

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

ELEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING

HELD JOINTLY WITH

PACIFIC COAST BRANCH, AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

CONFERENCE ON PEACE RESEARCH IN HISTORY

AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

STANFORD UNIVERSITY JUNE 25-28, 1985

ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS

TUESDAY JUNE 25

7:30 p.m. JORDAN HALL 040

WOMEN IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (SHAFFR)

Joan Hoff-Wilson, Indiana University

"LYDIA MARIA CHILD: ABOLITIONIST CRITIC  
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

Edward P. Crapol  
College of William and Mary

Although the domain of American diplomacy has been, and remains male dominated, a number of American women have attempted to shape and influence the nation's foreign policy. Lydia Maria Child, prominent author and abolitionist editor, was an active critic of American diplomacy in the antebellum and post-Civil War years. For more than forty years as writer, petitioner, organizer, pamphleteer, and editor she fought slavery, sought social and sexual equality, and decried "the insane rage for annexation" in nineteenth century America. Her campaigns included calls for an end to slavery and the implementation of equal rights for blacks and women, a demand for United States recognition of Haiti, opposition to the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War, and at the end of her long career, a denunciation of President Grant's attempt to annex the Dominican Republic.

I will document how Mrs. Child's critique of the nation's diplomacy flowed naturally from her antislavery beliefs as expressed in her book, An Appeal in Favor of That Class of Americans Called Africans. In conclusion, I will evaluate that extent to which Mrs. Child influenced American foreign policy and helped shape the intellectual/political consciousness of other individuals and groups by defining the issues and developing alternatives.

"INVISIBLE PROMOTIONS: THE DIPLOMATIC CAREER  
OF ELEANOR LANSING DULLES"

Lynn Dunn  
University of Utah

Eleanor Lansing Dulles, although not as well known as her older brothers, John Foster and Allen, had a distinguished and varied career.

Trained as an economist, she entered the federal bureaucracy in 1936 and served in a variety of positions. In 1952, she was appointed Special Assistant to the Director of the German Bureau. In this capacity she directed United States economic policy for Berlin from 1952 to 1959.

In all of these bureaucratic positions, Eleanor Dulles operated, as a woman, in an environment run, designed and

defended as a masculine preserve. Yet family connection provided influence and power beyond her mid-level rank.

The "Dulles connection" was crucially important in her initial appointment to the "Berlin desk" and significantly aided her in achieving the goals of United States policy there. Her creative approach to economic development and implementation of the impact project illuminate an altered American policy for Berlin during the Eisenhower Administration. This policy went well beyond mere defense of the city.

"NEARLY IN THE INNER CIRCLE: JEANE KIRKPATRICK"

Judith Ewell  
College of William and Mary

Among women who have influenced United States foreign policy, Jeane Kirkpatrick is unique in having done so as an insider with a cabinet level position in Ronald Reagan's administration. This paper will evaluate her personal, political, and academic background prior to 1979 and her contribution to the formulation and implementation of official foreign policy between 1980 and 1985. Her rise to national prominence in 1979 resulted from a combination of factors: the attention called to her article "Dictatorships and Double Standards" and the sponsorship of other, more prominent foreign policy analysts and Washington insiders who shared Ronald Reagan's concern about Soviet expansionism.

Because of an allegedly abrasive manner and because other Reagan advisors had little respect for her rather modest credentials as a foreign policy strategist, Kirkpatrick's role in the Reagan government became primarily a symbolic and political one rather than a leadership one. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the extent to which gender may have contributed to her successful career and to her (perhaps temporary?) inability to achieve a policymaking role within the administration.

COMMENT: Joan Hoff-Wilson, Indiana University

Barton Bernstein, Stanford University

WEDNESDAY JUNE 26

8:30 - 10:30 A.M. JORDAN HALL 041

RECENT SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (SHAFR/CPRI)

CHAIR: Betty Miller Unterberger, Texas A & M University

"NIXON, BREZHNEV, AND DETENTE "

Keith Nelson, University of California, Irvine  
(Abstract Not Available)

EDWARD P. CLAPOL  
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY  
"LYDIA MARIA CHILD'S INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN DIPLOMACY" (SHAHR)  
"LYDIA MARIA CHILD'S INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN DIPLOMACY"  
"LYDIA MARIA CHILD: ABOLITIONIST CRITIC  
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

Edward P. Clapol  
College of William and Mary

Throughout the domain of American diplomacy has been, and has been dominated, a number of American women have attempted to influence the nation's foreign policy. Lydia Maria Child, an abolitionist editor, was an active participant in American diplomacy in the antebellum and post-Civil War periods. For more than forty years as writer, petitioner, pamphleteer, and editor she fought slavery, sought sexual equality, and decried "the insane rage for annexation" in nineteenth century America. Her campaigns included calls for an end to slavery and the implementation of equal rights for blacks and women, a demand for United States recognition of Haiti, opposition to the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War, and at the end of her long career, a criticism of President Grant's attempt to annex the Dominican

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Keith Nelson, University of California, Irvine  
(Abstract Not Available)

"THE KAL AFFAIR: IMPLICATIONS  
FOR SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS"

Alexander Dallin  
Stanford University

The shutdown of the Korean Airlines jet over Sakhalin Island on September 1, 1983 had important implications for Soviet-American relations, regardless of the reasons for KAL 007's presence over Soviet territory. This paper seeks to explore, first, how the two superpowers handled the crisis--in dealing with each other and with third parties, and in managing the media; and, second, the dynamics of superpower behavior in the resulting crisis.

The differences--leaving aside political styles and political cultures--become plausible once one identifies divergent priorities on each side. Thus, for the U.S., tagging Moscow as guilty of "mass murder" and rallying political support became a priority task. For the Soviet Union, by contrast, the highest priority was confirming the regime's credibility with its domestic constituency.

Both sides in the crisis felt compelled to make statements and decisions under conditions of imperfect information. In such circumstances latent assumptions and images regarding the adversary rise to the surface, with the events in this instance reinforcing the predisposition on each side to impute the worst possible intentions to the other, ruling out accident, confusion, incompetence, or error. The paper discusses some of the dangers inherent in this tendency, which is reinforced by particular features of American and Soviet political life.

COMMENT: Coit Blacker, Stanford University

Diane Clemens, University of California, Berkeley

8:30 - 10:30 A.M. HISTORY 202

IMAGE-MAKERS IN AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Michael Schaller, University of Arizona

"THE ROLE OF THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORIAN: KIYOSAWA KIYOSHI"

Kitaoka Shin'ichi  
Rikkyo University

Kiyosawa Kiyoshi (1890-1945) is known in Japan today as the author of the best diplomatic history of Japan that appeared before 1945 (A Diplomatic History of Japan), and as the liberal who left the most penetrating criticism of the war in his diary (The Diary of Darkness, posthumous publication). However, very few now remembers some 30 books on Japan's foreign relations, particularly with the US, that he wrote to influence the people.

Kiyosawa was a staunch advocate of the liberal reorganization of Japan and the cooperation with the US, and an undaunted opponent of continental expansion. In the early 1920s, he was just one of those pro-American liberal intellectuals, but no one was more consistent through the 1930s than he.

Kiyosawa was in his youth an immigrant to the US from 1906 to 1918. Every foreign policy he later proposed was, it seems, prepared in these years. In this essay, it is planned to examine Kiyosawa's arguments, focusing on his immigrant experience. By so doing, it is also hoped to show why other former makers of pro-American images had changed their opinions, or lost their influence before 1941.

"THE ROLE OF THE PUBLISHER: HENRY R. LUCE"

Patricia Neils  
United States International University

The growing interdependence of nations in general and the new rapprochement of China-American intercultural relations in particular, make it ever more necessary that American citizens should seek fuller understanding of the Chinese people. Understanding is more than accumulated facts. It is also man's subjective knowledge, which includes all of his beliefs, attitudes, information, preferences, and stereotyped images. Of all the myriad of China image-makers Henry R. Luce is particularly significant for a number of reasons. First of all, he was the founder and long-time publishing editor of the immensely popular Time and Life Magazines which in the pre-television era dominated all other media in the role of image-makers. Secondly, his own life-span paralleled some of the most tumultuous and controversial years in the history of China-American relations. Thirdly, Luce was regarded by and treated as a powerful and influential person by a number of U.S. Presidents and other world leaders. Fourthly, Henry Luce was born in China while his father was a missionary there and from that experience Luce acquired an admiration of the Chinese people and their culture. Throughout his life he yearned to see China become a proud and powerful nation allied to the United States. Throughout the 1930s, 40s, and 50s Luce believed that this could best be accomplished through the leadership of the Christian, American educated Chiang Kai-shek. Meanwhile Luce also believed that Communism being atheistic and dictatorial was inappropriate for China.

These convictions were communicated over and over again in Time and Life Magazines and through the March of Time radio programs and the Time Newsreels which were shown in theatres throughout the United States. Although Luce was a master at reflecting and exploiting public opinion, he did not create it. He tried to catch the public mood just before it crystallized and to sway it in the direction he believed to be correct. With his colossal journalistic empire he was undoubtedly somewhat successful in doing that, but in instances where the climate of opinion was antithetical to his own views he was unable to wield a significant influence on attitudes and policies.

Luce's critics would lead us to believe that he was obsessed with a fanatical, foundationless fear of communism and that he was responsible for America's mistaken policy of supporting the corrupt, moribund, fascist regime of Chiang Kai-shek. This reevaluation of the events and China image-makers along with recent reports such as those of Richard Bernstein, Dennis Bloodworth, Fox Butterfield and Steven Mosher indicate that Luce was far more accurate in his assessment of the China situation than his critics would lead us to believe. Furthermore he was not as all powerful in his influence on images, attitudes and policies toward China as his critics have portrayed him or even as he himself would have liked to have been.

"THE ROLE OF THE NOVELIST: PEARL BUCK"

Sandra M. Hawley  
University of Houston Downtown

Pearl Buck has long been recognized as one of the most important of all shapers of American opinion and images about China; from the publication of The Good Earth and the awarding of the Nobel Prize to her columns and short stories in popular magazines in the 60's and even early 70's, Buck wrote about China, the China of her youth, her parents' lives, and, increasingly, of her imagination. This paper will begin the exploration of the varying images of China presented by Pearl Buck over the nearly 40 years during which she made China the focus of her work.

In addition to exploring vital images of China, the paper will trace shifting American opinion about China and the Chinese, during a period of turmoil and great change. In so doing, the paper should make clearer, if not the roots of America's China policy during this critical period, at least some of the images that lay behind the formation and the general public acceptance of that policy.

COMMENT: David Axeen, Occidental College

Frank Ninkovich, St. John's University

10:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. HISTORY 30

THE JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT OF 1951 (SUAFR)

CHAIR: Hosoya Chihiro, International University of Japan

"THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE "

Watanabe Akio, University of Tokyo

"THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE"

Miyazato Selgen, International University of Japan

(Abstracts Not Available)

COMMENT: Peter Duus, Stanford University  
Howard Schoneberger, University of Maine

10:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. HISTORY 303

PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES IN TWO WORLD WARS (AMI)

CHAIR: Stanley L. Falk, Alexandria, Virginia

"GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN JAPAN, 1914-1920"

Ursula Moessner,  
Saratoga, California

My presentation would focus on an episode from World War One--the Life of the German Prisoners of War in Japanese POW camps from 1914 until 1920. It is the story of the 4,306 German and 286 Austrian soldiers who from August to November 1914 had defended Tsingtau against the Japanese and had lost. Tsingtau was the port city of Kiaochow, then the German leasehold colony in China.

After their surrender, the soldiers were taken to hastily erected POW camps on three Japanese Islands where some of the men remained until late 1919 and some until early 1920. When they were taken prisoner in November of 1914, Germany was still a powerful nation full of self-confidence and imbued with a belief system that credited God, Kaiser and the Fatherland with Germany's social, political and economic stability. During their imprisonment most of the men reflected that belief and drew strength from it.

The presentation would include how the prisoners coped with (to them) unorthodox living conditions; how they conquered enormous mental and physical boredom; how some of them tried to escape--and indeed did so; and how many, in the end, contributed to German-Japanese friendship.

It is a low-key account of how a group of people managed to retain their dignity under adverse conditions. And how their desire for survival with honor strengthened the bond of comradeship between them.

"INTERNEED AMERICANS IN BERLIN, 1941-1942"

Charles Burdick  
San Jose State University

The news of the German declaration of war against the United States did not surprise the isolated American diplomats, attaches, and journalists in Berlin. They had anticipated some action, if not the time. Nonetheless no one had developed plans

for an internment. In all events they anticipated a two-week delay in their return home.

The German officials were surprised and possessed no ideas about interning the Americans. Under great duress they reopened a luxury hotel in Bad Nauheim for the Americans. The conditions were most adequate for wartime Germany, but the psychological difficulties were more challenging. The Americans had problems living in confined circumstances, understanding the neglect of their government, and combating boredom.

This situation led to serious internal concerns for the Americans who stayed five months. Their constant struggles over self-governance, food, and activity drove the responsible official, George Kennan, to distraction.

The internment provided an interesting commentary on human beings confined in a limited space under very difficult conditions. They had to entertain themselves which proved a difficult challenge.

**"GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND FRANCE, 1945-1949"**

Arthur L. Smith, Jr., California State University,  
Los Angeles (Abstract Not Available)

COMMENT: Stanley L. Falk, Alexandria, Virginia

Frederick Kiley, National Defense University

10:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. HISTORY 305

WORK IN PROGRESS (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Warren Kuehl, University of Akron

**"ORIGINS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM"**

Richard D. Byrne  
The University of Iowa

The Mutual Security Program (MSP) was initially authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The enabling legislation for the MSP consolidated American foreign economic, military, and technical assistance into an integrated program for building "situations of strength" in the free world. The MSP remained in operation for a decade and involved the United States deeply in the internal affairs of other nations.

The historical significance of the MSP is that it fully militarized and globalized the Containment Policy. Traditionally, scholars have viewed the development of the MSP as the American response to the Korean War. During the second half of 1950 the Truman Administration accelerated the European rearmament program and pursued containment more vigorously in Asia. Yet, the origins of the MSP antedated the Korean War. Months before the Korean War began the Administration focused on

problems, commenced planning, and took steps that foreshadowed the MSP. More than simply a response to the Korean War, the MSP was the culmination of efforts reaching back to the development of the European Recovery Program and the Military Assistance Program to fashion effective instruments of containment. The MSP served to place them within a coordinated and comprehensive framework.

**"ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:  
THE BURAIMI OIL CRISIS, 1952-1957"**

Tore T. Petersen  
University of Minnesota

While Great Britain relatively graciously accepted the process of decolonization elsewhere, she tenaciously clung to her position in the Middle East. This intransigence arose from Britain's claim to the enormous oil revenues that helped shore up the otherwise slumping economy of Great Britain. The United States at the same time followed a policy bent on enlarging her strategic and economic role in the Middle East, if necessary even at the expense of Britain. Nowhere is this clearer to be seen than in the struggle over the little known Buraimi oasis, located on the southeastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. The struggle severely strained Anglo-American relations in the early years of the Eisenhower administration.

Buraimi was within the British sphere of influence, but Saudi Arabia occupied the area with aid and encouragement from the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), in the fall of 1952. The British realized that if Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO were allowed to encroach on British territory, the entire British position in the Middle East might be jeopardized.

Despite pressure from the Eisenhower administration the British took an increasingly hard line against "the intruders"; at one point threatening to kill any ARAMCO personnel found in Buraimi. Later Britain forcibly retook the oasis and unilaterally defined its boundary.

The Eisenhower administration identified very closely with ARAMCO and to a large degree allowed the company to formulate American foreign policy towards Great Britain over Buraimi. The conflict was not settled until Britain crushed a Saudi backed rebellion in Oman, adjacent to Buraimi, in 1957.

COMMENT: The Audience

1:30 - 3:30 P.M. JORDAN HALL 041

AMERICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Damidar SarDesai, UCLA

"A MILITARY EXPERIMENT: THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, 1935-1941  
AND THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

Ricardo T. Jose  
University of the Philippines

This paper seeks to explore the ideas behind the creation of the Philippine Commonwealth Army: basic rationale, concepts involving national defense, original ideals and goals. These ideals--embodied in the National Defense Act, as well as President Manuel L. Quezon's and Gen. Douglas MacArthur's public statements--intended to create a citizen army for a country that did not have a standing tradition for successful organized military forces. Gen. MacArthur himself regarded the Philippine Army more as a tool for deterrence, although he kept on publicly stating that the Army's function was for actual defense. Partial guerrilla concepts were present in Gen. MacArthur's plan, such as in the use of a small, but fast air corps, and (later), an equally small, but fast Off-shore Patrol. Military units--the bulk of which were reserve units trained for 5 and 1/2 months--were themselves to hit and run whenever possible.

Politics and extreme idealism (on the part of Gen. MacArthur), however, wrought havoc with the basic ideas of the plan. Practical exercises and mobilization were not as successful as were hoped for; and the short training period was further whittled down owing to the clamor for an immediately useful training--which included sanitation, food production and other non-military subjects. Quezon's own vacillation on the Army led to budget cuts, and the accompanying diminished returns from training.

The ultimate test was the outbreak of war in the Pacific. In one month, the original plans of the Commonwealth Army proved incapable of execution. In one sense, then, the Army--and the entire national defense plan--was an experiment that had failed.

"THE UNITED STATES AND MALAYSIA, 1966-1985"

Pamela Sodhy  
National University of Malaysia

Since 1966, United States-Malaysian relations have focused mainly on economic ties, growing American interest in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Malaysia is a member, deteriorating relations over the Vietnamese refugees problem, and increasing educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and Malaysia. The first three topics revolved around two early themes in U.S.-Malaysian relations: the American view of Malaysia in a larger, regional context and as needing protection from Communism. The regional and containment themes remain strong and pervasive, as manifested in America's backing of ASEAN which it views as an effective device to thwart the spread of Communism in the area. The fourth topic revolves around a new theme that has emerged since the 1960's: that the relationship is taking on social and cultural dimensions as a result of the growing number of Malaysian students in

America, from about six hundred in 1966 to twenty-four thousand in 1985. Despite this new phase in the relationship, economic ties dominate at present. U.S. trade with Malaysia has increased five-fold in the last decade and mirrors the rapid growth in U.S. trade with ASEAN, now its 11th largest trading partner, and with the Pacific, which has surpassed America's Atlantic trade.

"TRUMAN, QUIRINO, AND THE DILEMMAS OF DEPENDENCY,"

Richard E. Welch, Jr.  
Lafayette College

This paper analyzes U.S. Philippine diplomacy during the presidency of Elpidio Quirino (1948-1953). It emphasizes the contrasting perceptions and priorities of the American and Philippine negotiators and seeks to relate the revival of an interventionist mentality in the U.S. State Department to the established pattern of patron and client. At various points, the Quirino years appeared to offer the prospect of increased American respect for the demands of Philippine nationalism, but there was little change and sustained political and economic dependence for the Republic of the Philippines.

The years of the Quirino presidency are significant in the diplomatic history of Philippine-American relations as they illustrate the difficulty of a small nation seeking political concessions from a major power while requesting increased economic assistance. Old ties and new fears assured the Philippines a measure of American generosity, but the effect of the Korean War was to give Japan and not the Philippines the central role in American Cold War strategy in the Pacific. The bargaining power of the Quirino administration was restricted by that fact and by the evolving emphasis of U.S. Philippine policy from economics to defense. Revision of U.S. trade and tariff policy was delayed; negotiations over the jurisdictional status of American forces in the Philippines were postponed; and the "special relationship" between the United States and the Philippines remained that of patron and client.

COMMENT: Gary R. Hess, Bowling Green State University

David DuFault, San Diego State University

1:30 - 3:30 P.M. HISTORY 202

PERSPECTIVES ON NINETEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY (SBAFR)

CHAIR: Kinley M. Brauer, University of Minnesota

"THE CONFEDERACY'S CHINESE FLEET"

Frank J. Merli  
Queens College

For more than a century an important chapter in Civil War diplomacy has been missing. No mention of the curious sequence of events centering on the Confederacy's Chinese Fleet appears in the classic accounts of E.D. Adams or F.L. Owsley; there is no mention of them in the more recent works of W.D. Jones, F.J. Merli, Brian Jenkins and Warren Spencer. Nor was I able to uncover any references to this subject in my survey of this literature for the SHAFR Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700.

It is my contention that the long-neglected story of the Chinese fleet possesses all the attributes of a near-perfect test case of mid-nineteenth-century American Civil War; it uncovers a hitherto unknown Asian dimension of that struggle; it provides a rare angle of vision on Anglo-American relations in that period and it illuminates aspects of neutrality in the 1860s. In addition, this incident has a potential for pointing up some of the ambiguities in that peculiar bifocal vision the West adopted toward Asia, while at the same time providing new material for assessing the conflict of cultures in China. At the very least, the story should call into question some of the conventional wisdom about the British response to civil wars in China and the Confederacy.

In 1862 Horatio Nelson Lay began to purchase ships for the Chinese government to assist in suppressing the Taiping rebellion. With the active connivance--as I think it was--of British officials, he succeeded in despatching a flotilla of some six ships to China. But when it arrived there, the Chinese refused to accept the terms agreed upon between Lay and the fleet's commander, and they elected to sell the ships. The British minister, Frederick Bruce, then exerted a considerable pressure upon Chinese officials to prevent sale of the Lay-Osborn flotilla to agents of the Confederate States. In this maneuver he received the sanction of his superiors in London and the active cooperation of the American minister in China, Anson Burlingame.

This sequence of events, stretching from 1862 to 1867, cost the British a considerable sum of money, and it provides a fascinating look at two faces of nineteenth-century neutrality. Moreover, the contrast between British responses to Confederate and Chinese efforts to procure naval craft in England calls into question the supposed, pro-South orientation of the Palmerston ministry, just as it affords a unique opportunity to reassess British definitions of natural interests in widely-separated parts of the world. And when Bruce came to the United States as British minister in 1865, he expected his role in keeping the Chinese fleet out of Confederate hands to benefit Her Majesty's government.

"COMPETITIVE IMPERIALISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 1820-1920"

Thomas Schoonover  
University of Southwestern Louisiana

In the course of the 19th or early 20th century, most nations manifested concern for securing their interests in the world economic order by a proper transit arrangement in the Middle American isthmus (Central America, Panama, and southern Mexico). My study has focused upon the four most active powers--Britain, the United States, Germany and France--during the years from 1821 to 1929, without ignoring the mark of other nations upon affairs on the isthmus.

Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, strategic and geographic considerations, visible in the "no transfer" and Monroe Doctrines, were vital to U.S. perspectives of its role in the Caribbean region. In the 1830s and 1840s, North American diplomatic and consular agents, entrepreneurs, and speculators had sought transit concessions in New Granada and Mexico. The United States was first concerned with British and later with French and German activity and influence in Middle America, inevitably assuming that any major power's influence was unfriendly to North American interests--a real or potential threat to its internal well-being and security. To justify its course and to generate Central American support, the United States commonly compared the cultural and economic disadvantages of monarchical and militaristic European governments to North American freedom and democratic institutions. Still, in 19th and early 20th century Central America, U.S. interests in trade, investment, raw materials, and ideology were clearly secondary to broad strategic-geographic considerations. Even recently, President Reagan's administration has launched the Caribbean Basin Initiative, supported Nicaraguan 'contras,' and armed many traditional, institutional power sources in Central America, because it contends that the Caribbean-isthmus area is strategically vital to U.S. well-being, prosperity and security. Even a cursory review of past U.S. government statements, policies and actions reveals that the CBI arguments are direct descendants of 19th century rationale. Invariably, U.S. policy intertwined its domestic well-being (employment, profit, and so forth) and internal-external security with access to the total world market. William Walker and the slave expansionists, Vanderbilt and the merchant-shipping capitalists, the California and east coast mining interests all argued for aggressive U.S. policy with regard to the isthmian area citing the need to promote the nations general welfare and security, to preserve the superior a race and social order, to resolve employment problems, and to advance civilization.

In contrast to Britain and the United States, analyzing the French and German activity in Central America is made difficult by the paucity of secondary sources. Since no unified "German" policy existed prior to 1871, Prussian, Hanseatic states, Hannoverian, and Austrian records were examined for traces of German policy towards Central America. Claiming to speak for Customs Unions states and intending to speak for all of Germany,

THURSDAY JUNE 27

8:30 - 10:30 A.M. JORDAN HALL 041

EISENHOWER AS FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKER (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Norman Graebner, University of Virginia

"ENDING THE KOREAN WAR"

Edward C. Keefer  
Department of State

Systematically released documentation now available does not contradict the Eisenhower memoirs' account of the end of the war, but it reveals that the process was not as well planned or as rational as Eisenhower has implied or his recent scholarly proponents have claimed. The concept of an orchestrated, escalating campaign of public and private hints to China culminating in the atomic threat is an exaggeration, at least a rationalization, of a far more ad hoc approach. The Eisenhower administration deliberated sporadically and ineffectively for almost five months trying to devise a means of using U.S. atomic military superiority to convince the Chinese and North Koreans to sign an armistice. Eisenhower sought a cheap battlefield victory by demonstrating the use of tactical atomic weapons in Korea, but was convinced by his military advisers that the concept was impractical. Instead the U.S. would have to strike at China. The atomic ultimatum was thus a fall-back policy and was probably issued only after there were clear signs of Chinese concessions at Panmunjom. Still, the atomic threat was not a bluff.

Eisenhower's success with China was not easily duplicated with the Republic of Korea. Eisenhower seriously underestimated South Korean opposition to the armistice, he reacted emotionally to Rhee's release of the Korean prisoners, seriously considered withdrawal from Korea, but was convinced by his advisers and Congress to try a multi-level policy to persuade, cajole, threaten, and bluff Rhee into accepting an armistice. The end of the Korean war was a consensus and collective effort by the Eisenhower administration.

"REASSURING ISRAEL"

Isaac Alteras  
Queens College

Israeli leaders were uneasy about the election to the Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower because of their fear that the close and sympathetic interest in Israel shown by Truman, might cease with the new Administration. Eisenhower's military background might lead him to make decisions based on cold calculations of power and strict considerations of national interest rather than on the intrinsic merits and justice of the Israeli case. Eisenhower was also less likely to allow domestic

Prussia responded to the 1848-1850 British-United States crisis in Central America by sending a special mission to preserve Germany's particular interests in isthmian transit. Prussia planned to use Germany's excess population to create culturally and economically dependent colonies which would protect German strategic-transit interests in this vital communications area of the world trade system. Indicative of the value Germany attached to an active isthmian policy was the fact that despite extensive war-time economic and political losses, post-World War I Germany acted to regain a strong position in Central America before the 1920s ended. Defining its national recovery as linked to reestablishing ties to world trade, Germany recognized it needed to reacquire influence on the isthmus.

France, a significant trading partner of Central America in the 1830s, saw its market share decrease during the 1840s and 1850s. Under Napoleon III, the French plotted to insure French interests in this key area at minimal political and economic costs and planned to extend Maximilian's Mexican intervention at least into Central America and perhaps all of South America. In addition, the French intrigued to substitute French for North American canal-transit proposals. The French expected their role via the DeLessups' canal to open the whole Pacific basin to French industry and culture, preserve France's proper role in "Latin" America, and contribute towards undermining U.S. and British influence in that area. Napoleon III's Empire and his successors viewed their domestic success as related to overseas success. Thus, the French and Germans, just as the British and North Americans, pursued goals in Middle America which linked domestic economic, political, and cultural goals with an expansive-activist foreign policy.

The host societies are necessary elements of the story of expansionism, interacting with the forces of social imperialism to mould modern international relations. Collaborators in the host society were to eliminate the disorder of host societies, often most efficiently and quickly removed via repression. The repression weakened elements of support in the home country, produced violent opposition in the host country, and resurrected home country pressures to restore order, via military intervention to remove former collaborators at times, because the home society had been educated to define its well-being, prosperity and security in terms of the host society. Disorder in the host meant danger to the home. The small Central American states did "play the game" by trying to induce various outside powers, or an apparently disinterested major imperial power, to intervene in their favor, and thus create options for the small state. The small Central American states compelled and seduced by the competitive world systems and the preponderant power of the industrializing states, departed from subsistence agriculture to one or two cash crop systems in order to better integrate into the laissez faire world system.

COMMENT: Joseph Fry, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Jerald Combs, San Francisco State University

politics to influence foreign policy decisions--this too, would be to the detriment of Israel. The Israelis' anxiety was reinforced by press reports that the new Administration was turning a cold shoulder to Israel's urgent plea for aid while lining up limited military and economic help for Egypt in order to encourage Egypt's strong man Premier Gen Mohammed Naguib to join the proposed Middle East Defense Alliance to counter Soviet designs in the area. All in all, it appeared that the Eisenhower Administration was about to embark on a new approach in its Middle East policy, paying more attention to Arab countries and less to Israel.

New evidence from the recently declassified documents of the Israeli State Archives suggests that their fears were premature. In its first four to five months the Administration had not yet formulated substantially new policy. As far as the Middle East was concerned, its policy was still in the making. The only noticeable change from its predecessor at this stage were less frequent pro-Israeli declarations. Unnoticed, however, were pro-Israeli deeds. As a whole, U.S. policy on issues such as the Arab refugee problem, the question concerning the status of Jerusalem, the Middle East Defense Organization, and the general approach to the Arab-Israeli Conflict crystallized only after John Foster Dulles' return from his fact finding mission to the Middle East in early June 1953. Until then, Israeli diplomats in Washington attempted to influence the policy makers of the new Administration to prevent the consolidation of a policy change detrimental to Israel's interests that so many had predicted. They succeeded in no small measure.

#### "DRAWING THE LINE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT"

Harriet D. Schwar  
Department of State

The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 between the United States and the Republic of China was in part an outgrowth of a U.S. effort to stabilize the Taiwan Strait situation in the first phase of the offshore islands crisis of 1954-1955. While Eisenhower was fully committed to the defense of Taiwan, he recognized that the American public would not tolerate war over the offshore islands and supported John Foster Dulles' proposal for an initiative by New Zealand to bring the problem before the United Nations. Although Dulles' immediate objective was a UN-imposed ceasefire, he anticipated an eventual negotiated settlement in which Peking would yield its claim to Taiwan in exchange for the offshore islands. In order to obtain Chiang Kai-shek's acquiescence in the UN initiative, Dulles and Eisenhower agreed to accept his long-standing proposal for a mutual defense treaty. A purely defensive treaty, Dulles concluded, would contribute to stability in the area. At U.S. insistence, the treaty applied only to Taiwan and the Pescadores, and the accompanying notes pledged the Nationalists to take no offensive action without U.S. approval. The "two-China" policy implied in this, although not clearly articulated, never came to fruition. Lacking full support even within the Administration

and based on inadequate understanding of attitudes of Peking and Taipei, it was foredoomed to failure.

COMMENT: Ian Bickerton, University of New South Wales

James Matray, New Mexico State University

8:30 - 10:30 A.M. HISTORY 202

REAPPRAISALS OF MAHAN (AMI)

CHAIR: Paul Ryan, Hoover Institution

"A MODICUM OF INFLUENCE: ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1899-1909"

Richard W. Turk  
Alleghany College

This paper addressed the issue of why Alfred Thayer Mahan was not more influential in foreign policy concerns during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. Mahan had become a firm supporter of Great Britain's international position by the mid-1890's. Although lagging somewhat behind the "expansionists of 1898" in the western Pacific, he leaped ahead of the McKinley administration by advocating an alliance between Great Britain and the United States in East Asia to help stem the Russian southward advance. This went too far for Roosevelt's taste, as did Mahan's apparent acceptance of the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. This may in part explain Mahan's preference for the Nicaragua canal route over Panama, and his years-long silence over Roosevelt's "taking" of the isthmus. Mahan also disliked the Anglo-Japanese alliance (as, indeed, he disliked Anglo-German cooperation during the second Venezuelan crisis) because of the negative effect on Anglo-American relations should the United States become embroiled with either Japan or Germany.

Mahan's Anglophilia had historical overtones as well. Admiration for the workings of British seapower during the War of 1812 resulted in Mahan downplaying American naval accomplishments, to Roosevelt's distress. This in turn contributed to Roosevelt's turning a deaf ear to Mahan's pleas for a revision of the United States government's long-standing position on the immunity of private property from seizure during wartime. Roosevelt did however take Mahan's ideas on standardization of warships (without, however, involving Mahan in any way) in an attempt to slow down the naval arms race by interesting the other powers in its implementation.

Roosevelt had a much keener sense of what was possible in the international realm than did Mahan. It was, perhaps, a greater willingness to advance American interests (even at British expense) which distinguished the two individuals. Even had Roosevelt not wanted to be his own Secretary of State, Mahan's views would have denied him a significant voice in policy formulation.

"NEGATIVE INFLUENCE: THE PROTECTION OF SHIPPING IN WARTIME"

Roland A. Bowling  
San Diego, California

Ever since Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan pronounced his "principles" regarding the superiority of "capital ships"; the decisiveness of "big battles"; the superiority of the "offensive"; and the "irregular, secondary...inconclusive...(and) indecisive" nature of commerce destroying, maritime nations have concentrated on building battlefleets of "capital ships" while neglecting to provide forces for the direct protection of shipping. This neglect was not considered as such since Mahan claimed that "command of the sea", which could be assured by a decisive "big battle" won by a superior battlefleet of "capital ships", would automatically assure the necessary protection. In the first trial by combat of Mahan's "principles" in World War I, Jutland, the supposed decisive "big battle" between "capital ships", was indecisive; but Germany's submarine version of the querre de course came within a razor's edge of winning the war. Nevertheless, between wars, all the major maritime powers, including a resurrected Germany, remained staunch advocates of Mahan's "principles", concentrating on building "capital ships" and again giving practically no attention to the need for the direct protection of shipping. Thus, during World War II, the U-boat onslaught against shipping in the Atlantic, at minimum, prolonged the war. While in the Pacific, the United States Navy virtually annihilated the Japanese merchant marine--over half by submarines, primarily because the Japanese concentrated their naval effort almost exclusively on their battlefleet in accordance with Mahan's "principles". Their belated efforts at convoying were too little and too late. The conclusion is inescapable: Mahan's influence has had a decidedly negative effect on the protection of shipping in wartime thus far. And it appears that he will have the same effect in the future, given the continued mesmerization of naval leaders with Mahan's emphasis on the superiority of "capital ships" (e.g. need for escorts) as an "indecisive" form of naval warfare.

COMMENT: John Hattendorf, U.S. Naval War College

Jack Shulimson, Marine Corps Historical Center

10:45 A.M - 12:30 P.M. JORDAN HALL 041

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN WORLD

WAR II (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Wayne S. Cole, University of Maryland

"ROOSEVELT AND THE SUMMER OF 1940"

J. Garry Clifford  
University of Connecticut

This paper, entitled "FDR and the Summer of 1940", focuses on President Roosevelt's two crucial decisions in the summer of 1940, namely, his support for the Destroyer Deal and peacetime conscription. The paper will emphasize that the President nearly waited too long before deciding on both issues. It will show how his confusion over priorities and timing allowed others to take the initiative with respect to both policies in ways that he could not have anticipated, and how his misperceptions and suspicious about Wendell Willkie nearly resulted in his backing away from both policy decisions. FDR's decision to take the lead on both issues in early August 1940 was critical and courageous, but his indecision from May on permitted both policy issues to develop along different lines in a way that confused public debate and made policy coordination difficult. Although some scholars, like Robert Dallek, argue that Roosevelt was wise to wait for public opinion to develop and to see whether England had a chance to survive before acting, this paper argues that the President hesitated more out of confusion than deliberate design, and that he allowed the debate in Congress over conscription (a desirable goal but not top priority for FDR) to endanger any forthright aid-to-England policy, so much so that he might well have backed off both issues in the midst of a presidential campaign against an opponent whom he mistakenly viewed as a potential fascist. Had FDR continued to stall on these issues, however, Cabinet hawks like Ickes, Stimson, and Knox might well have been angry enough to resign and openly support Willkie; hence FDR's support for both policy options can be explained in part in terms of domestic and bureaucratic politics. The fact that uniformed leaders in both the Army and Navy were lukewarm at best to both the draft and Destroyer Deal also contributed to FDR's indecision. The paper will also show that the President's unwillingness to give clear cues to the civilian groups who pushed both the draft and Destroyer Deal meant that the main arguments for each policy ran counter to one another; indeed, it was inconsistent to argue for peacetime conscription on the grounds that the hemisphere would be immediately threatened should England fall, while at the same time giving naval vessels to that same country because the latest intelligence indicated that it could withstand a German attack. By doing little to clarify the debate in Congress over the draft, FDR found himself forced to proceed with the Destroyer transaction through executive agreement, all the while disguising his motives and increasing isolationist opposition. Both policy decisions had enormous implications--an alliance with England in all but name, and peacetime conscription to raise an army that, denials notwithstanding, would eventually fight overseas. Rather than depicting FDR as a magician using mirrors, or a tightrope walker, this paper pictures him in the summer of 1940 as piloting a ship adrift that suddenly gets caught in a huge storm; the helmsman steers but he does not chart a careful, predetermined course.

"ROOSEVELT'S INTERVENTION IN THE BATTLE"

Waldo Heinrichs  
Temple University

I propose to reexamine the expanding American role in the war against German raiders and submarines beginning in April 1941. The traditional view is that Roosevelt was constrained by public and particularly Congressional isolationism from taking as active and open a role as he would have liked in escort of convoys to ensure delivery of aid to Britain. Recent studies by Robert Dallek and David Reynolds deemphasize this isolationist-interventionist polarity. They view Roosevelt as a cautious pragmatist who undoubtedly found isolationist opinion convenient if not congenial at times. Given an opportunistic Roosevelt, the question remains what prompted him to take the successive steps he took into the Atlantic war. Existing studies of the Atlantic intervention by Samuel Eliot Morison, Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, and Patrick Abbazia offer no satisfactory answers. What is required, and what provides the basis for this paper, is extensive research in the administrative and operational archives of the United States Navy as well as the British archives and the Roosevelt and other collections of private papers.

This paper will argue that three hitherto neglected considerations affected the president's Atlantic decisions of 1941. Of prime concern was the operational capability of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet at any given time. It is already apparent, for example, that the fleet was in no condition to undertake escort commitments in the spring of 1941. A second consideration was the changing character of the war on the Atlantic. The shifting deployment of U-boats, the knowledge of their positions gained from ULTRA, the threat of German naval raiders, and the effect of British naval losses elsewhere all affected the president's choices. Finally, intelligence and estimates of German and Japanese intentions in that immensely turbulent year operated from time to time to inspire or discourage deeper involvement.

Indeed, research to date suggests that the above military and external factors are more accurate predictors of the successive stages of involvement that is the strength or weakness of isolationist sentiment.

"ROOSEVELTIAN LEADERSHIP AND THE COMING OF THE PACIFIC WAR"

Jonathan Utley  
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

The Roosevelt administration was divided over how to respond to Japanese expansion. Both within State and between State, Navy, War, Treasury, and a host of smaller agencies, there was strong disagreement over the proper policy toward Japan. It was Roosevelt's responsibility to establish some order in this bureaucratic nightmare, a responsibility he failed to meet.

Roosevelt's problem did not stem from an uncertainty about what type of order he sought in Asia, or from a fear of public opinion, or even from a style of leadership that encouraged different parts of the government to seek their own solutions to the same problem. Instead, Roosevelt was hampered by his disdain for detail.

The president loved to ponder questions of grand strategy and reveled in personal diplomacy but from his talk of a quarantine in 1937 to his suggestion of a modus vivendi in 1941, Roosevelt failed to go beyond the general statement.

The consequence of this lack of leadership from the top was a variety of conflicting policies from below. Thus it is at the bureaucratic level rather than the presidential level that the historian should look to understand the road to Pearl Harbor.

COMMENT: Frederick W. Marks, Forest Hills, New York

Asada Sadao, Doshisha University

10:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. HISTORY 205

THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF THE NEW WARFARE (SIAFR/CPRII)

CHAIR: David Rosenberg, National Defense University

"STRATEGIC BOMBING IN WORLD WAR II: THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUE"

Ronald Schaffer  
California State University, Northridge

Some of the people who helped prepare the American air offensive against Japan believed their activities raised significant humanitarian questions. These men, who were planning to incinerate every major Japanese city in the most efficient way possible, expected that someone at a level higher than their own would give due consideration to the moral issues that arose from incendiary raids. This paper examines how American military and civilian leaders actually dealt with those issues. It focuses chiefly on Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson who assumed most of the responsibility for weighing the moral consequences of air warfare and shows how for a variety of reasons, some political, some psychological, some resulting from a failure to secure accurate information, Stimson found it impossible to consider the humanitarian questions adequately. Finally, it discusses whether anyone could have done a better job of weighing those questions during a conflict like World War II.

"SENDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO EUROPE, 1954-1961"

Gary Tocchett  
United States Military Academy

The labels historians have attributed to the presidents and strategic policies of the 1950s and early 1960s often hide more

than they reveal. This paper examines presidential decision-making in the development and deployment of the Thor and Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) from 1954 to 1961. Unlike previous assessments, it suggests that presidential political decisions, not bureaucratic politics, shaped the history of these weapons. Development and deployment provided important domestic and international benefits of both a symbolic and substantive nature.

Finally, this study further illustrates the complexity, sophistication and irony of Eisenhower's leadership. Actual missile deployment was never as important to him as the promise of deployment. Eisenhower manipulated his bureaucracies to regulate the pace of development and deployment to maximize domestic and international political advantage. But, "hidden-hand" leadership provided only short term political benefit and left a dangerous and ambiguous legacy to the administration that followed.

COMMENT: Conrad Crane, United States Military Academy

David Hollaway, Stanford University

2:00 - 3:30 P.M. HISTORY 205

SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC (SHAFR)

CHAIR: D. Clayton James, Mississippi State University

"ALASKA'S CHANGING STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE, 1934-1984"

Jonathan M. Nielson  
University of Alaska

Proliferation of American economic imperialism and Japanese expansionism in the Pacific spurred interest in the Territory of Alaska as a northern anchor for hemispheric defense. The advent of air power in the 1920s dramatically altered Alaska's strategic value. The Second World War vindicated those who had charged that Alaska was not being accorded the defense it deserved or the role in national defense demanded by changing military relationships.

Post-war confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China further heightened Alaska's strategic significance. This enhanced position in national defense and strategic thinking influenced Territorial politics and the statehood battle, provided substantial defense dollars to a precarious economy, and guaranteed that decisions made in the Pentagon would be felt in Alaskan communities from Point Barrow to Fairbanks.

Recent decisions to upgrade Alaska's hemispheric role in national defense, coupled with the state's as yet untapped wealth in vital strategic minerals and natural resources, portend far reaching changes in the military and economic relationship

between Alaska and Pacific-rim nations. American diplomacy will have to accommodate such changes as the 21st century approaches.

"STRATEGIC NECESSITY OR NAVAL EXTRAVAGANCE?" BRITAIN'S  
DEFENSE OF HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE, 1945-1949"

Malcolm Murfett  
National University of Singapore

During the period 1945-49 Attlee's government in London was faced with a considerable dilemma in seeking to ensure military security for its interests in the Far East while at the same time attempting to satisfy the need for financial restraint demanded by the Treasury.

This paper will examine British defense policy in the Far East as it evolved over the course of the four years immediately following the end of the Second World War and will consider in particular the problem of rehabilitating the Hong Kong and Singapore naval bases as operational and service centres for the British Pacific Fleet.

Events on the regional stage--the spectre of a communist China, the perceived threat of the USSR and an advance of Marxism-Leninism or any variant thereof throughout the Far East--brought about significant changes in British policy overcoming the reluctance of the socialists, who had little enthusiasm for reestablishing an active military presence east of Suez.

By focussing upon the military arguments presented by the Chiefs of Staff and the range of committees advising the government in London this paper will demonstrate that strategic necessity was able to triumph over strongly held political convictions and that political consistency is no match for external threats to national interests.

"THE IDEA OF A PACIFIC PACT"

David W. Mabon  
Department of State

In early 1951 the Truman Administration seriously considered a multilateral alliance which would include Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Japan, the Philippines and perhaps Indonesia. John Foster Dulles explored the idea in the course of his search for avenues to a multilateral peace treaty with Japan.

Dulles' was not the first such proposal. Since 1949 there had been a substantial body of opinion in America and in some Asian nations which held that the United States should, in view of the Communist revolution in China, adopt a broader and more comprehensive response to the perceived challenge in Asia paralleling what had already been done in Europe: a "Pacific Pact."

In the United States and Asian countries alike, this conception took many different forms. American support for it, though broad, was shallow and unfocused. Secretary Dean Acheson had many reasons for opposing a Pacific Pact. Adoption of one variant of the proposal represented no triumph of the

multilateral idea in the Administration's thinking. Instead it was an act of desperation by policymakers stymied in the pursuit of a current goal.

As floated by Dulles, the Pacific Pact proposal was a failure. British opposition was intense. The novel idea of including Japan, one of the nations the Pact was to be directed against, within the Pact, did not appeal to Australia and New Zealand. Not one, but three security pacts emerged from the Japanese Peace Treaty negotiations, and the "spokes on a wheel" pattern of U.S. security relationships in the Asian area had its inception. Two additional bilateral pacts negotiated within the next three years reinforced this pattern.

The Pacific Pact episode revealed U.S. willingness to undertake a standing, permanent obligation in pursuit of a particular goal, and as such prefigured later U.S. negotiating behavior in East Asia and the Pacific. The written paper expands on this theme, and discusses why the SEATO Treaty was not a fundamentally significant exception to the trends of bilateralism and particularism in U.S. policymaking in Asia.

COMMENT: D. Clayton James, Mississippi State University

Ramon Myers, Hoover Institution

2:00 - 3:30 P.M. HISTORY 305

PEACE MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (CPRU)

CHAIR: Roger Paxton, University of Utah

"MEDIEVAL PEACE MOVEMENTS: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW"

Udo Heyn  
California State University, Los Angeles

A reaction to rampant public and private violence, the medieval peace movement was a series of campaigns aimed at the pacification of Western and Central Europe from the tenth into the sixteenth centuries. It evolved through three distinct yet interrelated phases (the Peace and Truce of God, ca. 900-1000 A.D., and the Peace of Lands, ca. 1100-1500 A.D.), and was without doubt the longest continuous peace initiative known to man. Yet there has been little interest in relating this historical experiment to our own peacekeeping needs and efforts. Instead, scholarly interest has tended to concentrate on the three campaigns singly and in isolation and from, essentially, an intellectual historian's point of view.

The study of the medieval peace movement began before World War One with the collection and classification of individual peace edicts, then progressed to predominantly legal and political interpretations in the interwar years, and finally settled on regional studies after World War Two. The primary sources for the three campaigns are now accessible in major

collections of documents and legal codes, supplemented by hagiographies and chronicles. Around these, a number of secondary works have emerged, primarily in Germany and France. But a definitive study of the movement as a whole remains, and probably will remain, beyond our reach.

The reason lies, of course, in the extraordinary problems surrounding the accumulation, substantiation and finally, interpretation of a diverse body of evidence which represents, after all, the chance, fragmentary remains of a long vanished and--to today's researcher--alien civilization.

Though much of our proof must be circumstantial, it clearly conveys the cumulative impact of a movement which responded to a series of fundamental crises in Europe's culture by using the legal system to integrate the proximate acts of church and lay authorities, aimed at arms control, into Europe's broadly evolving social system. In the process, the campaigns became themselves the instrument of a wide-ranging institutionalization of superior authority, which finally provided the stability which the vested interests of the new elites and their constituencies required. Thus, the movement which had started as a desperate--and often diffuse--effort to pacify a small, if burgeoning, outpost on the Eurasian peninsula, in the end became the historical catalyst which turned Europe's legal system into the universal instrumentality for internal and external peacemaking as which it is emulated, worldwide, today.

"THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN INTER-WAR EUROPE: A REAPPRAISAL "

Harold Bauman, University of Utah  
(Abstract Not Available)

COMMENT: Carroll Gillmore, University of Utah

John S. Conway, University of British Columbia

3:30 - 5:30 P.M. HISTORY 30

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT MID-CENTURY (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Paul Holbo, University of Oregon

"HARMONY IN WAR: THE VOICE OF AMERICA, 1941-1945"

Holly C. Shulman  
Golden Jubilee Commission on Telecommunications

"Harmony . . . in psychological warfare": Anglo-American Cooperation and the voice of America During the Second World War.

Several years after the Second World War the official historian of the American agency for propaganda, the Office of War Information (OWI), sent his nearly completed history to Robert E. Sherwood, playwright, presidential speechwriter, and wartime director of the Overseas Branch of the OWI. Sherwood,

largely complimentary of the text, nevertheless commented that it omitted critical aspects of the early American propaganda effort. It was the British, Sherwood suggested, who had formulated much of the substance of American propaganda policy, and it was the British as well who had helped shape the form of that propaganda.

The OWI historian did not heed Sherwood's advice at that time. To date, no other historian has explored this aspect of the Anglo-American wartime alliance. Nevertheless, in order to understand the development of American wartime propaganda, it is crucial to explain the role the British played in creating both the general propaganda policy of the Overseas Branch of Office of War Information and the particular formulations used by the Voice of America. Furthermore, this cooperation sheds light on a still unexplored aspect of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War. This paper will examine the role the Anglo-American relationship played in creating American propaganda and with it, the Voice of America.

"COOPERATION IN KOREA, 1945-1948"

J.Y. Ra, Kyung Hee University  
(Abstract Not Available)

"RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IRAN, 1947-51"

James Goode  
University of Georgia

The Truman administration showed greater sensitivity than the British government toward nationalism in the Middle East at the same time that London was pressing the United States to be more accommodating toward nationalism in East Asia.

No nation in the Middle East subjected Anglo-American relations to greater stress than Iran. After World War II the United States conceded Britain's predominance in Iran, but as the Cold War deepened the Truman administration became more concerned with preventing Soviet expansion toward the Persian Gulf than with maintaining British economic interests in the same area. American diplomats suspected that the British would not hesitate to compromise with the Russians to save their valuable oil concession.

Britain made clear its priority: to maintain the status quo. The two Western allies must not antagonize the Soviet Union. London feared that Washington would sacrifice anything to keep the Soviets out of Iran, even the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Focusing on three issues, the proposed Soviet oil concession in northern Iran in 1947, the abortive Export-Import Bank loan of 1950, and the nationalist takeover of the oil concession in 1951, this analysis of British and American reactions sets out policy differences between the two allies and discusses their implications.

"CONVERGENT INTERESTS? MALCOLM MACDONALD AND THE AMERICANS  
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1948-1955"

C.M. Turnbull  
University of Hong Kong

"Anglo-American relations and colonialism in Southeast Asia, 1948-55"

The break up of the western colonial system in Southeast Asia in the decade following the end of the Second World War, (involving negotiated independence in the Philippines and Burma, military struggle in Indonesia and Vietnam, and combined constitutional and military action in Malaya), dictated a fundamental change in British policy and attitudes in the colonial empire in general and Southeast Asia in particular.

Focusing on the activities of Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner General in Southeast Asia, this paper examines the changing Anglo-American relationship in this period and British attempts to involve the United States in the region, with results that were not always expected or welcome.

COMMENT: Peter Buzanski, San Jose State University

Roger Adelson, Arizona State University

3:30 - 5:30 P.M. HISTORY 205

THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF HUNGER (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Richard Dean Burns, California State University, Los Angeles

"FAMINE RELIEF IN CHINA, 1928-1930"

Arline T. Golkin  
Whittier College

American famine relief to China was undertaken in response to dramatic needs associated with widespread starvation. Efforts did not, however, result in the establishment of standing programs for famine intervention. Chinese officials refused to let foreigners select and control major prevention projects, and American donors made contributions in an irregular manner based upon conditions in both China and the United States. As a result, most relief supported only emergency measures.

This paper examines American response to famine in China from 1928 to 1930 when questions of defining famine and developing relief campaigns produced debate and disillusion among relief agents and agencies and helped end an era of private relief efforts. From 1931 to 1949, American government intervention took precedence over private campaigns which, for almost half a century, had been part of popular response to conditions in China.

Ultimately, neither private nor official American relief efforts played a direct role in eliminating the fundamental disorders which combined to produce famine conditions in China. However, Americans did provide China with a legacy of ideas for improving popular welfare. When applied on a national scale after 1949, they helped reduce vulnerability to starvation and diminished the threat of actual famine conditions.

"FOOD FOR WAR" IN INDOCHINA AND CENTRAL AMERICA:  
PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE IN U.S. FOOD AID POLICY, 1974-1984

Marc J. Cohen  
The Washington Center

Political uses of U.S. food aid are nearly as old as the Republic itself. When Congress created the Food for Peace program (Public Law 480) in 1954, the law recognized the use of food aid to support foreign policy as a legitimate objective. The most spectacular example of the political use of Food for Peace, to the detriment of other program objectives, came in the early 1970s. Nearly 75% of the PL 480 budget went to support the U.S. war effort in Indochina, despite food emergencies elsewhere.

This led liberal members of Congress to amend the law to make emergency relief and Third World economic development the top food aid priorities. Amendments also forbade the use of proceeds from the sale of food aid commodities to fund recipient country military activities. The Carter Administration strongly supported these initiatives in its rhetoric, and, somewhat more ambiguously, in its actual policies.

Because of legal restrictions, budgetary restraint, and the famine in Africa, one would expect that the Reagan Administration would not find food aid a useful instrument in the Central American conflict. However, despite changes in legislation, U.S. food aid to Central America under Reagan bears a good deal of resemblance to the Nixon-Ford "food for war" program. The level of resources provided has increased dramatically, with little or no attempt to support economic development or meet the basic human needs of the poorest Central Americans. Rather, the program offers balance of payments and budget support to "friendly" countries, thereby contributing, at least indirectly, to the counter-insurgency efforts of the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. The Administration has also explicitly used food "as a weapon" against Nicaragua, and has directly linked African drought relief resources to the funding of its Central American military initiatives.

However, food aid to Central America does not account for as large a proportion of the PL 480 budget as did the Indochina program of 10 years ago, and is only a small part of total U.S. assistance to the region. Congress has focused on restricting military aid in its efforts to change Administration policy, whereas food and other economic aid generally remain popular.

Thus, the Administration has circumvented Congressional restrictions on the use of food aid with ease; this suggests that the legislature has certain inherent weaknesses vis-a-vis the executive in their struggle over foreign policy. The

evidence also supports the notion that Food for Peace is a "structurally" political program; therefore, reforms aimed at increasing its humanitarian and developmental emphasis will not have their intended effects. These conclusions, in turn, raise further questions: why does U.S. foreign policy continue to involve military adventures in the Third World, and what steps need to be taken to change this?

COMMENT: Jane M. Porter, Department of Agriculture

Franz Schurman, University of California, Berkeley

FRIDAY JUNE 28

8:30 - 10:30 A.M. HISTORY 205

INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA (SUAFR)

CHAIR: Richard Immerman, University of Hawaii

"AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTION IN MEXICO  
DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN OVERVIEW"

W. Dirk Raat  
State University of New York, Fredonia

The history of U.S. intelligence gathering and covert activity in Mexico during the twentieth century can be viewed in five stages:

1) The period of the late Porfiriato, 1903-1911. During this period a bicultural and binational spy and police system developed that was coordinated by Enrique Creel, governor of Chihuahua.

2) The era of the "Epic Revolution," 1911-1917. The U.S. pursued a direct and overt style of diplomacy in which U.S. interests succeeded in outmaneuvering the British and the Germans. Most intelligence work was done by the ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) and the War College Division of the Army. The Bureau of Investigation (created in 1909) investigated the affairs of revolutionists along the border.

3) The inter-war years, 1917-1941. Because of the experience of World War I, the MID (Military Intelligence Division) emerged as the single, most important source of intelligence and counterintelligence during this period, dealing with economic and political affairs at home and in Mexico as well as military matters in Mexico. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also got involved in Mexico after the mid-1940s.

4) World War II and the post-War era, 1941-1959. U.S. entry into the war stimulated the growth of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and its intelligence operations. It soon evolved into a "special service" group supporting a

variety of covert, anti-Nazi operations. After the war individuals from the OSS were incorporated into the newly created Central Intelligence Agency (1947). For the first time the U.S. combined under one leadership the overt task of intelligence analysis with the work of secret operations. Until 1959, the CIA focused on logistical and strategic matters, such as the impact of Soviet propaganda in Mexico or the strategic value of precious metals and war industry minerals.

5) The contemporary period, 1959 to the present. This era is and was one of intensive covert activity and counterintelligence operations. The CIA reacted to the Cuban Revolution by making the Mexico City office the largest and most active in the hemisphere after New York City and Washington, D.C. Between 1959 and 1971, espionage, counterespionage, and "dirty tricks" operations directed at Cuban sympathizers, fidelistas, leftist journalists, trade union leaders, and student leaders was the order of the day. After 1973, and at least until 1976, "destabilization" tactics were used. The CIA was joined by the FBI after 1955 when the later agency formed its own counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) for the border (San Diego, Phoenix, El Paso, and San Antonio). All CIA and FBI activity was coordinated in Mexico City by the legal attache attached to the U.S. Embassy.

Thus the history of intelligence activities began with the simple, direct tactics of the Porfiriato, and evolved to the highly technical, massive, clandestine operations of today's FBI and CIA. In part this growth reflects the development of a modern, bureaucratic state in the U.S. and Mexico, and the increasingly imperial interests of the U.S.

#### "EISENHOWER AND THE OVERTHROW OF RAFAEL TRUJILLO"

Stephen G. Rabe  
University of Texas at Dallas

In the mid-1970s, the Select Senate Committee chaired by Senator Frank Church concluded that, during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, U.S. officials plotted to kill Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba. The Church Committee also found that officials supplied weapons to Dominican dissidents whose aim was to assassinate Rafael Trujillo. The committee could not, however, determine who authorized such conspiracies, although it speculated that the presidents might have approved them "circumlocutiously."

Using recently declassified documents, this paper explores the Eisenhower administration's efforts to remove Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic. By 1960, the administration had concluded that Trujillo menaced hemispheric security. The administration initially tried to persuade Trujillo to step down. When the tough dictator refused, the administration considered violent measures. At a meeting 13 May

1960, President Eisenhower stated that he wanted Trujillo "sawed off." Thereafter, the United States worked to supply arms to Dominicans who sought to assassinate Trujillo.

COMMENT: Friederich Katz, University of Chicago

Thomas M. Leonard, University of North Florida

8:30 - 10:30 A.M. HISTORY 305

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: PERSPECTIVES FROM ABROAD (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Raymond G. O'Connor, Miami University

AUSTRALIA: Joseph M. Siracusa, University of Queensland

CANADA: Geoffrey Smith, Queens University

REPUBLIC OF CHINA: Chen Chi, National Chung Hsing University

JAPAN: Aruga Tadashi, Hitotsubashi University

PHILIPPINES: Bonifacio Salamanca, University of the Philippines  
(No Abstracts Available)

COMMENT: Sandra Taylor, University of Utah

10:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. JORDAN HALL 041

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE VIETNAM WAR (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Ronald Spector, University of Alabama

"A FATEFUL MISUNDERSTANDING: EISENHOWER'S ADVICE  
TO LYNDON B. JOHNSON ON VIETNAM"

William B. Pickett  
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology

President Lyndon Baines Johnson enlisted the public support of the nation's most prestigious military man and most prominent Republican, former president Dwight D. Eisenhower, for his escalation of the conflict in Vietnam.

Recently, Stephen E. Ambrose, has shown that the five-star general was more than a source of bipartisan support. Johnson sought Eisenhower's advice and received from him important emotional sustenance for a policy of boldness in Vietnam. "Eisenhower's advice was consistently hawkish . . . far more belligerent, more ready to take extreme action, as an outsider

than he had been when he was the man on the spot." (Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, 656)

Ambrose's interpretation conveys an impression that the former President, while impatient at times, was a proponent of the policy of military escalation that Johnson followed. Scrutiny of top secret memoranda written by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, former White House staff secretary to Eisenhower and the officer assigned by the President as liaison between the two men, reveals that Eisenhower, though willing to support the proper application of military force, gradually became aware that Johnson either failed to understand what he was saying or was unwilling to implement it. Far from being consistently hawkish, the former president attempted unsuccessfully to keep the president's mind on the political nature of his objective in Southeast Asia and the limits of his ability to influence events there.

"DECISION ON VIETNAM: SENDING GROUND COMBAT TROOPS, 1964-1965"

Vincent Demma, U.S. Army Center for Military History  
(Abstract Not Available)

"A WAR FOR NOTHING: THE ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM"

Christian G. Appy  
Harvard University

Official justifications for the American war in Vietnam failed to match the reality experienced by U.S. soldiers. Though many Americans arrived in Vietnam believing they were sent to stop the spread of communism and to advance the cause of democracy, the actual nature of the war so fundamentally undermined these explanations that most American troops could not continue to find in them a meaningful purpose for their sacrifices. Confusion and skepticism intensified as the war dragged on, but there was, from the beginning, significant disillusionment.

Though most suspected that the war was "for nothing," soldiers responded to that common perception in a variety of ways. Some came to enjoy combat for its own sake, finding exhilaration in the danger and violence. Others focused on simply doing their "job" and tried to contain and control any excessive reactions. And there were those who gave as little of themselves to the war as possible, withdrawing or resisting through avoidance, disobedience, drugs, or alcohol. The responses varied but most soldiers shared a will to survive. Survival was, in fact, the only "cause" that provided a clear and convincing motive to carry on.

COMMENT: Samuel Popkin, University of California, San Diego

Stephen Vlastos, University of Iowa

10:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. HISTORY 202

DOLLARS AND DIPLOMACY (SHAFR)

CHAIR: William Stueck, Jr., University of Georgia

"AMERICAN FOREIGN FINANCIAL ADVISING IN LATIN AMERICA BEFORE THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEMS"

Emily Rosenberg  
Macalester College

The process by which Americans advised or supervised foreign economies before World War II has very little recorded history. Although one can find scattered treatments of customs collectors in the Caribbean, of the Kemmerer Commissions in the 1920s, and of cooperation between the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Bank of England in affecting European stabilization programs, there is no systematic overview of the subject of American foreign economic advising before Bretton Woods. Even the basic data--the who, where, when, how, and why--has never been compiled, much less assessed and interpreted.

The earliest and most startling finding in such an investigation involves the great extent of financial advising that took place especially during the 1920s, a decade that historians used to describe as a time of limited global involvement for Americans. At certain times in that decade Americans headed the Central Bank of Peru, established the budget of Poland, administered the finances of Persia, ran the economies of Liberia, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, and collected customs revenues in nearly a dozen countries in the western hemisphere. Americans also staffed short-term financial commissions that advised governments in South Africa, Chile, China, Ireland, and many other countries.

When confronted with such magnitude and variety--and with the inexplicable invisibility of financial advising in the general histories of that decade--one must first construct a taxonomy to clarify types and categories of financial advising missions. Which countries were advised? By whom? Were the missions short or long term? Who sought the advisory relationship? How were the appointments made?

After the basic data is known, then other questions may be investigated. Why was financial advise offered and/or sought? What were the relationships among the major actors involved in foreign advising: the economists, the American investment bankers, the American government, the host governments? What economic attitudes and policies were carried to foreign governments? What were some of the results?

Ultimately, this study seeks to draw a more complete picture of the pre-Bretton Woods system of international financial advising. The conclusions will contribute to an assessment of the causes of the instability within the international economic order of the interwar period.

"SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE TEACHING OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY  
THE CASE OF HERBERT HOOVER AND HIS DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE BAWDWIN MINE IN BURMA"

Ronald D. Renard  
Payap University

Herbert Hoover developed the Bawdwin silver, lead, and zinc mine in the Northern Shan States of Burma from 1903 to 1918. Bawdwin Mine, traditionally worked by Chinese diggers had been the source of much of the Ming Dynasty's silver but fell into disuse in 1855 because of the miners' inability to exploit ore below the water line and because of unrest in Yunnan that impeded trade between China and the Shan States. The mine was all the more lucrative because the Chinese left slag rich in lead heaped around the mine site. Exploitable amounts of zinc existed also making Bawdwin one of the most profitable mines in the world at that time.

Were it not for Herbert Hoover's drive, geological expertise, foresight, and determination to make the mine a viable enterprise, the project might never have been completed. Isolated by the disease-ridden jungles of Burma, far from rail lines, and distant from sources of coolie labor and markets, developing Bawdwin posed many technical, social, and economic obstacles. Herbert Hoover had to use all his talent and faculties, and much of his financial resources to bring success to this project. One observer called this venture Herbert Hoover's "crowning achievement in mining engineering and organization."<sup>1</sup> Once he succeeded, however, the income derived formed the basis of his family fortune.<sup>2</sup> Without this wealth, Hoover would have found the road to president difficult, if not impossible. Hoover gained much of this income in 1918 when he was apparently pressured by the British to sell his interest. As Hoover recorded, "In 1918 I received an offer for the American interest in the mine and we unwillingly sold it."<sup>3</sup>

In the process of developing this mine, an existing trade imbalance between Burma proper and the Shan States was reversed, a 70 kilometer narrow gauge railway was built, 30,000 coolies were imported, and the mine's needs governed the wage level for all the Northern Shan States. In addition to these demographic and economic changes which created a series of problems for the different rulers in the Shan States, Bawdwin also created changes in the politics of the area. The hereditary ruler, the Saohpa of Tawngpeng State, in which Bawdwin is located, became very wealthy. The Burma Corporation, which exploited the mine, became one of the leading non-native concerns in British Burma. Both the Saohpa and the exploiters became targets for Burmese nationalists, particularly just after World War II when the mine directors claimed yields were declining and sealed up several once highly-productive shafts. After independence in 1948, the Burma Corporation became a joint venture with the Burmese government. The Saohpa ceased to be a party to the Bawdwin Mine in 1959 when all the Saohpa were turned out of power with all their income thereupon going to the government. In 1962, after the military coup bringing Ne Win to power, the mine was

nationalized and it fell into the hands of a number of army generals. They reopened some of the closed shafts but were disappointed to learn that they were not worth exploiting.

These changes quite probably would not have taken place without Herbert Hoover. Had the development been left to British entrepreneurs, political factors quite probably would have prevented them from starting work on the mine before World War I. And, since it took over a decade to develop the mine, if the British had started in, say 1920, they would have been approaching completion after the start of the Depression which might have made the entire venture unfeasible. One of the reasons Bawdwin was so lucrative was that World War I created a high demand for the metals being mined. Without this the mine might well have languished until after World War II and Burmese independence. Then, shortages of capital, expertise, and political security would have severely impeded the effort. In this case, therefore, one American made a significant impact on Burma, perhaps even more than the amassing of a personal fortune had on Hoover, his chances for the presidency, and American history.

Research into other areas of U.S.-Southeast Asia interaction would no doubt yield other examples of changes in both societies. As in the Hoover-Bawdwin Mine case, these changes are often more profound in Southeast Asia than in the United States. Rather than making such subjects less noteworthy, they increase the need to study and to assess America's role in international affairs.

"AMERICAN LOANS AND BUSINESS INTERESTS IN INTERWAR YUGOSLAVIA"

Linda Killen  
Radford University

The United States was the primary supplier of investment capital to interwar Yugoslavia. Most of this came in the form of two Blair and Company sales (1922 and 1927) of Yugoslav government bonds on the New York market. The approximately \$50 million in proceeds financed sourly needed reconstruction projects, especially the repair and construction of railroads vital in linking the geographically and ethnically disparate new nation together.

The circumstances surrounding each of the Blair loans were very, very different, especially in regard to the stance taken by the US State Department concerning Yugoslavia's "worthiness" to be the recipient of such loans. The availability (or non-availability) of US investment capital probably had a direct relationship to the level of bilateral business interaction during the 1920s. Yugoslavia could not buy American goods and services, and would not repay dollar obligations, until it had access to a dollar source of currency. In spite of private sector willingness to loan the country money, the State Department's disapproval, resulting in large part from Yugoslavia's failure to negotiate repayment terms for its war debts, meant that little dollar investment was available during the early, critical years of Yugoslavia's post-war recovery period. As a result, little trade or direct industrial

investment occurred. Removal of this war debt obstacle paralleled and may have been directly linked to a sizeable increase both in trade and in direct corporate investment in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia's 1932 default on its public and private sector debt obligations produced an official US ban on further export of American investment capital but did not immediately stop the increase in trade and in corporate investments which had been underway since the late 1920s. After a slow start, it looked as though America's economic interaction with Yugoslavia was on the upswing, only to be cut short by renewed Yugoslav fears of dollar depletion (resulting in part from the unavailability of dollar capital), the general protectionist movement in Europe during the mid 1930s, and the Yugoslav and American governments' inability to resolve their very different trade policies.

Yugoslavia offers a good case study of the impact of US investment capital (in this case on an economically marginal, investor-unfamiliar country), of the influence State Department policy had on the availability of capital in such a market, and on the relationship between capital availability and trade. I believe that a study of American loans to interwar Yugoslavia not only fill in missing factual gaps in our knowledge but also provides a chance to study America's impact on economically marginal areas (how much thought and planning, public or private, went into such policy?), and to better understand the post WWII attitudes of both Americans and Yugoslavs toward each other.

COMMENT: Noel Pugach, University of New Mexico

Paul Drake, University of California, San Diego

10:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. HISTORY 305

THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN OCCUPATIONS IN ASIA  
AND THE PACIFIC (SHAFR)

CHAIR: Theodore Wilson, University of Kansas

"EPISCOPALIAN MISSIONARIES AND MOUNTAIN PEOPLES  
IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1903-1941: A QUESTION OF INFLUENCE"

Kenton J. Clymer  
University of Texas at El Paso

This paper explores the question of how much impact Episcopalian missionaries had on the mountain people of the Philippines during the period 1903-1941. Because it is based on missionary sources rather than field work, it is more accurately described as a study of missionary perception of influence. But it also attempts some judgments about actual impact.

The earliest missionaries described the mountain peoples as Noble Savages who, however, needed some cultural modifications if for no other reason than to help them resist the evil aspects of

Western commercial culture that was sure to come. Later missionaries were more impressed with the element of fear in the indigenous religion and consequently felt an even greater need to transform the culture.

The missionaries reported substantial success in terms of conversions to Christianity and, subsequently, in modifying certain traditional customs and beliefs. But there is also evidence that the missionaries failed to make lasting and significant changes in values. In sum, there clearly was some change in individuals and probably to some degree in the larger society as well. But whether deeper societal changes, especially in basic values, were effected before World War II, is problematic.

"SOLDIERS AND SAILORS ON TONGA, 1942-1945"

Charles J. Weeks  
Southern Technological Institute

Located approximately 1,200 miles northeast of New Zealand, the Kingdom of Tonga is one of the world's smallest nations and is ruled by the only remaining Polynesian monarch. Thirty-six of the 169 islands are inhabited by Tongans, a proud and handsome people of Polynesian stock and culture. Known for their hospitality, they are justifiably proud of the nickname "The Friendly Islands" bestowed upon their country by Captain James Cook during his second Pacific voyage.

Although Dutch explorers reached Tonga in 1616 and Europeans resided in the Kingdom from 1796 onward, Caucasians remained in a small minority of the total population. Nevertheless, Westerners exerted a significant influence on Tongan culture. The arrival of Wesleyan missionaries in 1822 marked a watershed as Tongans rapidly and fervently accepted Christianity. In 1900, amid the rivalry of resident European merchants and the competition of far away imperialistic powers, the Kingdom became a British protectorate. By 1942 Tongans had also accepted Western education, government, and products. But despite these changes, Tonga remained a traditional Polynesian society only superficially Westernized. Largely because the Kingdom had retained home rule, Tongans kept their own language, dress, protocol, taboos, and handicrafts.

When the Pacific War broke out in 1941, Allied planners in Washington decided that it was vital to establish a series of island bases between Hawaii and Australia to safeguard supply lines to the southwest Pacific. On May 9, 1942, over 8,000 American soldiers and sailors arrived on Tongatapu, the main island in the Tongan chain, suddenly thrusting its 15,000 residents into the twentieth century.

The American occupation of Tonga can be divided into two phases: the first period, from the arrival of Task Force 51 until the transfer of island command to New Zealand after the successful Guadalcanal campaign in February 1943; and a second period lasting until the final evacuation of the American naval base in August 1945. During most of the first phase, Tonga was host to a large American military detachment assigned to what

they believed was a critical mission. As long as the defense of Tongatapu against a Japanese invasion continued to be a possibility, the morale of the American forces remained high. After 1943, however, the Tongan base became an isolated backwater with an ambiguous purpose. It was during the latter phase that the normally friendly Tongan-American relations sometimes deteriorated.

Although the occupation did not have a "fatal impact" on Tongan society, the Americans did leave their mark. On the positive side, U.S. forces left improved roads, a completed airport, a water supply system, and better piers. Americans introduced new crops, health education, and vast quantities of money. With material progress, however, came social ills. For the first time Tongans had easy access to alcohol and tobacco, and, on several occasions, their taste for these products led to serious problems with the occupation force. Prostitution and venereal disease grew to previously unknown proportions thereby complicating a deeply religious society. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army introduced the concept of racial segregation by keeping its black and white soldiers separated. Throughout the period of occupation, the British government was unable to offer much protection to the Tongans and in 1945 Navy Seabees virtually took over the island for several days.

After the departure of the U.S. soldiers and sailors, the Kingdom reverted to relative isolation from the Western world and Tongans returned to their traditional society, but memories of a brief period of material wealth lingered.

"UNDERSTANDING THE OCCUPIERS: JAPANESE INTELLECTUALS  
AND THEIR VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1952"

Igarashi Takeshi  
University of Tokyo

It goes without saying that the dramatic change of the Japanese-American relations in the post-WWII period was mainly derived from American occupation policies toward Japan and the San Francisco peace settlement. In addition to that, we can still argue that it was necessary for the Japanese to have had some intellectual base to understand what the United States was on their own terms.

In the paper, I will deal with four kinds of Japanese activities to promote Japanese understandings of the United States, and what kind of views Japanese intellectuals and officials had about the United States and presented to the public.

- (1) Japanese Americanists like Takagi Yasaka
- (2) Gaimusho's Study on the United States
- (3) Articles in the Intellectual magazines such as Sekai Chuo-Koron, and Kaizo, including Akahata, organ of JCP
- (4) Establishment of Chiteki-Koryu Iinkai (Intellectual Exchange Committee)

The paper will show that some Japanese Americanists had already had enough knowledge about the United States to make friendly relations with the United States, and Japanese views

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... .. Roads Millery College ... ..

... .. University ... ..

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... relations.

COMMENT. James Boutillier, Royal Roads Military College

George Knoles, Stanford University