerner, Erin Mahan, James Matray, Meredith Oyen, Jaideep Prabhu, Stephen Rabe, Andrew Rotter, Chapin Rydingsward, Thomas Schwartz, Sara Wilson, Thomas Zeiler

Business Items

(1) Announcements

Costigliola called the meeting to order at 8:30 A.M. and thanked everyone for attending.

(2) Motions passed by e-mail

Hahn reported that since last meeting Council approved the January 2009 minutes and agreed to name the SHAFR Junior Faculty Research Grants after William Appleman Williams.

(3) 2008 election

Costigliola declared that Council would sit in Executive Session to discuss the 2008 election. After a long and thorough discussion about the conduct of the 2008 election, Council unanimously passed the following resolution:

The President seeks endorsement of Council for his having appointed an ad hoc committee to make recommendations for improving SHAFR's procedures for nominating and electing officers. Said committee is now headed by Richard Immerman and includes Tom Schwartz, Arnie Offner, Catherine Forslund, and Kathryn Statler. The pool for appointees was former presidents, current Council members, and the current chair of the Nominating Committee. This committee is now doing its work and will report to Council with its recommendations in January 2010. For a number of years, SHAFR has been considering how to regularize its nominating and electing process and whether to move toward an electronic ballot. There has been concern with the consistently low voter turnout. The Council especially thanks Stephen Rabe for urging SHAFR to update and perfect its electoral procedures.

Council also advised that a graduate student should be appointed to the ad hoc committee and Costigliola named Meredith Oyen to that role. Costigliola ended the Executive Session portion of the meeting.

(4) Report on 2010 SHAFR Summer Institute

Schwartz reported on a recent proposal from Carol Anderson and Thomas Zeiler to host at Emory University the 2011 Summer Institute on the topic "Human Rights, Globalization, and Empire." It was noted that Emory's proximity to the Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta would appeal to SHAFR members. Schwartz also reported that the committee had yet to received proposals for the 2010 Summer Institute. He noted that the committee is considering Texas, which would take advantage of the Johnson Presidential Library in Austin. Immerman asked if the Institute would continue to alternate between faculty and graduate student formats as originally stipulated. Costigliola answered in the affirmative, but noted that exceptions would be permitted on a case-by-case basis. Hahn added that the Institute need not coincide with the SHAFR conference nor be hosted in the region where the organizers reside. Oyen raised the issue of timing, noting that it would be difficult for scholars residing overseas to attend a mid-summer institute. Schwartz thanked Council for its advice and promised to report back on the committee's progress.

(5) Motion to authorize appointment of editorial board for web-site

Costigliola stated that Etheridge was doing an excellent job as SHAFR Webmaster. He informed Council that in light of recent concerns regarding some of the content of the SHAFR blogs, Etheridge has requested the creation

of an editorial board. After a brief discussion, Council unanimously passed a motion advising appointment of a three person editorial board to oversee the blogs posted on shafr.org.

Zeiler recommended that the board consult with the editorial staff at H-diplo.

(6) Motion to reestablish life membership option

Costigliola briefly discussed SHAFR's life membership option. It was noted that in 2004 the cost of life membership was \$500 (ten times the annual rate). Due to an oversight, the lifetime option was dropped from the Blackwell website. Blackwell recently inquired if SHAFR wished to renew this option. Costigliola advised Council to formulate a position regarding lifetime membership. It was noted that according to Blackwell, at \$500 the price of life membership in SHAFR would be considerably below the industry standard. Blackwell also indicated that if set at \$1,200 (twenty-four times the annual rate) SHAFR life membership would be consistent with the rate of the other societies whose membership Blackwell manages. For comparative purposes, Hahn reported that life time membership in the AHA stands at \$2,600 (approximately twenty times the annual rate) and that the OAH offers a discount to members with 50 years of past membership but does have a life option. It was additionally noted that Blackwell would treat life membership revenue in the same way as regular member revenue and thus the money would go into the journal's account to form part of the total revenue that goes to SHAFR's royalty.

Council discussed the relative merits of reinstating the lifetime membership option. Hahn emphasized that lifetime membership fees would increase revenue during the purchasing year but would eliminate a potential source of income flow in subsequent years. Prabhu advised Council to consider offering a 10-year membership option. Rotter noted that many individuals purchase lifetime membership in organizations for symbolic reasons. Council members also expressed interest in a sliding scale model (employed by both the AHA and OAH) in which membership dues increase relative to an individual's annual income. When consensus emerged that there was little support for life memberships, Costigliola moved table the issue. The motion passed unanimously.

(7) Motion regarding editorship of *Diplomatic History*

Costigliola asked Council to discuss the following motions regarding editorship of *Diplomatic History*:

- 1) Council approves reappointment of Robert Schulzinger and Thomas Zeiler as Editor-in-Chief and Executive Editor, respectively, for the 2009-2013 term.
- 2) A notice will be posted immediately in *Passport* that the SHAFR will appoint a committee in 2012 to consider applications for the editorship, for a term beginning in August 2013.
- 3) The current editors will be eligible (and cordially invited) to submit an application to that committee for reappointment.

During discussion it was noted that consultation by Costigliola with a number of people in the field yielded the following consensus: 1) The present editors are doing a superb job with the journal. The quality and variety of the articles and the metrics are first rate. 2) SHAFR should not, however, abandon the principle that the editorship is for a defined four-year term. The journal is now in excellent hands. There is no guarantee that SHAFR would be so fortunate with future editors. 3) Given the sizable SHAFR subsidy to the journal and the opportunities for support of graduate students, the editorship is a plum as well as a serious responsibility. In fairness the editorship should be rotated, though stability is also very important. 4) Passage of the draft motion should help ensure continued excellence and stability for the journal while also opening the chance for others to consider applying for the editing the premier journal in our field.

In discussion, Council approved an amendment to the original motion stipulating that "the editor will serve ex officio on the committee to renegotiate the *Diplomatic History* contract."

As amended, the motion passed unanimously.

(8) Potential changes in subscription rates for *Diplomatic History*

Zeiler reported that institutional subscription rates for *Diplomatic History* would increase by a minimum of 9.5% in 2010 as stipulated in the Blackwell contract. Council affirmed that it did not wish to raise this rate of increase.

Hahn reported that Blackwell requested Council to contemplate raising individual rates, which are currently below the industry standard. Costigliola noted that Blackwell had previously suggested this measure but

that it decided to maintain the current rate as a recruitment tool during the 2009 annual conference. Other advantages of low membership rates were also indicated. It was suggested low rates are part of a broader strategy is to expand the base of the organization. After further discussion, Council unanimously passed a motion to maintain the current membership rates.

(9) Report from Ad Hoc Committee on SHAFR Elections

Immerman reported that the Ad Hoc Committee (Catherine Forslund, Richard Immerman, Arnold Offner, Thomas Schwartz, Mark Stoler, and Meredith Oyen) is scheduled to meet over the weekend. In the coming months, the committee will produce a series of recommendations to be considered at next Council meeting.

Discussion ensued. Immerman noted that approximately one-third of SHAFR members do not provide e-mail addresses. This would pose a problem if SHAFR moved to electronic voting. Costigliola suggested that a request for email addresses be sent out with the paper ballots during the 2009 elections. Hahn noted that email accounts are often left dormant or abandoned all together and that 100-200 messages bounce back when an e-mail circular is sent. Zeiler and Prahbu suggested that SHAFR use a social networking site, such as Facebook, to communicate with and gather information from its members.

(10) SHAFR banking arrangements

Hahn informed Council that National City Bank, where SHAFR has maintained savings and checking accounts since 2002, was recently bought out by PNC. Hahn recommended that Council approve a special account offered by PNC in which funds are automatically transferred between checking to savings to maintain proper balance and to provide a higher interest rate. While SHAFR has made use of this offer on a trial basis (with Costigliola's approval), the bank requires formal approve by Council to continue the arrangement. After discussion, Council passed a motion authorizing the arrangement.

Hahn also reported that local media in Ohio reported that PNC's purchase of National City Bank was prompted by its near collapse in summer 2008. In light of FDIC coverage caps of \$250,000 per account holder per bank, Hahn recommended that SHAFR open an additional account at Huntington Bank or another bank in Columbus, in order to distribute cash holdings between two banks as a means to ensure FDIC coverage of all reserves. He noted that sending surplus reserves to the Endowment would be another option, although the Endowment accounts have declined in recent years. After discussion, Council unanimously passed a resolution authorizing Hahn to open an additional account at Huntington Bank or another bank in Columbus.

Hahn informed Council that he had recently looked into electronic payments as a potential alternative to SHAFR's current practice of issuing paper checks. Some recipients of SHAFR fund have stressed the convenience of electronic deposits. However, Hahn's initial research indicated that the fees associated with such means were relatively high in relation to the small number of monthly checks issued. Additional issues concerning data security and collection were also stressed in support of SHAFR continuing to rely on paper checks.

(11) Bemis and Williams allocations for 2010

Hahn briefly summarized the Bemis Research Grant program, which was created in part to protect SHAFR's public charity status. Council allocated \$35,000 in 2007 and \$32,000 in 2008 and 2009. Hahn advised Council to decide on the level of funding for 2010. He noted that the Blackwell subsidy is scheduled to increase during the next year and that SHAFR could safely maintain its current level of funding during calendar year 2010. Matray recommended that Council disconnect the administration of the Bemis and Williams grants from the endowment. After further discussion, a motion to allocate a \$32,000 for the 2010 Bemis/Williams Research Grant Program passed unanimously.

Council agreed that the current ratio (28 to 4) between graduate student grants and junior faculty grants should continue to guide the committees with the understanding that this ratio could be renegotiated if necessary.

(12) Motion from Ways & Means Committee

Schwartz reported that the committee looks favorably upon an application issued by Kyle Longley requesting SHAFR's support of an upcoming conference at Arizona State University scheduled for March-April 2010. The Committee recommended that SHAFR co-sponsor the conference with a grant of \$1,000, on the condition that it be repaid at the conclusion of the conference and matched by other contributions in the proposal. After discussion, the motion passed unanimously.

(13) Motion of memoriam

In honor of Ernest May, Schwartz introduced the following resolution

SHAFR notes with deep sorrow and regret the death of Ernest Richard May, the Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard University, and Past President of SHAFR, on June 1, 2009. Ernest May was one of the world's leading authorities on the history of international relations, and his published work over the last fifty years had a major impact on the field. His first book, *The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917*, won the George Louis Beer Prize of the American Historical Association in 1959. He went on to produce such definitive and influential books and essays including *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of the United States as Great Power* (1961), *Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (1972), *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (1974), *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Between the Two World Wars* (ed. and contributor, 1985), *Thinking in Time: Uses of History for Decision Makers* (with Richard Neustadt, 1986), *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (with Philip Zelikow, 1997), and *Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France* (2000). Ernest May was also a historical consultant for the Central Intelligence Agency, and his pioneering work in intelligence history led to his role as a senior advisor to the September 11 Commission. Along with John Steinbrunner and Thomas W. Wolfe, May authored the *History of the Strategic Arms competition, 1945-1972*, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At the time of his death he was still an active teacher and scholar at Harvard, offering courses at the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Ernest Richard May was born in Fort Worth Texas on November 19, 1928. He received his bachelor's degree in 1948 and his doctorate in 1951 from UCLA. He served in the Navy during the Korean War and joined the Harvard faculty in 1954. He is survived by his wife, Susan Wood, and three children from his first marriage, and three grandchildren. He is also survived by a half-century of doctoral and undergraduate students, who cherished his teaching and supervision of their work, and who will dearly miss this gentle and sweet man.

Council unanimously passed the Memorial Resolution.

Reports

(14) *Passport*

Lerner reported that the Mershon Center at Ohio State University had recently rejected a \$3,800 grant requested for *Passport*. As emphasized at previous meetings, Lerner noted that the Mershon funds – which *Passport* has consistently received in the past – were never guaranteed. He also stressed that the rejection does not reflect any displeasure by the Center with *Passport* or the field of diplomatic history. Importantly, *Passport* (and SHAFR) will maintain its office suite at the Mershon Center. Lerner informed Council that the loss of the Mershon funds have been partially offset by the recent agreement with Blackwell to bundle *Passport* with its shipment of *Diplomatic History*. This arrangement has been in place for the previous two mailings and will save at least \$5,000 annually.

Lerner estimated *Passport's* expenses for the coming year at approximately \$8,450 with \$1,300 in estimated revenue. For comparative purposes, it was noted that former SHAFR Newsletter was produced at a cost of \$10,000 per year. It was additionally reported that both Hahn and Lerner believe it appropriate to increase the pay of *Passport's* editorial assistant from \$500 to \$750 per issue.

Lerner briefed Council on *Passport's* transition to Blackwell mailing services. He noted that, as requested by Blackwell, he aligned *Passport* to an April-September-January schedule to align it with the publication of *Diplomatic History*. Initial complications in the workflow at Blackwell have been resolved. Lerner also noted that Blackwell failed to mail the April 2009 issue to approximately 500 members because of an electronic glitch. *Passport* promptly emailed SHAFR members with a link to a pdf version of the entire issue, and Blackwell, at its own expense, reprinted and mailed hard copies to the 500 members in question.

Noting the high value of the SHAFR office at the Mershon Center, Hahn suggested that Council pass a resolution thanking the Mershon Center for the space.

Costigliola moved that Council approve funding *Passport* as requested at the usual and customary rates. The motion passed unanimously. Council also passed a resolution acknowledging the Mershon Center and the valuable support it has given to *Passport* and SHAFR over the years.

(15) *Diplomatic History*

Zeiler reported that *Diplomatic History* is flourishing. There is a backlog of book reviews and while article

submissions have risen considerably, the acceptance rate had continued to decline. The journal received 110 total submissions, including 95 new submissions. The number of new submissions had increased 94% since 2004 and the acceptance rate stands at 21%. Over the past year, circulation and subscriptions have gone up by 4.5% and 8% respectively. It was additionally noted that consistent with its desire to promote greater diversity, the journal has recently welcomed two female members to the board and currently has ten female scholars on its list of reviewers. Zeiler encouraged Schwartz to organize a special DH issue in honor of Ernest May.

(16) State Department Historical Advisory Committee

Zeiler summarized recent developments related to the HAC. He reported that the inspector general's investigation into allegations of mismanagement at the Office of the Historian resulted in the reassignment of personnel. Searches are underway for a new director as well as FRUS chief editor. Zeiler encouraged Council members to recommend candidates for either position.

In discussion ensued, Council members advised that Council remain abreast of the situation in the Historian's Office. Zeiler advised the Council invite the next Office of the Historian director to meet with Council to discuss relevant issues. He noted that the SHAFR committee on historical documentation is currently responsible for monitoring the situation at the Office of the Historian. Council was reminded that the HAC currently includes three SHAFR members, and that SHAFR is authorized to nominate one member of HAC. Immerman noted that Bob McMahon, SHAFR's most recent nominee, is now chair of the HAC. Costigliola directed Council to continue to discuss SHAFR's cooperative relationship with the HAC via email.

(17) Website

Ethridge reported that traffic to the SHAFR web-site has increased significantly since the websites re-launch in January. Utilizing information derived from Google analytics, Ethridge noted that since January 1 the website has had more than 24,000 visits, including 13,000 unique visits. 49% of the traffic came through search engines, 35% from direct traffic, and 16% from referring sites. A significant portion of the new traffic is the result of increased visibility of shafr.org on the World Wide Web. It was noted, for instance, that 4,000 visits since January 1 had originated with a google search of "Afghanistan War 2001," which currently ranks shafr.org as the third most popular site. Regarding internal traffic patterns, Ethridge noted that 533 visits have landed on the "join SHAFR" page.

Ethridge stated that SHAFR's inaugural team of bloggers were very productive, although submissions came in spurts. To address this issue, he recommended increasing the overall number of bloggers while decreasing the volume required of each individual. Ethridge also reported continued difficulties in recruiting scholars to write op-eds.

In light of the increased popularity and visibility of shafr.org, Ethridge encouraged Council to expand the original content offered on the website, noting that if traffic continued to increase over the next two years, SHAFR could be in a position to derive advertising revenue from the website. Ethridge testified to the considerable amount of time and resources that would be required if Council chooses to continue its online services and outreach.

Ethridge welcomed Council advice and questions. Lerner highlighted Ethridge's valuable contribution, stressing the significant amount of time and energy required of the Webmaster. Immerman urged Council to devise a comprehensive online strategy that would address issues of expansion, lay-out, and new services while also gauging more accurately the amount of work that would be required to pursue and maintain such goals. Costigliola agreed and noted that Council ought to reconsider the Webmaster's annual stipend. Zeiler suggested advised Council to consider creating a committee to deal with issues related to electronic submissions.

Ethridge thanked Council for its support and guidance during the past six month. He concluded by emphasizing the great potential for the expanded website to serve as a platform connecting the SHAFR and the SHAFR community to the broader public while simultaneously generating interest (and increasing membership) in the Society itself.

(18) 2009 annual meeting

Kramer thanked Sara Wilson for her invaluable work on behalf of the conference. He reported that under Costigliola's directive to expand the audience and participant pool of annual conference, the 2009 conference committee (Paul Kramer Chair, Carol Anderson, Dirk Bonker, Anne Foster, Amy Greenberg, Naoko Shibusawa, and Salim Yaqub) issued a broad call for papers that was widely publicized in print journals as well as on sixty H-Net listservs.

In response to its outreach, the committee received an unprecedented number of proposals including 100 for panels and 45 for individual papers. The committee also received 20 applications for Divine travel funds and 25 applications for SHAFR's Diversity/International Outreach fellowships.

Following a rigorous selection process and with Council's approval, the committee decided to approve 82 panels, with approximately 380 presenters (28% female), representing scholars from 17 countries outside the US (the UK, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Spain, Italy, France, Norway, Switzerland, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, China, Japan, Israel). Approximately 25% of the presenters are graduate students, and 32% of the presenters on the program (120 individuals), identified themselves as first-timers at SHAFR. Despite an 8% drop out rate, Kramer reported that 2009 would be the best-attended SHAFR conference ever.

The committee awarded 7 Divine fellowships (ranging from \$200 to \$500 for a total of \$2,500) and 21 Diversity/International Outreach Fellowships (15 at \$1,000 and 6 at \$1,650 for a total of \$24,900). Diversity/International Outreach recipients included 8 women as well as scholars from the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, Israel, and Russia.

Kramer urged Council to maintain the expanded format in subsequent years, which he believed would benefit the conference, the organization and the field all at the same time. He also expressed support for the Diversity/International Outreach fund, as an effective tool for attracting new scholars to SHAFR. He also offered two recommendations for the 2010 conference: 1) The committee strongly advised against the plan for soliciting rejected applicants with an offer of discounted membership and instead recommended that first timers to SHAFR who had papers accepted receive the discounted membership offer. 2) The committee recommended that SHAFR increase allocations to the Divine fellowship.

Kramer expressed his pleasure serving as program committee chair, noted his readiness to assist the 2010 program committee and thanked Council for its support throughout the planning process.

During discussion, a consensus emerged recognizing the need to gauge the membership reaction to the expanded format and to determine how panel attendance fared under the new system. Costigliola identified shafr.org as potential tool to solicit conference feedback.

Wilson reported that more than 500 individuals had pre-registered for the conference, 75 tickets had been sold for the social event, and a team of volunteers had been assigned to take headcounts at each of the panels. Wilson advised Council to consider returning to the Falls Church Marriott in 2011. The unusually high number of break out rooms and the hotel's proximity to the Metro were identified as unique benefits of the 2009 venue. Anna Nelson had mobilized a team of volunteers on behalf of the Local Arrangements Committee to conduct local and media outreach.

Wilson also urged Council make larger strides to bring SHAFR into web 2.0. It was noted that new web applications proved very useful for circulating collective documents and for creating email groups, but that SHAFR could do more to promote and feature the annual conference on the website. She suggested the use of interactive features, such as blogs and pictures. Along these lines, it was recommended that SHAFR bypass paypal by creating an independent payment system within shafr.org.

During discussion, several members supported the idea of using the website to gauge the membership's reaction to both the expanded format and the Falls Church/Marriott experience. Costigliola said that he would contact Ethridge in this regard.

Council expressed its gratitude to Kramer, Wilson, and the local arrangements and program committees.

(19) 2010 annual meeting

Rotter reported that the 2010 conference will be held in at the University of Wisconsin. The program committee is composed of Naoka Shibusawa (co-Chair), Anne Foster (co-chair), Kristen Hoganson, Dirk Bonker, Jason Colby, Carol Anderson, Salim Yaqub, and Amy Greenberg. Jeremi Suri will head the local arrangements committee.

(20) 2011 annual meeting

Rotter reported that in 2011 the annual meeting will be held in the Washington D.C. metro area. The specific conference site has yet to be determined. Rotter noted that Council will need make a decision after assessing the relative merits of the Falls Church experience, the Westfields Marriott (site of the 2007 conference), and the possibility of returning to a campus site.

(21) Endowment

Matray reported on SHAFR's investment package. He noted that the endowment had lost 22.9% during the last year. As of March 1, 2009 the endowment stood at \$853,000 having lost approximately 34% since November 2007. Due to a slight up tick in the market, the endowment currently stands at approximately \$968,000 and over the last six months the endowment had only lost 3% of its value. Matray noted that he was not optimistic regarding the sustainability of current market trends and expressed agreement with Hahn's previous

recommendation that Council maintain the current level of spending but that it proceed cautiously and avoid any major new initiatives. He also recommended that Hahn be given the authority to make the decisions necessary to render more efficient his task of managing SHAFR's finances.

(22) Dissertation Completion Fellowships

Hahn reported on behalf of Emily Rosenberg and the SHAFR Dissertation Fellowship Committee. This year the committee received 35 applications (12 from women). The committee felt that the quality was a bit higher than the previous year. There was also broad diversity in terms of field and of nationality of applicants. Although most of the applicants (and all of the winners) were historians, the award also attracted applications from several other disciplines.

This year the winners were Ryan Irwin from The Ohio State University and Mara Drogan from The State University of New York, Albany. Irwin's dissertation, entitled "Race and Revolution: White Redoubt in the Postcolonial Decade, 1960-1970," focuses on the apartheid debate as a lens for analyzing the relationship between decolonization and the Cold War during the 1960s. Drogan's dissertation, entitled "Atoms for Peace, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Globalization of Nuclear Technology, 1955-1960," analyzes the many bilateral agreements signed under the Atoms for Peace program.

The committee found that many of the projects were potentially excellent, but that the proposals themselves often lacked sufficient clarity and consistency. The committee recommended that future proposals convey: 1) a sense of the overall research questions, historiographical contributions, and lines of argument; 2) an explicit statement explaining the archival sources that have been used; 3) a clear timetable of work that has been and needs to be completed.

The committee suggested that a statement to this effect could be coordinated with next year's committee and posted along with the announcement. The committee also noted that some applicants had applied the previous year, raising the possibility that, with the poor job market, people may delay finishing and hope to tack on an additional year of support through this program. While there may be nothing wrong with this, if the fellowship is designed to support the "final year," repetitive applications may raise a question of policy.

The committee also expressed its strong support for the Dissertation Completion fellowships as an effective way to increase SHAFR's visibility and membership.

Council unanimously passed a motion to disqualify those applicants for the Dissertation Completion Fellowship who have already applied for said fellowship on two prior occasions.

(23) Betty Miller Unterberger Prize

On behalf of committee chair Linda Qaimmaqami, Hahn announced that the Betty Miller Unterberger Dissertation Prize of 2009 was awarded to Gregory R. Domber, of George Washington University with honorable mentions to Nicole Phelps and Meredith Oyen. The committee also recommended that SHAFR issue certificates to applicants receiving honorable mentions. Council approved this recommendation.

(24) Adjournment

Costigliola concluded the meeting by thanking everyone for attending. The meeting adjourned at 12:15 pm.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn

Executive Director

PLH/cr

The Diplomatic Pouch



1. Personal and Professional Notes

Frank Costigliola (UConn) received a 2009-10 fellowship from the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.

John Tully (Central Connecticut State) won both the Board of Trustees Teaching Award for Central Connecticut State University and the Board of Trustees Teaching Award for the four universities in the Connecticut State University system.

Jonathan Reed Winkler (Wright State) won the 2008 Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt Naval History Prize and the 2009 Distinguished Publication Award from the Ohio Academy of History for his book *Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I* (Harvard University Press, 2008).

Jeremi Suri has become the E. Gordon Fox Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin.



2. Research Notes

"How Much is Enough?": The U.S. Navy and "Finite Deterrence"

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 275, edited by William Burr

President Obama's call for a "world without nuclear weapons" immediately raised questions such as: how do you get there; what does deterrence actually require before you get there; and how many nuclear weapons would be involved at each step. Exactly these questions of "how much is enough" were raised fifty years ago in secret debate within the U.S. government, when Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke argued that a small force of mainly nuclear missile-launching Polaris submarines was enough for deterrence. Burke and Navy leaders developed a concept of "finite" or "minimum" deterrence that they believed would make the United States safer because it would dissuade nuclear attacks while removing pressures for a dangerous "hair-trigger" posture.

In early 1960, when Eisenhower's budget director Maurice Stans was told that the U.S. Navy's Polaris missile-launching submarines could "destroy 232 targets, which was sufficient to destroy all of Russia," he asked defense officials, "If POLARIS could do this job, why did we need other ... ICBMs, SAC aircraft, and overseas bases?" According to Stans, the answer "he had received ... [was] that was someone else's problem." An electronic briefing book of declassified documents obtained through archival research and published for the first time by the National Security Archive shows how the U.S. Navy tried to take responsibility for this "problem" by supporting a minimum deterrent force that would threaten a "finite" list of major urban-industrial and command centers in the heart of the Soviet Union. With their capability to destroy key Soviet targets, Burke believed, the virtually undetectable and invulnerable Polaris submarines could "inflict terrible punishment" and deter Moscow from launching a surprise attack on the United States or its allies. By contrast, Burke saw land-based missile and bombers as vulnerable to attack, which made the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship dangerously unstable. While he did not propose eliminating all strategic bombers and ICBMs, he believed that a force of about 40 Polaris submarines (16 missiles each) was a reasonable answer to the question "how much is enough?" Although the Kennedy administration rejected Burke's concept, years later former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara revived it by arguing that 400 nuclear weapons were "enough" to deter a Soviet attack.

The Archive's briefing book includes:

- A report by Admiral Roy Johnson arguing that the proper basis of deterrence lay in the "assured delivery of rather few weapons," which was "sufficient to inflict terrible punishment." Even "10 delivered weapons would produce a major disaster with fully a quarter as many casualties as the first hundred."
- A speech by Arleigh Burke in which he argued that Polaris submarines would mitigate the vulnerabilities of strategic forces, but would also "provide time to think in periods of tension" making possible gradual retaliation as well as opportunities for "political coercion, if we like, to gain national objectives more advantageous than simple revenge."
- The record of Burke's conversation with the Secretary of the Navy, where, having lost a major bureaucratic

conflict over the direction of nuclear targeting, he declared that Air Force leaders were "smart and ruthless ... it's the same way as the Communists; it's exactly the same techniques."

- Burke's inside "Dope" newsletter to top Navy commanders where he declared that hair-trigger nuclear response capabilities and preemptive nuclear strategies were "dangerous for any nation" because they could initiate a "a war which would not otherwise occur."

This is the first in a series of electronic briefing books that will document moments during the Cold War when top officials considered radical changes in the U.S. nuclear posture, involving significantly smaller strategic forces. More powerful forces and conflicting policy imperatives defeated these proposals, but they are nonetheless worth revisiting because their proponents raised searching questions about nuclear strategy that were never properly addressed during the Cold War.

For more information, contact:

William Burr
202-994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1989

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 275

The National Security Archive has published its fourth installment of the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, the man who was behind some of the most momentous transformations in Soviet foreign policy in the end of the 1980s, in his role as Mikhail Gorbachev's main foreign policy aide. In addition to his contributions to *perestroika* and new thinking, Anatoly Sergeevich was and remains a paragon of openness and transparency, providing his diaries and notes to historians who are trying to understand the end of the Cold War. This section of the diary, covering 1989—the year of miracles—is published here in English for the first time.

For more information, contact:

Svetlana Savranskaya
202-994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 272

Twenty years ago, the commander of the Soviet Limited Contingent in Afghanistan Boris Gromov crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, thus marking the end of the Soviet war that lasted almost ten years and cost tens of thousands of Soviet and Afghan lives.

As a tribute and memorial to the late Russian historian, General Alexander Antonovich Lyakhovskiy, the National Security Archive has posted on the Web a series of previously secret Soviet documents including Politburo and diary notes published here in English for the first time. The documents suggest that the Soviet decision to withdraw occurred as early as 1985, but the process of implementing that decision was excruciatingly slow, in part because the Soviet-backed Afghan regime was never able to achieve the necessary domestic support and legitimacy.

The Soviet documents show that ending the war in Afghanistan, which Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called "the bleeding wound," was among his highest priorities from the moment he assumed power in 1985 -- a point he made clear to then-Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal in their first conversation on March 14, 1985. Already in 1985, according to the documents, the Soviet Politburo was discussing ways of disengaging from Afghanistan, and actually reached the decision in principle on October 17, 1985.

For more information, contact:

Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton
202-994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



The Vassiliev Notebooks

The Cold War International History Project has recently published the Vassiliev Notebooks, a collection of detailed notes on Soviet intelligence activities in the United States from 1930-1950. The 1,115-page collection was compiled by former KGB officer and journalist Alexander Vassiliev during his two years of research in the KGB archive. Drawing upon operational files, personnel files, and other KGB documents, the notebooks shed new light upon important aspects of early Cold War history. Though Vassiliev's access was not unfettered, the pages of densely handwritten notes that he was able to take comprise additional evidence on such topics as Alger Hiss, the Rosenberg case, and "Enormous," the massive Soviet effort to gather intelligence on the Anglo-American atomic bomb project.

The notebooks can be accessed on-line at the web page of the Cold War International History Project at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.documents&group_id=511603



Global Cold War: New Parallel History Project (PHP) Collections on India

The PHP is pleased to announce its latest documentary collections. Prof. Surjit Mansingh from American University in Washington, DC portrays Indo-Soviet relations in the Khrushchev-Nehru era from an Indian perspective. Drawing on hitherto unknown archival evidence, she argues that despite their contrasting views on international affairs, Jawaharlal Nehru and Nikita Khrushchev managed to establish a mutually beneficial relationship between their countries. Mansingh's essay is accompanied by selected documents from the National Archives of India and the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, made available by the PHP for the first time.

Covering the same period from a different angle, Dr. Andreas Hilger from Hamburg University follows up on his previous work on Indo-Soviet relations under Stalin. He characterizes Soviet policies toward India as hampered by a number of structural, ideological, and economic factors. Hilger's essay is based on documentary evidence from the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), the Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the Former GDR (SAPMO), and the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office.

For further information, visit the web pages: <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=96318> and <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=56154>



George Kennan Papers

The Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University is pleased to announce the completion of the processing of the George F. Kennan Papers. Kennan, a diplomat and historian, is best known for his "Long Telegram" and the subsequent "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* in which he advocated a new course in U.S.-Soviet relations that became known as "containment." Kennan was involved in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union throughout most of his distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service and, as a historian at the Institute for Advanced Study, he analyzed the Soviet Union's history and politics.

The processing project, funded by a grant from the National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC), integrated the 16 linear foot collection that had been open since the 1970s with over 100 linear feet of previously-restricted material. Beginning on March 17, 2009, all of the papers became available for research use. The majority of the new material dates from 1950 to 2000 and is composed of an extensive correspondence file and writings file, including his diaries and unpublished works. For more information on the collection, please see the finding aid at: <http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/n009w2294>.

The Mudd Manuscript Library is open from 9:00 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. Monday through Friday and until 7:45 p.m. on Wednesday evenings during the academic year. Summer hours are 8:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Monday through Friday and until 7:15 p.m. on Wednesdays. No appointment is necessary, but registration, including the presentation of photo identification, is required to use the holdings. Further information about conducting research at Mudd library can be found at the following website: <http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/research/>.

For further information, contact:
mudd@princeton.edu



New Evidence on North Korea's *Chollima* Movement and First Five-Year Plan (1957-1961)

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) is pleased to announce a new publication from the Wilson Center's North Korea International Documentation Project: *New Evidence on North Korea's Chollima*

Movement and First Five-Year Plan (1957-1961). The collection was specially prepared for the joint NKIDP-United States Institute of Peace conference, the 2009 "New DPRK Revolutionary Upsurge--A Blast from the Past or a New Path?" and contains newly obtained documentary evidence on North Korean political and economic developments in the late 1950s from Polish, (East) German, Chinese, and Czech archives. The 25 documents contained in the reader shed new light on the events surrounding the launch of the *Chollima* movement, a campaign designed to increase production and to subordinate individual thoughts and actions to the needs of the collective. The *Chollima* movement took its name from a mythical winged horse that could travel 1,000 li, or 400 km, in one day, and exhorted the North Korea people to work as hard as the legendary horse. The documents place recent government efforts to revive the *Chollima* movement into a broader historical context.

New Evidence on North Korea's Chollima Movement was assembled and edited by NKIDP Coordinator James Person, with indispensable assistance from Tim McDonnell, Bernd Schaefer, Gregg Brazinsky, and Jakub Poprocki. Like all NKIDP publications, it is available for download free of charge from the CWIHP website.

For further information, visit the web page at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409.



CIA Declassified Histories of the Vietnam War

The CIA has released six volumes that describe the CIA's role in Indochina during the Vietnam War. Written by Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., these histories are based on extensive research in CIA records and on oral history interviews of participants. The release totals some 1,600 pages and represents the largest amount of Vietnam-era CIA documents yet declassified.

These histories can be accessed on-line at: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam.asp>.



3. Announcements:

CFP: "Cold War Politics and American Ethnic Groups"

The *Journal of American Ethnic History*, the official journal of the Immigration and Ethnic History Society, announces its call for article submissions for a special issue on "Cold War Politics and American Ethnic Groups."

The overall goal of this special issue is to study the experience of American ethnic groups, political refugees, and immigrants during the Cold War period from a variety of perspectives. The volume seeks to uncover the diverse ways in which American ethnic groups were affected by the foreign relations, intelligence, and defense strategies of both the U.S. and the communist regimes. This issue also aims to discuss the effect that certain ethnic groups had or tried to have on American foreign policy and what techniques they used for this. In addition, the issue explores how Cold War politics shaped internal dynamics within American ethnic and immigrant communities. Defining the Cold War era as the continuing opposition between the U.S. and the USSR, the historical period covered in this volume spans from the late 1940s until the end of the 1980s.

We strongly encourage submissions that use sources from recently opened archives both in the U.S. and former-communist countries. We are looking for historically based studies that use primary materials from within the ethnic groups themselves. Submissions covering both European and non-European ethnic groups are welcome.

Deadline for receipt of manuscripts is December 1, 2009. Please address all manuscript submissions and questions to:

Ieva Zake, Guest Editor
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology
Rowan University
Glassboro NJ 08028
856-256-4500, ext. 3515
zake@rowan.edu



CFP: 2010 Policy History Conference
Columbus, Ohio, June 2010

The *Journal of Policy History* and the Institute for Political History are holding the sixth biennial Conference on Policy History at the Hyatt on Capitol Square Hotel in Columbus, Ohio from June 3-6, 2010.

We are currently accepting paper proposals on all topics regarding the history, development, and implementation of public policy; American political development; and comparative historical analysis. We encourage the submission of complete sessions, but individual paper proposals are welcome. The editors of the *Journal of Policy History* encourage conference presenters to submit their papers for possible publication.

For questions regarding conference content or program information, please contact David Robertson at daverobertson@umsl.edu, Amy Bridges at abridges@ucsd.edu, or Paula Baker at baker.973@osu.edu. Please direct general inquiries to the conference coordinator, Cynthia Stachecki, at policyhistoryconference@gmail.com.

Paper proposals must be received by December 30, 2009. Proposals must include one (1) copy of each of the following:

1. Panel/Paper Description and Contact Information Page

This document should be the first page of your paper or panel proposal. The Panel/Paper Description and Contact Information Page Template can be downloaded from the conference web page at: <http://www.slu.edu/departments/jph/2010%20Call%20for%20Papers.html>.

2. A one (1) page summary of each paper

3. A one (1) page C.V. of each panelist

Please send materials to:

Policy History Conference
Journal of Policy History
Saint Louis University
3800 Lindell Blvd.
P. O. Box 56907
St. Louis, MO 63156-0907



CFP: *Perspectives on Cross-Cultural History*
Saint Louis University, March 19-20, 2010

The Study Group on Cross-Cultural History and the History Department at Saint Louis University invite proposals for papers that explore the changes that take place when different cultures interact. The chronological range is from the 16th to the 20th centuries. We are also interested in the theoretical underpinnings of studying such interactions.

Proposals should include the following: a one-page abstract of the paper, name and institutional affiliation of the author, the author's brief c.v., postal address, phone number, and e-mail address. For panel proposals, please include a one-page description of the session's themes. Complete proposals should be e-mailed as attachments in MS Word to history@slu.edu. The deadline for submissions is November 15, 2009.

Contact e-mail:
history@slu.edu



Encyclopedia of US-Latin American Relations

We are seeking contributors to the *Encyclopedia of US-Latin American Relations*, a comprehensive multivolume reference work consisting of over 800 entries to be published in 2010. Entries provide historical context to people, events, organizations, policies, treaties, and conflicts central to the political history of the Western Hemisphere and detail the political-cultural interconnections between the U.S. and the countries of Latin America, including Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. The A-Z volume is intended for a broad audience in universities and public libraries, ideal for use by students, professors, and general readers.

For more information, contact:

Thomas Leonard



Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 2010-2011 Fellowships

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars announces the opening of its 2010-2011 Fellowship competition. The Center awards approximately 20-25 academic year residential fellowships to individuals from any country with outstanding project proposals on national and/or international issues. Topics and scholarship should relate to key public policy challenges or provide the historical and/or cultural framework to illuminate policy issues of contemporary importance. Applicants must hold a doctorate or have equivalent professional experience. Fellows are provided stipends (which include round trip travel), private offices, access to the Library of Congress, Windows based personal computers, and research assistants. The application deadline is October 1, 2009.

For more information and application guidelines please contact the Center at:

Fellowships@wilsoncenter.org.
202-691-4170 (phone)
202-691-4001 (fax)
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/fellowships>.



Fellowship at the Institute For Advanced Study *School of Historical Studies, Princeton, NJ*

The Institute For Advanced Study, School of Historical Studies, is an independent private institution founded in 1930 to create a community of scholars focused on intellectual inquiry, free from teaching and other university obligations. Scholars from around the world come to the Institute to pursue their own research. Those chosen are offered membership for a set period and a stipend. The Institute provides access to extensive resources including offices, libraries, subsidized restaurant and housing facilities, and some secretarial services. Open to all fields of historical research, the School of Historical Studies' principal interests are the history of western, near eastern and Asian civilizations, with particular emphasis upon Greek and Roman civilization, the history of Europe (medieval, early modern, and modern), the Islamic world, East Asian studies, the history of art, the history of science, philosophy, modern international relations, and music studies. Candidates of any nationality may apply for a single term or a full academic year. Residence in Princeton during term time is required. The only other obligation of Members is to pursue their own research. The Ph.D. (or equivalent) and substantial publications are required. Information and application forms may be found on the School's web site, www.hs.ias.edu.

For further information, contact:

Marian Zelazny
Administrative Officer
(609) 734-8300
mzelazny@ias.edu
School of Historical Studies
Institute for Advanced Study
Einstein Drive
Princeton, NJ 08540



Abe Fellowship Competition

The Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP), and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) announce the annual Abe Fellowship competition. The Abe Fellowship is designed to encourage international multidisciplinary research on topics of pressing global concern. The Abe Fellowship Program seeks to foster the development of a new generation of researchers who are interested in policy-relevant topics of long-range importance and who are willing to become key members of a bilateral and global research network built around such topics.

Applicants are invited to submit proposals for research in the social sciences and related fields relevant to any of the following three themes:

- 1) Traditional and Non-Traditional Approaches to Security and Diplomacy

Topic areas include transnational terrorism, internal ethnic and religious strife, infectious diseases, food safety, climate change, and non-proliferation, as well as the role of cultural initiatives in peace building.

2) Global and Regional Economic Issues

Topic areas include regional and bilateral trade arrangements, globalization and the mitigation of its adverse consequences, sustainable urbanization, and environmental degradation.

3) Role of Civil Society

Topic areas include demographic change, immigration, the role of NPOs and NGOs as champions of the public interest, social enterprise, and corporate social responsibility. Research projects should be policy relevant, contemporary, and comparative or transnational.

Terms of the fellowship are flexible and are designed to meet the needs of Japanese and American researchers at different stages in their careers. The program provides Abe Fellows with a minimum of three and maximum of 12 months of full-time support over a 24 month period. Part-time residence abroad in the United States or Japan is required. Applicants must hold a Ph.D. or the terminal degree in their field, or equivalent professional experience. Applications from researchers in professions other than academia are encouraged.

For further information and to apply, contact:

<http://fellowships.ssrc.org/abe>

abe@ssrc.org



National Humanities Center Fellowships

Research Triangle Park, North Carolina

The National Humanities Center offers 40 residential fellowships for advanced study in the humanities during the academic year, September 2010 through May 2011. Applicants must hold doctorate or equivalent scholarly credentials. Young scholars as well as senior scholars are encouraged to apply, but they must have a record of publication, and new PhDs should be aware that the center does not support the revision of a doctoral dissertation. In addition to scholars from all fields of the humanities, the center accepts individuals from the natural and social sciences, the arts, the professions, and public life who are engaged in humanistic projects. The center is also international and gladly accepts applications from scholars outside the United States.

Most of the center's fellowships are unrestricted. Several, however, are designated for particular areas of research. These include environmental studies and history; English literature; art history; French history, literature, or culture; Asian Studies; and theology. Fellowships are individually determined, the amount depending upon the needs of the fellow and the center's ability to meet them. The center seeks to provide at least half salary and also covers travel expenses to and from North Carolina for Fellows and their dependents.

Located in the Research Triangle Park of North Carolina, near Chapel Hill, Durham, and Raleigh, the center provides an environment for individual research and the exchange of ideas. Its building includes private studies for fellows, conference rooms, a central commons for dining, lounges, reading areas, a reference library, and a fellows' workroom. The center's noted library service delivers books and research materials to fellows, and support for information technology and editorial assistance are also provided. The center locates housing for fellows in the neighboring communities.

Fellowships are supported by the center's own endowment, private foundation grants, alumni contributions, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Applicants submit the center's form, supported by a c.v., a 1,000-word project proposal, and three letters of recommendation. You may request application material from Fellowship Program, National Humanities Center, P.O. Box 12256, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2256, or obtain the form and instructions from the center's web site at <http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/>. Applications and letters of recommendation must be postmarked by October 15, 2009.

For further information, contact:

nhc@nationalhumanitiescenter.org



Visiting Scholars Program

Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center

University of Oklahoma

The Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma seeks applicants for its Visiting Scholars Program, which provides financial assistance to researchers working at the Center's archives. Awards of \$500-\$1000 are normally granted as reimbursement for travel and lodging.

The Center's holdings include the papers of many former members of Congress, such as Robert S. Kerr, Fred

Harris, and Speaker Carl Albert of Oklahoma; Helen Gahagan Douglas and Jeffery Cohelan of California; Sidney Clarke of Kansas; and Neil Gallagher of New Jersey. Besides the history of Congress, congressional leadership, national and Oklahoma politics, and election campaigns, the collections also document government policy affecting agriculture, Native Americans, energy, foreign affairs, the environment, the economy, and other areas. Topics that can be studied include the Great Depression, flood control, soil conservation, and tribal affairs. At least one collection provides insight on women in American politics. Most materials date from the 1920s to the 1990s, although there is one Nineteenth Century collection. The Center's collections are described on the World Wide Web at <http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/archives/> and in the publication titled *A Guide to the Carl Albert Center Congressional Archives* (Norman, Okla.: The Carl Albert Center, 1995) by Judy Day, et al., available at many U. S. academic libraries. Additional information can be obtained from the Center.

The Visiting Scholars Program is open to any applicant. Emphasis is given to those pursuing postdoctoral research in history, political science, and other fields. Graduate students involved in research for publication, thesis, or dissertation are encouraged to apply. Professional researchers and writers are also invited to apply. The Center evaluates each research proposal based upon its merits, and funding for a variety of topics is expected.

No standardized form is needed for application. Instead, a series of documents should be sent to the Center, including: (1) a description of the research proposal in fewer than 1000 words; (2) a personal vita; (3) an explanation of how the Center's resources will assist the researcher; (4) a budget proposal; and (5) a letter of reference from an established scholar in the discipline attesting to the significance of the research. Applications are accepted at any time.

For more information, contact:

Archivist
Carl Albert Center
630 Parrington Oval
University of Oklahoma
Norman, OK 73019
(405) 325-5835. FAX: (405) 325-6419



4. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$1000 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$1,000 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2010. Nominations should be sent to: Walter Hixson, University of Akron, Department of History, Arts & Science Building 216, 302 Buchtel Common, Akron, OH 44325-1902 (email: whixson@uakron.edu).



The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished

article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2009, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, University of Kentucky, Department of History, 1715 Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY 40506-0027. Email: Hang.Nguyen@uky.edu. Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2010.



The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2009, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to SHAFR Bernath Book Prize Committee, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus OH 43210. Books may be sent at any time during 2009, but must arrive by December 1, 2009.



The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of \$2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

Eligibility: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Procedures: Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-

nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR's annual meeting.

The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2010. Submit materials to Marc Gallicchio, Department of History, Villanova University, 403 St. Augustine Center, 800 Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085. Email: marc.gallicchio@villanova.edu).



Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy.

The award of \$1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book or other work with letter of nomination to Jeffrey P. Kimball, Miami University, 724 Melinda Drive, Oxford, OH 45056. Email: jpkimball@muohio.edu. To be considered for the 2011 prize, nominations must be received by November 15, 2010.



The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

The purpose of this award is to encourage scholarship by women in U.S. foreign relations history. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded biannually (even years) to the author of the best book written by a woman in the field and published during the preceding two calendar years.

Eligibility: Nominees should be women who have published distinguished books in U.S. foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Three copies of each book (or page proofs) must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for nominations for the 2010 prize is December 1, 2009. Submit required materials to Frank Ninkovich, St. Johns University, History Department, St. John Hall Room 244-G, St. John's University, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439. Email: NINKOVIF@stjohns.edu).



5. Recent Publications of Interest

Arato, Andrew. *Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq* (Columbia, 2009).

Bedford, Kate. *Developing Partnerships: Gender, Sexuality, and the Reformed World Bank* (Minnesota, 2009).

Bischof, Guenter, and Ursula Mathis-Moser, eds. *Acadians and Cajuns: The Politics and Culture of French Minorities in North America (Acadiens et Cajuns : Politique et culture de minorités francophones en Amérique du Nord)*, Canadiana Oenipontana, Vol. IX (Innsbruck, 2009).

Bischof, Guenter, Fritz Plasser and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, eds. *New Perspectives on Austrians and World War II, Contemporary Austrian Studies*, Vol. XVII (Transaction, 2009).

Bunt, Gary R. *iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam* (North Carolina, 2009).

- Calder, Kent E. *Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations* (Yale, 2009).
- Carlisle, Rodney. *Sovereignty at Sea: U.S. Merchant Ships and American Entry into World War I* (Florida, 2010).
- Carter, Ralph G., and James M. Scott. *Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs* (Duke, 2009).
- Case, Holly. *Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II* (Stanford, 2009).
- Cohen, Stephen F. *Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War* (Columbia, 2009).
- Connery, Christopher, and Hortense Spillers. *The Sixties and the World Event* (Duke, 2009).
- Divine, Donna Robinson. *Exiled in the Homeland: Zionism and the Return to Mandate Palestine* (Texas, 2009).
- Dwyer, John J. *The Agrarian Dispute: The Expropriation of American-Owned Rural Land in Postrevolutionary Mexico* (Duke, 2008).
- Elias, Robert. *The Empire Strikes Out: Baseball and the Rise (and Fall) of the American Way Abroad* (New Press, 2009).
- English, Richard. *Terrorism: How to Respond* (Oxford, 2009).
- Ettinger, Patrick. *Imaginary Lines: Border Enforcement and the Origins of Undocumented Immigration, 1882-1930* (Texas, 2009).
- Fletcher, Laurel E., and Eric Stover. *The Guantánamo Effect: Exposing the Consequences of U.S. Detention and Interrogation Practices* (California, 2009).
- Gaeta, Paola. *The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary* (Oxford, 2009).
- Goldman, Shalom L. *Zeal for Zion: Christians, Jews, and the Idea of the Promised Land* (North Carolina, 2010).
- Greenberg, Ela. *Preparing the Mothers of Tomorrow: Education and Islam in Mandate Palestine* (Texas, 2009).
- Haynes, John Earl, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev. *Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America* (Yale, 2009).
- Hendrickson, David C. *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations, 1789-1941* (Kansas, 2009).
- Hilton, Matthew. *Prosperity For All: Consumer Activism in an Era of Globalization* (Cornell, 2009).
- Jones, Howard. *Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations* (North Carolina, 2010).
- Kastor, Peter J., and François Weil. *Empires of the Imagination: Transatlantic Histories of the Louisiana Purchase* (Virginia, 2009).
- Kelsay, John. *Arguing the Just War in Islam* (Harvard, 2009).
- Laderman, Scott. *Tours of Vietnam: War, Travel Guides, and Memory* (Duke, 2009).
- Litvak, Meir, and Ester Webman. *From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust* (Columbia, 2009).
- McCrossen, Alexis. *Land of Necessity: Consumer Culture in the United States-Mexico Borderlands* (Duke, 2009).
- Merrill, Dennis. *Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Latin America* (North Carolina, 2009).
- Milam, Ron. *Not a Gentleman's War: An Inside View of Junior Officers in the Vietnam War* (North Carolina, 2009).
- Paterson, Thomas G., J. Garry Clifford, Deborah Kisatsky, Shane J. Maddock, and Kenneth J. Hagan. *American Foreign Relations: A History, Vol. 1: To 1920; Vol. 2: Since 1895* (Wadsworth, 2009).
- Pease, Donald E. *The New American Exceptionalism* (Minnesota, 2009).
- Pegler-Gordon, Anna. *In Sight of America: Photography and the Development of U.S. Immigration Policy* (California, 2009).
- Piehler, G. Kurt, and Sidney Pash, eds. *The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the Home Front* (Fordham, 2009).
- Prados, John. *Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975* (Kansas, 2009).
- Ram, Haggai. *Iranophobia: The Logic of an Israeli Obsession* (Stanford, 2009).
- Roberts, Timothy Mason. *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Virginia, 2009).
- Schwab, Stephen Irving Max. *Guantánamo, USA: The Untold History of America's Cuban Outpost* (Kansas, 2009).
- Seigel, Micol. *Uneven Encounters: Making Race and Nation in Brazil and the United States* (Duke, 2009).

- Skya, Walter A. *Japan's Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shinto Ultrationalism* (Duke, 2009).
- Springer, Devin R., James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* (Georgetown, 2009).
- Steuer, Kenneth A. *Pursuit of an Unparalleled Opportunity: The American YMCA and Prisoner of War Diplomacy Among the Central Power Nations During World War I, 1914-1923* (Columbia, 2009).
- Sweig, Julia E. *Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford, 2009).
- Takeyh, Ray. *Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs* (Oxford, 2009).
- Taylor, Jay. *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Harvard, 2009).
- Tønnesson, Stein. *Vietnam 1946: How the War Began* (California, 2009).
- von der Goltz, Anna. *Hindenburg: Power, Myth, and the Rise of the Nazis* (Oxford, 2009).
- Walker, William O., III. *National Security and Core Values in American History* (Cambridge, 2009).
- Walzer, Michael, and Nicolaus Mills, eds. *Getting Out: Historical Perspectives on Leaving Iraq* (Pennsylvania, 2009).
- Wittner, Lawrence S. *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement* (Stanford, 2009).
- Young, John. *Twentieth Century Diplomacy: A Case Study in British Practice, 1963-76* (Cambridge, 2008).



George Bush Presidential Library Research Grants

The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government & Public Service wishes to announce two research grant programs to assist research at the George Bush Presidential Library. The Peter and Edith O'Donnell Research Grant supports research in any field using holdings from the Bush Library. The Korea Grant Program, made possible by the Korea Foundation, focuses on Asia, particularly Korea, also using records available at the Bush Library.

Awards are open to researchers at all stages of projects, and range from \$500 to \$2,500.

Applications are due November 1, 2009 for use during the 2010 calendar year. Further information, including an application, can be found at the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs Website: <http://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/grants/>.

Interested parties are strongly encouraged to contact the George Bush Presidential Library archival staff to discuss research proposals before submitting an application. Contact information can be found at: <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/faq.php>.

Passport
Mershon Center
for International Security Studies
The Ohio State University
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
passport@osu.edu

NON-PROFIT ORG.
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
HANOVER , PA 17331
Permit No. 4

The Last Word